CourtListener 10805037•In re L.L. CA2/2
Full text
Filed 3/6/26 In re L.L. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re L.L. et al., Persons Coming B345302
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF Super. Ct. No.
CHILDREN AND FAMILY 23CCJP00707B–D)
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Y.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Georgia A. Huerta, Judge. Affirmed.
Anuradha Khemka, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________________
Y.C. (mother) appeals from the orders asserting
dependency jurisdiction over the three daughters she shares with
M.L. (father). She argues that insufficient evidence supported
the juvenile court’s finding that the domestic violence in her
relationship with her boyfriend in the presence of the daughters’
half sibling created a substantial risk of harm to the daughters at
issue. Although jurisdiction was also based on the conduct of
father, who did not appeal, and although mother does not
challenge the dispositional orders, we exercise our discretion to
reach the merits of mother’s jurisdictional challenge and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The family
Mother and father have three daughters together (born
2015, 2016, and 2018), but are no longer a couple. When mother
and father were together, father kicked and hit mother in the
stomach and choked her while she was pregnant. Mother did not
call the police. Both parents then found new partners, and these
relationships were also marred by domestic violence.
2. Prior dependency case involving maternal half sibling
Mother has another child who was the subject of a different
dependency case arising from domestic violence between mother
and her boyfriend, R.S., in that child’s presence. In December
2023, the juvenile court sustained allegations that R.S. spat on
mother, pushed her down, choked her with both of his hands,
pressed a screwdriver against her face, struck her face with his
fists, and pressed knives against her neck and back, causing
2
lacerations. The court awarded sole physical custody to the half
sibling’s father, with joint legal custody, and terminated
jurisdiction.
3. Father and his girlfriend
After separating from mother, father sought a restraining
order against her and took custody of their three daughters. At
the time of the incident giving rise to this dependency case,
father and his girlfriend, A.F., were living in a motel room with
the three daughters and two of A.F.’s children. Father came
home from work one day and hit and choked A.F. in the presence
of some of the children, resulting in his arrest.
4. Section 300 petition
On November 26, 2024, the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition
under subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j) of section 3001 asking the
juvenile court to exert jurisdiction over mother and father’s three
daughters based on father’s domestic violence with his girlfriend
in the daughters’ presence, mother and her boyfriend’s domestic
violence in front of the half sibling, and both parents’ substance
abuse issues.
At the initial hearing, the juvenile court ordered the
children detained from both parents and placed in foster care.
Mother and father were granted monitored visits.
On March 27, 2025, the juvenile court sustained the
allegations related to the domestic violence in mother’s
relationship and father’s domestic violence and drug abuse under
subdivisions (a), (b), and (j) of section 300, and dismissed the
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
3
allegations related to mother’s drug abuse.2 The court removed
the children and ordered reunification services for both parents.
For mother, these included a drug and alcohol program with
testing, parenting classes, and individual counseling. Mother
was granted monitored visits.
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial evidence supports jurisdiction based on the
domestic violence between mother and her boyfriend
Subdivision (j) of section 300 provides that jurisdiction is
proper if “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or neglected, as
defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a
substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as
defined in those subdivisions. The court shall consider the
circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the
age and gender of each child, the nature and abuse or neglect of
the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and
any other factors the court considers probative in determining
whether there is a substantial risk to the child.” “ ‘Subdivision (j)
does not state that its application is limited to the risk that the
child will be abused or neglected as defined in the same
subdivision that describes the abuse or neglect of the sibling.
Rather, [it] directs the [juvenile] court to consider whether there
is a substantial risk that the child will be harmed under
2 Relevant here, the court sustained the allegations that
mother and her boyfriend’s “history of engaging in violent
altercations in the presence of the [half sibling],” which resulted
in a prior dependency proceeding, and “mother’s failure to protect
the [half sibling] endangers the [three daughters’] physical health
and safety, and places the children at risk of serious physical
harm, damage, [and] danger.”
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subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i) of section 300, notwithstanding
which of those subdivisions describes the child’s sibling.’ ” (In re
I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 774 (I.J.).)
Subdivision (b)(1)(A) of section 300 says jurisdiction is
proper where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as
a result of” “[t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent or
guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.” “Exposing
children to recurring domestic violence may be sufficient to
establish jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b).” (In re
T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 134 (T.V.); accord, In re R.C.
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941.) Such violence “impacts
children even if they are not the ones being physically abused,
‘because they see and hear the violence and the screaming.’ ”
(T.V., at p. 134.) Subdivision (i) of section 300 broadly provides
for jurisdiction where “[t]he child has been subjected to an act or
acts of cruelty by the parent . . . or a member of the child’s
household, or the parent . . . has failed to adequately protect the
child from an act or acts of cruelty when the parent . . . knew or
reasonably should have known that the child was in danger of
being [so] subjected.” The Legislature did not further define “act
or acts of cruelty,” “due to the myriad forms such conduct may
take.” (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 548.) Jurisdiction under
subdivision (i) requires no finding that the parent intended to
harm the child. (In re D.C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1012.)
In view of the breadth of this provision and the lack of any
requirement that harm be intentional, it is reasonable to
conclude that a child may fall under this provision whose mother
allows them to witness her being abused.
5
The severity of domestic violence, in both mother’s and
father’s relationships, supports the challenged jurisdictional
finding. Mother has been subjected to domestic violence in at
least two of her relationships, first with father, and then with the
next boyfriend, who went so far as to punch her in the face, choke
her with both hands, lacerate her neck and back with a knife, and
threaten to kill her. This more recent violence against mother
served as the basis for dependency jurisdiction over a maternal
half sibling in a separate case that resulted in that half sibling’s
removal from mother and the award of sole custody to that child’s
father.3 Mother does not appear to have appealed from those
findings or orders. What is more, mother failed to participate in
any of the reunification services ordered for her in that prior
proceeding. And in this case too, at least as of September 10,
2025, mother’s progress with her case plan has been
“unsubstantial.”4 Mother’s history of being in relationships
where she is the subject of severe domestic violence in at least
one of her children’s presence, her lack of compliance with
services that might aid her to avoid such relationships in the
future, and the fact that she has been granted visitation (albeit
3 Limited information is in the record about this prior
proceeding, and we do not know for sure the statutory base(s) on
which that petition was sustained. This lack of exactitude does
not hinder our analysis, however, because it is sufficient for
purposes of subdivision (j) that the juvenile court made an
implied finding that the sibling was abused or neglected under
one of the relevant subdivisions of section 300. (See In re
Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 980.)
4 We take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s September
2025 minute orders filed after mother’s appeal.
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monitored) with her three daughters at issue all support the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding. That the daughters have
already been exposed to severe domestic violence by father is
another circumstance showing a substantial risk of serious harm
from potential exposure to domestic violence in mother’s
relationship, as the trauma from such exposure would only serve
to compound their already compromised well-being. (See I.J.,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 778 [“ ‘Some risks may be substantial even
if they carry a low degree of probability because the magnitude of
the harm is potentially great’ ”].)
Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
exercise of jurisdiction under subdivision (j) of section 300, we
decline to address the other statutory grounds. (I.J., supra, 56
Cal.4th at p. 773.)
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DISPOSITION
Substantial evidence supports the challenged finding, and
the orders based thereon are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J.
GILBERT, J.*
Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
*
Appellate District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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