People v. Martin CA6

CourtListener 10796438CalctappFeb 19, 2026

Full text

Filed 2/19/26 P. v. Martin CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H053377
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 18CR001249)

v.

JAMES ROBERT MARTIN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Convicted by plea of forcible sodomy, appellant James Robert Martin was
sentenced to 16 years in prison. On appeal from the postjudgment restitution order,
Martin’s counsel has filed a brief which states the case but raises no issues, asking this
court to conduct an independent review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436
(Wende). We advised Martin of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf
within 30 days, and he has not done so. Finding no arguable issues in our independent
review of the record, we will affirm.
BACKGROUND
In February 2018, Martin appeared for arraignment, was appointed counsel, and
pleaded no contest to forcible sodomy (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2)(A)),1 admitting a
prior serious or violent felony “strike” conviction under section 1170.12,

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
subdivision (c)(1) and waiving his right to appeal his “conviction, the judgment, and any
other orders previously issued by this court.”
The next month, Martin was sentenced per his agreement with the Monterey
County District Attorney to 16 years in prison—the upper term of eight years, doubled
due to his prior strike. The trial court also ordered Martin to pay a restitution fine of
$4,800 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(2)) and direct victim restitution (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)) in an
amount to be determined.
Seven years later, in June 2025, Martin appeared for a contested restitution hearing
before a different judge of the superior court. The sole disputed issue was the propriety
of restitution claimed for the costs of therapy undergone by Doe’s mother from 2017 to
2022 and whether the therapy might have been attributable to some other cause not
compensable here.2 Martin’s counsel alternatively suggested that the previously imposed
restitution fine of $4,800 be commensurately reduced.
Interpreting Martin’s commentary on the proceedings as reflecting his wish to
“voluntarily” absent himself, the court ordered Martin removed from the courtroom
without objection. The court then ordered $3,240 in direct victim restitution—$648 to
Jane Doe and $2,592 to Doe’s mother. (See Cal. Const., art I, § 28, subd. (e).) The court
also declined to reduce the $4,800 restitution fine, reasoning both that it lacked
jurisdiction to modify that term of the now-final judgment and alternatively that, “even if
[the court] had the discretion to modify the restitution fund fine, [it] would not” choose to
do so.

2
Martin was alleged in another case to have threatened Doe’s mother, and his
counsel noted the absence of a waiver in this case that would satisfy People v. Harvey
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 758 and permit consideration of that offense in ordering restitution
in this case.

2
DISCUSSION
Here, Martin appeals only from the postconviction restitution order and not his
long-final judgment of conviction. In a different procedural context, the California
Supreme Court has held that appeals from a denial of resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6 are not subject to Wende review. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216, 231 (Delgadillo).) Our high court reasoned that (1) the entitlement to independent
review of the record under Wende and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 had not
been extended beyond a defendant’s “ ‘first appeal as of right’ ”—during which the Sixth
Amendment constitutional right to counsel continues—to an appeal from the denial of
postconviction relief under an ameliorative state statutory scheme; and (2) “ ‘[t]here is no
unconditional state or federal constitutional right to counsel to pursue collateral relief
from a judgment of conviction.’ ” (Delgadillo, at p. 227.) The Delgadillo court
expressly declined to consider Wende’s application to other postconviction contexts,
“which may present different considerations.” (Id. at p. 231, fn. 5.)
Although “restitution hearings are sentencing hearings” at which a defendant does
not enjoy the same constitutional protections as in a proceeding to determine guilt
(People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 662, fn. 6), sentencing hearings are
nonetheless considered a “critical stage” of the criminal prosecution (People v. Cutting
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 348). And “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel applies at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding.” (People v. Crayton (2002)
28 Cal.4th 346, 362.) Further, because the notice we provided to Martin specified that
we would engage in Wende review, we would apply Wende’s prophylactic measures even
if not strictly required. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233, fn. 6.)
Having independently reviewed the record under Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, we
find no arguable issues.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

3
____________________________________
LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.

____________________________________
CHUNG, J.

Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.