People v. Train CA2/5

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Filed 2/17/26 P. v. Train CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B341113

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA118967)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING
ARMANDO TRAIN, OPINION AND
DENYING PETITION
Defendant and Appellant. FOR REHEARING

[NO CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

Good cause appearing, the unpublished opinion in the
above-entitled matter, filed on January 22, 2026, is hereby
modified as follows:
On page 7 of the opinion, the only full paragraph shall be
stricken and replaced with the following paragraph.
“Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 518
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 518)
amended section 654 by removing the requirement that a
defendant be punished under the provision providing for
the longest term of imprisonment and granting the trial
court discretion to impose punishment under any
applicable provision. (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1; Pen. Code,
§ 654 [“An act or omission that is punishable in different
ways by different provisions of law may be punished under
either of such provisions”].) Here, the statutory penalty for
being a felon in possession of a firearm and for being a felon
in possession of ammunition is identical, namely, the trial
court can select a term of 16 months or two or three years.
(Pen. Code, §§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), 30305, subd. (a)(1), 18.)
Accordingly, there is no meaningful discretion for the court
to exercise in choosing which of the two counts to stay. We
will therefore modify the judgment to stay the execution of
sentence for count 3. (See People v. Bey (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 144, 167 [a remand for resentencing was
“unnecessary because the punishment [was] the same for
counts 1 and 2 and the court therefore “modif[ied] the
judgment to stay the sentence on count 2 in accordance
with section 654”].) We must further modify the sentence
on count 3 from a consecutive one-third the midterm to a
full-term concurrent sentence because “a stayed sentence
cannot also be consecutive” to a principal sentence (People
v. Toure (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1107) and,
accordingly, must be full-term (People v. Cantrell (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1164). As we explain below in Part
III.C., the trial court provided a detailed explanation for
why it believed defendant should receive the maximum
punishment and a remand therefore would be an “idle act”.

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(People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 431–432.) We will
therefore impose the high term on count 3 (that is, the
same term as the trial court imposed on count 2) but run
that sentence concurrent to the sentence on count 2 and
stay its execution. (See, e.g., People v. Villa-Gomez (2017) 9
Cal.App.5th 527, 530–531.)”

On page 11 of the opinion, the first sentence of the
Disposition shall be modified to read:
“The judgment is modified to (1) vacate the conviction
on count 4; (2) impose the high term of six years on count 3,
which will run concurrent to the sentence on count 2, but
execution of that sentence is stayed; and (3) reflect that
defendant’s sentence on count 2 is to the high term, “H”
and not the middle term, “M.”

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There is no change in the judgment. The petition for
rehearing is denied.

BAKER, Acting P. J. MOOR, J. KIM (D.), J.

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Filed 1/22/26 P. v. Train CA2/5 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B341113

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. NA118967)

ARMANDO TRAIN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, James D. Otto, Judge. Affirmed in part,
and reversed in part.
Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Deepti Vaadyala,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

A jury found defendant Armando Train guilty of one count
of murder, two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm,
and one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. The
trial court sentenced defendant on each count of conviction and
did not stay the sentence on any count. On appeal, defendant
contends that the court improperly sentenced him on two counts
of being a felon in possession of a firearm when he had only
committed a single violation of that crime. He also contends that
the court erred when it sentenced him for being both a felon in
possession of a firearm and a felon in possession of ammunition
because it should have stayed one of those sentences. We vacate
defendant’s conviction on one count of being a felon in possession
of a firearm and stay his sentence for being a felon in possession
of ammunition. We otherwise affirm the judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Underlying Crimes

On January 29, 2022, Abraham Garcia, Eduardo Alonso,
and Alejandra Padilla were using drugs at an abandoned
property in Long Beach, where Alonso, the murder victim, was
living. Defendant appeared at the property, called for Alonso,
and “claimed his hood name,” stating “‘This is Morro from
Eastside Paramount.’” Alonso ran to the doorway and Garcia
followed. Defendant then shot Alonso and ran away.
When the paramedics arrived at the crime scene, Alonso
had no heartbeat. A Long Beach Police Department officer

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collected a single spent nine-millimeter cartridge case. A medical
examiner determined Alonso died from a gunshot wound to the
chest, and removed a projectile from the wound.
Days later, on February 9, 2022, Long Beach Police
Department homicide detectives arrested defendant, who was
wearing a fanny pack. The detectives recovered a loaded firearm
from inside the fanny pack. A criminalist conducted a forensic
analysis on the firearm and determined it was the same weapon
used to murder Alonso.

B. Procedural History and Sentencing

On May 29, 2024, the Los Angeles County District Attorney
(District Attorney) charged defendant by information with
murder (Pen. Code1, § 187, subd. (a), count 1); being a felon in
possession of a firearm on February 9, 2022 (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1),
count 2); being a felon in possession of ammunition on
February 9, 2022 (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1), count 3); and being a
felon in possession of a firearm on January 29, 2022 (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1), count 4). The District Attorney also alleged that as
to count 1, defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd.
(a)) and as to all counts that defendant had four prior convictions,
within the meaning of section 1203, subdivision (e)(4). The
District Attorney also alleged that defendant had a prior serious
or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the Three
Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12) and the existence of
eight circumstances in aggravation pursuant to California Rules
of Court, rule 4.421.

1 All further undesignated statutory references will be to the
Penal Code.

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On June 10, 2024, a jury found defendant guilty of all
counts and found true the allegation that he personally used a
firearm during the commission of the murder. Following the
verdicts, defendant admitted the strike prior, and the trial court
found true all eight alleged circumstances in aggravation2.
On September 18, 2024, the trial court sentenced defendant
to 68 years, eight months, to life in prison, as follows: 50 years to
life for count 1 (25 years to life, doubled for the strike prior); 10
years consecutive for the firearm enhancement on count 1; six
years consecutive for count 2 (upper term of three years, doubled
for the strike prior); and consecutive 16-month terms for each of
counts 3 and 4 (one-third of the two-year midterm, doubled for
the strike prior). The court stated: “I have considered the
probation report, . . . defendant’s conduct during the trial, his
conduct during this sentencing where he showed no remorse, the
fact that I found every factor in aggravation to be true as alleged
. . . . [¶] This was just an unnecessary, terrible incident. And
while I cannot sentence . . . defendant to life without parole since
this is not a special circumstance case that carries that sentence,
I will sentence him as follows . . . .” The court then imposed the
maximum allowable punishment, plus various fines and fees.
The court did not stay any punishment under section 654.

2 Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (b)(1),
(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), and (b)(5).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Multiple Convictions for Possession of a Firearm by a Felon
(Counts 2 and 4)

Defendant contends he was improperly punished twice in
counts 2 and 4 for unlawful possession of the same firearm and
requests that we vacate the sentences on these two counts and
remand for resentencing so that the trial court can select which
sentence to stay.
“[P]ossession of a firearm by a felon is a continuing
offense.” (People v. Mason (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 355, 365
(Mason), citing Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521,
525, fn. 1, and People v. Warren (1940) 16 Cal.2d 103, 112.) “‘In
the case of continuing offenses, only one violation occurs even
though the proscribed conduct may extend over [an] indefinite
period.’” (Mason, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 365.) The crime of
possession of a firearm by a felon continues for as long as the
possession of the firearm continues and is not completed until the
possession has ceased. (Id. at pp. 366–367.) Therefore, where
there is no evidence that the defendant relinquished his
possession of a firearm, or that his possession was interrupted for
a time, he can be convicted of only one count of that offense.
(Ibid.)
Here, defendant was convicted of illegally possessing the
firearm when he shot Alonso on January 29, 2022, and when he
was arrested on February 9, 2022. The parties do not dispute
that defendant possessed the same firearm on both dates.
Further, the District Attorney did not present any evidence to
show that defendant ceased his possession of that firearm at any

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time between the murder and the arrest. On this record, we
conclude that defendant can only be convicted of one count of
possession of a firearm by a felon. The appropriate remedy when
a defendant has been convicted twice for a single violation is to
vacate one of the counts of conviction. (Mason, supra, 232
Cal.App.4th at p. 367.) We therefore vacate defendant’s
conviction on count 4. (See ibid. [defendant’s crime “was not
completed until the possession ceased”].)

B. Multiple Punishments for Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition (Counts 2 and 3)

Defendant also contends that the trial court erred when it
imposed a sentence on count 2, for the unlawful possession of a
firearm on February 9, 2022, and then also imposed a consecutive
sentence on count 3, for the unlawful possession of the
ammunition that was loaded inside that firearm on that same
day. Defendant argues that the sentence violates section 654’s
prohibition on multiple punishments and requests that we vacate
the sentences on both counts and remand for resentencing. The
Attorney General concedes the error but argues that a remand is
unnecessary and that this court should instead modify the
judgment to stay the sentence on count 3.
Section 654 provides that “[a]n act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may
be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall
the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.”
(Id., subd. (a).) The statute “bars multiple punishment for
separate offenses arising out of a single occurrence when all of
the offenses were incident to one objective.” (People v. Cowan

6
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 498.) Section 654 prohibits punishment
for both unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession
of ammunition when the only ammunition at issue was either
found inside or fired from the firearm. (People v. Broadbent
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 917, 922–923 (Broadbent); People v. Sok
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 88, 100 (Sok); People v. Lopez (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 132, 138 (Lopez).)
Where multiple punishments have been improperly
imposed, the proper procedure is for the reviewing court to
modify the sentence to stay imposition of the lesser term. (People
v. Spirlin (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 119, 131.) Here, the trial court
should have stayed the punishment on count 3, the lesser term.
(Broadbent, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 922–923; Sok, supra,
181 Cal.App.4th at p. 100; Lopez, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at
p. 138.) We will therefore modify the judgment to stay the
sentence on that count.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant next argues that we should reverse the sentence
because trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to
file a sentencing brief or to ask the trial court for leniency at
sentencing. A criminal defendant’s right to counsel includes the
right to effective legal assistance. (People v. Mai (2013) 57
Cal.4th 986, 1009.) A defendant asserting ineffective assistance
of counsel must show (1) his counsel’s “performance was deficient,
in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms,” and (2) “resulting prejudice, i.e., a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been

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different.” (Ibid.) “‘[A] court need not determine whether
counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we
expect will often be so, that course should be followed.’
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697.)” (People v.
Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 982.)
Defendant contends that he was prejudiced by counsel’s
performance because the trial court had “many ways to impose
something less” and trial counsel had “nothing to lose” by making
a request for leniency. Defendant, however, points to no evidence
in mitigation (aside from his age, which we discuss below) that
trial counsel could have or should have presented to the court on
his behalf. As to his age, defendant contends that trial counsel
should have argued in mitigation that defendant was only 17
years old at the time of the crimes. The record, however,
demonstrates that defendant was 25 years old when he
committed his crimes. Defendant cannot establish ineffective
assistance of counsel by merely speculating that a plea upon the
mercy of the court, without offering any mitigating information,
would have resulted in a lower sentence. (People v. Medina
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 773 [a claim of ineffective counsel cannot
be established by speculation regarding the content of testimony
from possible witnesses]; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883,
933 [“A factual basis, not speculation, must be established before
reversal of a judgment may be had on grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel”].)
Here, the trial court indicated it had reviewed the
probation report, which listed no factors in mitigation and

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recommended “the imposition of a high-base term.” The court
found all eight alleged circumstances in aggravation to be true.
Defendant had a criminal history that included four prior felony
convictions, one of which he admitted was a strike prior. The
court observed that defendant showed a lack of remorse and
remarked negatively on his conduct during the trial. Before the
court sentenced defendant to the maximum term, it expressed
regret that it was unable to sentence him to life without parole.
Finally, the court elected to impose each sentence consecutively,
rather than concurrently. On this record, defendant cannot
demonstrate that any argument for leniency by trial counsel
would have resulted in a more favorable outcome for him.

D. Restitution Fines

We now consider whether the restitution fine and parole
revocation restitution fine imposed by the trial court were
mistakenly recorded on both the determinate sentencing abstract
of judgment and the indeterminate sentencing abstract of
judgment. The parties agree that the court imposed a single
$300 restitution fine and a single additional $300 parole
revocation restitution fine, which it stayed pending revocation of
parole. The trial court recorded the imposition of those fines on
each abstract of judgment. According to defendant, “the inclusion
of the restitution fines on both [abstracts of judgment] could lead
to double collection, so they should be removed from one of the
two [abstracts of judgment].” We disagree. The abstracts of
judgment correctly reflect that defendant was assessed a single
$300 restitution fine for “Case A” and a single $300 in a parole
revocation restitution fine for “Case A”. Both abstracts of

9
judgment list a single, and correct, criminal case number as
“Case A.” Accordingly, the abstracts of judgment accurately
reflect the court’s assessment of a single restitution fine and a
single parole revocation restitution fine and we need not order
any modification. We will, however, order that the abstract of
judgment for the determinate term on count 2 be modified to
reflect that defendant was sentenced to the high term (“H”),
rather than the mid-term (“M”). (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26
Cal.4th 181, 187.)

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IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified to (1) vacate the conviction on
count 4; (2) stay the sentence on count 3; and (3) reflect that
defendant’s sentence on count 2 is to the high term, “H,” and not
the middle term, “M.” The clerk of the superior court is directed
to forward a copy of the modified abstract of judgment on the
determinate sentence to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

MOOR, J.

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