In re M.C. CA2/2

CourtListener 10804508CalctappMar 5, 2026

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Filed 3/5/26 In re M.C. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re M.C., a Person Coming B344385, B345369
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP03623)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent;

ANABEL G.,

Respondent,

v.

GUSTAVO C.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.
Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Respondent.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******

Gustavo C.R. appeals from restraining and custody orders
of the juvenile court regarding minor M.C. First, father disputes
the lack of any exception for court-ordered visitation in the
restraining order. Second, father contends that the custody order
fails to contain reasoning for not allowing visitation, which would
purportedly prevent a subsequent family court from determining
whether modification of the order to add visitation is warranted.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm the orders of the juvenile
court.

COMBINED FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Investigation
This appeal concerns minor M.C., who was born in
June 2015. M.C.’s mother is respondent Anabel G. (mother), and
M.C.’s father is defendant and appellant Gustavo C.R. (father).
Mother and father were married at one time but separated seven
years after M.C. was born. At all relevant times, M.C. lived with
mother and his maternal half-sisters K.G. and Km.G. (K.G. and
Km.G. have a different biological father than M.C., so references
to “father” here refer to defendant and appellant, their
stepfather.) Father lived in a different residence.
In October 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral arising

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from concerns that father picked up M.C. from school. A social
worker subsequently interviewed the parties.
M.C. told the social worker that father “touches [M.C.’s]
private spot,” which M.C. clarified to mean his penis. After M.C.
took a shower, father would “wiggle” M.C.’s penis. M.C. also
stated that father used to “pinch [his] butt” and “[try] to kiss
[him] on the lips.” M.C. demanded father to stop, but father
“does it anyway.”
According to M.C., father threatens him by saying M.C.
would live with father and never see his mom. As M.C. recounted
father’s threats, he reportedly became anxious and shook his leg.
In August 2024, father went to mother’s residence with the police
to see M.C. M.C. told the police he did not want to visit with
father overnight because he “does bad things, threatens me and
says bad words . . . to me and makes me feel bad and not
comfortable . . . .” The police left M.C. with mother.
Father also threatened to hit M.C. with a belt, using the
belt to make slapping sounds. When M.C. was five years old,
father told him to shower, but M.C. forgot. Father hit him on the
right shoulder with the belt, leaving a “red stain.” Mother argued
with father for hitting him. M.C. reported that mother talks to
him if he misbehaves. M.C. feels safe with mother, but not with
father.
Mother confirmed that beginning in February 2024, M.C.
refused to have overnight visits with father. Despite inquiry
from mother, M.C. refused to explain the reason. When father
went to mother’s residence with the police to take M.C., father
grabbed M.C. to give him a hug. M.C. looked at mother and
extended his arm for her help.

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Just prior to the referral, mother took M.C. to visit a family
friend. M.C. disclosed to the family friend that father would kiss
him on the lips, pinch his buttocks, touch his penis, and hit him
with a belt. Mother later recorded a conversation with M.C.,
during which M.C. repeated what father did to him. M.C. said
that father forces M.C. to stay in the bedroom with him. M.C.
told mother that father threatened to take him from mother.
M.C. maintained, “Never, never in my life, do I want to go with
him.”
Father also sexually abused K.G. She reported that the
abuse started when she was eight years old and continued until
she was 14 years old. Father touched K.G. over and under
clothing. When K.G. was sleeping, father digitally penetrated
her vagina. On one occasion, K.G. woke up with her underwear
off and father naked with his penis on top of her vagina. Mother
worked nights and was unaware of the abuse. K.G. eventually
resisted the abuse and ultimately told mother she did not want
father in the home. Mother asked father to leave the same night.
In November 2024, K.G. obtained a five-year restraining order
against father, which prohibits father from harassing, assaulting,
or contacting K.G.
Mother’s other daughter, Km.G., did not recall any sexual
abuse from father. However, after leaving the shower on one
occasion, father spun around in a towel and exposed himself to
her.
In November 2024, the three children participated in a
forensic interview with the Harbor-UCLA K.I.D.S. Hub. The
children recounted father’s physical and sexual abuse. The
accounts were generally consistent with their accounts in the
DCFS investigation.

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Petition and detention
In November 2024, DCFS filed a non-detained Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300 petition1 seeking jurisdiction of all
three children under subdivisions (b), (d), and (j). DCFS alleged
father’s previous sexual abuse of K.G. and M.C. placed all three
children at risk of physical harm and sexual abuse.2
In December 2024, at the initial hearing, the juvenile court
noted a family law proceeding was pending between mother and
father concerning M.C. The court also noted the existence of the
restraining order protecting K.G. against father.
The juvenile court found a prima facie case that all three
children were persons described under section 300. The court
detained M.C. from father with no visitation based on a finding of
substantial danger to the physical health of the child. M.C. was
released to mother’s custody.
Jurisdiction/disposition hearing
Prior to the adjudication hearing, mother filed a request for
restraining order protecting her and her three children from
father. The request was based on the physical and sexual abuse
described in the DCFS investigation.
The adjudication hearing took place on February 5, 2025.
During the hearing, M.C.’s counsel argued the DCFS petition
should be sustained as pled. Father’s counsel argued that the
parents’ divorce proceeding would be the more appropriate venue
to adjudicate the request for restraining order. Father’s counsel

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 DCFS is not a participant in this appeal, as it did not
request the restraining and custody orders at issue.

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also argued that no detriment would result from the closing of
the dependency case because the restraining order for K.G.
already provided mother and the children with some measure of
protection.
The juvenile court granted a temporary restraining order
and sustained the petition as pled, finding credible the children’s
rendition of father’s conduct. The court declared the children
subject to its jurisdiction as dependents of the court and granted
mother sole custody of M.C. The court terminated jurisdiction
but stayed termination pending receipt of a custody order and
ruling on a permanent restraining order.
On March 19, 2025, the juvenile court held a hearing
regarding the custody order and restraining order. Father’s
counsel sought denial of the restraining order based on a theory
of res judicata because the family law court had denied two
purportedly similar requests for restraining orders by mother.
Father also requested visitation only if M.C. wishes to visit
father. Father presented no argument regarding any provision in
the restraining order. Nor did father ask the court for specific
reasons why it would not order visitation for M.C.
The juvenile court determined res judicata did not apply,
holding the family law hearing was materially different from the
juvenile court hearing. The court stated that unlike the family
law proceeding, the dependency proceeding had a sustained
petition and findings concerning the best interests of M.C. The
court also noted it issued a temporary restraining order on
similar allegations and no objections based on res judicata were
asserted at that time.
Using Judicial Council form JV-255, the juvenile court
issued a three-year restraining order prohibiting father from

6
harassing, assaulting, or contacting M.C. Under the “Order to
Not Abuse” provisions in the restraining order, the box indicating
“If this box is checked, this case involves domestic violence . . .”
was checked. Under the “No-Contact Order” provisions in the
restraining order, the box stating “You may contact or visit with
your children only during court-ordered contact or visits” as an
exception to the general no-contact order was unchecked.
The juvenile court also entered a Judicial Council JV-200
custody order granting mother sole custody of M.C. and ordering
father not to have contact with M.C. Jurisdiction over M.C. was
terminated. The visitation provisions in the custody order were
unchecked and not completed. In particular, the box next to “No
visitation is ordered for the reasons stated . . .” was unchecked.
The JV-200 form allowed for reasons for no visitation to be stated
on an attached Judicial Council form JV-206 or on an Attachment
5c. However, no such forms or attachments were included with
the order. Under “Other findings and orders,” the order stated,
“Mother to have sole legal custody and sole physical custody. FA
to not have contact with [M.C.] Upon signing of this Juvenile
Custody Order, counsel for parents are both relieved.” No other
findings or orders were indicated.
Father filed timely notices of appeal of the juvenile court’s
orders concerning M.C.3

3 On February 19, 2025, father filed a notice of appeal in case
B344385 challenging the February 5, 2025 removal of M.C. from
father’s custody. On April 4, 2025, father filed a notice of appeal
in case B345369 challenging the February 5, 2025 and March 19,
2025 removal of M.C. from father’s custody, as well as the
permanent restraining order entered on March 19, 2025.

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DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standard of review regarding
exit orders
At the close of a dependency case the juvenile court may
issue orders pursuant to section 362.4, commonly known as “exit
orders.” (In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 269.) For
example, the court may enter a final custody order determining
final custody of and visitation with a child. (§ 362.4, subd. (a).)
The court may also enter protective or restraining orders under
section 213.5. (Nicholas H., supra, at p. 269.) Generally, we
review a juvenile court’s exit orders for abuse of discretion. (In re
J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 113 [custody and visitation
orders]; In re Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861, 866 [issuance of
restraining order].)
II. Restraining order
A. Applicable law and standard of review
Section 213.5, subdivision (a) gives the juvenile court the
authority to issue a restraining order “enjoining a person from
molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually
assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning . . . destroying the
personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by
mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or
disturbing the peace of the child . . . .”
“In reviewing the restraining order, ‘we view the evidence
in a light most favorable to the respondent, and indulge all
legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the juvenile

Pursuant to father’s request, we consolidated the two appeals and
designated case B344385 as the lead case.

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court’s determination. If there is substantial evidence supporting
the order, the court’s issuance of the restraining order may not be
disturbed.’” (In re C.Q. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 355, 364.) Some
courts have applied two standards of review on appeal from the
issuance of a restraining order: “substantial evidence to support
the facts and [abuse of] discretion to impose a restraining order.”
(In re N.L. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1466.) “The practical
differences between these two standards in this context are not
significant.” (Ibid.) Father does not dispute the sufficiency of the
evidence that supported the sustaining of the section 300
petition. Accordingly, we review the restraining order for abuse
of discretion.
B. Analysis
Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in
the restraining order by not permitting visitation as may be
ordered by subsequent courts, including the family court. The
court did not check the box in the JV-255 form indicating father
may visit M.C. “during court-ordered contact or visits.”
The record contains substantial evidence supporting the
juvenile court’s decision to issue a restraining order without an
exception for court-ordered visitation. Both M.C. and K.G.
disclosed that father sexually abused them. A restraining order
against father protects K.G. for five years. Km.G. reported father
exposed himself to her. When father brought the police to take
M.C. from mother, M.C. refused to leave with father and sought
mother’s protection. M.C. consistently expressed feeling safe
with mother and not father. M.C. has expressed no desire to visit
father and explicitly said, “Never, never in my life, do I want to
go with him.”

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The juvenile court is charged with making orders
consistent with the best interests of the child. (In re Armando L.
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 606, 619.) “[I]n making exit orders, the
juvenile court must look at the best interests of the child.” (In re
John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973.) Based on the evidence
of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and M.C.’s fear of father, the
juvenile court reasonably determined that M.C.’s best interests
required complete protection from contact with father, without
exception for potential future court-ordered visits. This
determination was well within the court’s discretion and is
supported by substantial evidence.
Father argues the legislative history of the Family Code
and the Welfare and Institutions Code demonstrate the
Legislature intended for juvenile and family courts to work
together to protect victims. However, the absence of an exception
for court-ordered visits in the restraining order does not prevent
such coordination or preclude future modification. California
Rules of Court, rule 5.92(a)(3) expressly allows a restraining
order in a closed juvenile case to be modified by a family court.
Should circumstances change such that contact with father would
serve M.C.’s best interests—for example, if M.C.’s fear of father
dissipates and M.C. wishes to have contact—father may seek
modification of the restraining order from the family court. The
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a
restraining order that reflects M.C.’s current need for protection
while preserving the family court’s authority to modify the order
if warranted in the future.
Moreover, father forfeited this challenge by failing to object
to the specific terms of the restraining order in the juvenile court.
It was in the juvenile court father sought denial of the

10
restraining order based on res judicata and requested visitation
only if M.C. wished to visit. However, father never asserted the
restraining order should contain an exception for court-ordered
contact or visits, even though that was possible. “[A] reviewing
court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an
objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.”
(In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 (S.B.).)
While we have discretion to excuse forfeiture in cases
presenting important legal issues (S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p.
1293), the issue father raises here is factual rather than legal—
whether it is in M.C.’s best interest that father have no contact
with him without exception. For the reasons discussed above, the
record amply supports the juvenile court’s determination. We
decline to excuse father’s forfeiture. On both the merits and on
grounds of forfeiture, father’s challenge to the restraining order
fails.
III. Custody order
A. Applicable law
“When a juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a
dependent child, it is empowered to make ‘exit orders’ regarding
custody and visitation. [Citations.] Such orders become part of
any family court proceeding concerning the same child and will
remain in effect until they are terminated or modified by the
family court.” (In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1122–
1123.) Section 362.4 authorizes the juvenile court to make such
an order. (In re Anna T. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 870, 871
(Anna T.).)
A custody order issued by the juvenile court pursuant to
section 362.4 is a final judgment and cannot be modified in a
family law proceeding unless the court finds there has been a

11
significant change of circumstances since the juvenile court order
was issued and modification of the order would be in the child’s
best interests. (§ 302, subd. (d); Anna T., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 871–872.)
California Rules of Court, rule 5.700(b) requires the use of
Judicial Council form JV-200 (Custody Order—Juvenile—Final
Judgment). The importance of using the mandatory form was
explained in the August 18, 2015 report by the Judicial Council’s
Family and Juvenile Law Advisory Committee, which stated:
“‘The orders need to provide specific direction to the parents and
other parties to facilitate compliance and reduce the potential for
conflict . . . . [¶] Juvenile final custody orders also need to
provide sufficient detail, and use language familiar to the family
law bench and bar, to permit the family court to enforce them if a
dispute does arise or to modify or terminate the orders if
circumstances change significantly and modification would be in
the best interest of the child.’” (Anna T., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at
p. 878.) The custody order “‘must address the circumstances that
led to the juvenile court’s child custody and parenting time orders
to enable a family court to determine whether circumstances
have changed to a degree that justifies considering whether the
requested modification is in the best interests of the child.’” (Id.
at p. 879.) This must be done “‘without disclosing juvenile case
information that should remain confidential, because juvenile
court child custody orders, including attachments, are not
themselves confidential.’” (Ibid.)
In dependency proceedings where a child is removed from a
custodial parent, section 361.2 governs placement with the
noncustodial parent. Subdivision (a) provides: “[When] a court
orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall

12
first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom
the child was not residing at the time that the events or
conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of
Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that
parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the
parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be
detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) The same detriment
analysis informs custody and visitation determinations in exit
orders.
B. Analysis
Father asserts that the custody order does not adequately
explain why no visitation was ordered. Father maintains the
family law court will not be able to determine whether the
circumstances that led to the custody order have substantially
changed.
The juvenile court properly exercised its discretion in
issuing a custody order granting mother sole legal and physical
custody and prohibiting father from contact with M.C. The
court’s decision was based on substantial evidence and reflects
M.C.’s best interests given the sustained findings of sexual and
physical abuse by father.
The record establishes that father was a noncustodial
parent, and at all relevant times, M.C. lived with mother and his
maternal half-sisters K.G. and Km.G. Father lived in a different
residence. When M.C. was detained from father’s custody in
November 2024 and placed with mother, the juvenile court was
required under section 361.2, subdivision (a), to determine
whether placement with father would be detrimental to M.C.’s
safety and well-being.

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The record contains substantial evidence supporting such a
finding of detriment. M.C. disclosed that father sexually abused
him by touching his penis and buttocks and physically abused
him by hitting him with a belt. M.C. expressed fear of father and
stated he never wanted to see him. Father also sexually abused
M.C.’s half-sister K.G. over a period of six years, prompting a
five-year restraining order protecting K.G. from father. In
addition, father exposed himself to M.C.’s other half-sister,
Km.G. M.C. consistently expressed feeling safe with mother but
not with father. This evidence amply supports the court’s
implicit finding that placement with father would be detrimental,
and further supports the custody order’s provision prohibiting
father from contact with M.C.
The custody order did not contain any explanation
regarding why father was not allowed to visit M.C., either on the
face of the order or in any attachments. However, the custody
order referenced and attached the permanent restraining order,
which indicates the case involves domestic violence. As an exit
order under section 362.4, subdivision (a), the restraining order is
to be sent to the family court. (§ 362.4, subd. (b).)
Father cites no authority suggesting the juvenile court’s
written indication that domestic violence is involved provides
insufficient guidance for the family court. As M.C.’s full name is
on the custody and restraining orders, which are not confidential,
the juvenile court was required to balance M.C.’s privacy with its
obligation to explain its order. Even though the restraining order
expires in three years, the finding of domestic violence justifying
the issuance of the restraining order remains a relevant
circumstance for a decision whether to allow visitation. By
indicating that M.C. was the victim of domestic violence, the

14
juvenile court has provided the family court sufficient
information to determine whether circumstances have
significantly changed. The written order suggests that if, in the
future, M.C. is no longer at risk of violence from father, father
may seek modification of the custody order to allow visitation.
Moreover, the family law court will not be operating in a
vacuum when considering any future modification request. The
custody and restraining orders were filed in the parents’ pending
family law case (Superior Court Case No. 24LBFL00458), which
already contains extensive documentation of father’s conduct,
including mother’s two prior requests for restraining orders filed
in August and October 2024, both detailing father’s sexual abuse
of the children and physical violence. While the family law court
denied those requests as matters between the divorcing parents
without the benefit of the evidentiary hearing and sustained
findings made in the juvenile dependency proceeding, the family
law court has substantial context regarding the circumstances
that led to the juvenile court’s “no contact” determination.
Should father seek modification of the custody order under
section 302, subdivision (d), the family law court will be well-
positioned to evaluate whether there has been a significant
change in circumstances and whether modification would serve
M.C.’s best interests.
Anna T., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 870 is readily
distinguishable. In Anna T., the juvenile court declined to issue
an exit order, finding such an order unnecessary. Instead, the
court indicated it was “‘reverting to the original family law
order,’” with modifications stated only in the minute order. (Id.
at p. 874.) The order terminating jurisdiction over the child
restated the court’s decision not to issue a juvenile court custody

15
order pursuant to section 362.4, stating: “‘The Court reverts back
to the original family law decision—no Juvenile Custody Order is
required for this case.’” (Id. at p. 875.) The Anna T. court
reversed, finding the juvenile court’s failure to follow required
procedures for issuing posttermination custody orders deprived
its orders of continuing effect. (Id. at p. 879.) The appellate court
emphasized that exit orders “must address the circumstances
that led to the juvenile court’s child custody and parenting time
orders to enable a family court to determine whether
circumstances have changed to a degree that justifies considering
whether the requested modification is in the best interests of the
child.” (Id. at pp. 878–879.)
Anna T.’s holding was grounded in the juvenile court’s
failure to issue any exit order at all—the court simply attempted
to “revert” to predependency family law orders rather than
exercising its section 362.4 authority. By contrast, the juvenile
court here properly followed mandatory procedures by issuing a
formal custody order on the mandatory JV-200 form, as required
by California Rules of Court, rule 5.700(b). The court also issued
a three-year restraining order on Judicial Council form JV-255,
which was attached to and referenced in the custody order. Both
orders contain clear provisions prohibiting father from contact
with M.C. The restraining order explicitly indicates the case
involves domestic violence.
Unlike Anna T., where no exit order existed to guide the
family court, here the juvenile court created enforceable exit
orders that became part of the family law case file upon
termination of jurisdiction. (§ 362.4, subd. (b).) The orders, as
well as mother’s two prior restraining order requests filed in the
family law court, provide the court with the essential information

16
needed: that M.C.’s safety requires protection from father based
on sustained findings of sexual and physical abuse, and that any
modification must account for the domestic violence that
necessitated a three-year restraining order. This satisfies
Anna T.’s requirement that exit orders “address the
circumstances” underlying the custody determination. (Anna T.,
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 879.) The family law court can
meaningfully evaluate whether a significant change in
circumstances has occurred and whether any modification would
serve M.C.’s best interests.
Father cites no authority suggesting the juvenile court’s
indication of domestic violence, combined with the attached
restraining order and the existing family law case history,
provides insufficient guidance. The exit orders here stand in
stark contrast to Anna T.’s absence of any section 362.4 order.
We thus find no abuse of discretion.
Father also forfeited this challenge by failing to request
specific reasoning in the custody order. At the March 19, 2025
hearing, father focused his argument on why the restraining
order should not be granted and maintained that he should be
allowed to visit if M.C. agreed. Father did not challenge the
custody order based on lack of reasoning for the “no visitation”
provision or ask the court to provide specific reasons. “[A]
reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a
ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the
trial court.” (S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) Because the
issue father raises is factual—concerning the adequacy of the exit
order’s explanation—rather than a question of important legal
principle, we decline to overlook the forfeiture. (Id. at p. 1294.)

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On both the merits and on forfeiture grounds, father’s
challenge to the custody order fails. The juvenile court’s exit
orders appropriately protected M.C. while preserving the family
court’s authority to modify the orders should circumstances
significantly change in the future.

DISPOSITION
The orders of February 5, 2025, and March 19, 2025, are
affirmed.

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

LUI, P. J. GILBERT, J.*

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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