People v. Bailey CA2/6

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Filed 2/17/26 P. v. Bailey CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B339612
(Super. Ct. No. PA098662)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

LAVELL DANIEL BAILEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

Lavell Daniel Bailey challenges his convictions for felony
assault with intent to commit rape during a first-degree burglary
(Pen. Code1, § 220, subd. (b); Count 1), misdemeanor indecent
exposure (§ 314, subd. (1); Count 3), and misdemeanor lewd
conduct (§ 647, subd. (a); Count 4). He raises claims of
prosecutorial misconduct, instructional error, a Racial Justice Act
violation, and insufficient evidence. We will affirm.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the

Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Count 1 – Felony Assault with Intent to Commit Rape
During a First-Degree Burglary
L.B.2 was awoken when appellant climbed up to her
balcony and entered her bedroom through her unlocked screen
door. She had been sleeping in panties with her sliding door open
because it was hot. Appellant said, “Just give me what I want.”
L.B. started screaming, “Help me, help me!” Appellant covered
her mouth and nose and held her in the bedroom. She fought to
get to the front door and managed to unlock it. Appellant threw
her down, straddled her, and covered her nose and mouth again.
She could not breathe. Appellant said, “I don’t want to hurt you,
but I will.” He grabbed her over her panties. L.B. believed he
was going to rape and kill her. Appellant fled when a neighbor
entered L.B.’s apartment to assist her.
Count 3 – Misdemeanor Indecent Exposure
M.C. was entering a stall in the women’s bathroom at the
public library when she turned and saw appellant blocking the
bathroom door, staring at her. His pants were down, exposing
his penis. M.C. yelled, “Get out of here!” repeatedly, and
appellant finally left. Surveillance footage shows appellant,
wearing a gray hoodie and an N95 mask, follow M.C. into the
women’s bathroom. A few minutes later he is seen walking out
with M.C. exiting behind him and yelling.
Count 4 – Misdemeanor Lewd Conduct
Additional surveillance footage from the public library
shows appellant wearing a mask, a gray hoodie, and gray sweats,

2 We use initials to protect the victim’s privacy in criminal

appeals. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)

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stroking his exposed penis in a bathroom doorway while a
librarian was nearby.
Uncharged Acts
N.S. was working as a custody assistant for the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department at the San Fernando
Courthouse “lockup.” Appellant, an inmate, approached N.S.,
exposed his penis, and began stroking it. N.S. told him his
conduct was inappropriate and he would be disciplined.
Deputy P.B. of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department was working in “lockup” in the San Fernando
Courthouse when appellant requested soap. Deputy P.B. opened
a tray slot and observed appellant with his erect penis exposed
and pointed at her. She told him to put it away and shut the tray
slot.
Procedural History
In a first amended information the Los Angeles County
District Attorney, charged appellant with felony assault with
intent to commit rape during a first-degree burglary (§ 220, subd.
(b); count 1), misdemeanor indecent exposure (§ 314, subd. (1);
count 3), misdemeanor lewd conduct (§ 647, subd. (a); count 4),
unauthorized use of personal identifying information (§ 530.5,
subd. (a); count 5), and petty theft (§ 484, subd. (a); count 6).
Appellant pleaded not guilty and denied all special allegations.3

3 As to count 1, it was alleged the crime involved a high

degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421 (a)(1)), the victim was particularly vulnerable
(id., rule 4.421 (a)(3)), the crime indicated planning,
sophistication, and professionalism (id., rule 4.421 (a)(8)), and
appellant engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious danger
to society (id., rule 4.421 (b)(1)). It was further alleged the crimes
and objectives alleged were predominantly independent of each

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A jury found appellant guilty as charged on counts 1, 3, and 4.
Counts 5 and 6 were dismissed during trial.
The trial court sentenced appellant to life with the
possibility of parole on count 1, with concurrent 80 and 180 day
terms on counts 3 and 4, respectively. Appellant was given 844
days of presentence custody credit (734 days of actual time plus
110 days of good time/work time credits).
DISCUSSION
CALCRIM No. 1191B
For the first time on appeal, appellant contends the jury
was erroneously instructed under CALCRIM No. 1191B that it
could consider his guilt on the section 647 subdivision (a) charge
to prove his guilt on the other charges.4 He asserts the

other (id., rule 4.425 (a)(1)) and involved separate acts of violence
and threats of violence (id., rule 4.425 (a)(2)). Neither the court
nor the jury made findings on the special allegations and none
were imposed.

4 The instruction stated, “The People presented evidence

that the defendant committed the crimes of assault with intent to
commit rape during the commission of a first degree burglary,
indecent exposure, and lewd conduct in public. [¶] If the People
have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed one or more of these crimes, you may, but are not
required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was
disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based on that
decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit
and did commit the other sex offenses charged in this case. [¶] If
you find that the defendant committed one or more of these
crimes, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with
all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that
the defendant is guilty of another crime. The People must still

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instruction was incorrect because section 647 subdivision (a) is
not a sexual offense listed under Evidence Code section 1108,
subdivision (d)(1). He also claims the prosecutor compounded the
error by incorrectly stating the burden of proof, and the errors
violated his constitutional rights. Appellant did not object to the
instruction or the prosecutor’s statement, nor did he request a
curative admonition. His claims are thus forfeited. (People v.
Cowan (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1161.)
In any event, his claims fail. “An appellate court reviews
the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses whether
the instruction accurately states the law.” (People v. Mitchell
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) We consider jury instructions as a
whole and assume jurors are intelligent and capable of
understanding and correlating all instructions given. (People v.
Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.)
Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a) states that “[i]n
a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual
offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual
offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if
the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.”
Subdivision (d)(1) states “‘[s]exual offense’ means a crime under
the law of a state or of the United States that involved . . . (A)
Any conduct proscribed” by listed penal code provisions. (Evid.
Code, § 1108, subd. (d)(1), italics added.) Evidence Code section
1108 thus defines sexual offenses by the conduct committed, not
the actual charge for such conduct.
Among the Penal Code provisions listed in Evidence Code
section 1108, subdivision (d)(1)(A) is section 314, which provides

prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” (CALCRIM no.
1191B.)

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“[e]very person who willfully and lewdly . . . [e]xposes his . . .
private parts . . . in any public place, or in any place where there
are present other persons to be offended or annoyed thereby . . . is
guilty of a misdemeanor.” (§ 314.) Section 647 is not listed. 5
The section 647, misdemeanor lewd conduct charge against
appellant was based upon his conduct of stroking his exposed
penis in a library bathroom doorway while a librarian stands
nearby. Such conduct unquestionably is proscribed by section
314. (People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1291.)
In People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152 (Villatoro), our
Supreme Court held that Evidence Code section 1108 extends to
charged as well as uncharged sexual offenses. (Id. at pp. 1161-
1162.) The Court did not, as appellant contends, hold the specific
charge must be one listed in the statute.
Appellant also contends giving CALCRIM No. 1191B
lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof, an error compounded
by the prosecutor stating in closing that she only had to prove the
charged crimes by a preponderance of the evidence. We disagree.
CALCRIM No. 1191B does not lower the burden of proof because
it makes clear the “offenses are only one factor to consider; . . .
they are not sufficient to prove by themselves that the defendant
is guilty of the charged offenses; and . . . the People must still
prove the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v.
Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 502.) The prosecutor
correctly explained that if the jury found the uncharged acts were
proven by a preponderance of the evidence, they could consider

5 Section 647 provides: “An individual who . . . engages in
lewd . . . conduct in a public place or in a place open to the public
or exposed to public view” (§ 647, subd. (a).) “is guilty of
disorderly conduct . . . .” (§ 647.)

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those acts as “one factor” in determining whether the charged
acts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. She then correctly
stated, “each and every element of every crime still needs to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Other instructions were clear that uncharged conduct must
be proved by a preponderance of evidence but all charged conduct
required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude the
burden of proof was properly stated and giving CALCRIM No.
1191B “did not impermissibly lower the standard of proof or
otherwise interfere with defendant’s presumption of innocence.”
(Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal. 4th at p. 1168.)
The Racial Justice Act
Appellant contends he made a prima facie showing he was
repeatedly beaten in custody and the beatings, as well as being
called “a [B]lack pro per with no knowledge,” impaired his ability
to effectively represent himself, causing a denial of due process
and a violation of the Racial Justice Act. He claims neither claim
was disproven so they must be presumed true, and the matter
remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
The Racial Justice Act (RJA) provides, “[t]he state shall not
seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a
sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.”
(§ 745, subd. (a).) The RJA sets forth “‘conduct . . . which, if
proved, is enough to “establish” a violation of section 745,
subdivision (a).’” (Finley v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
12, 19.)
“When a defendant files a motion in the trial court alleging
a violation of the Racial Justice Act, the first step is for the trial
court to determine whether the defendant has made ‘a prima
facie showing of a violation.’ [Citation.] The statute specifically

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defines ‘“[p]rima facie showing”’ to mean ‘. . . the defendant
produces facts that, if true, establish . . . there is a substantial
likelihood . . . a violation of subdivision (a) occurred.’” (Jackson v.
Superior Court (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 372, 381 (Jackson).) A
“‘“substantial likelihood” requires more than a mere possibility,
but less than a standard of more likely than not.’” (Ibid.)
Notably, “‘a defendant seeking relief under the Racial Justice Act
must state fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is
sought, and include copies of reasonably available documentary
evidence supporting the claim. The court should accept the truth
of the defendant’s allegations, including expert evidence and
statistics, unless the allegations are conclusory, unsupported by
the evidence presented in support of the claim, or demonstrably
contradicted by the court’s own records. . . . [T]he court should
not make credibility determinations at the prima facie stage.’”
(Ibid.) We review denials of RJA motions de novo. (Id., at
p. 382.)
Here, the trial court denied appellant’s RJA motion because
his allegations were “vague, ambiguous, . . . entirely conclusory
and are not supported by any evidence.” We agree. Appellant
failed to produce facts that, if true, establish a substantial
likelihood a violation occurred. (§ 745, subd. (h)(2).) He failed to
“‘state fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is
sought, [or] include copies of reasonably available documentary
evidence supporting the claim.’” (Jackson, supra, 109
Cal.App.5th at p. 381.) For example, the alleged “Black pro per”
comment is not in the transcripts, the prosecutor declared she
never heard it, and appellant failed to identify who made the
comment, or when, where, or in what context the comment was
allegedly made.

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A RJA violation can only be committed by a judge, an
attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the
case, an expert witness, or a juror. (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)-(2).)
Appellant did not allege the beatings were committed by anyone
other than fellow inmates. We conclude appellant’s RJA motion
was properly denied.
Instructions to Disregard Appellant’s Custody Status
Appellant next contends the trial court erred by failing to
sua sponte instruct the jury to disregard his custody status. But
the record shows during trial when two witnesses referred to
appellant’s custody status, the court instructed the jury that the
fact appellant is or was in custody should not affect their decision
in any way. The trial court was not required to instruct the jury
on the same issue a third time.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Appellant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct
by relying on evidence from dismissed counts to prove identity,
which he asserts is akin to referring to facts not in evidence.6 We
disagree. The prosecutor relied on properly admitted evidence
without appellant’s objection and appellant provides no authority
stating properly admitted evidence must be excluded from juror
consideration if the related charges are dismissed during trial.
Sufficiency of Evidence
Finally, appellant asserts insufficient evidence supports he
was the masked suspect in the library for counts 3 and 4. “‘The
test on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the
conclusion of the trier of fact, not whether the evidence proves

6 He also duplicates his earlier contention the prosecutor

improperly stated the burden of proof but we have already
concluded the burden of proof was correctly stated.

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guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26
Cal.3d 557, 576.) We do not focus on “‘“isolated bits of
evidence.”’” (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261.) We
examine the entire record and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the judgment to determine whether there is reasonable
and credible evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 241.) Determining witness
credibility and the truth or falsity of facts is the exclusive
province of the factfinder. (People v. Giron-Chamul (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 932, 957.) We do not reweigh evidence or reassess
witness credibility. (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.)
M.C. testified she saw appellant in the women’s bathroom
holding his penis with his pants down, she reported his conduct
to police the day it occurred, and she told police he was
circumcised. The jury heard testimony that S.F. “immediately”
recognized appellant in the surveillance footage. A librarian
testified she recognized the masked suspect as appellant because
she had seen him on prior occasions in the library, on the street
near the library, loitering in front of the library, and entering the
library to use the bathroom. She testified he sometimes wore a
mask, but other times did not. Thus, a reasonable jury could
infer the librarian was able to recognize appellant if he was
wearing a mask.
The jury also heard from a library aide who testified
appellant showed her a photo of his nude body and erect penis.
She testified he was not wearing a mask, and he told her his first
and last name. She also testified she recognized him from earlier
interactions when he visited the library and asked her to unlock
the men’s bathroom for him.

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A second library aide identified appellant as having showed
her a pornographic photo while she was helping him with his
library card. She testified he was not wearing a mask and that
after the incident she put her guard up whenever she saw him at
the library and noticed he asked to use the restroom excessively.
“[U]ncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient
to sustain a conviction, unless the testimony is physically
impossible or inherently improbable.” (People v. Scott (1978) 21
Cal.3d 284, 296.) Whether the evidence and testimony could
have resulted in a contrary finding “does not warrant the
judgment’s reversal.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327,
357-358.) Here, multiple witnesses identified appellant based on
numerous interactions with him. We conclude sufficient evidence
justifies the jury’s determination appellant was the masked
suspect in the library surveillance footage.
DISPOSITION
Judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J., Acting P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

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David W. Stuart, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________

Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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