CourtListener 10804495•People v. Washington CA2/8
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Filed 3/5/26 P. v. Washington CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B330868
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA489335
v.
RODERICK NATHANIEL
WASHINGTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Curtis B. Rappe, Judge. Affirmed.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Shezad H. Thakor, and
Steven D. Matthews, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
____________________
A jury convicted Roderick Washington of many counts
based on credit card fraud and unemployment insurance fraud.
Washington appeals the judgment on several grounds. We grant
his request to review the court’s determinations pursuant to
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). We
affirm. Statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
I
Washington committed two types of fraud.
A
Washington’s first type of fraud involved credit cards.
Police found evidence of this fraud when they searched the
house of Antonia Harrison, Washington’s girlfriend. Washington
had been staying with Harrison. In Harrison’s house, officers
found hundreds of credit profiles, including lists of personal
identifying information, mail addressed to Washington, licenses
and credit cards in other people’s names, and forged police and
fraud reports.
Police also searched Washington’s daughter’s residence.
There they found debit cards in other people’s names, including
names they had seen among Washington’s belongings.
Investigation revealed Washington had opened accounts in
the name of other people, including dead ones. After opening
these accounts, he would claim there was fraudulent activity on
the account in order to avoid paying the debt on that account.
The company or bank would then provide a new account, which
Washington would also fail to pay off. Washington caused just
under half a million dollars in loss to bank and credit card
company Synchrony Financial. Law enforcement and
investigators for Synchrony confirmed Washington had
information about 90 Synchrony accounts.
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Washington also perpetrated fraud against Wells Fargo,
using other people’s personal information to open accounts and to
get cash advances. Video captured Washington getting money
using multiple identities. One witness whose information
Washington used testified at trial that he had never opened such
an account, was not the person in the surveillance video, and had
never given Washington permission to use his information.
B
The second type of fraud Washington committed involved
California’s Employment Development Department, which runs
the state’s unemployment and disability insurance program. The
Department relaxed standards during the covid pandemic to
address the sudden increased need. After getting through the
crisis period, the Department began investigating a series of
applications for unemployment benefits all sent from the same IP
address. The Department discovered this IP address was
associated with Washington’s residence. The Department issued
$524,368 in connection with applications Washington and his
associates submitted, although only $154,434.68 remained in the
accounts. Several of the applications used addresses connected
with Washington or his associates. Will Harrison, Washington’s
girlfriend’s son, helped Washington with the scheme. So did
Melissa Washington, Washington’s daughter.
C
Police arrested Washington for charges relating to credit
card fraud. While he was in jail, police monitored Washington’s
phone calls. His calls, including ones to Will Harrison and
Melissa Washington, revealed that Washington was continuing to
orchestrate the unemployment insurance fraud scheme from
prison. He gave instructions to his associates to ensure the
3
applications continued to be submitted and processed and the
issued debit cards claimed.
In his first fraud case, Washington elected, and the court
allowed him, to represent himself on October 16, 2020. On
November 30, 2020, Washington appeared in court represented
by private counsel. In January 2021, Washington’s counsel
moved to be relieved due to counsel’s illness. The court then
granted Washington’s renewed motion to represent himself.
A new information charged Washington with
unemployment insurance fraud. Washington represented himself
in this case as well, filing a number of motions. Pursuant to
Washington’s Pitchess motion, the court granted an in-camera
review of the records of two peace officers involved in the search
of Harrison’s house.
The prosecutor moved to consolidate the cases on May 13,
2021. At the May 27, 2021 hearing, Washington said he did not
oppose consolidation, and the court granted the motion.
Washington told the court he was thinking about giving up his
pro per rights in the case. The prosecutor filed an amended
consolidated information later that day.
On June 10, 2021, the court told Washington it had found
nothing discoverable in the peace officers’ personnel records. At
the same hearing, Washington waived his pro per status and
accepted representation by counsel.
On March 21, 2022, Washington sought to represent
himself again. The court denied his request.
On January 13, 2023, the trial court denied Washington’s
request to change counsel after a hearing pursuant to People v.
Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
4
On April 19, 2023, the court again denied Washington’s
request to represent himself.
D
The jury convicted Washington of: (1) two counts of theft by
false pretenses in violation of section 532, subdivision (a); (2) one
count of possession of a forged driver’s license in violation of
section 470(b); (3) two counts of possession of multiple person’s
personal identifying information with intent to defraud in
violation of section 530.5, subdivision (c)(3); (4) one count of
preparing false documentary evidence in violation of section 134;
(5) three counts of unlawful transfer of personal identifying
information in violation of section 530.5, subdivision (d)(1); (6)
four counts of possession of personal identifying information with
intent to defraud in violation of section 530.5, subdivision (c)(2);
and (7) 33 counts of unemployment insurance fraud in violation
of Unemployment Insurance Code section 2101, subdivision
(a). With regard to the unemployment insurance fraud counts,
the jury found the loss from the offenses exceeded $500,000 and,
after a bifurcated trial, there existed factors in aggravation.
The trial court sentenced Washington to three years on the
unemployment insurance fraud count and a consecutive five
years for the loss enhancement. The court sentenced Washington
to consecutive eight-month terms on the other 32 unemployment
insurance fraud counts and 11 of the other counts. In total, the
court sentenced Washington to 36 years and eight months in
prison.
Washington appealed.
II
Washington raises four complaints. First, he argues the
trial court erred by imposing consecutive rather than concurrent
5
sentences for his unemployment insurance fraud convictions.
Second, he claims the trial court should have granted his
requests to represent himself in March 2022 and April
2023. Third, he raises an issue about the trial court’s Pitchess
determination. Finally, he argues his 33 convictions for
insurance fraud should be consolidated into a single
conviction. We hold his first, second, and fourth contentions lack
merit. With the concession of the prosecutor, we have reviewed
the trial court’s Pitchess motion. We hold the court did not err.
A
We turn first to Washington’s argument that the trial court
abused its discretion by imposing consecutive instead of
concurrent sentences for his 33 convictions of unemployment
insurance fraud. This argument is incorrect.
Trial courts have wide discretion to determine whether a
defendant’s sentences should be consecutive. (§ 669, subd. (a);
People v. Nicolas (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1182.) Various rules
promulgated by the Judicial Council guide these choices,
including the California Rules of Court. Rule 4.425 lays out
certain factors courts should consider in making the decision.
(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 349.) Our review of such a
determination is deferential. (People v. Bradford (1976) 17
Cal.3d 8, 20.)
Rule 4.425 identifies an aggravating factor found true by
the jury as a basis for imposing consecutive sentences. Here, the
court identified the fact that the jury found true the aggravating
factor that Washington was on probation at the time he
committed these crimes. This was a basis for the consecutive
sentences. In accordance with Rule 4.425, the trial court did not
use this circumstance to impose the upper term or otherwise
6
enhance the sentence. Rather, it found this aggravating
circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances. This was
proper.
Washington argues the insurance fraud claims can be
viewed as a single victim crime over a short period, which
supports concurrent sentencing. However, as discussed below,
the unemployment insurance fraud claims can also be considered
multiple crimes. And while they did all involve the Department
as a victim, they also involved each individual whose identity
Washington used to make these false claims. The court did not
abuse its discretion.
Washington highlights that the statutory provision
allowing an enhancement for related felonies based on the
amount of money involved provides a sentencing triad of two,
three, or five years. These relatively low numbers, Washington
argues, means the imposition of consecutive sentences is
improper. This argument is invalid. A lone instance of financial
fraud may be relatively minor in the panoply of crime.
Culpability soars, however, when a criminal industrializes the
process.
Washington argues consecutive sentences are the most
draconian sanction and therefore improper here. The trial court
was entitled, however, to consider the magnitude of Washington’s
crimes and his failure to respond to the deterrent effect his past
sentences were designed to impose.
Washington argues that the fact that the prosecutor offered
a plea bargain of probation before trial demonstrates the
sentence is the product of judicial vindictiveness and therefore
inappropriate. This is inaccurate. While a disparity between an
imposed sentence and a proffered plea bargain can be a sign that
7
the court punished the defendant for exercising a right to trial, it
alone is insufficient. “The mere fact, if it be a fact, that following
trial defendant received a more severe sentence than he was
offered during plea negotiations does not in itself support the
inference that he was penalized for exercising his constitutional
rights.” (People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 34–35. Washington
identifies no other signs the trial court was punishing him for
exercising his right to a trial.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
consecutive sentences.
B
Washington next challenges the trial court’s denial of his
right to represent himself in March 2022 and April 2023.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant
two mutually exclusive rights: the right to counsel and the right
to represent oneself. (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 703
(Boyce).) We indulge all inferences against the defendant’s
waiver of the right to counsel. (Ibid.) To invoke the right to self
representation, the defendant must do so unequivocally,
knowingly, and in a timely fashion. (People v. Wright (2021) 12
Cal.5th 419, 435–436.) Where the defendant meets these criteria,
the court has no discretion to deny the request. (Ibid.) That a
defendant knows little of the law or will do a poor job is not a
reason to deny the request. (People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th
814, 827.) Neither is a defendant’s lack of access to the law
library or phone. (Ibid.)
However, the right to self-representation is not absolute.
(People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 721 (Lynch).) A trial
court may deny such a request where it is untimely under the
circumstances or the waiver is not knowing and intelligent.
8
(People v. Best (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 747, 763 (Best); People v.
Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 929 [request for self-
representation properly denied where waiver not knowing and
intelligent].) A court may also deny such a request where it is
made for an improper reason, such as delaying the trial, or where
the defendant’s conduct threatens the integrity of the trial.
(Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 721–722; People v. Kirvin (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1515–1516 (Kirvin).)
We review the entire record to determine (1) if a defendant
made a genuine request for self-representation and (2) whether
the trial court’s decision was proper. (Best, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th
at p. 756.) If the court based its denial of a request on an
improper basis, but the record reveals a proper basis, we will
affirm. (Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 703.) We defer to the
court’s determination of whether a defendant’s conduct is so
disruptive, disobedient, disrespectful, or obstructionist that self-
representation would threaten the integrity of the trial. (Best,
supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 761; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th
701, 735 (Welch) [trial court in best position to judge defendant’s
conduct].)
We turn now to the first denial Washington challenges.
During a hearing in March 2022, Washington’s counsel expressed
to the court that Washington was confused about his pro per
status and that, despite counsel’s explanations, he believed he
was still pro per on his insurance fraud case. The court
reiterated what counsel had told Washington, reminding him the
two cases had been consolidated, so he was represented with
regard to all of the charges. Washington objected, claiming he
was not told he had to give up his pro per status on the other case
and that he did not receive notice that the cases had been
9
consolidated. Washington then requested to go pro per again.
The court denied the request, noting that Washington was
“wanting to be pro per on some things and not on other things.”
Washington’s pattern of vacillation supported the trial
court’s decision. (People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 271–272
[trial court did not err in denying a Faretta request where
defendant engaged in a pattern of vacillation that over time could
harm the progress of the trial].) He vacillated between wanting
to represent himself and wanting counsel. This was apparent not
only in his flip-flopping requests for counsel and to represent
himself, but also his conduct of acting as his own lawyer even
when represented.
On October 16, 2020, Washington requested and the court
allowed him to go pro per. On November 20, 2020, Washington
appeared represented by private counsel. In January 2021, when
the court relieved counsel due to illness, the court granted
Washington’s renewed request to represent himself. Washington
represented himself on his original and his new fraud case.
In May 2021, the court consolidated the cases, which
Washington explicitly declined to oppose. Washington told the
court he was thinking of giving up his right to be pro per. At the
June 10, 2021 hearing, Washington waived his pro per status and
accepted representation. About nine months later, Washington
sought to represent himself again in March 2022. In denying the
request, the court noted Washington improperly filed and argued
even when represented by counsel.
The court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Washington’s March 2022 request.
We turn next to the denial of Washington’s April 2023
request. At a pretrial hearing where the case was 0 out of 15,
10
Washington again asked to go pro per. The trial court again
denied the request:
“The Court: Well, that request is denied. And here’s why:
Mr. Washington has placed himself in a position where he has no
opportunity to go to the library, to use the telephone. And this
court – he’s also been somewhat – strike that. He’s also
disregarded this court’s rulings.
“And in terms of various writs that he’s filed alongside his
counsel, this court has repeatedly ruled, and he’s been provided
copies of these rulings.
“And he cannot represent himself alongside counsel. He
disregards the rules of not only this court but also of the other
institutional individuals that he’s come in contact with.
“And I think that, number one, is because of his custody
status, he has – will not have the ability to adequately represent
himself.
“Number 2, this court knows from past experience with Mr.
Washington when he was pro per, that he cannot follow the
court’s directions. And also this case is very old. We’re 0 out of
15 for trial.
“This court believes that, if I were to allow him to go pro
per, this case would just drag on and on and on. He would focus
on the issues that have already been resolved by this court, such
as the issue of the search warrant, the motions that were
previously heard to traverse, to –”
“Washington: No. Excuse Me. I’d like to say something.”
“The Court: No, you may not. You’re represented by
counsel.
“This is another reason. He interrupts. If he’s pro per, he
interrupts more.
11
“I know he believes that this court did not ever rule on that
issue, but it did. There’s a minute order in the file indicating the
court ruled.
“He does not believe that the court has provided him with a
copy of the original, unredacted search warrant, but it did. This
court provided that to him, either directly or through his counsel.
“We had allowed him to have an additional 1538.5, even
though he had one at the lower court.
“And yet he’s still not satisfied. He will focus on that, and
he will never prepare himself or be able to prepare himself to go
to trial.
“So his request to be pro per is denied.”
Washington correctly argues, and the prosecutor concedes,
that the trial court was wrong to base its decision on
Washington’s inability to access the law library and telephone.
However, the other reasons described by the court provide a
proper basis for the denial. (Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 703.)
The trial court noted Washington’s repeated and
demonstrated inability to follow the court’s rules. (Welch, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 734 [court may properly deny request for self-
representation where defendant’s conduct gives court reason to
believe it will create disruption].) The court cited Washington’s
continued improper filings and unwillingness to stop litigating
issues already decided by the court. (Kirvin, supra, 231
Cal.App.4th at p. 1516 [court did not abuse discretion in finding
defendant’s repeated refusal to come to court and obey court
orders would threaten integrity of trial].) The court noted it had
provided additional proceedings to mollify Washington, but
Washington still refused to accept the rulings. The court noted
Washington’s improper interruptions of the proceedings and that
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these interruptions increased when Washington was representing
himself.
The trial court further noted allowing Washington to go pro
per at this stage would likely delay the proceedings, which had
already taken a few years. The court’s citation to Washington’s
continued relitigation of issues would slow the case’s progress.
Given the court’s experience with Washington, it had a basis for
this determination.
Neither the trial court’s denial of Washington’s request in
March 2022 nor in April 2023 was an abuse of discretion.
C
The prosecutor did not oppose Washington’s request that
we independently review the trial court’s determination at the in-
camera review of the peace officer records pursuant to Pitchess.
We have done so. The trial court’s ruling was proper.
D
Washington argues the trial court erred by failing to
consolidate his 33 convictions for unemployment insurance fraud
into a single violation. This argument is in error.
While acknowledging that People v. Whitmer is against
him, Washington argues we should instead apply People v. Bailey
(1961) 55 Cal.2d 514 (Bailey). In Bailey, the defendant submitted
a fraudulent welfare application. (Id. at pp. 515–516.) The
defendant then collected several welfare payments, each under
the monetary limit for grand theft. (Id. at p. 518.) The Supreme
Court approved aggregating the thefts into one felony charge of
grand theft because the acts were carried out as part of a single
plan. (Id. at pp. 519–520.)
13
From Bailey arose the doctrine of disallowing the charging
of multiple counts where the acts were part of one overarching
plan. (Kirvin, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1518.)
About four decades later, the Supreme Court revisited the
Bailey doctrine in People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733
(Whitmer). In Whitmer, the defendant embezzled money from his
motorcycle dealer employer by submitting fictitious applications
for purchases. (Id. at p. 735.) The defendant argued he could
only be charged with a single felony under Bailey because he
completed each theft in the same way. (Id. at p. 736.) The
Supreme Court disagreed. (Id. at pp. 740–741.)
The court held Bailey was limited to its facts and whether
acts of misconduct should be aggregated or not depended on the
facts of the case. (Whitmer, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 740–
741.) The Supreme Court noted that, while the defendant’s
conduct was similar, he had to fill out separate paperwork for
each application and in general used a different fictitious buyer
for each. (Id. at p. 735.) Each count of grand theft was therefore
based on a separate and distinct act. (Id. at p. 736.) In such
circumstances, the misconduct could properly be charged as
separate felonies. (Id. at pp. 740–741.) To find otherwise would
provide a “felony discount” to the most prolific thieves. (Id. at p.
739.) However, in recognition of the fact that the courts of appeal
had applied Bailey differently, the Supreme Court ruled it would
not be fair to apply it retroactively to Whitmer. (Id. at p. 735,
742.)
Washington argues Bailey should still apply because it was
the law when the legislature enacted the current punishment
provision for unemployment insurance fraud. The Whitmer court
rejected this argument. (Whitmer, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 741–
14
742.) The court noted that sometimes legislative inaction without
more does not signify approval. (Ibid.) This was especially true
because Whitmer was not incompatible with Bailey and the cases
it distinguished. (Ibid.) Thus, though Whitmer could not be
applied retroactively, it is appropriate to apply it to misconduct
occurring after the court decided Whitmer, like Washington’s acts
here.
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
SCHERB, J.
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