Schuman v. Citibank CA2/1

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Filed 2/23/26 Schuman v. Citibank CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STEVEN A. SCHUMAN, B343274

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCV18993)
v.

CITIBANK, N.A. et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Rolf M. Treu, Judge. Affirmed.
iGeneral Counsel, Wendy Evelyn Giberti; Leonard, Dicker
& Schreiber, Richard C. Leonard and Steven A. Schuman for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner, Adam A. Vukovic and Emily
Yu for Defendants and Respondents.
_________________________
Plaintiff Steven A. Schuman sought a cash-out refinance
loan for his residence. Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) communicated
that it was willing to provide a 30-year, $1.5 million loan at an
interest rate of less than 4 percent with a cash out component
subject to Schuman meeting certain terms and conditions. Prior
to the closing date, Citibank disclosed to Schuman that the
amount of cash he could expect at closing would be significantly
less than the initial estimate, as Citibank would require that a
portion of the loan proceeds be used to pay off three other
outstanding loans. Schuman refused to close on those terms and
sued Citibank for breach of contract, fraud, and promissory
estoppel.
After sustaining two demurrers with leave to amend, the
trial court sustained Citibank’s demurrer to Schuman’s verified
second amended complaint (the SAC) without leave to amend.
The court concluded the exhibits to the SAC, including Citibank’s
conditional loan approval and a mortgage loan commitment, were
too indefinite to constitute an enforceable contract or to support a
claim for promissory estoppel. The court further found Schuman
failed to state a claim for fraud.
Schuman argues he sufficiently alleged each claim. We
conclude the trial court did not err and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDRAL BACKGROUND
A. The Operative Complaint
1. Factual Summary
As this matter comes to us at the demurrer stage, we
accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in the SAC but
not any of its asserted conclusions of fact or law. (Los Angeles
Waterkeeper v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2023) 92

2
Cal.App.5th 230, 264.) If facts appearing in exhibits attached to
the complaint are inconsistent with the complaint’s allegations,
we accept as true the contents of the exhibits. (Genis v.
Schainbaum (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1014-1015.)
The SAC alleged that Schuman owned and lived in a house
in Beverly Hills (the Beverly Property). The Beverly Property
had an existing mortgage loan whose interest rate would become
variable in February 2023. On March 16, 2022, he sought a loan
from Citibank to purchase a new home in Nipomo, California (the
Nipomo Property). A loan broker referred Schuman to Citibank
loan officer Jesse Nathan Tyre-Karp to assist with a purchase
money loan for the Nipomo Property, and also to help Schuman
refinance the existing mortgage on the Beverly Property via a
$1.5 million loan at a 30-year fixed interest rate of 3.375 percent.
In a March 16, 2022 email, Tyre-Karp requested that
Schuman provide several documents, including tax returns,
personal and business bank statements, mortgage statements for
each property Schuman owned, and a fully executed purchase
contract for the Nipomo Property.
Two weeks later, Schuman advised Citibank that the
Nipomo Property purchase “fell through” but that he was “still
very interested in the refi[nance loan]” for the Beverly Property.
The SAC alleged the “cash out of nearly $1,000,000 [from the
loan] would provide Schuman with much[ ]needed cash,” but did
not indicate how he learned he could expect this amount of cash
from the loan. The SAC also alleged “Schuman informed Tyre-
Karp that the cash could be used as part of the down payment on
a new home, to repair the Beverly Property before leasing it, and
to repair and upgrade the new home. In addition, any excess
cash could always be used to pay down Schuman’s various loans

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on investment properties.” There is no allegation that Citibank
or Tyre-Karp agreed the loan proceeds would be applied in the
manner that Schuman desired.
In an April 20, 2022 letter, Citibank notified Schuman his
loan had been “conditionally approved.” The letter described the
loan as a refinance loan for the Beverly Property in the amount of
$1.5 million, for 30 years, with a fixed interest rate of 3.375
percent. The letter stated, “You will receive final loan approval
once the conditions listed on the enclosed [b]orrower’s [c]hecklist
have been met, provided you maintain your continued credit
worthiness, and can provide acceptable collateral for the
mortgage loan.” (Boldface and underscoring omitted.)
The borrower checklist set forth 14 items, including that
Schuman was to deposit at least $50,000 in a Citibank account
prior to closing to obtain an interest rate reduction (i.e., a
condition precedent to obtaining favorable loan terms). Item 7 on
the checklist stated, “Approval is subject to [l]ender verification
of the maximum [l]oan to [v]alue which will be determined at the
time of full loan approval.” The checklist also required Schuman
to provide loan statements relating to a home equity line of credit
(HELOC) from First Citizens Bank and information relating to
three other properties, including “the initial approval letter for
the refinance loan currently tied with” one of the properties. The
items concerning the HELOC and three properties each stated,
“***Additional [c]onditions may apply.***” Neither the
conditional approval nor the borrower checklist stated the
amount of cash to borrower that Schuman could expect at closing.
Tyre-Karp told Schuman that if he deposited $200,000 or
$500,000 into a Citibank account, the interest rate would
decrease to 3.25 or 3.125 percent, respectively. Relying on the

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conditional loan approval, Schuman deposited over $500,000 into
two Citibank accounts.
On May 4, 2022, Tyre-Karp emailed Schuman, “Final loan
approval is done. Congrats!”
On May 5, 2022, Citibank issued a mortgage loan
commitment (the commitment) to Schuman. The SAC alleged
that the commitment “contained no conditions precedent to the
formation of a final contract,” “contain[ed] all the terms necessary
to form a fully binding contract,” and required only evidence of
title. The SAC further alleged, “As of May 5, 2022, Citibank
agreed unconditionally to fund [the l]oan and the parties had
reached a full and final agreement.” “Citibank had never
imposed any condition with regards to the use of the proceeds of
the loan.”
The commitment stated Schuman’s application for a “loan
has been approved subject to the terms and conditions set forth
in this commitment letter” and that the loan must close and fund
prior to May 20, 2022, when the locked interest rate would
expire. It further stated, “The [l]ender reserve[d] the right to
terminate this commitment prior to the settlement of the loan in
the event of an adverse change in your personal or financial
status.”
The commitment included two pages of terms and
conditions and attached another borrower’s checklist that
included six items. The checklist stated the items were required
“to complete the processing of [Schuman’s] real estate loan
application” and that Citibank “reserve[d] the right to cancel any
conditional approval” if the documents and information were not
received by May 12, 2022. The items included tax information for
both Schuman and his limited liability company as well as real

5
estate tax information. The checklist explained that any
delinquent real estate taxes might require “possible
requalification for the loan.” Neither the commitment nor the
attached checklist represented that Schuman would receive
nearly $1 million cash out (or any other specific amount) from the
loan.
On May 6, 2022, Citibank provided Schuman with a closing
disclosure, which stated, “This form is a statement of final loan
terms and closing costs.” (Italics omitted.) The cover letter
stated that the disclosure was being provided to him to give him
“the opportunity to review [the terms] prior to [his] closing date,”
which was scheduled for May 10, 2022. The closing disclosure
listed the loan terms, projected payment details, closing costs,
and that $1,430,634.60 from the Citibank loan would need to be
used to pay off three other loans. The disclosure included a chart
indicating that at the time of the “loan estimate,” Citibank had
estimated Schuman would receive $953,688 in cash, but the final
amount of cash to him at the time of closing would be $62,795.16.
The disclosure explained this difference was due to payments and
payoffs of three other loans.1
The SAC alleged, “The refinance, as promised, would have
given Schuman over $950,000 [in] cash at a fixed rate.” The
closing disclosure “contained new and materially different terms,
namely” that the cash to Schuman had changed since the time of
his loan estimate. The difference was because Citibank proposed
to pay “two unrelated loans on investment properties in Seattle,”

1 The closing disclosure lists First Citizens Bank as a
fourth item under “[p]ayoffs and [p]ayments,” but does not list
any payoff amount.

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but Citibank had never conditioned the loan on the payment of
these other loans.
The SAC alleged that before Citibank provided Schuman
with the closing disclosure, Citibank had closed his existing
$600,000 HELOC with First Citizens Bank. “Schuman knew . . .
that the HELOC would be closed when the loan from Citibank
closed,” but he did not agree that Citibank could close the
HELOC without making the loan.
The SAC alleged that Schuman refused to close on the
terms set forth in the closing disclosure, and that as a result
Tyre-Karp stated the loan needed to be resubmitted to
underwriting.
In a May 18, 2022 email attached to the SAC, Tyre-Karp
stated, “Your intended purchase of the new home [in] . . . Aroyyo
[sic] Grande . . . as your principal residence changes the intended
occupancy of the [Beverly Property], and may impact your
liabilities, assets, and credit as well as the Citi[bank] loan
products available to you. This is new information that wasn’t
previously available to our credit team at the time Citi[bank]
issued its loan commitment to you, so it was necessary for them
to re-review your application.” The SAC alleged that Tyre-Karp
and Citibank, “had known from the very first day that Schuman
was intending to move from the Beverly Property” and used the
fact he was going to buy a new home “as an excuse to back out of
the . . . [c]ommitment.”
In a May 26, 2022 document entitled “Statement of Credit
Denial, Termination or Change” attached to the SAC, Citibank
explained the principal reasons it could not approve a loan on
Schuman’s requested terms were that he requested excessive
cash back from the loan or to finance costs that may not be paid

7
by the loan proceeds, had insufficient income for total obligations,
owned or financed more properties than the allowed maximum,
and that Citibank was “[u]nable to verify residence or
occupancy.” The SAC alleged these reasons were “patently false
and/or . . . are facts Citibank knew all along.”
2. Schuman’s Claims
The SAC asserted causes of action for (1) breach of contract
against Citibank, (2) fraud against Citibank and Tyre-Karp, and
(3) promissory estoppel against Citibank.
The cause of action for breach of contract alleged that
Citibank agreed to make the refinancing loan on the terms set
forth in the April 20, 2022 letter conditionally approving the loan,
in the commitment, and as described in the factual recitation of
the SAC. The cause of action does not state how Citibank
breached the agreement or refer to the amount of cash Schuman
expected to receive from the Citibank loan. Citibank’s actions
allegedly damaged Schuman because he “lost the ability to
refinance the Beverly Property while it was still his primary
residence.” At the time Schuman filed the SAC, no lender offered
a loan on similar terms, and the best interest rate available was
approximately 7.25 percent. The SAC prayed for specific
performance of “the loan on the terms promised” or damages of
nearly $1.4 million.
The cause of action for fraud against Citibank and Tyre-
Karp alleged the defendants “repeatedly” told Schuman that he
would receive nearly $1 million in cash when the loan closed, but
the defendants did not intend to give this much cash to Schuman
or disclose that Citibank would use the loan proceeds to pay
Schuman’s unrelated loans. The “[d]efendants . . . materially lied
about the cash at closing to induce [Schuman] to close on the

8
[l]oan and forego other lenders.” Schuman “did forgo other
lenders and was induced into acceptance and performance on the
contract,” including depositing $500,000 into a Citibank account.
The “[d]efendants knew [Schuman’s] locked rate expired on
May 20, 2022, just two weeks after Citibank switched the [l]oan
terms, leaving Schuman no time to obtain other financing.” The
defendants engaged in a “ ‘bait and switch’ ” that rendered the
loan of little value to Schuman and closed Schuman’s HELOC to
further pressure him to accept the new loan terms. Schuman
sought fraud damages in excess of $1 million and punitive
damages for the defendants’ “willful breach of fiduciary duty.”
The cause of action for promissory estoppel alleged
“Citibank made a clear and unambiguous written promise to loan
[Schuman] $1[.5 million] at a fixed [interest] rate of 3.375[
percent] with a [30]-year term.” Schuman claims he relied on
Citibank to make the loan, spending over 30 hours gathering
documents and communicating with Citibank, foregoing pursuing
other loans, depositing over $500,000 into a Citibank account,
and paying for an appraisal. Schuman was damaged as a
different loan would require him to pay interest of at least 7.25
percent.
B. Demurrer
1. The Defendants’ Demurrer
Citibank and Tyre-Karp demurred to the SAC. They
argued that Schuman failed to allege the existence of a contract
because the commitment was conditional and the alleged
contractual terms uncertain. They further argued that the
statute of frauds barred the alleged contract and that Schuman
failed to allege damages caused by Citibank. Schuman could not
state a claim for promissory estoppel because there was no

9
“ ‘clear and unambiguous’ ” promise. The defendants argued the
economic loss doctrine barred the fraud claim, the SAC failed to
plead any misrepresentation with the required particularity, and
the SAC could not allege reliance or identify causation or
damages.
The defendants also argued that the court should not
permit Schuman to amend his complaint because he had already
twice done so and failed to state a claim. In Schuman’s original
complaint and later in his first amended complaint, Schuman
alleged claims for breach of contract, professional negligence or
fraud, and promissory estoppel. In each instance, the trial court
found the exhibits to the then-operative complaint conflicted with
Schuman’s allegations that a contract existed and, thus,
sustained the defendants’ demurrers with leave to amend.
2. Schuman’s Opposition
In opposition, Schuman argued that Tyre-Karp and
Citibank knew that Schuman wanted to refinance the Beverly
Property and use nearly $1 million cash out from that refinance
to purchase a new home. The defendants “attempted to alter the
terms of a valid and enforceable loan agreement, which Schuman
refused to amend.” He argued that as of April 22, 2022, the only
condition that remained for Citibank to issue the loan was for
Schuman to deposit money into a Citibank account. After he did
so, Tyre-Karp congratulated Schuman that “[f]inal loan approval
[wa]s done.” The commitment confirmed that Citibank would
lend Schuman $1.5 million at a fixed interest rate of 3.125
percent, for 30 years. Schuman argued that the commitment
contained only additional terms of performance, not conditions
precedent to Citibank’s promise to fund the loan. Schuman
further argued that because he deposited $500,000 and Citibank

10
closed his HELOC, the parties partially performed and, thus, the
statute of frauds did not apply.
As to fraud, Schuman argued the economic loss doctrine did
not apply and that he pleaded the cause of action with the
requisite specificity.
Schuman did not request further leave to amend if the
court was inclined to sustain the demurrer.
3. The Defendants’ Reply
In reply, the defendants argued that the exhibits to the
SAC demonstrated that Citibank issued only a conditional
approval and commitment, and the parties never reached a final,
binding loan agreement. Further, Schuman could not have been
fraudulently induced into a loan agreement because there was no
agreement.
4. The Trial Court’s Ruling
On December 11, 2024, the trial court sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend. It found that “the exhibits
attached to the SAC evidence a series of negotiations and
‘agreements to agree.’ ” The commitment “only indicat[ed] that
[Schuman]’s loan application was approved and that such
approval was subject to further conditions.” That a contract had
not been formed was further supported by Schuman’s allegation
that he refused to close on the terms stated in the closing
disclosure. The court also found that Schuman could not
maintain a cause of action that the defendants fraudulently
induced him to enter into a contract because the parties did not
enter into any binding agreement. The court further found there
was not a clear and unambiguous offer sufficient to support a

11
promissory estoppel claim. The court later entered judgment for
the defendants.2
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“ ‘We independently review [a] ruling on a demurrer and
determine de novo whether the pleading alleges facts sufficient to
state a cause of action.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]e accept as true the well-
pleaded allegations in [the] . . . complaint. “ ‘We treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but
not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.’ ” ’ ”
(Los Angeles Waterkeeper v. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 264.) “[C]ourts will not close their
eyes in situations where a complaint contains allegations of fact
inconsistent with attached documents/exhibits, or allegations
contrary to facts which are judicially noticed. [Citation.] Where
facts appearing in attached exhibits or judicially noticed
documents contradict, or are inconsistent with, the complaint’s
allegations, we must rely on the facts in the exhibits and
judicially noticed documents.” (Genis v. Schainbaum, supra, 66
Cal.App.5th at p. 1015.) The plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that the trial court erroneously sustained the

2 Schuman filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s
order sustaining the demurrer. We dismissed the appeal due to
Schuman’s failure to provide an appealable judgment or order.
On February 20, 2025, the trial court entered judgment, and after
Schuman provided the judgment to this court, we vacated the
dismissal. We treat Schuman’s premature notice of appeal as
filed immediately after the entry of judgment, and therefore
valid. (Boyer v. Jensen (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 62, 69; Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2).)

12
demurrer as a matter of law. (Rakestraw v. California
Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) We may affirm
a trial court’s ruling sustaining a demurrer if correct on any
theory. (J.B. Aguerre, Inc. v. American Guarantee & Liability
Ins. Co. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 6, 15-16.)
B. Breach of Contract
“Contract formation requires mutual consent, which cannot
exist unless the parties ‘agree upon the same thing in the same
sense.’ (Civ. Code, § 1580; see also §§ 1550, 1565.) ‘If there is no
evidence establishing a manifestation of assent to the “same
thing” by both parties, then there is no mutual consent to
contract and no contract formation.’ [Citation.] ‘Mutual consent
is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward
manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable
meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed
intentions or understandings.’ [Citations.] [¶] Where the
existence of a contract is at issue and the evidence is conflicting
or admits of more than one inference, it is for the trier of fact to
determine whether the contract actually existed. But if the
material facts are certain or undisputed, the existence of a
contract is a question for the court to decide.” (Bustamante v.
Intuit, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 199, 208.)
“ ‘Under California law, a contract will be enforced if it is
sufficiently definite (and this is a question of law) for the court to
ascertain the parties’ obligations and to determine whether those
obligations have been performed or breached.’ [Citation.] ‘To be
enforceable, a promise must be definite enough that a court can
determine the scope of the duty[,] and the limits of performance
must be sufficiently defined to provide a rational basis for the
assessment of damages.’ [Citations.] ‘Where a contract is so

13
uncertain and indefinite that the intention of the parties in
material particulars cannot be ascertained, the contract is void
and unenforceable.’ [Citations.] ‘The terms of a contract are
reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the
existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.’
[Citations.] But ‘[i]f . . . a supposed “contract” does not provide a
basis for determining what obligations the parties have agreed to,
and hence does not make possible a determination of whether
those agreed obligations have been breached, there is no
contract.’ ” (Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at
p. 209.)
Consistent with these principles, “[a] loan commitment is
not binding on the lender unless it contains all of the material
terms of the loan, and either the lender’s obligation is
unconditional or the stated conditions have been satisfied. [¶]
When the commitment does not contain all of the essential terms,
. . . the prospective borrower cannot reasonably rely on the
commitment, and the lender is not liable for either a breach of
contract or promissory estoppel.” (11 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real
Estate (4th ed. 2025) § 35.9, fns. omitted; see Peterson
Development Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 103,
115 [holding a letter of commitment’s terms were uncertain and
no binding agreement existed].) “The material terms of a loan
include the identity of the lender and borrower, the amount of the
loan, and the terms for repayment.” (Peterson Development Co. v.
Torrey Pines Bank, supra, at p. 115; see also Laks v. Coast Fed.
Sav. & Loan Assn. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 885, 891 [describing
important terms missing from the commitment to include the
“payment schedules for each loan, identification of the security,
prepayment conditions, terms for interest calculations, loan

14
disbursement procedures, and rights and remedies of the parties
in case of default,” and affirming the trial court’s ruling
sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff’s promissory estoppel
claim].)
Schuman argues that the April 20, 2022 conditional loan
approval letter became an enforceable contract when he, by
May 3, 2022, performed 14 conditions precedent listed on the
borrower’s checklist. He argues in the alternative that the loan
agreement became binding when Citibank issued the
commitment on May 5, 2022.
The April 20, 2022 conditional loan approval letter did not
create a binding obligation on Citibank to provide a loan to
Schuman. Nor did Schuman’s alleged compliance with the 14
items listed on the borrower’s checklist by May 3, 2022 create a
binding contract. Both the letter and the checklist stated that
the approval was conditional and that Citibank was requesting
further financial information from Schuman, which it would then
need to evaluate and ensure he “maintain[ed] [his] continued
credit worthiness, and [could] provide acceptable collateral for
the mortgage loan.” Item 7 of 14 on the checklist stated,
“Approval is subject to [l]ender verification of the maximum
[l]oan to [v]alue which will be determined at the time of full loan
approval.” In other words, the borrower’s checklist advised
Schuman that Citibank was continuing to conduct its due
diligence before any final approval of the loan application.
Additionally, Citibank requested information for three other
properties owned by Schuman and noted that “[a]dditional
conditions may apply” upon receipt of that information. Thus,
the only conclusion one can draw from the April 20, 2022 letter
and checklist was that Citibank had not yet made a binding

15
commitment to fund the loan, nor would it until it had an
opportunity to evaluate the additional information Schuman
submitted. The terms to which Citibank would ultimately
agree—including the amount of cash to borrower, a term not even
stated in the conditional approval—were uncertain.
The May 5, 2022 mortgage loan commitment reinforces the
tentative and, thus, nonbinding nature of the parties’ back and
forth. It explained Citibank “reserve[d] the right to terminate
[the] commitment prior to the settlement of the loan in the event
of an adverse change in [Schuman’s] personal or financial status”
and “reserve[d] the right to cancel any conditional approval” if it
did not receive the requested information on time. (Italics
added.) It stated Schuman’s loan application “has been approved
subject to the terms and conditions set forth in this commitment
letter.” The attached checklist stated the items were required “to
complete the processing of [Schuman’s] real estate loan
application,” indicating that activity had not yet concluded and
Citibank’s evaluation continued. The checklist included that if
there were delinquent real estate taxes, “possible requalification
for the loan” may be required, again emphasizing the nonfinal
nature of the commitment.
The SAC alleged the commitment “contained no conditions
precedent to the formation of the final contract.” On appeal,
Schuman abandons that inaccurate characterization and admits
conditions precedent remained in the commitment, but argues
those conditions were “inconsequential” and could have been
performed at closing. He argues any claim that there was a
change in his personal or financial status was “patently false” or
involved facts known by Citibank all along. He further argues
that Citibank closing his HELOC and his deposit of $500,000 into

16
a Citibank account demonstrated that a binding agreement had
been formed pursuant to which the parties had partially
performed.
We do not agree that any remaining conditions precedent
in the commitment were inconsequential, or already known to
Citibank and satisfied, such that Schuman stated a breach of
contract claim. As stated above, a lender’s commitment may be
binding if it contains all the material terms of the loan, and
either the lender’s obligation is unconditional or the stated
conditions have been satisfied. (Peterson Development Co. v.
Torrey Pines Bank, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 115.) In
determining whether a term is material, “ ‘the question is
whether the indefinite promise is so essential to the bargain that
inability to enforce that promise strictly . . . makes it also unfair
to enforce the remainder of the agreement. The more important
the subject matter to be agreed upon, the more likely it is that
the uncertainty will prevent or hinder enforcement. If the
contract cannot be performed without settlement of the
undetermined point . . . the entire contract may fail.’ ”
(Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793,
813.)
Here, the amount of cash in hand to the borrower was an
essential term of the loan; indeed, Schuman argues it was “the
most material term.” Citibank’s closing disclosure offered a
$1.5 million loan, with an interest rate of 3.125 percent, fixed for
30 years—the very terms Schuman alleges in the SAC that
Citibank promised to him—and he rejected it because it
“contained new and materially different terms, namely” that the
cash to borrower had changed since the time of his loan estimate.
However, neither the conditional approval nor the commitment

17
stated how much cash to borrower Schuman could expect at the
time of closing and, thus, neither reflected a sufficiently definite
and enforceable contract. (Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc., supra, 141
Cal.App.4th at p. 209; Peterson Development Co. v. Torrey Pines
Bank, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 115; Laks v. Coast Fed. Sav. &
Loan Assn., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 891.)
We further reject Schuman’s claim that his deposit of
$500,000 into a Citibank account and the closure of his HELOC
constituted partial performance under an enforceable contract.
As just stated, there was no enforceable contract. These acts
were simply the performance of some of the conditions precedent
required prior to the formation of any contract. The deposit of
monies was required before closing as a condition of Citibank
agreeing to a lower interest rate and the HELOC needed to be
closed before or at the time of closing to ensure Citibank’s first
lien position on the property.
C. Fraud
The elements of fraud are (1) misrepresentation,
(2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce
reliance, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage.
(Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 32.)
“Fraud must be pleaded with specificity, to provide the
defendants with the fullest possible details of the charge so they
are able to prepare a defense to this serious attack. To withstand
a demurrer, the facts constituting every element of the fraud
must be alleged with particularity . . . . [Citation.] Even in a
case involving numerous oft-repeated misrepresentations, the
plaintiff must, at a minimum, set out a representative selection of
the alleged misrepresentations sufficient to permit the trial court
to ascertain whether the statements were material and otherwise

18
actionable.” (Goldrich v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties, Inc.
(1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 772, 782-783.) “ ‘This particularity
requirement necessitates pleading facts which “show how, when,
where, to whom, and by what means the representations were
tendered.” ’ ” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631,
645, italics omitted.)
Schuman argues that he pleaded fraud with the requisite
specificity. However, as to the misrepresentation element, the
SAC only alleged, “[The d]efendants repeatedly and intentionally
lied to [Schuman] regarding the amount of cash, almost $1
[million that] he would receive when the loan closed.”3 There are
no allegations indicating how, when, or by what means the
misrepresentations were tendered, such that they are insufficient
to ascertain whether a claim has been stated. (Lazar v. Superior
Court, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.)
The closing disclosure indicates only a single instance
whereby Citibank represented that the cash to Schuman would
be almost $1 million, and that was at the time of the loan
estimate. However, the loan estimate was provided early in the
loan process and, by its terms, was only an estimate, subject to

3 The SAC also alleged the defendants falsely represented
that Schuman would not have to continue to live in the Beverly
Property as a condition of the loan. Schuman does not discuss
this portion of his fraud claim on appeal and, thus, we consider
any argument relating to that alleged misrepresentation to be
forfeited. (Hurley v. Department of Parks & Recreation (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 634, 648, fn. 10.)

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change.4 As a matter of law, Schuman could not justifiably rely
on the loan estimate as a promise of the amount of cash he would
receive.
D. Promissory Estoppel
“ ‘[A] promise is an indispensable element of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel. The cases are uniform in holding that this
doctrine cannot be invoked and must be held inapplicable in the
absence of a showing that a promise had been made upon which
the complaining party relied to his prejudice . . . .” [Citation.]
The promise must, in addition, be ‘clear and unambiguous in its
terms.’ [Citation.] ‘Estoppel cannot be established from . . .
preliminary discussions and negotiations.’ ” (Garcia v. World
Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1044.)5

4 The Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.)
requires creditors to provide a loan estimate to a consumer no
later than the third business day after the creditor receives the
consumer’s application. (12 C.F.R. § 1026.19(e)(1)(iii)(A).) “[A]n
application consists of the submission of the consumer’s name,
the consumer’s income, the consumer’s social security number to
obtain a credit report, the property address, an estimate of the
value of the property, and the mortgage loan amount sought.”
(12 C.F.R. § 1026.2(a)(3)(ii).) Schuman does not allege that
Citibank failed to comply with lending laws. Federal law also
acknowledges that the amount of cash to the borrower (also
called “cash to close”) may change between the loan estimate and
the closing disclosures and therefore mandates that the creditor
identify the different amounts on the closing disclosure. (12
C.F.R. § 1026.38(e)(5).)
5 The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are: “(1) a
promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the
party to whom the promise is made; (3) his reliance must be both

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Consistent with the SAC’s allegations, Schuman argues,
“Citibank made a clear and unambiguous written promise to loan
Schuman $1[.5 million] at a fixed [interest] rate of 3.375[ percent]
with a [30]-year term.” As discussed above, however, Citibank’s
commitment was conditional and not a clear promise on which a
prospective borrower could reasonably rely.
Even if we assume Citibank made such a promise,
Schuman’s promissory estoppel claim fails because the amount of
cash out was not part of the specified promise. As evidenced by
the closing disclosure, Citibank acted in accordance with its
purported promise, offering Schuman a $1.5 million refinance
loan at an even better interest rate of 3.125 percent fixed for 30
years. Thus, Citibank did not fail to fulfill any such promise.
Rather, Schuman chose to reject that loan because he would not
receive approximately $1 million in cash from the loan as he had
hoped. Neither Schuman’s claim for promissory estoppel nor his
arguments on appeal concerning that claim assert that Citibank
made a clear and unambiguous promise to give him around $1
million in cash. We therefore treat any such argument as
forfeited. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [“ ‘ “When an appellant fails to raise a
point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument
and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived” ’ ”].)
E. Denial of Leave to Amend
Schuman did not ask the trial court for further leave to
amend, nor does he make that request on appeal. We therefore

reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the
estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” (Laks v. Coast Fed.
Sav. & Loan Assn., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 890.)

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find no abuse of discretion in the trial court sustaining the
demurrer without further leave to amend.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Citibank and Tyre-Karp are
awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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