O'Brien v. Aston Carter CA2/5

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Filed 2/17/26 O’Brien v. Aston Carter CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

DAMETA O’BRIEN, B340199

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STCV18291)

ASTON CARTER, INC. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel M. Crowley, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Snell & Wilmer, Jason Yu, Jing (Jenny) Hua, Ava Freund
and Drake Mirsch; Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Lucky
Meinz, John D. Ellis and Lowell B. Ritter for Defendants and
Appellants.
Moon Law Group, H. Scott Leviant, Kane Moon and Sandy
Pham for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
Defendants and appellants Aston Carter, Inc., One Medical
Group, and 1Life Healthcare, Inc., appeal from an order denying
a motion to compel arbitration in this action brought by plaintiff
and respondent Dameta Afeni O’Brien under the Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA; Lab. Code, § 2698 et
seq.).1 PAGA authorizes an “aggrieved employee” to sue for
recovery of civil penalties for Labor Code violations on behalf of
the employee “and other current or former employees.”
(§ 2699.).2 The trial court denied the motion, concluding that
O’Brien had not alleged a claim for relief on her own behalf (an
“individual” PAGA claim), which would be subject to arbitration,
but she still had standing to proceed solely on behalf of all other
aggrieved employees (the “non-individual” PAGA claim). On
appeal, the appellants contend the motion to compel arbitration
should have been granted because O’Brien’s PAGA action
included an individual PAGA claim. We conclude the trial court
erred in interpreting the complaint as alleging only a non-
individual PAGA claim, and no dismissal of the individual PAGA
claim has been entered. We reverse the order denying the motion
to compel arbitration with directions.

1 All further statutory references are to the Labor Code
unless otherwise stated.

2 The legislature amended section 2699, effective July 1,
2024. (§ 2699, subd. (v)(1), added by Stats. 2024, ch. 44, § 1.)
Because O’Brien filed the operative complaint in January 2024,
the former version of the statute applies in this matter, however,
the language “and other current or former employees” is the same
under both versions of the statute.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Aston Carter is a temporary staffing company. 1Life
entered into an agreement with Aston Carter for staffing services
at 1Life and its affiliated companies, including One Medical. In
May 2022, O’Brien signed an agreement to arbitrate all disputes
regarding her employment with Aston Carter and its clients. The
arbitration agreement stated that it was governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C § 1 et seq.) and, to the extent not
inconsistent with or preempted by the FAA, by the laws of the
state of California. Subsequently, O’Brien began work at One
Medical. O’Brien worked as a member support specialist at One
Medical from June 2022 to August 26, 2022.
In August 2023, O’Brien filed a class action complaint. On
January 24, 2024, O’Brien filed the operative second amended
complaint against the defendants alleging a single cause of action
to recover civil penalties under PAGA based on Labor Code
violations. The caption stated that O’Brien brought the action
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. The
complaint alleged, in pertinent part, “California has enacted the
PAGA to permit an individual to bring an action on behalf of
himself and on behalf of others for PAGA penalties only, which is
the precise and sole nature of this action.” “Aggrieved Employees”
were defined as all California employees harmed by the
defendants’ practices, and O’Brien brought the action to recover
penalties on behalf of “all Aggrieved Employees” and on behalf of
the State of California.
On March 8, 2024, Aston Carter filed a motion to compel
arbitration arguing that O’Brien’s individual PAGA claim must

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be sent to arbitration and the non-individual claim dismissed for
lack of standing, or, alternatively, stayed. On May 16, 2024, One
Medical and 1Life filed a notice of joinder in the motion to compel
arbitration.
On May 23, 2024, O’Brien opposed the motion, stating in
pertinent part that “[t]o remove all doubt, Plaintiff declares that
Plaintiff will forego seeking ‘individual’ PAGA penalties and
seeks only to recover PAGA penalties on behalf of all other
Aggrieved Employees (a ‘non-individual[’] PAGA claim) that
worked for Defendant, and on behalf of the State of California. In
other words, Plaintiff will not be pursuing redress at this time for
her individual wage and hour claims or ‘individual’ PAGA claim
and will proceed in Court, on behalf of the State of California, to
recover penalties from her ‘non-individual’ PAGA claim that is
based solely upon conduct affecting other aggrieved employees.
Thus, there is no reason to stay the action and there will be
nothing to compel to mediation.” O’Brien subsequently added,
“In this instance, Plaintiff expressly declares without prejudice
that ‘individual’ PAGA penalties will not be sought, thereby
eliminating from this action any claim subject to any arbitration
agreement.” In conclusion, O’Brien stated, “Plaintiff agrees to
dismissal without prejudice of her ‘individual’ PAGA claim and
proceed with only the ‘non-individual’ PAGA claim against
Defendants in Court.”
On May 30, 2024, Aston Carter filed a reply, as did One
Medical and 1Life. The defendants noted that O’Brien had not
filed a dismissal of her individual PAGA claim or a declaration
confirming that she was not seeking individual penalties or
pursuing an individual PAGA claim. They again asked the court

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to order the individual PAGA claim to arbitration and to dismiss
or stay the non-individual PAGA claim.
After a hearing on June 6, 2024, the trial court denied the
motion to compel arbitration and the joinder. The court found a
valid, enforceable arbitration agreement existed. After reviewing
the allegations of the complaint, the court concluded O’Brien had
not alleged an individual PAGA claim in the operative complaint,
leaving nothing to send to arbitration and no claim for an
arbitrator to resolve. Aston Carter filed a timely notice of appeal,
as did One Medical and 1Life.

DISCUSSION

A. Appealability and Standard of Review

An order denying a motion to compel arbitration is an
appealable order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (a); Reyes v.
Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1122.) When the trial
court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration rests on questions
of law, including questions of statutory interpretation and
application of that law to undisputed facts, we review the ruling
de novo. (Kader v. Southern California Medical Center, Inc.
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 214, 221.)

B. Claims Alleged in the Complaint

The appellants contend O’Brien’s complaint alleged both
individual and non-individual PAGA claims, and the trial court
should have ordered the individual PAGA claim to arbitration.
They assert that if they had filed a dispositive motion to dismiss

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the complaint because it failed to allege an individual PAGA
claim, the motion would have been denied. We agree with the
appellants’ reading of the complaint, and we conclude the
complaint has not been amended. As a result, the motion to
compel arbitration must be granted.

1. PAGA Generally

The Legislature enacted PAGA in response to “widespread
violations of the Labor Code and significant underenforcement of
those laws.” (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
1104, 1116 (Adolph).) To address those problems, PAGA
established new civil penalties for Labor Code violations and
authorized individuals, acting as private attorneys general, to
recover those penalties. (Ibid.) An “aggrieved employee” acting
in place of the state Labor and Workforce Development Agency,
may bring a civil action against an employer “ ‘on behalf of
himself or herself and other current or former employees’ to
recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations they have
sustained.” (Id. at p. 1113, quoting former § 2699, subd. (a).)
Standing to bring a PAGA action requires the plaintiff to be
an “aggrieved employee.” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1116,
1120–1121; see § 2699, subds. (a), (c).) At the relevant time,
PAGA defined an “aggrieved employee” as someone who was
“employed by the alleged violator” and suffered “one or more of
the alleged violations[.]” (Former § 2699, subd. (c); Adolph, at
p. 1116.)
In Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S.
639, 662 (Viking River), the United States Supreme Court held
that, with respect to an arbitration agreement governed by the

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FAA, the FAA preempts California law by allowing division of a
PAGA action into individual and non-individual PAGA claims.
(Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 662.) The Viking River court
further concluded that if a plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims
were compelled to arbitration, the plaintiff would no longer have
standing to maintain non-individual PAGA claims, and the non-
individual claims must be dismissed. (Id. at pp. 662–663.)
A year later, however, in Adolph, the California Supreme
Court held that when an individual PAGA claim is compelled to
arbitration under an agreement subject to the FAA, the plaintiff
continues to be an aggrieved employee with standing to pursue
non-individual PAGA claims in court on behalf of other
employees. (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1114, 1120–1121.)
Adolph did not decide whether a plaintiff may waive individual
PAGA claims and proceed solely on non-individual PAGA claims.
(See id., at p. 1125 [“PAGA was designed to authorize aggrieved
employees to pursue enforcement actions on behalf of themselves
and their current and former coworkers”]).

2. The Complaint

We disagree with the trial court’s interpretation of the
operative complaint. Based on our review, the complaint alleges
both individual and non-individual PAGA claims. The caption
states that O’Brien is bringing the action individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated. The allegations of the
complaint explain that PAGA allows an individual to bring an
action on behalf of the individual and on behalf of others, which,
collectively, was the sole nature of the action. And the complaint
seeks to recover penalties on behalf of all aggrieved employees,

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without excepting O’Brien. Based solely on the allegations of the
complaint, the motion to compel arbitration of O’Brien’s
individual PAGA claim must be granted.

3. Request for Dismissal of Individual PAGA Claim

Because the trial court concluded that the complaint did
not contain an individual PAGA claim, the court did not address
the statements in O’Brien’s opposition pleading. The appellants
contend that any request for dismissal in O’Brien’s opposition
pleading was ineffective because the pleading was not
accompanied by a declaration or a formal request for dismissal.
A plaintiff may dismiss the complaint, or any cause of
action asserted in the complaint, in its entirety, with or without
prejudice prior to the actual commencement of trial. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 581, subd. (c).) An action may be dismissed with or
without prejudice upon the written request of the plaintiff to the
clerk, or “by oral or written request to the court at any time
before the actual commencement of trial[.]” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 581, subd. (b)(1).)
O’Brien’s statements in her opposition pleading were
ambiguous. On one hand, she declared that she would not seek
“individual” PAGA penalties and would not pursue her individual
PAGA claim “at this time,” and she “declares without prejudice”
that individual PAGA penalties will not be sought, but then
elsewhere, she “agreed” to dismissal without prejudice of her
individual PAGA claim. It is not clear from the statements in the
opposition pleading that O’Brien is requesting dismissal of her
individual PAGA claim.

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Even if the opposition pleading were interpreted as a
request for dismissal of O’Brien’s individual PAGA claim, the
trial court has not entered an order dismissing the claim from the
complaint. (Holland v. Morgan & Peacock Properties Co. (1959)
168 Cal.App.2d 212, 213–214 [request for dismissal in open court,
“and order thereon,” as effective as written request for dismissal];
Richards & Knox v. Bradley (1900) 129 Cal. 670, 672.)
O’Brien’s complaint alleges an individual PAGA claim and
no dismissal of the individual PAGA claim has been entered, and
therefore, the trial court erred by denying the motion to compel
arbitration.

DISPOSITION

The order denying the motion to compel arbitration is
reversed. The trial court is directed to enter a new and different
order granting the motion to compel arbitration of the individual
PAGA claim. Appellants Aston Carter, Inc., One Medical Group,
Inc., and 1Life Healthcare, Inc., are awarded their costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

BAKER, Acting P. J. KIM (D.), J.

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