CourtListener 10796917•People v. Hall CA1/1
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Filed 2/20/26 P. v. Hall CA1/1
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A165406
v.
GARY MARCUS HALL, (Del Norte County
Super. Ct. No. CRF219022)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Gary Marcus Hall pleaded no contest to two counts of
committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years (Pen.
Code, § 288, subd. (a)).1 Consistent with the negotiated disposition, the trial
court sentenced him to 10 years in state prison, which included the upper
term on one of the counts.
Defendant appealed asserting (1) the trial court (and the parties)
mistakenly assumed he was presumptively ineligible for probation, (2) the
court erred in finding aggravating factors that had not been pled, and (3) the
court erred in finding these aggravating factors in the absence of his personal
waiver of his right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. We rejected
each of defendant’s arguments and affirmed the judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1
otherwise indicated.
1
As to his third assertion—that he did not personally waive his Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial2—we affirmed on two grounds. First, we held
defendant had, in fact, waived his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial on
aggravating factors. Second, we held the trial court had, in any case, relied
on at least one permissibly established aggravating factor—defendant’s
multiple convictions3—and therefore, under People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th
799 (Black II),4 the aggravated sentence was not constitutionally infirm.
Defendant sought review by our Supreme Court of both grounds. The court
granted review and deferred further action “pending consideration and
disposition of a related issue in People v. Lynch, S274942 (see Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court.” (People v.
Hall (Hall), S283530, Supreme Ct. Mins., Feb. 28, 2024.)
In its subsequently issued its opinion in People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch), the high court majority held the court’s earlier
analysis in Black II is no longer sound given recent amendments to
section 1170, subdivision (b). (Lynch, at pp. 756–757.) Rather, section 1170,
subdivision (b) now requires that “the facts supporting every aggravating
circumstance upon which the trial court relies to ‘justify’ imposition of the
upper term must be properly proven as the statute requires.” (Lynch, at
p. 757.) Accordingly, “under the current statute a Sixth Amendment
2 He expressly disavowed any reliance on the then-recently enacted
statutory right to jury trial under section 1170, subdivision (b).
3 Known as the “recidivist factor,” it is set forth in California Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(b)(2) which states: “The defendant’s prior convictions as an
adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are
numerous or of increasing seriousness.” All further references to the “rules”
are to the California Rules of Court.
4 Overruled in People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1084 (Wiley).
2
violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to
impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied
on have been properly established.” (Lynch, at p. 768.) And any such
“violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating
facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that
those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current
statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying
the Chapman[5] standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for
resentencing.” (Lynch, at p. 768.) The court went on to “disapprove People v.
Hall [(2023)] 97 Cal.App.5th [1101], 1104–1108, People v. Ruiz [(2023)]
97 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1076–1078, People v. Falcon [(2023)] 92 Cal.App.5th
911, 938–939, People v. Butler [(2023)] 89 Cal.App.5th 953, 960, People v.
Lewis [(2023)] 88 Cal.App.5th 1125, People v. Ross [(2022)] 86 Cal.App.5th
1346 . . . , People v. Dunn [(2022)] 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 407, People v. Zabelle
[(2022)] 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1110–1113, People v. Lopez [(2022)]
78 Cal.App.5th 459, 467, footnote 11, and People v. Flores [(2022)]
75 Cal.App.5th 495, 500, to the extent they are inconsistent with today’s
opinion.” (Id. at pp. 768–769.)
The high court thereafter transferred the instant case back to us “with
directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of” Lynch.
(Hall, supra, S283530, Supreme Ct. Mins., June 12, 2025.) As the court did
not grant review in Lynch on the issue of jury trial waiver, nor did the court
grant review on that issue in the instant case, we again affirmed his
aggravated sentence, but on the ground of jury waiver, alone. We
subsequently granted rehearing to consider new case authority submitted by
5 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman).
3
defendant on that issue. Having done so, we again affirm his aggravated
sentence.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY6
Defendant, a registered sex offender, was friends, and resided, with the
two victims’ grandfather.7 The victims were under the age of 14 at the time
of the molestations. One recalled approximately 20 incidents of abuse,
including instances of defendant fondling his penis, masturbating him, and
orally copulating him. The last incident occurred when he was 12 or 13 years
old. The other victim recalled four instances where defendant molested him
when he was under or around 10 years old. Defendant variously sodomized
him, lay in bed with him and pulled down his underwear, and grabbed his
penis over his clothes.
In 2021, the People charged defendant with sodomy of a child 10 years
old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a)); two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a
child (§ 288.5, subd. (a)); and failure to register as a sex offender (§ 290.018).
The continuous sexual abuse counts included an enhancement allegation of a
prior conviction of section 288 (§ 667.51, subd. (a)). Defendant faced a
potential sentence of 25 years to life on the sodomy count, 16 years each on
the continuous abuse counts plus five years each for the related
enhancements, and one year on the failure to register count—in sum, 68
years to life.
6 We discuss pertinent factual and procedural details in our discussion
of the issues before us.
7 Our factual summary is based in part on the transcript of the
preliminary hearing, which the parties stipulated provided a factual basis for
defendant’s plea.
4
At the preliminary hearing, the trial court admitted evidence of a 1995
misdemeanor conviction for violation of section 288, subdivision (c)—lewd or
lascivious acts on a child 14 or 15 years old—which required defendant to
register as a sex offender.
Shortly before trial, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, the People
filed an amended information, adding two felony counts of committing lewd
acts upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a))—one count for each
victim—to which defendant pleaded no contest. As summarized on the
change of plea form, the disposition provided that the trial court “could grant
probation with time in jail all the way up to 10 years in prison (base term
plus 1/3 the middle term for the 2nd count if ran [sic] consecutive).”
Defendant initialed the provision of the form that stated, “I understand that I
am not eligible for probation in this case. [P]resumptively ineligible.” We
discuss further details about the change of plea form and the plea and
sentencing hearings, infra, at pages 16–19.
Prior to accepting defendant’s no contest pleas, the court reviewed the
plea form with him and defendant personally confirmed that he read and
understood it and had given up all the rights as stated therein, including his
“right to have a jury trial.” Counsel then stipulated that the preliminary
hearing transcript could be used as a factual basis for the plea, with defense
counsel stating defendant was “not admitting guilt in any way.” The trial
court then proceeded to admonish defendant that the disposition included his
giving up his rights, including the right to jury trial, and defendant expressly
stated, “Yes,” he was giving up that right. At the sentencing hearing, both
the prosecutor and defense counsel confirmed the trial court would consider
all sentencing factors, both mitigating and aggravating.
5
Victim statements were given by a close friend of the victims’
grandmother, who had known the victims all their lives, and one of the
victims appeared.
The prosecution urged the court to impose the upper term, pointing out
“[i]t only takes one factor [in aggravation] under the case law to—for the
Court to do an aggravated sentence.” He then urged the court to find
applicable all the factors in aggravation recommended in the probation
report, as well as several additional aggravating factors. The probation
officer emphasized the “long-term emotional, mental, and psychological
ramifications” for the victims.
At the conclusion of the prosecution’s presentation, defendant spoke,
stating “The kids are lying. I have said that from the beginning, and I still
say it. . . . [T]heir behavior isn’t from anything I have done. They have been
rotten behavior from the get-go. . . . [¶] . . . They didn’t like the way I
disciplined. . . . [¶] It’s not me that didn’t show remorse. I didn’t do it. . . .”
Defense counsel agreed her client had maintained he was innocent from “day
one,” and acknowledged “he is angry; he is upset.” She also acknowledged
that his prior section 288 conviction “made this a very difficult case,” and
stated the only reason he agreed to a negotiated disposition was to avoid the
risk of a potential life sentence. Counsel asked the court to consider a
midterm and not impose consecutive sentences; “[a]gain, my client is
adamant that he’s been falsely accused.”
The probation officer then provided further testimony, stating when he
asked defendant about his prior section 288 conviction, he said that case “was
all lies, and he was railroaded in that case.” “[F]or some reason the young
men in this case as well as the counselors in that [prior case] were out to get
him for some reason.”
6
The court found defendant ineligible for probation and further found no
mitigating factors and seven aggravating factors set forth in rule 4.421.
Commenting that the aggravating circumstances “far, far outweigh” the
circumstances in mitigation, the court sentenced defendant to a 10-year
prison term, comprised of the upper term of eight years for count 5 and two
years (one-third of the six-year middle term) for count 6. The remaining
counts were dismissed.
DISCUSSION
Ineligibility for Probation
On appeal, defendant maintained the trial court (and counsel) erred in
assuming he was presumptively ineligible for probation under section 1203,
subdivision (e)(5), as stated in the sentencing report. Defendant pointed out
section 1203, subdivision (e)(5) provides such a presumption only where there
has been a prior conviction of section 288 as a felony, and he was convicted of
violating section 288 as a misdemeanor. On remand, defendant made no new
challenge as to this issue, and our opinion remains unchanged on this point.
Accordingly, while defendant is correct that his misdemeanor
conviction did not give rise to a presumption of ineligibility for probation, he
made no objection at the time of sentencing to the court’s invocation of such
presumption and therefore waived the issue on appeal. (See People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353.) Recognizing this was likely the case,
defendant alternatively advanced a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The standard of review for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
well established. “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
7
performance prejudiced the defense.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 687.) However, “a court need not determine whether counsel’s
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” (Id. at p. 697.) Indeed, it is
often easier to dispose of such a claim based on lack of sufficient prejudice
alone. (Ibid.) To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the
petitioner must carry his burden of proving prejudice as a ‘demonstrable
reality,’ not simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of
counsel.” (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937, quoting People v.
Stephenson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 652, 661.)
We agreed with the Attorney General that defendant could not show
prejudice attributable to the asserted ineffectiveness of counsel. “The
standard for analyzing prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
mirrors the state standard for prejudicial error. (Richardson v. Superior
Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050–1051. . . .) That is, ‘a “miscarriage of
justice” should be declared only when the court, “after an examination of the
entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error.’ (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836. . . .)” (People v. Lepere (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 727, 738.)
We therefore concluded, and continue to conclude, there is no
reasonable probability a result more favorable to defendant would have
ensued had counsel urged that defendant was eligible, and not presumptively
ineligible, for probation. First, defendant was, in fact, wholly ineligible, not
merely presumptively ineligible, for probation pursuant to section 1203.066,
subdivision (a)(5) and (7). These provisions state, “Notwithstanding Section
1203 or any other law, probation shall not be granted to . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (5) A
8
person who is convicted of committing a violation of Section 288 or 288.5 and
who has been previously convicted of a violation of Section 261, 264.1, 266,
266c, 267, 285, 286, 287, 288, 288.5, or 289, or former Section 262 or 288a . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] [or] (7) A person who is convicted of committing a violation of
Section 288 or 288.5 against more than one victim.” (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(5),
(7).) Second, even if defendant was fully eligible, there was no reasonable
probability the court would have granted probation, given the court’s
statements at the sentencing hearing and its imposition of the maximum
allowable sentence under the terms of the plea agreement.
“Pleading” Aggravating Factors
On appeal, defendant maintained the then-recent amendments to
section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) made by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg
Sess.) require the prosecution to “plead” any aggravating factors it intends to
urge at sentencing. After defendant filed his opening brief, the Court of
Appeal in People v. Pantaleon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 932, 939–941
(Pantaleon),8 addressed and rejected this same contention. We agreed, and
continue to agree, with the analysis in Pantaleon, which points out there is a
significant distinction between “enhancements,” which section 1170.1,
subdivision (e) requires “shall be alleged in the accusatory pleading”
(§ 1170.1, subd. (e)) and “ ‘circumstances in aggravation’ ” addressed by
section 1170, subdivision (b), which does not contain a like mandate.
(Pantaleon, at pp. 939–940; see Chavez Zepeda v. Superior Court (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 65, 96–97 & fn. 8 (Chavez Zepeda) [amended statute does not
require prosecutor to present evidence supporting aggravating factors at
8Disapproved on another ground in Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
pages 1077–1078, 1085–1086.
9
preliminary hearing].) In short, as Pantaleon explains, defendant’s sentence
was not constitutionally or statutorily infirm due to failure to allege
sentencing factors in aggravation.
In his petition for rehearing of our decision on appeal, defendant urged
that we had misperceived his argument as one based solely on recent
amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), and his argument was, in
fact, based “on a line of California cases” like People v. Mancebo (2002)
27 Cal.4th 735, and therefore Pantaleon was inapposite. In Mancebo, our
Supreme Court reiterated that “a defendant has a cognizable due process
right to fair notice of the specific sentence enhancement allegations that will
be invoked to increase punishment for his crimes.” (Id. at p. 747, italics
added.) But as the court in Pantaleon explained, there is a long-recognized
distinction between sentencing enhancements and aggravating factors.
(Pantaleon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 939, 941.) Pantaleon therefore
rejected the defendant’s “constitutional theory of error” that he had not only a
statutory right to pleading notice of aggravating factors, but also a “fair
notice” due process right to pleading notice of factors in aggravation. (Id. at
pp. 940–941.) Indeed, the appellate court observed the “defendant’s
constitutional theory of error [was] foreclosed by binding [Supreme Court]
authority.” (Id. at p. 941, citing In re Varnell (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1132, 1135,
1141–1142.)
In his supplemental brief on remand following the high court’s decision
in Lynch, defendant acknowledged the court had not addressed the issue of
“ ‘pleading and notice’ ” of aggravating factors. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 769.) Nevertheless, defendant urged us to revisit the issue in light of
“subsequent developments” (capitalization & boldface omitted) in several
other cases. We declined to do so.
10
To begin with, although defendant sought review of the pleading issue,
the high court did not take it up in either Lynch, or more significantly, the
instant case. Our charge on remand is to reconsider the matter only as
ordered by the Supreme Court—that is, in light of Lynch. “When a case is
transferred or remanded to the [C]ourt of [A]ppeal for further proceedings,
the scope of the [C]ourt of [A]ppeal’s jurisdiction is determined by the
[S]upreme [C]ourt’s decision or order.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide:
Civil Appeals & Writs (The Rutter Group December 2024 Updated)
¶13:202.2, citing Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688,
701 [the order of the reviewing court contained in its remittitur “defines the
scope of the jurisdiction of the court to which the matter is returned,” and the
“ ‘ “lower court cannot reopen the case on the facts, allow the filing of
amended or supplemental pleadings, nor retry the case” ’ ”]; see Boermeester
v. Carry (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 383, 386 [Supreme Court remanded matter
with “clear instructions,” and “[w]e are bound by these instructions”].) The
high court transferred this matter back to us to us with “directions to vacate”
our decision “and reconsider the cause in light” of Lynch. Nothing in the
court’s order suggests we should revisit our conclusion that defendant’s
sentence is not constitutionally infirm due to lack of pleading aggravating
factors.
In any case, in Lynch, the high court commented briefly on the
defendant’s “notice” argument advanced in opposing any prejudice analysis
(under either Chapman or Watson) on “due process” grounds and rejected it
11
for reasons that suggest there is no constitutionally mandated pleading
requirement.9
Additionally, none of the cases defendant cited in his supplemental
briefing reached a conclusion different than did Pantaleon as to pleading
aggravating factors. While subsequent cases have criticized and parted
company with Pantaleon on the issues decided to the contrary in Lynch, no
case has disagreed with Pantaleon’s holding as to pleading aggravating
factors. (See Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 1085–1086 [disapproving
9 The high court first observed, “When a statute includes specific
pleading and proof requirements, ‘the People’s failure to include a multiple-
victim-circumstance allegation must be deemed a discretionary charging
decision’ which ‘restrict[s] the trial court to this application.’ ” (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 752.) It went on to explain, “Because Lynch was tried and
sentenced under the 2007 version of section 1170, this case does not directly
present issues of pleading and notice. Accordingly, it is not necessary for us
to decide exactly what the statute and the federal Constitution demand in
this context. But to the extent pleading and notice issues bear on whether a
prejudice analysis is appropriate, we find the situation here to be different
from [the due process cases cited by the defendant], rendering them
distinguishable. [¶] Each of the substantive offenses of which Lynch was
convicted was charged in the information. The Penal Code gave notice of the
applicable sentencing range for each offense. The statutory structure, case
law, and California Rules of Court set out the contours of the hearing process.
The probation report and the People’s statement in aggravation advised
Lynch of all the aggravating circumstances that the court could rely upon to
impose the upper sentence. All the aggravating circumstances actually relied
on by the court have long been set out in the Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421.) Parties regularly discuss their presence or absence during
plea negotiations and consider them in preparation for a sentencing hearing.
In short, Lynch had notice of potentially aggravating circumstances, had the
opportunity to contest them at the sentencing hearing, and actually did
contest three of the factors. Moreover, because the previous sentencing
structure did not require that aggravating circumstances be set out in the
charging document, the People’s failure to plead and prove them cannot be
‘deemed a discretionary charging decision.’ ” (Id. at pp. 752–753.)
12
Pantaleon to the extent it is inconsistent with the high court’s holding in
Lynch that “a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts,
other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the
defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily
provided midterm” (fn. omitted)]; Chavez Zepeda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 92–97 [recognizing distinction between enhancements and aggravating
factors, and holding aggravating circumstances need not be supported by
evidence at the preliminary hearing]; Lovelace v. Superior Court (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1105 [holding “residual clause” (rule 4.421(c)) exceeds
legislative delegation of authority to the Judicial Council under section
1170.3 and thus violates the separation of powers clause of the California
Constitution].)10 In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 725, which defendant
also cited, does not take issue with any of these cases. Rather, the court in
that case addressed the specifics of the One Strike law, holding the
prosecution must include allegations informing the defendant of its intent to
10 Defendant points to the following language in Justice Goldman’s
concurring opinion in Lovelace: “[S]ubdivision (b)(2) of section 1170 provides
that, ‘upon request of the defendant, trial on the circumstances in
aggravation alleged in the indictment or information shall be bifurcated from
the trial of charges and enhancements.’ As noted above, the People contend
that this language establishes a pleading requirement for aggravating
factors, including enumerated ones. Although at least one court has found
the language ambiguous on that score (see [Pantaleon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th
at p.] 940 . . .), it seems to me that the People’s reading is correct; while the
statute does not expressly say that circumstances in aggravation must be
alleged, it would defeat the Legislature’s purpose in requiring bifurcation if
the prosecution could avoid it simply by declining to plead them.” (Lovelace,
supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1118, conc. opn. by Goldman, J.)
However, this was not an issue addressed by the majority opinion.
And, unlike in Lovelace, the People make no such concession here.
13
invoke that sentencing scheme and the basis for doing so.11 (In re Vaquera,
at pp. 723–725.)
In sum, in the absence of any case holding that constitutional due
process requires that factors in aggravation be pleaded, we follow established
precedent to the contrary.
Constitutional Right to Jury Trial on Aggravating Factors
Defendant’s principal claim on appeal was that the aggravated term
imposed by the trial court was unlawful because he did not, himself and in
open court, waive his constitutional right to a jury trial on the facts
underlying the aggravated factors, as required by Cunningham v. California
(2007) 549 U.S. 270 (Cunningham) and Blakely v. Washington (2004)
542 U.S. 296 (Blakely).12 (See generally Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th 799, 816;
11 We also note that while the Legislature has amended a number of
sentencing statutes in the last several years, including section 1170, it has
made no further amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) in light of
Pantaleon. (See People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792, fn. 7 [noting
Legislature had taken no action to abrogate longstanding case law, although
“it easily could have done” so]; Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1156 [“ ‘ “[w]here a statute has been construed by
judicial decision, and that construction is not altered by subsequent
legislation, it must be presumed that the Legislature is aware of the judicial
construction” ’ ”; “Legislature’s failure to amend [statute] while not
conclusive, ‘may be presumed to signify legislative acquiescence’ ” in court’s
prior opinion].)
12 At oral argument, counsel reiterated that defendant was advancing
only a constitutional claim under the Sixth Amendment and was not
challenging his aggravated sentence under section 1170, as amended by
Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.).
14
Couzens et al., Sentencing California Crimes (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 10:1
et seq.)
Federal constitutional precedent establishes that “ ‘[o]ther than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Apprendi [v. New Jersey (2000)] 530 U.S. [466,]
490 . . . [(Apprendi)].)” (Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 814.) The “relevant
‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after
finding additional facts, but the maximum [the judge] may impose without
any additional findings.” (Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 303–304.)
There are two exceptions to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial on aggravating facts—facts admitted by the defendant and the fact
of a prior conviction. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 836–837
(Sandoval),13 citing Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 301, 303; Apprendi, supra,
530 U.S. at p. 490; see Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1086 [“a defendant is
entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a
prior conviction and its elements”].) Otherwise, the defendant must
personally waive his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial in order for the trial
court to find aggravating circumstances that increase the defendant’s
sentence beyond the statutory maximum. (Wiley, at p. 1086; Black II, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 816; People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47–48 (French).)
In our opinion prior to the Supreme Court’s grant of review, we firstly
held, that under well-established precedent, including controlling authority
by our high court, defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
13 Superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at page 757.
15
constitutional right to a jury trial, including as to aggravating factors, and his
aggravated sentence is constitutionally permissible for that reason, alone.
We secondly held, as an additional ground for affirmance, that even if
defendant did not waive his constitutional jury trial right, the trial court
found at least one aggravating factor—recidivism pursuant to rule
4.421(b)(2)—on a basis consistent with the Sixth Amendment and therefore,
under Black II, his aggravated sentence was not constitutionally infirm.
Although, the court in Lynch rejected our second holding (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 761), our first ground for upholding defendant’s aggravated
sentence—that he did waive his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial—
remains unimpeached by Lynch.14
Defendant nevertheless asked us on remand to reconsider our
threshold determination that he waived his constitutional right to jury trial
on the aggravating circumstances. We declined to do so. Rather, we
reiterated that we would reconsider the appeal as ordered by the Supreme
Court—that is in light of Lynch. (See discussion, ante, at p. 12.) We
therefore adopted and set forth our prior discussion of defendant’s waiver of
his constitutional right to jury trial.
We again recite the facts and circumstances pertinent to the issue of
jury trial waiver. Following the preliminary hearing and just prior to trial,
the parties reached a negotiated disposition, and in accordance therewith
14 In fact, the high court observed in Lynch that the defendant in that
case had neither been asked “to expressly waive jury trial on aggravating
circumstances” nor to “stipulate to the facts underlying any of the
aggravating circumstances listed by the trial court in support of its upper
term sentence,” and thus the court had “no occasion . . . to address the
conditions applicable to waiver and stipulation.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 769.)
16
defendant executed a felony change of plea form. Among other provisions of
the plea form, he initialed the provision stating, “I understand that the Court
will not decide whether to accept a plea or sentence bargain or to impose
sentence or extend probation until a Probation Officer makes an investigation
and reports on my background, prior record (if any) and the circumstances of
the case.”
He additionally initialed the provisions of the form waiving his rights,
to among other things, a jury trial. These provisions stated, in pertinent
part, “10. I understand that, as to each charge I plead to and each special
allegation and/or sentence enhancement I admit to be true, I have the
following rights: [¶] . . . [¶] b. A speedy and public trial by jury. [¶]
c. Representation by an attorney at all times. [¶] d. See, hear, and question
all witnesses who testify against me. [¶] . . . [¶] 11. I understand that by this
plea and any admissions I am making, I give up all the rights which are
listed above except the continuing right to be represented by an attorney.”
At the change of plea hearing, the prosecutor summarized the plea
agreement as follows: “A plea of no contest to Count 5 and a plea of no contest
to Count 6. All sentencing options would be open to the Court. The Court
could consider all aggravating factors. That’s the stipulation under
1170(b)”—a maximum potential exposure of 10 years. Defense counsel
agreed. Defendant also stated that was his understanding of the negotiated
disposition.
Prior to accepting defendant’s no contest pleas, the court reviewed the
plea form with him and defendant personally confirmed that he read and
understood it and had given up all the rights as stated therein, including his
“right to have a jury trial.” He also confirmed he had had time to discuss his
rights and defenses with his lawyer. Counsel, in turn, also assured the court
17
she was satisfied defendant “understands the consequences” of the no-contest
felony plea. Counsel further stipulated that the preliminary hearing
transcript could be used as a factual basis for the pleas, observing defendant
was “not admitting guilt in any way.”
The trial court proceeded to admonish defendant that “by entering into
this plea, you are giving up various rights,” including “the right to have a jury
trial.” The court additionally identified the rights to remain silent, to present
evidence, to confront his accusers, and to appeal any legal errors up to the
change of plea. After these admonishments, the court again asked defendant
if he “waive[d] these rights in order to enter into this deal that you have
worked out.” Defendant answered, “Yes.”
The prosecutor then asked that the minutes also specifically reflect “the
parties’ stipulation under Penal Code section 1170(b)(2) as to what the Court
can consider at sentencing,” and specifically that the court could consider “all
aggravating factors” “in [r]ule 4.421.” The court responded: “In other words,
you are talking about the parties stipulat[ing] that the Court can consider all
aggravating factors listed on the form?” Defense counsel agreed.
The court then proceeded to take defendant’s no contest pleas and
found them knowingly and voluntarily made, stating “I find you have done so
[i.e., pled to the felonies and waived his rights] here in open court, that you
understand the contents of the felony [plea form] as well as the penalty and
consequences.”
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor and defense counsel
confirmed that the negotiated disposition included that the trial court would
consider all sentencing factors, both aggravating and mitigating. Defense
counsel agreed there was a “[s]tip to all aggravating factors for the Court to
be considered,” so “[t]he options open to the Court are probation with jail time
18
all the way up to the ten years. And that would be the eight years with one-
third the middle term of two if the Court decided to run it consecutive.”
As our Supreme Court has explained, there is a distinction between
what is constitutionally required for a valid jury waiver and what may be
statutorily required under state law. (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th
151, 171 (Sivongxxay). In Sivongxxay, the defendant advanced two jury trial
arguments: one, that his waiver of a jury trial as to guilt had not been
sufficiently informed by a more detailed recitation of the rights he was
waiving, and two, that the jury trial advisements and colloquy prior to trial
had not made specific reference to the special circumstance allegation, which
the trial court, after finding defendant guilty of the charged crimes found
true, and pursuant to which it imposed the death penalty. (Id. at pp. 157,
164–176.) The high court rejected both. Its holding as to the defendant’s
second argument is particularly pertinent here.
The defendant did not, explained the court, “argue that he was
unaware of the special circumstance, or that he did not appreciate that he
could receive the death penalty if it were found true. Rather, he
emphasize[d] that the trial court never explicitly told him that he had a right
to a jury trial for the special circumstance allegation. Defendant argue[d]
that this omission, viewed in the context of the record as a whole, means that
he cannot be understood to have entered a valid waiver of his right to a jury
trial for this allegation.”15 (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 171.)
15 The defendant complained both that “ ‘the trial court made no
mention of the special circumstance determination or the right to a jury trial
thereon’ ” during the pretrial proceedings and that defense counsel “never
stated on the record that he had discussed the special circumstance
determination with his client.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 170.)
19
This, said the high court, “demand[ed] more than the federal and state
Constitutions require for a valid waiver of the jury trial right. As [the court
had] discussed, a knowing and intelligent jury waiver requires an
appreciation of the nature of the jury trial right and the consequences of
forgoing this right. [Citation.] There is no additional constitutional
requirement that a defendant be specifically advised of the specific charges,
enhancements, allegations, or other issues to which a general jury waiver will
apply. On the contrary, with a comprehensive jury waiver such as the one
entered below, absent unusual circumstances not present here ‘ “[i]t is settled
that where a defendant waives a jury trial he is deemed to have consented to
a trial of all of the issues in the case before the court sitting without a jury.” ’
([Citations]; see generally 6 LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure (4th ed. 2015)
§ 22.1(h), p. 48 [‘A jury waiver generally waives the right to a jury
determination of all of the elements of an offense, including facts that
authorize a higher sentencing range, treated as elements under the Court’s
Apprendi line of cases’].)[16] Under this prevailing rule, our earlier
determination that defendant’s general waiver of a jury trial was knowing
and intelligent is sufficient in itself to defeat defendant’s contention that his
waiver did not meet constitutional standards with regard to the special
16 The high court also noted “The relevant section of the LaFave
treatise further provides: ‘When a jury trial of guilt and enhancements are
separated, a defendant convicted by jury at the earlier phase should have an
opportunity to waive a jury for the enhancement phase.’ (6 LaFave, supra,
§ 22.1(h), p. 48.) In this case, of course, there is no issue presented with
regard to whether a defendant who has invoked a jury trial as to guilt or
innocence may waive a jury with regard to a charged special circumstance
allegation.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 172, fn. 6.)
20
circumstance allegation. (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 171–172, italics
omitted.)
The court went on to say that even if it “were to assume that—contrary
to the conventional rule—a constitutionally sufficient general jury waiver
does not necessarily incorporate a knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury
trial for a special circumstance allegation in a capital case,” “the specific
advisements the trial court provided to [the] defendant before taking his
waiver, together with the other surrounding circumstances, confirm[ed] that
defendant knowingly and intelligently relinquished his right to a jury trial
for this allegation.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 173.)
The trial judge had explained “that in a court trial he alone ‘would
make the decision on whether that evidence was sufficient to prove
[defendant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,’ and ‘In the event [he] made
such a finding,’ the case would proceed to a penalty phase, at which time it
would ‘fall upon [the judge] to make the decision as to the appropriate
punishment, which could result in a death penalty sentence.’ The ultimate
question posed to defendant was ‘Do you give up your right to a jury trial and
agree that this Court, alone, will make those decisions. . . ?’ After defendant
answered in the affirmative, the trial court observed that the waiver applied
to ‘all issues’ in the trial.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 174.) “Viewed
together with all other relevant circumstances, this colloquy demonstrate[d]
beyond any dispute that defendant’s waiver incorporated a knowing and
intelligent declination of a jury trial for the special circumstance allegation.
The trial court’s advisement conveyed that defendant had a right to a jury
trial with regard to all issues as to which an adverse determination could
expose him to the death penalty—which included the special circumstance
allegation—and that with his waiver, defendant would be giving up that
21
right. Defendant’s ensuing assent to a bench trial therefore manifested a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his jury trial right with regard to the
special circumstance allegation.” (Ibid.)
The court majority reiterated the point in responding to the dissent’s
conclusion to the contrary, stating “The dissenting justices apparently read
the trial judge’s advisements differently, perceiving the failure to expressly
refer to the special circumstance allegation as somehow implicitly excluding
that allegation from a counseled and otherwise comprehensive jury waiver.
(See conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 203–206; conc. & dis. opn. of
Cuéllar, J., post, at pp. 218–219.) We respectfully disagree with this
interpretation of the colloquy, for the reasons we have previously given. The
dissenting justices’ position boils down to the proposition that the judge was
constitutionally bound to utter the phrase ‘special circumstance’ at some
point in the waiver colloquy with defendant, even if the judge never went on
to explain what this phrase meant. But our waiver jurisprudence rejects the
notion that a knowing and intelligent waiver hinges on the recitation of a
‘ “talismanic phrase.” ’ [Citations.] The fact of the matter is that the
dissenting justices, like defendant, would require a degree of elaboration and
specificity in a jury waiver colloquy that has never been demanded for a jury
waiver to be considered knowing and intelligent under constitutional
standards.”17 (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 175–176, fn. & italics
omitted.)
17 We note that in French, the high court concluded the defendant had
not forfeited his constitutional claim that he was entitled to a jury trial of
aggravating facts, stating “At the time that defendant entered his plea of no
contest, he expressly waived his right to a jury trial on the substantive
offenses, but this waiver did not encompass his right to a jury trial on any
aggravating circumstances. The absence of such an explicit waiver is not
22
surprising. When defendant entered his plea, Blakely had not yet been
decided, and prior to that decision ‘it was widely assumed that for the
purposes of the rule established in Apprendi, the maximum term authorized
by the jury’s verdict was the upper term.’ [Citation.] . . . Defendant’s waiver
of jury trial on the offenses in connection with his no contest plea cannot
reasonably be interpreted to extend to proof of aggravating circumstances
when, at the time of the plea, no right to a jury trial on such circumstances
had been recognized. Defendant did not forfeit his Sixth Amendment right
by failing to request a jury trial on the aggravating circumstances, and his
claim must be addressed on the merits.” (French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 48,
fn. omitted.)
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Sivongxxay make clear
this statement in French applies where no jury trial right has yet been
recognized. The majority’s discussion is set forth above. In his dissent,
Justice Cuéllar stated, “The gist of defendant’s claim is that the record fails
to show he was aware of his right to a jury trial on this phase of the trial or
that he waived it. State v. Williams (2005) 197 Ore.App. 21 . . . presents an
analogous situation. Williams similarly was unaware that he had the right
to a jury finding of the facts that could trigger an enhanced sentence; his trial
had predated Blakely[,supra,] 542 U.S. 296 . . . , which held that a criminal
defendant has a federal constitutional right to have a jury find the facts that
could subject him to a sentence greater than the statutory maximum. The
Williams court reasoned that no waiver could be implied in those
circumstances unless the record showed that the defendant was aware both
of ‘ “the right to have a jury determine the aggravating factors” ’ and that
‘ “he was waiving that right.” ’ (Williams, at p. 1152; accord, People v.
French[, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p.] 48 . . . [because the defendant entered his
plea pre-Blakely, his jury waiver on the substantive offense ‘did not
encompass his right to a jury trial on any aggravating circumstances’]; State
v. Schofield (2005) 2005 ME 82. . . .) Unlike the majority, I see no meaningful
distinction in the fact that Williams was unaware of his jury trial right
because of an intervening change in the law, while defendant was unaware of
his jury trial right because it was never mentioned anywhere in the colloquy.
(Cf. maj. opn., ante, at pp. 172–173, fn. 7.)” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at
pp. 222–223 (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)
Here, in contrast, at the time defendant pleaded no contest, the
constitutional right to jury trial on facts in aggravation was well established.
23
The court reached a different conclusion with respect to the defendant’s
statutory right to jury trial on a special circumstance allegation as elucidated
by the court in its prior decision in People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658
(Memro), overruled on another ground as stated in People v. Gaines (2009)
46 Cal.4th 172, 181, footnote 2.18 (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 176–
178.) In Sivongxxay, “[t]here was no specific reference in the waiver colloquy
to the need to adjudicate the special circumstance allegation; the term
‘special circumstance’ was never mentioned at all. Although such precision
[was] not required for a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, [the high
court believed] that Memro’s requirement of a ‘separate waiver,’ ” even as
that rule was clarified in subsequent cases, “demand[ed] at least that much
specificity.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 177–178.) Thus, although
the court recognized the line it was drawing was “a narrow one,” it held the
defendant’s “purported waiver as to the special circumstance determination
was deficient, as a matter of state law.” (Id. at p. 178.)
Given the clarity of the record here that defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to jury trial generally and did so fully advised
and personally agreeing in open court that the negotiated disposition
included that the court would consider all aggravating circumstances, we
conclude defendant’s jury waiver was constitutionally sufficient and extended
to all issues, including aggravating factors. Indeed, defendant has made no
challenge to his jury trial waiver with respect to his no-contest pleas and
18 “Memro construed the [then-applicable] statutes (as enacted by the
Legislature in 1977, see Stats. 1977, ch. 316, §§ 7, 12, pp. 1257, 1260), read
together, as requiring a ‘separate, personal waiver’ of the right to a jury for a
special circumstance allegation, above and beyond the standard guilt phase
and penalty phase waiver.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 176.)
24
conviction of two counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age
of 14 years. He has thus conceded the validity of his jury trial waiver as to
guilt, and under Sivongxxay, that alone is sufficient basis to reject
defendant’s jury trial waiver challenge as to the court’s determination of
sentencing factors. (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 172 [“our earlier
determination that defendant’s general waiver of a jury trial was knowing
and intelligent is sufficient in itself to defeat defendant’s contention that his
waiver did not meet constitutional standards with regard to the special
circumstance allegation”].) We also observe that, like Sivongxxay, this is not
a case where the defendant did not waive his right to jury trial as to guilt but
assertedly did so as to bifurcated sentencing issues. (Id. at p. 172, fn. 6.)
And even if defendant’s general jury trial waiver did not extend to
sentencing issues, we would conclude, as did the Supreme Court in
Sivongxxay, that the record, “[v]iewed together with all other relevant
circumstances” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 174), demonstrates
defendant understood he had a right to jury trial as to all issues and, as part
of the negotiated disposition, he was foregoing a jury determination of any
issue. The trial court squarely asked defendant, “Do you waive these rights
[including the right to jury trial] in order to enter into this deal that you
worked out?”—a deal that expressly included the court considering factors in
mitigation and aggravation. Moreover, the court asked defendant this
question after the prosecutor and defense counsel made a point of
emphasizing that the court would be making findings as to both aggravating
and mitigating sentencing factors. Defendant also confirmed he had had
sufficient time to speak with his attorney, and counsel likewise told the court
she was “satisfied [defendant] understands the consequences of” the felony
plea.
25
The recent decision in People v. Kinnear (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1116
(Kinnear), which defendant submitted after he had filed his petition for
rehearing of our decision on remand, and which prompted us to grant
rehearing on our own motion, does not support a different result. To begin
with, that was a case in which the issues of guilt and sentencing factors were
bifurcated and the defendant did not waive jury trial on the issue of guilt.
Rather, after a jury found him guilty of making criminal threats, he
supposedly stipulated to an alleged prior conviction and aggravating factors.
(Id. at p. 1120.) Thus, that case, unlike Sivongxxay and the case now before
us, did not involve a general jury waiver and thus did not involve the
“conventional rule” that “ ‘ “where a defendant waives a jury trial he is
deemed to have consented to a trial of all of the issues in the case before the
court sitting without a jury.” ’ ” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 172–
173.)
Furthermore, after the jury found Kinnear guilty, the only colloquy
that occurred was as follows: The prosecutor stated it was his understanding
the defendant “ ‘wants to stipulate to the priors and the aggravating
factors.’ ” (Kinnear, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 1122.) The court then
recited there was an allegation of a prior strike offense and it was alleged
“ ‘there are aggravating factors which could make your sentence longer,’ ”
namely a prior prison term and the new offense was committed while he was
on supervision or parole. (Ibid.) After these perfunctory remarks, the court
asked Kinnear, “ ‘[d]o you now stipulate or agree that you suffered the prior
strike and the aggravating factors are, in fact, true?’ ” (Ibid.) Kinnear
replied, “ ‘Yes, sir.’ ” (Ibid.) As we have recited at length, the record before
us is profoundly different, as was the record before the high court in
Sivongxxay.
26
In short, given the record in Kinnear, which bears no similarity to the
record here or in Sivongxxay, we have no disagreement with the appellate
court’s holding in that case that the defendant did not waive his right to a
jury trial and did not enter into a knowing and voluntary stipulation as to the
sentencing enhancements and allegations.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is AFFIRMED.
27
_________________________
Banke, Acting P. J.
We concur:
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
A165406, People v. Hall
28
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