People v. Ureno CA4/3

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Filed 2/23/26 P. v. Ureno CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064374

v. (Super. Ct. No. 22NF1116)

ERIK MEJIA URENO, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Sheila F. Hanson and Terri K. Flynn-Peister, Judges. Affirmed.
Heather E. Shallenberger for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel and James Spradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Erik Ureno appeals from the judgment entered after he was
convicted of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon. (Penal Code § 245
subd. (a)(1).)1 On appeal, Ureno contends the trial court abused its discretion
by denying his motion for mental health diversion. He argues the evidence
does not support the court’s finding he was unsuitable for diversion because
he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. We find no abuse of
discretion and affirm.
BACKGROUND2
I.
THE CHARGED OFFENSES
While an individual was on a morning walk, Ureno approached
him from behind, said an expletive, stabbed him twice in the back, and then
ran away. An officer who responded to the stabbing used a chest seal on the
individual because he was having trouble breathing. The individual was
transported to the hospital, where he underwent surgery.
Three months later, a different person was walking home from
work when Ureno ran up to him. Ureno was holding a knife in his hand and
was trying to conceal it behind his leg. Ureno thrust the knife at the person
twice, and the person asked him what he was doing. Ureno did not respond.
Ureno then thrust the knife towards the person again and stabbed him in the
lower chest, upper abdomen area. Ureno ran away. The person was taken to
the hospital, where he underwent surgery.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless

otherwise indicated.

2
The People charged Ureno with two counts of attempted murder
(§§664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)) and two counts of assault with a deadly
weapon (§245, subd. (a)(1)).
II.
URENO’S MOTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH DIVERSION
In 2023, Ureno filed a motion for mental health diversion under
section 1001.36, outlining how he satisfied both the statute’s eligibility and
suitability provisions. He supported his motion with a report from Dr. Lisa
Grajewski, a licensed psychologist. The report explained Ureno had a history
of mental illness, including diagnoses identified as mental health disorders in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
Ureno, who was 30 years old at the time he was first interviewed
by Dr. Grajewski, reported he began experiencing symptoms of mental illness
at age 14 and additional symptoms at age 22. Ureno’s medical records
indicated he began receiving medication to treat his mental health issues
when he was 26 years old. During previous incarcerations, Ureno was placed
in mental health housing and was compliant with treatment and medication.
Ureno’s treatment and medication, however, did not relieve all his symptoms.
During his current incarceration, Ureno was diagnosed with additional
mental health disorders revealing new and active symptoms.
With respect to drug use, Ureno reported he smoked marijuana
between the ages of 14 and 25 and then began using methamphetamine.
Ureno also used heroin in the past and, at the time he was interviewed by Dr.
Grajewski, was taking medication to help with his opiate withdrawal.
In her report, Dr. Grajewski opined that Ureno’s mental health
disorders played a significant role in the commission of the charged offenses.
Ureno was allegedly experiencing symptoms due to his disorder and was

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under the influence of methamphetamine during both offenses. Ureno had
little memory of the offenses and recounted that voices told him to stab
someone “in order to be ‘respected’ and avoid hell.” Dr. Grajewski further
stated Ureno had no rational motive for the offenses, and instead, they were
related to his disorder.
Dr. Grajewski determined Ureno’s symptoms would respond to
mental health treatment. Specifically, Ureno’s disorder could be addressed
through medication and psychotherapy. Additionally, Ureno would benefit
from a “dual diagnosis program.” Dr. Grajewski recommended a program that
provided “psychoeducation, medication, protocol support, scheduled support
for [Ureno’s] substance abuse, and training designed to improve negative
cognitive beliefs associated with [his mental illness].” Dr. Grajewski also
recommended treatment for Ureno’s substance use disorder. Finally, Dr.
Grajewski recommended that Ureno be enrolled in an intensive outpatient
program to treat his mental illness and substance abuse disorder.
Dr. Grajewski concluded Ureno did not pose an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety because there was no indication Ureno was violent
as an adolescent or a child, where violent behavior typically begins.
Moreover, Ureno had no history of injuring others while in school or during
his prior or current incarcerations. Dr. Grajewski noted Ureno did not
present as irritable, aggressive, or threatening to her during their sessions.
Finally, Dr. Grajewski attributed both Ureno’s past conviction for sexual
assault and current charged offenses to Ureno’s mental health disorders and
related symptomology.

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III.
THE PEOPLE’S OPPOSITION
The prosecutor urged the trial court to deny Ureno’s motion,
asserting he was unsuitable for diversion based on the violent circumstances
of his offenses. The prosecutor noted Ureno committed “unprovoked attack[s]
on [ ] defenseless victim[s].” The prosecutor also cited Ureno’s previous
criminal history, which spanned six years and included a sex crime and
multiple assaults using a knife. The prosecutor argued Ureno “would be
extremely likely to commit similar crimes” to those charged, because his
utilization of a knife in various violent cases “displayed [his] propensity for
violence.” The prosecutor also maintained Ureno’s violence had “escalated
over time” and he had now “stabbed two strangers without provocation.”
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
At the hearing on the motion for mental health diversion, Ureno’s
counsel added that Ureno had been evaluated by medical professionals who
had a treatment plan in place. Instead of the outpatient treatment Dr.
Grajewski recommended, the new plan was for Ureno to enroll in an
inpatient residential program followed by an outpatient program.
The trial court denied Ureno’s motion for diversion. The court
found Ureno met the eligibility requirements for diversion under section
1001.36, subdivision (b)(1),(2), but was not suitable for diversion because he
posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Specifically, the court
concluded Ureno would pose an unreasonable risk of committing a super
strike if treated at an inpatient program.
The trial court acknowledged Dr. Grajewski’s opinion that Ureno
did not “have a violent nature”, but determined the record showed Ureno’s

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“severe amphetamine, methamphetamine, and opioid disorders coupled with
his schizoaffective disorder . . . manifest[ed] its way in a very violent
manner.” The court noted the current offenses included Ureno stabbing two
different “random individuals.” It also noted he had a history of violent
offenses, namely, an assault charge and a carjacking offense. Additionally,
Ureno committed two misdemeanors after the currently charged allegations.
Like the charged offenses, both incidents involved his use of a knife.
The trial court commented the proposed treatment plan seemed
inadequate under the circumstances stating: “I have no plan or program in
front of me . . . to let me know when he’s back on drugs, when he’s off his
medications, when he’s left an in-patient facility. And without that, I don’t
know how I’m going to stop him from stabbing somebody.”
The trial court recognized Ureno “fit the purpose of” section
1001.36, which was created to “keep individuals with mental illness from,
essentially, being a revolving door in the criminal justice [system].” However,
based on the facts of the current offenses and Ureno’s background, the court
found Ureno was a “huge danger to the community.” The court commented it
would have considered “some other treatment program” wherein there was no
risk Ureno could walk out of treatment.
V.
JUDGMENT
Following a trial, a jury found Ureno not guilty of attempted
murder (§§664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)), and guilty of two counts of assault
with a deadly weapon (§245, subd. (a)(1)). Ureno timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION
I.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
In 2018, the Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36,
creating a program of pretrial diversion intended for defendants with certain
mental health disorders. (People v. Frahs (2022) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624.)
Diversion gives trial courts discretion to suspend criminal proceedings and
can lead to potential dismissal of charges upon a defendant’s successful
completion of a mental health treatment program. (Id. at p. 626.) The mental
health diversion statutes are to be applied “as broadly as possible.” (Id. at p.
632.)
The purpose of the mental health diversion program is to:
(1) “increase[ ] diversion of individuals with mental disorders to
mitigate . . . reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public
safety”; (2) allow “local discretion and flexibility for counties in the
development and implementation of diversion . . . across a continuum of care
settings”; and (3) “provid[e] diversion that meets the . . . needs of individuals
with mental health disorders.” (§ 1001.35.)
In 2023, the Legislature amended section 1001.36, redefining the
criteria set forth in subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2) as “eligibility” requirements,
and the criteria set forth in subdivision (c)(1) through (c)(4) as “suitability”
requirements. (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891
(Sarmiento).) Under the amended section, a court may, in its discretion, grant
pretrial diversion if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements under
subdivision (b) and the court determines that the defendant is suitable for
diversion under subdivision (c). (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).)

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A. Eligibility
A defendant is eligible for diversion if: (1) “[t]he defendant has
been diagnosed with a mental disorder as identified in the most recent
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” and
(2) “[t]he defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1), (2).) The court
must assume that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in
the commission of the charged offense, “unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that it was not a motivating factor, casual factor, or contributing
factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.” (Id., subd.
(b)(2).)
B. Suitability
If a “defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements . . . in
subdivision (b),” the court then must determine “whether the defendant is
suitable for pretrial diversion.” (§ 1001.36, subds. (a), (c).) A defendant is
suitable for pretrial diversion if: (1) according to a “qualified mental health
expert,” the “defendant’s . . . mental disorder causing, contributing to, or
motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment”;
(2) “[t]he defendant consents to diversion and waives the . . . right to a speedy
trial”; (3) “[t]he defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of
diversion”; and (4) “[t]he defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety . . . if treated in the community.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)–(4).)
“[U]nreasonable risk of danger to public safety” is defined by
section 1170.18 subdivision (c), and it requires the court to find the defendant
is likely to commit a super strike as defined by section 667, subdivision
(e)(2)(C)(iv). (§§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4); see also People v. Moine (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 440, 450 (Moine).) Section 667 lists a series of qualifying super

8
strikes, including “any homicide offense . . . [and] any attempted homicide
offense.” (See § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV).)
In determining whether a defendant poses an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety if treated within the community, the “court may
consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified
mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the
defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and
any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
C. Residual discretion
The trial court retains “‘residual’ discretion” to deny diversion
even where the defendant makes a prima facie showing that he or she meets
all statutory requirements. (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892.) This
discretion must be exercised “‘“consistent with the principles and purpose of
the governing law.”’” (Ibid.) “That purpose includes a strong legislative
preference for treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of
such treatment to both the offending individual and the community. Where
the court chooses to exercise this residual discretion to deny diversion, its
statement of reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes
of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those goals.” (Id. at
pp. 892–893.)
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mental health
diversion for abuse of discretion. (People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840,
848.) An abuse of discretion occurs when a court “makes an arbitrary or
capricious decision by [either] applying the wrong legal standard” or “bas[ing]

9
its decision on . . . factual findings . . . not supported by substantial evidence.”
(Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449.)
III.
ANALYSIS
There is no dispute about the trial court’s decision that Ureno
met the eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion and most of the
suitability requirements. The only issue on appeal is whether the court
abused its discretion in finding Ureno unsuitable for diversion because he
posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the
community. (See §1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Ureno contends the court abused its
discretion because granting him diversion would have made it so he “would
not pose a danger to society.” Ureno’s argument is misplaced.
As an initial matter, we address Ureno’s argument that denying
him diversion increases “the danger to the public in the long run” because
when he completes his nine-year prison term, he will be released with “his
severe mental health disorder unaddressed and fully intact.” However, the
question in front of the trial court was not whether he would be a danger to
society without diversion, but whether he would pose an unreasonable risk of
danger during treatment. (See §1001.36, subd. (c)(4) [“The defendant will not
pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety . . . if treated in the
community”].) As will be discussed in more detail below, the record reflects
there was ample evidence for the court to conclude he would.
A. Ureno’s History of Violence and Criminal History
Ureno’s history of violent attacks on strangers supports the trial
court’s conclusion Ureno posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety. On two different days, Ureno stabbed individuals whom he did not
know, nor had any altercation or conversation with. One victim was stabbed

10
twice in the back, and another in the chest. Both victims were taken to the
hospital and required surgery. Not only do surprise violent attacks on
unsuspecting citizens pose a significant threat to public safety, but Ureno’s
weapon of choice, a knife, can cause victims to suffer life-threatening injuries
or death.
Additionally, the two misdemeanors Ureno committed shortly
after committing the charged offenses further support the trial court’s ruling.
Unprovoked, Ureno approached strangers with a knife. On one occasion,
Ureno entered a store and began screaming at an employee. Ureno
challenged the employee to a fight and told the employee he would kill him.
He then told the employee to go out to the parking lot, where he would stab
the employee. On another occasion, Ureno approached an unhoused man who
was sleeping in a park and told him he had to leave the park. Ureno then
attempted several times to stab the unhoused man with a knife. Like in the
charged offenses, Ureno’s actions could have caused the victims to suffer life-
threatening injuries or death.
B. Dr. Grajewski’s Opinion
Although Dr. Grajewski opined Ureno would not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to society, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding otherwise based, in part, on foundational concerns
with her opinion. It is unclear from the record whether Dr. Grajewski
reviewed Ureno’s full criminal history when she determined Ureno did not
have a “violent nature.” In fact, it does not appear Dr. Grajewski considered
many of Ureno’s violent crimes, including a carjacking and two assaults
involving a knife that occurred after the charged offenses, in her analysis of
whether he poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Moreover,
Dr. Grajewski acknowledged Ureno’s past treatment, including medication,

11
did not relieve all his symptoms. Based on these foundational problems, the
court reasonably rejected Dr. Grajewki’s opinion that Ureno was neither
violent nor posed an unreasonable risk of danger to society. (See, e.g., People
v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 124 [doctor’s opinion defendant did not
pose a significant risk to public safety did not warrant overturning a contrary
dangerousness determination supported by other evidence]; People v. Gerson
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1086 [appellate court could not reweigh evidence
to overturn trial court’s determination that defendant failed to establish his
eligibility for diversion].)
C. Treatment Plan
In support of its decision that Ureno posed an unreasonable risk
of danger to society, the trial court determined it was unsatisfied with
Ureno’s proposed treatment plan. Specifically, the court was concerned Ureno
would “walk away” from inpatient treatment, “stab somebody” and commit a
super strike. This conclusion is supported by the record. On multiple
occasions, Ureno violently attacked strangers without provocation. According
to Dr. Grajewski, part of the reason Ureno attacked those strangers was
because of his mental health disorders and how they manifest through his
symptoms. The record shows past medication has been ineffective in
preventing all his symptoms. Consequently, the court reasonably concluded
Ureno’s proposed plan, receiving pharmacological and psychotherapy in an
inpatient treatment facility, would be insufficient to alleviate the
unreasonable risk of danger to society.3 (See § 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A).)

3 The trial court also explained it had “no plan or program in

front of [it]” to let it know when Ureno was back on drugs, off his medication,
or left an in-patient facility. “[T]o the extent the court in this case relied on a
lack of ability to monitor a person’s activity and progress while participating
in diversion as a basis for denial of [Ureno]’s motion, it did so in reliance on

12
We reject Ureno’s argument that he should have been granted
diversion because he has “never been offered” psychotherapy, and with that
therapy, he would no longer pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society.
Dr. Grajewski opined Ureno would respond to mental health treatment and
the prosecution did not contend otherwise. However, this factor is only the
first criterion Ureno had to meet to be suitable for diversion. (See §1001.36,
subd. (c)(1).) As discussed above, the trial court determined Ureno was
unsuitable for diversion because he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to
society if treated in the community and thus did not meet the fourth criterion
under section 1001.36, subdivision (c). (See §1001.36, subd. (c) [“A defendant
is suitable for pretrial diversion if all of the following criteria are met”]
(italics added).) As previously discussed, Ureno's charged offenses and
criminal history indicate he was extremely violent. Moreover, his past
medication treatment did not stop all symptoms of Ureno’s mental illness.
Consequently, even if Ureno were to receive and respond to psychotherapy,
the court was justified in deciding the risk of danger to society Ureno posed
was nevertheless unreasonable.

an incorrect statement of the law.” (People v. Cabalar (2025) 117Cal.App.5th
41, 58–59 (Cabalar).) “The provider of the mental health treatment program
in which the defendant has been placed shall provide regular reports to the
court, the defense, and the prosecutor on the defendant’s progress in
treatment.” (§1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(B).) “The statutory scheme leaves it to the
trial court to use its discretion to establish, with input from the parties, the
particularities of the regular reporting, which may include, for example, the
required frequency, the necessary level of detail, and/or circumstances
triggering a need for immediate notice to the court.” (Cabalar at p. 58, fn. 7.)
In any event, because substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion
Ureno posed an unreasonable risk of danger, any error was harmless.

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D. Conclusion
As Ureno points out, one of the stated purposes of the mental
health diversion statute is to promote, “[i]ncreased diversion of individuals
with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the
criminal justice system while protecting public safety.” (§ 1001.35, subd. (a).)
However, as a matter of policy, the Legislature has struck what it believes is
“the proper balance between protecting public safety and mitigating the entry
and reentry into the criminal justice system of individuals with mental
disorders.” (Moore v. Superior Court (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 561, 581.)
Regarding public safety, the role left for the trial court is to review the
evidence in each case and exercise its discretion to determine which side of
the legislatively drawn line a defendant falls—reasonable risk or
unreasonable risk. (§ 1001.36, subds. (a) & (c)(4).)
Here, the trial court expressed Ureno “seemed to fit the purpose”
of section 1001.36. But, based on the circumstances of the charged offenses,
Ureno’s other offenses, and the proposed treatment program, the court
reasonably determined the risk of danger Ureno posed to the public would be
unreasonable were he to be treated in the community. (§§ 1001.36, subd.
(c)(4); 1170.18, subd. (c).) As a result, the court properly exercised its
discretion in denying Ureno’s petition for mental health diversion. (See
Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

SCOTT, J.

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