In re J.C. CA4/2

CourtListener 10795817CalctappFeb 18, 2026

Full text

Filed 2/18/26 In re J.C. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re J.C., A Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E086993

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J295620)

v. OPINION

T.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Lynn M. Poncin,

Judge. Affirmed.

Michelle Jarvis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Laura Feingold, County Counsel, and Helena C. Rho, Deputy County Counsel, for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

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T.B. (father) appeals from an order terminating parental rights over his minor

child. He argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by declining to continue the

Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26 hearing to allow a bonding study. We

affirm.

BACKGROUND

This appeal concerns father’s child J.C. (born 2016). J.C. has two half siblings

who are not at issue in this appeal.

In January 2023 J.C. was living with mother and his two half siblings, but not

father. Father was a truck driver who was often gone working, but he would visit J.C.

when he had time off.

On January 5, 2023, the department took J.C. and his two half siblings into

protective custody after police raided their mother’s home. As to J.C., the dependency

petition includes allegations under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). Specifically, the

department alleged mother had a substance abuse problem that placed J.C. in danger, that

father knew or should have known about this substance abuse problem and failed to

protect J.C., and that he left J.C. without provision for support.

When the department asked J.C. who his father is, J.C. said “ ‘I have two dads,’ ”

identifying father as one of them. The other was the father of one of J.C.’s half siblings;

J.C. had witnessed that father’s murder. He could not recall the last time he saw father.

1 Unlabeled statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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Father reported he saw J.C. about once every two or three weeks for an hour or

two at a time. Father recalled that at their last meeting J.C. told him “ ‘[y]ou’re not my

dad,’ ” and father “admitted he reacted inappropriately . . . and told him to, ‘Have your

dad buy you everything I just bought you then.’ ” Father did not provide a home address,

and he requested the department assess his out-of-state relatives for placement. Father

explained this was in part because “he did not believe his current home was suitable for

[J.C.] because it was near the area where [J.C.] witnessed,” the murder of his half

sibling’s father.

At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court sustained the

allegations against mother and the allegation that father failed to protect J.C. from

mother’s substance abuse, but dismissed the allegation that father left J.C. without

provision for support. It removed J.C. from both parents’ custody and ordered

reunification services.

During the six-month review period father made progress on his case plan. He

said he regretted his “minimal presence in his son’s life,” and acknowledged that he

“ ‘should have made more effort.’ ” Father’s visits were consistent and the department

did not note any issues or concerns.

During the 12-month review period father continued to make progress. However,

the department remained unable to confirm father’s housing arrangements. In January

2024, father told them he found new housing but did not provide an address. The

department did not report any issues with visits. It remained concerned about father’s

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housing situation and his long, inflexible work hours, but nevertheless recommended

continuing reunification services.

By the 18-month status review period, father had still not provided any evidence

of stable housing despite claiming he had two homes and even suggesting he wanted a

home assessment. The department reported that “[w]hile [ ] father has made minimal

progress, he continues to lack stable housing . . . and does not appear ready to resume his

parental role.”

At the 18-month status review hearing, the court terminated father’s reunification

services. It also granted father visitation for six to eight hours a week.

The department conducted a monthly visit of the caregiver’s home in October

2024. The caregiver said that when pressed, J.C. admitted to lying to his caregiver about

where he goes with father on visits, and that he goes to father’s house rather than the

park. This concerned the department because the visitation order required visits to

happen in the community and father insisted visits were not happening at his home. The

department then spoke to J.C., who said he went to father’s house every week and spends

most of his visit there. J.C. said he plays video games and watches TV, and nobody else

is home. When asked whether he ever wanted to return to father’s care, he said “ ‘yes, he

has one room but he’s going to get a bigger house and going [to] build it.” He liked

visits, liked spending time with father, and felt safe.

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In December 2024 the court changed father’s visits to supervised and reduced

them to two hours every week because father violated court orders by having visits at his

home.

Things began to deteriorate at this point. Father started ending visits early or

canceling/rescheduling at the last minute. This created behavioral issues with J.C.,

particularly if father canceled at the last minute. Father did not get J.C. a Christmas

present, but told him he would get a Nintendo Switch “if he sa[id] that he want[ed] to live

with father.” At a supervised visit in February 2025, father brought photos of family

members and “said ‘this is your family’ in a forceful aggressive way.” Later, after two

canceled visits, J.C. said he did not want to go to the next one. That visit lasted only

15 minutes, and the one after that only 40 minutes due to J.C.’s refusal. Father asked J.C.

why he did not want to go to visits, and then told him “ ‘you have mental issues.’ ”

In April 2025 while the department was speaking to J.C.’s caregiver J.C.

approached and asked “ ‘can I stay here forever?’ ” He referred to his caregivers as

“mommy” and “daddy.” When the department spoke to J.C., he repeated that he wanted

to live with his caregivers forever, said he likes the house and that they are family. The

department asked J.C. whether he wanted to live with father and J.C. said no. The

department then explained what adoption was, but J.C. remained quiet.

Later that month the court continued the section 366.26 hearing. In response to a

request from mother’s counsel for a bonding study, the court ordered “the child be made

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available for a bonding study, as long as the bonding study does not create a need for a

continuance.”

From May to August 2025 visits between father and J.C. continued to be mostly

unsuccessful. Father’s visits became more regular, but the supervisor reported that

“father does not really talk to [J.C.],” and just lets him play on father’s phone. J.C.

continued to say he did not want to go to visits, sometimes asking “ ‘[d]o I really have to

go?’ ” At one point J.C. told father he wanted to stay with “mommy” (meaning his

caregiver) and father told him “ ‘they’re not your real family.’ ” Father then canceled a

visit for the 4th of July weekend, as well as the next weekend’s visit, and J.C. responded

“ ‘he can’t make it? He wonders why I don’t want to go.’ ” Father also did not show up

for at least one scheduled visit. J.C. told the department he does not like going to visits

with his father, that he feels safe in his caregivers’ care, and that he wanted to be adopted

by them.

On August 18, 2025, exactly four months after the court first ordered J.C. be made

available for a bonding study, father’s counsel asked “the Court for authority to make the

minor available for a bonding study.” The court told father’s counsel it had already made

such an order on April 18, then repeated the order verbatim—including that it would only

permit a bonding study if it did not create a need for a continuance. It then set a

contested section 366.26 hearing for September 25, 2025.

After the August 18, 2025 hearing, father’s counsel contacted an expert to perform

a bonding study and notified county counsel the expert would be in touch to schedule it.

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The expert also tried to contact the department. After two weeks, the department had still

not gotten in touch with the expert. Following multiple emails between the parties, father

was able to schedule a bonding study for September 19, 2025.

Sometime in September during a visit father referred to J.C.’s caregivers as

“mother [e]ffers.” This upset J.C., and afterward visits were held at the department’s

offices. J.C. also refused to visit father twice, citing this incident. On September 12,

2025 J.C. told the department “ ‘I’m already with my family and tia is adopting me. I

feel good, I feel safe, loved, I’m with family.” The department asked again whether he

wanted his caregivers to adopt him, and explained that meant their home would be his

forever home, and he confirmed that he wanted them to adopt him.

When the time came for the bonding study, J.C. refused to participate, again citing

the father’s comments about the caregivers. J.C. agreed to allow father to apologize

while the bonding study expert observed. Father apologized and gave J.C. some food.

He and J.C. then hugged and said they loved each other. The bonding study expert

reported the apology seemed to have a positive impact and there was some sign of

affection between father and J.C., but “[g]iven the shift in the child’s demeanor post

apology, there may be more to learn about.” The bonding study expert said they needed

more observation time “to determine the type of attachment that exists.”

The court held a contested section 366.26 hearing on September 25, 2025.

Father’s counsel requested a continuance to complete the bonding study. The court

denied the request, saying it would not be in the child’s best interests because the parties

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had had since April to complete a study, the section 366.26 hearing had already been

continued a number of times on unrelated issues, and the minor “has clearly reported to

the social worker what his feelings are in this case and what he wants to see going

forward.”

The court then heard testimony and argument on whether there was a beneficial

relationship between father and J.C. such that the court should not terminate father’s

parental rights. At the end of the hearing, the court concluded father did not meet either

the second or third prong of the beneficial relationship exception and terminated his

parental rights.

ANALYSIS

Father argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied a continuance to

allow completion of the bonding study. We disagree.

A court may grant a continuance in dependency proceedings so long as that

continuance is not “contrary to the interest of the minor” and the party requesting it

shows good cause. (§ 352, subds. (a)(1)-(2).) “In considering the minor’s interests, the

court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her

custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to

a minor of prolonged temporary placements.” (§ 352, subd. (a)(1).)

“We review the juvenile court’s decision to deny a continuance for abuse of

discretion. [Citation.] ‘Discretion is abused when a decision is arbitrary, capricious or

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patently absurd and results in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (In re D.Y. (2018) 26

Cal.App.5th 1044, 1056.)

Here, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the continuance because we agree

with the court that such a continuance would not have been in J.C.’s best interest. The

record is clear that J.C. wanted to be adopted by the prospective adoptive parents, did not

want to continue visiting with father, and seemed ready for the process to be over. His

preference for adoption thus mirrored the law’s. In other words, while the law requires

us to assume J.C. has a substantial interest in resolving the proceedings as quickly as

possible in order to obtain the benefits of adoption, we need not assume here: J.C.

expressed that this was his actual preference. Because the law assumes that proceeding

quickly is in the minor’s interest, and the minor himself stated that it was in his interest, it

was not an abuse of discretion for the court to find that a continuance would have been

contrary to those interests.

In addition, father had plenty of time to complete a bonding study and plenty of

warning that the court would not grant a continuance if one was not completed. The

court first ordered the parties to make J.C. available for the bonding study in April, but

father did not start trying to schedule a study until August. Father argues this is because

he was unaware that the court’s original order making J.C. available for a bonding study

applied to father as well as mother. Regardless, father waited until just over a month

before the section 366.26 hearing to clarify this, and to seek such a study, despite

knowing that the court was unlikely to grant a continuance if one was not completed.

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Nevertheless, father argues the court was compelled to grant the continuance

because it ordered a bonding study. “The juvenile court’s discretion to order a bonding

study arises from Evidence Code section 730,” which requires the court to find “that the

expertise is, or may be, required to resolve issues in the case” to justify appointment of an

expert. (In re S.R. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 864, 869.) Thus, if the court had ordered a

bonding study, it would have implicitly found that such expertise was necessary, so

proceeding without it might have presented a problem.

But the court did not order a bonding study. The court’s specific order was that

“the child be made available for a bonding study, as long as the bonding study does not

create a need for a continuance.” In other words, the court did not find a bonding study

was necessary, nor did it appoint an expert per Evidence Code section 730. Rather, it

ordered the parties to cooperate with each other if they wanted to pursue a bonding study

on their own. Thus, the court did not need to wait for the results of a bonding study—and

in fact told the parties it would not wait.

Finally, though we find no error, even if we did it would be harmless. We may

only reverse the court’s order denying a continuance if it prejudiced a party, meaning it

would have been reasonably probable there would have been a different result if it had

been granted. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; In re J.I. (2003) 108

Cal.App.4th 903, 913.)

Father sought a continuance to bolster his arguments against terminating his

parental rights. Avoiding termination would have required father to show that

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termination of parental rights “ ‘would be detrimental to the minor’ due to any of certain

specified circumstances.” (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249.)

One such circumstance, the parental bond exception, applies where the parent can show

they “have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would

benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) There are three

elements to this exception: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the

continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental

rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 641, 631,

italics omitted.)

Here, there is no reasonable probability father could have established the

beneficial parental relationship exception applied, even with a continuance and a bonding

study. Before the dependency, father and J.C. had a limited relationship; father was not

part of the household and he was often out of town for work. During the dependency,

J.C.’s relationship with father only deteriorated. By the end of the dependency, father’s

visitation became erratic, and J.C. told the department repeatedly that he did not want to

visit father and wanted to be adopted. It is thus unlikely that father would have been able

to prove either of the latter two prongs of the exception applied. On this record, it is pure

speculation to think the bonding study might have made a difference.

Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating parental rights.

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DISPOSITION

We affirm.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
J.
We concur:

MILLER
Acting P. J.

LEE
J.

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