People v. Parmach CA4/1

CourtListener 10797815CalctappFeb 23, 2026

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Filed 2/23/26 P. v. Parmach CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D087172

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF2302922)

ALMARA PARMACH,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Jason M. Armand, Judge. Affirmed.
James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C.
Cavalier, and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Almara Parmach appeals the judgment sentencing him to prison for
two years for making a criminal threat. He contends the evidence introduced
at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict and the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to classify the conviction as a misdemeanor
and by denying probation. We disagree with those contentions and affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Parmach and His Family
Parmach married F.P. in 2012 and moved with their four children from
Afghanistan to the United States in 2021. While they were living in
Anaheim, Parmach and F.P. had two more children (twins) in 2022. One of
Parmach’s cousins found a house for the family in Corona, and they moved
there in 2023.
B. Reports of Domestic Violence
Soon after the Parmachs moved to Corona, S.R., a volunteer who helps
immigrants from Afghanistan adjust to life in the United States, contacted
them to help. Several months later, F.P. called S.R. and asked for help with
learning how to drive. On June 21, 2023, the two went to a parking lot where
F.P. could practice. While F.P. was driving, S.R. noticed on F.P.’s forearm
two bleeding cuts, each about three inches long, and asked about them. F.P.
began to cry and said Parmach cut her with a broken plate. When S.R. asked
F.P. whether she wanted to go to a doctor, F.P said she was “scared” to do so
because Parmach said “he would hurt her” if she did. F.P. lifted her shirt to
show S.R. a scar from a knife wound Parmach had inflicted when they lived
in Afghanistan. F.P. also showed S.R. photographs of a knife wound he
inflicted on her hand and a bite wound he inflicted on their three-year-old
son’s face. S.R. told F.P. that she could contact the police, and F.P. said she

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was willing to do so. F.P. “was very scared to call the police” and wanted “to
give [Parmach] another chance” before doing so.
On June 30, 2023, when Parmach was out of town, F.P. summoned the
police to her house to report the domestic violence. After Officer Isaiah
Franco arrived, S.R. joined by speakerphone so that she could translate for
F.P., who did not speak English. F.P. described to Franco four separate
incidents of domestic violence and showed him photographs of corresponding
injuries. When Franco asked F.P. whether any weapons had been used to
hurt her, she showed him a kitchen knife. F.P. “was scared” when she talked
to Franco. S.R. heard F.P. report that Parmach “had told her I’ll kill you”
and “she believed that he would, indeed, kill her.” S.R. heard F.P. report that
when Parmach “hits their children and she tries to protect them, he would
hurt her.” S.R. heard F.P. report that “if she ever called the police [Parmach]
would kill them.”
On July 1, 2023, Sergeant Joseph Brown met F.P. and her children and
arranged forensic interviews for some of the children. Barbara Castro
interviewed Parmach’s daughters, A.P. and H.P.
A.P. was eight years old at the time of the interview. A.P. reported that
Parmach bit her brother R.P. on the face and threw her twin sisters on a bed
and hit them in the head when they were crying. A.P. said that Parmach
“hit” F.P.’s hand with a knife when he was angry. When Castro asked A.P.
whether she was “worried” about something, A.P. responded, “Yes,” and said
Parmach “told my mom that he’s gonna kill us if [she] calls the police.” After
Castro asked for more information about that, A.P. said that one night when
Parmach was “mad,” she “was looking downstairs” and heard him say to F.P.,
“I’m gonna kill you all if [you] tell the police.”

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H.P. was six years old at the time of the interview. H.P. reported that
she saw Parmach punch F.P. in the face so that “[h]er eyes got dark and
purple” and cut her with a knife. H.P. described another incident in which
Parmach cut F.P.’s hand with a knife. H.P. told Castro that “if my mom
call[s] the police, my dad will kill my mom.”
Brown interviewed F.P. on July 18, 2023. Mojdeh Farid participated in
the interview as a translator. F.P. reported several incidents during which
Parmach committed acts of physical violence against her or her children and
showed him photographs of related injuries. F.P. appeared “afraid” and
“reluctant” to report the incidents and told Brown “a couple of times she did
not want Mr. Parmach to be in trouble because of what she was telling
[him].” Farid described F.P.’s demeanor during the interview as “scared” and
“ashamed.”
C. Charges and Plea
The People charged Parmach with one count of torture (count 1; Pen.
Code, § 206; undesignated section references are to this code), two counts of
willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse (counts 2 & 4; § 273.5,
subd. (a)), two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (counts 3 & 5; § 245,
subd. (a)(1)), one count of making a criminal threat (count 6; § 422, subd. (a)),
and three counts of willful infliction of injury on a child (counts 7–9; § 273a,
subd. (a)). The People alleged great bodily injury enhancements on counts 2
through 5 (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) and on count 7 (id., subd. (d)). They alleged
three aggravating sentencing circumstances (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(1)–(3)).
Parmach pled not guilty to all charges and denied all allegations.

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D. Trial
The case proceeded to a jury trial. The prosecutor called F.P. as a
witness. She denied Parmach committed any of the violent acts she had
reported to S.R. or to law enforcement. F.P. testified, “This is all a
misunderstanding . . . . [M]y husband didn’t do anything to me. This was a
mistranslation . . . . Everything I said is twisted.” F.P. specifically denied
reporting to law enforcement that Parmach said to her, “If you call the police,
I will kill you.” F.P. testified, “Nothing like that happened. . . . [T]hey
misunderstood.” The prosecutor also called A.P. and S.P. as witnesses. They
both denied Parmach committed any of the violent acts they had reported to
Castro. A.P. testified she did not remember telling Castro she heard
Parmach “say he was going to kill your family if you called the police,” and
responded, “No,” when asked whether she “ever heard him say that.” H.P.
testified she did not remember talking to Castro and responded, “No,” when
asked whether she had “ever seen your dad use angry words at your mom.”
The prosecutor called S.R., Franco, Castro, Brown, and Farid as witnesses,
and they testified about the incidents of domestic violence F.P. or the
children had reported to them as summarized in part I.B., ante.
Parmach called himself and four of his relatives as witnesses. Parmach
denied he caused any injuries to F.P. or their children. He also denied telling
F.P. he would kill her and the children if she called the police. The relatives
testified they spent time with the Parmach family and never observed any
abuse.
The jury found Parmach guilty of making a criminal threat (count 6).
It found him not guilty on all other counts.
The trial court held a bench trial on the alleged aggravating sentencing
circumstances. The court granted the People’s motion to withdraw two of

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them (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2), (3)) and found the remaining one
true (id., rule 4.421(a)(1)).
D. Sentencing
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Parmach’s requests to
reduce the criminal threat conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor (§ 17,
subd. (b)) and to grant him probation (§ 1203). In support of those decisions,
the court stated:
“[T]he [c]ourt finds that this crime did involve the threat of great
violence to a member of his family, his wife. . . . I do find that
his wife was particularly vulnerable. She’s new to this country.
She doesn’t speak the language and she was not able to drive.
And I also find that Mr. Parmach . . . took advantage of a position
of trust in the actions of threatening [her].

“The [c]ourt does find the factor in mitigation, however. Mr.
Parmach has no criminal history.

“The [c]ourt finds the factors in aggravation outweigh the factors
in mitigation . . . .

“Threatening to kill his wife and children as she reported
allegations of domestic violence to law enforcement, making those
threats to a woman who doesn’t speak the language, is new to
this country, doesn’t understand the mechanisms and
institutions in place for a person in her position, I think,
outweigh against reducing this to a misdemeanor.”

The court then sentenced Parmach to prison for the middle term of two years.
(§§ 18, subd. (a), 422, subd. (a).)
II.
DISCUSSION
Parmach challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction of making a criminal threat. He also challenges the trial court’s
decision to sentence him to prison for a felony rather than to grant him
probation for a misdemeanor. We address each challenge in turn.

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A. Sufficiency of Evidence
Parmach argues the testimony the People presented at trial did not
establish he made a threat. He also argues the statement on which the
People relied did not satisfy two of the required elements of the offense.
Parmach contends the evidentiary insufficiency requires reversal of the
judgment. We disagree.
Our review is deferential on a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction. We review the record in the light most
favorable to the People to determine whether the record contains substantial
evidence (i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value) from
which the jury reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 451; People v.
Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874, 898.) We presume in support of the
conviction every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the evidence,
including logical inferences from circumstantial evidence. (People v. Flores
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411 (Flores); People v. Pierce (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th
508, 523 (Pierce).) The conviction must be upheld unless there is no
substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict under any hypothesis.
(People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87; People v. Webb (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 660, 668.)
We first consider Parmach’s argument the People did not present
sufficient evidence he made a threat. Parmach says “the only evidence
supporting the criminal threat allegation” was the following testimony of S.R.
about F.P.’s report of domestic violence to police:
“Q. Okay. Did you hear [F.P.] say that if she called the police,
[Parmach] said that he would kill her?

“A. Can you repeat that?

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“Q. Did you hear [F.P.] say that if she ever called the police that
[Parmach] would kill them.

“A. Yes.

Parmach contends “it is not clear from [S.R.’s] testimony that Parmach even
made a threat.” He also contends S.R.’s testimony was not an “inconsistent
statement” that could constitute substantial evidence because at trial F.P.
“was not asked whether Parmach threatened to kill her and the children if
she went to the police,” and therefore “the jury had no opportunity to compare
the credibility of [her] out-of-court statement with her testimony in court.”
Parmach argues S.R.’s “uncorroborated” testimony was not substantial
evidence that he made a criminal threat. Several flaws in this argument
require us to reject it.
First, the testimony of S.R. quoted above was not the only evidence the
People presented to prove that Parmach made a threat. S.R. also testified
she heard F.P. report to police that Parmach “had told her I’ll kill you.” The
People introduced Castro’s recorded interviews of two of Parmach’s
daughters, A.P. and H.P. A.P. reported that when Parmach “was mad” she
heard him say to F.P., “I’m gonna kill you all if [you] tell the police.” H.P.

told Castro that “if my mom call[s] the police, my dad will kill my mom.”1

1 Parmach claims “[t]he children’s statements are too untrustworthy to
be considered substantial evidence.” He says they were very young when
they heard the threats, A.P. was in bed trying to sleep when she heard the
threat, H.P. confused the threat with Parmach’s arrest, and both recanted at
trial. But in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we resolve neither
credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th
1149, 1181.) Resolution of those matters is the exclusive province of the jury.
(People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 827–828.) Since the children’s
statements to Castro did not describe anything physically impossible or
inherently improbable, the jury could rely on them to find Parmach guilty.
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Parmach’s statement he would kill F.P. was an “ ‘ “ ‘expression of an intent to
inflict evil, injury, or damage on another’ ” ’ ” and thus qualified as a criminal
threat. (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 233; see People v. Wilson
(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789, 805 [criminal threat is “ ‘expression of an intent
to inflict serious evil upon another person’ ”]; People v. Dias (1997) 52
Cal.App.4th 46, 49 [defendant’s statement that “if [victim] called the police,
[defendant] would come back and kill him” was threat within scope of § 422].)
Second, Parmach did not object to the admissibility of S.R.’s testimony
or Castro’s recorded interviews of A.P. and H.P. Their statements of what
Parmach said to F.P. were “made other than by a witness while testifying at
[trial] and [were] offered to prove the truth of the matter stated” and
therefore constituted hearsay, which is generally inadmissible. (Evid. Code,
§ 1200.) When admitted without objection, however, hearsay is competent
evidence sufficient to sustain a finding or judgment. (Gallagher v. Connell
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1268; People v. Wren (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d
368, 369.) Parmach may not now argue the evidence does not fall within the
exception to the hearsay rule for a witness’s prior inconsistent statement
(Evid. Code, § 1235) and its erroneous admission requires reversal of the
judgment (id., § 353, subd. (a) [no reversal of judgment for erroneous
admission of evidence absent timely and specific objection, motion to exclude,
or motion to strike]). “The lack of timely objection to the hearsay rendered it
competent evidence and removes all power in this court to reverse.”
(Frudden Enterprises, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984)
153 Cal.App.3d 262, 269.)

(People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 280; People v. Gaines (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 91, 138–139 (Gaines).)
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Third, even if Parmach could now make the argument that the hearsay
exception did not apply, we would reject it. A statement inconsistent with a
witness’s trial testimony is not inadmissible under the hearsay rule if the
witness had an opportunity to explain or to deny the statement while
testifying. (Evid. Code, §§ 770, subd. (a), 1235; People v. Chhoun (2021)
11 Cal.5th 1, 44.) When F.P. testified at trial, she denied telling police that
Parmach said he would kill her if she called the police. A.P. testified at trial
that she did not remember telling Castro that she heard Parmach “say he
was going to kill your family if you called the police” and that she never
heard him say that. H.P. testified at trial that she never observed Parmach
“use angry words at [F.P.]” and did not remember talking to Castro. F.P.’s
trial testimony contradicted what S.R. earlier heard F.P. tell police, and the
testimony of A.P. and H.P. contradicted their earlier statements to Castro.
The prior statements were thus admissible to prove their substance, i.e., that
Parmach threatened to kill F.P. if she called the police, and the statements
constituted substantial evidence he made the threat. (People v. Barrett
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 897, 973; People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1144;
Gaines, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 138.)
Next, Parmach argues the People did not prove his alleged threat to kill
F.P. if she called the police was, “on its face and under the circumstances in
which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and
specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an
immediate prospect of execution of the threat.” (§ 422, subd. (a).) Parmach
says there is “no ability to judge whether [this] element was proved” because
“[n]o testimony was introduced to show the circumstances of the threat
including the time, place and what happened before and after the statement.”
We are not persuaded.

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Whether a threat is of the type that section 422 proscribes depends
largely on context. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 338–340; People v.
Choi (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 753, 761–762.) Relevant circumstances include
the defendant’s affect in uttering the threat (People v. Solis (2001)
90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1013) and past violence by the defendant against the
victim (People v. Gaut (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1432). A.P. told Castro
that Parmach was at home at night and “was mad” when he threatened to
kill F.P. if she called the police. F.P. told S.R. that Parmach cut F.P.’s
forearm with a broken plate and that she was “scared” to seek medical
attention because Parmach said “he would hurt her” if she did. F.P. also told
S.R. that Parmach had wounded her with a knife, and F.P. lifted her shirt to
reveal a scar from one of the wounds and shared photographs of another.
A.P. and H.P. reported other incidents in which Parmach violently injured

F.P.2 Under the circumstances disclosed at trial, his threat to kill her if she
called the police was “so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific
as to convey to [her], a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of
execution.” (§ 422, subd. (a); cf. People v. Hester (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 630,
633, 635 [angrily saying, “ ‘I’ll kill you,’ ” was criminal threat]; People v.

2 The jury’s acquittal of Parmach on the charges alleging physical
injuries to F.P. does not preclude our consideration of evidence of those
injuries in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the criminal
threat conviction on count 6. “An acquittal of one or more counts shall not be
deemed an acquittal of any other count.” (§ 954.) “As a general rule,
inherently inconsistent verdicts are allowed to stand.” (People v. Avila (2006)
38 Cal.4th 491, 600.) Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the guilty verdict on count 6 “should be independent of the jury’s
determination that evidence on another count was insufficient.” (United
States v. Powell (1984) 469 U.S. 57, 67.) “Thus, in determining whether
substantial evidence supports the finding of guilt for count [6], we give no
effect to the jury’s verdict[s] on [other counts].” (People v. Brugman (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 608, 632 (Brugman).)
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Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1433–1434 [husband’s statement to
wife, “ ‘I’ll kill you now if you’ ” do not answer certain questions, was criminal
threat]; People v. Martinez (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1215, 1221 [angrily
saying, “ ‘I’ll get you,’ ” in close proximity “can be very intimidating and can
carry an aura of serious danger”].)
In his last argument against the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the criminal threat conviction, Parmach contends the People did not prove
F.P. was “in sustained fear for [her] own safety or for [her] immediate
family’s safety.” (§ 422, subd. (a).) Parmach says “[t]he alleged threat did not
deter her from reporting her claims of domestic violence to the police,” and
she delayed the report not because he threatened her but because “she
wanted to give [him] another chance.” He asserts that F.P. “was free to
contact [S.R.]” and to learn how to drive and that he “did not control his
wife.” “F.P. felt afraid,” says Parmach, because she was “depress[ed]” and
“overwhelmed” by the challenge of raising a large family in a new country
with an unfamiliar culture, “and blaming her husband for abuse . . . was
more likely to bring her sympathy than complaining about her hard life.”
This argument is unconvincing.
The main flaw in the argument is that Parmach construes the evidence
in the light most favorable to him. When evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the People and accept all inferences the jury reasonably might
have drawn from the evidence. (Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 411; Pierce,
supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 523.) The People presented substantial evidence
that Parmach’s threat to kill F.P. if she called the police caused her “to be in
sustained fear.” (§ 422, subd. (a).) S.R. testified that when she met F.P. for
the driving lesson on June 21, 2023, F.P said she was “scared” to see a doctor

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for the cuts Parmach had inflicted on her forearm because Parmach said “he
would hurt her” if she did. F.P. was also “very scared to call the police.” She
delayed doing so until June 30, 2023, when Parmach was out of town. F.P.
testified she was “scared” when she talked to Franco, and S.R. heard F.P. tell
him that Parmach had threatened to kill her if she called the police. Brown
and Farid testified that F.P. still seemed “afraid” and “scared” during the
July 18, 2023 interview. From this testimony, the jury reasonably could have
found F.P. remained fearful for nearly a month. That amount of time
“extends beyond what is momentary, fleeting or transitory” (People v. Allen
(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156) and satisfies the “sustained fear” element
of making a criminal threat. (§ 422, subd. (a); Brugman, supra,
62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 634–635 [fear that lasted about a month was
“sustained”]; Allen, at p. 1156 [15 minutes of fear of armed defendant who
threatened to kill victim and her daughter was “more than sufficient” to
satisfy § 422].)
B. Sentencing Errors
Parmach claims the trial court erred by imposing a felony prison term
on his criminal threat conviction instead of treating the conviction as a
misdemeanor and granting him probation. He faults the court for focusing
exclusively on F.P.’s vulnerability and the great violence he threatened to
inflict on her. Parmach complains the court failed to consider the stress that
led F.P. falsely to blame him for her injuries and, in turn, provoked him to
threaten her life. He asks us to vacate the sentence and to remand the
matter for resentencing.
Before we address the merits of this claim of error, we dispose of the
People’s contention that Parmach forfeited the claim. The People argue he
may not challenge the court’s decision to sentence him to prison for the

13
middle term because he neither objected to that decision nor claimed any of
the sentencing factors the court relied on were improper or unsupported. The
People rely on the rule that “complaints about the manner in which the trial
court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting
reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 356.) That rule does not apply to Parmach’s claim of error. He
is not complaining in this court for the first time about the trial court’s
selection of the middle prison term rather than the lower term or the
adequacy of its statement of reasons for that selection. Rather, Parmach is
arguing, as he did in the trial court, that the court should have reduced his
conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor and granted him probation. He
adequately informed the People and the court of his position and thereby
preserved it for appeal. (People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1030–
1031; People v. Superior Court (Dorsey) (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1223–
1224.)
We now turn to the merits of Parmach’s claim of sentencing errors. His
conviction of making a criminal threat was punishable as either a felony or a
misdemeanor at the discretion of the trial court. (§§ 17, subds. (a), (b), 422,
subd. (a); People v. Queen (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 838, 842.) The court also
had discretion to grant or to deny probation. (§ 1203, subd. (b)(3); People v.
Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 216.) We will not disturb the court’s
discretionary sentencing decisions unless Parmach clearly shows they were
arbitrary, capricious, or irrational. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1996)
14 Cal.4th 968, 977–978 (Alvarez); People v. Kingston (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th
272, 278 (Kingston).) He has not made that showing as to either decision.
Factors relevant to the decision whether to treat the criminal threat
conviction as a felony or as a misdemeanor include the nature and

14
circumstances of the offense, Parmach’s appreciation of and attitude toward
the offense, his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and demeanor
at trial, and general sentencing objectives such as those listed in rule 4.410 of
the California Rules of Court. (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 978; People v.
Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1027–1028.) The parties discussed the
nature and circumstances of the offense, Parmach’s characteristics, and
sentencing objectives in their sentencing memoranda. The trial court
presided over Parmach’s trial and stated that in preparation for the
sentencing hearing it had reviewed the parties’ memoranda and its notes
from the trial. The court found that although Parmach had no criminal
history, he should be sentenced as a felon because the crime “involve[d] the
threat of great violence to a member of his family, his wife,” who “was
particularly vulnerable,” and in committing the crime he “took advantage of a
position of trust.” The record supports those findings. Parmach complains
the “court gave short shrift to the mitigating factors cited in [his] sentencing
brief.” But in deciding whether to reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor,
the court was not required “to reiterate [his] argument on the record.”
(Dryden, at p. 1029.) “The trial court stated that it had read [Parmach’s]
papers, and the record reflects a decision based on ‘individualized
consideration of the offense, the offender, and the public interest.’ [Citation.]
While the record here may also have supported a different conclusion, we find
no error in light of the deferential standard of review.” (Ibid.)
For similar reasons, we also find no error in the trial court’s decision to
deny probation. The “primary considerations” in deciding whether to grant
probation are public safety, the nature of the offense, the interests of justice
in punishment and rehabilitation of the defendant, the victim’s loss, and the
defendant’s needs. (§ 1202.7.) Rule 4.414 of the California Rules of Court

15
prescribes more detailed criteria for the court’s consideration. Parmach
addressed those criteria in his sentencing memorandum, which the court said
it had reviewed. The court mentioned some of the criteria at the sentencing
hearing, including “[t]he nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the
crime”; “[t]he vulnerability of the victim”; “[w]hether the defendant took
advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the crime”; and
“[p]rior record of criminal conduct.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.414(a)(1), (3),
(9), (b)(1).) Although the court did not mention other criteria Parmach relied
on in his sentencing memorandum, we presume the court considered them in
making its decision. (See id., rule 409 [sentencing judge is deemed to have
considered prescribed criteria unless record affirmatively shows otherwise].)
We reject Parmach’s assertion that “the court did not engage with all the
facts that should have informed its decision.” We conclude the trial court
considered the facts relevant to the offense and the offender and did not act
arbitrarily, capriciously, or irrationally in denying probation. (Kingston,
supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 278; People v. Stuart (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 165,
178–179.)

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III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

IRION, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

CASTILLO, J.

RUBIN, J.

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