CourtListener 10788878•People v. Jones CA3
Full text
Filed 2/11/26 P. v. Jones CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C102566
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 05F01670)
v.
RUSSELL JONES,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2007, a jury found defendant Russell Jones guilty of first degree murder and
found that he committed the murder in the course of a robbery and a burglary. In 2022,
defendant filed a petition for resentencing under what is now Penal Code1
section 1172.6.2 The trial court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was recodified without
substantive change to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Defendant filed his
1
Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court failed to determine his liability for murder
beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 21, 2005, a Sacramento County sheriff’s deputy entered Daryl
Sussdorf’s car dealership looking for him after he failed to respond to his daughter’s
phone calls. The deputy found blood in many places on the first floor and followed a trail
of blood to the second floor. He found Sussdorf sitting on a chair upstairs gasping for air,
bleeding profusely from his head, and nonresponsive. The right rear pocket of Sussdorf’s
jeans had been torn from the seams, and detectives later found an empty wallet under a
rolling filing cabinet on the first floor. Sussdorf had suffered 11 blows to the head from a
hammer. Sussdorf died 10 days later at the hospital due to blunt force trauma to the head.
After the attack, detectives found an index card on the floor of Sussdorf’s business
with defendant’s name on it. The following month, detectives arrested codefendant Mark
Adcock who led them to defendant. The detectives had Adcock make a pretextual phone
call to defendant. Adcock asked defendant if Sussdorf’s wallet had been disposed of, and
defendant said yes. Defendant told Adcock not to talk about Sussdorf’s murder over the
phone and not to talk to the police.
Sheriff’s deputies then arrested defendant and interviewed him. Defendant
admitted he had previously purchased cars from Sussdorf and had known him for one
year. He also admitted he had been with Adcock on the day of the murder. A deputy
told defendant he knew defendant had been wearing a black puffy jacket the night of the
murder. Defendant said the jacket was at his mother’s house and claimed someone else
had given it to him. Adcock had informed the deputy that defendant had worn a pair of
red gloves the night of the murder, and defendant confirmed he owned a pair of red work
petition under former section 1170.95, but we refer to the current section 1172.6
throughout this opinion.
2
gloves. He said the gloves would also be at his mother’s house, but when a deputy asked
if they would find traces of the red gloves at the murder scene, defendant denied the
gloves were his.
The deputies then put defendant in a room with Adcock and video recorded their
conversation. Defendant told Adcock that he expected to die in prison and thought that
this would be a death penalty case. He also told Adcock he thought the deputies might
find something incriminating on his jacket. Defendant told Adcock he was going to deny
everything and asked Adcock to do the same.
Deputies then searched defendant’s mother’s house. They found a pair of red
gloves but initially did not find the black puffy jacket. Later, deputies asked defendant’s
mother about the jacket, and she went and got it for them from defendant’s closet.
Defendant’s mother had seen him wearing the jacket prior to the murder. A photograph
of defendant from less than one month before the murder showed him wearing the same
jacket. A criminalist tested blood from the blood stains on the jacket and determined that
the blood was Sussdorf’s.
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and found that the murder
was committed in the course of a robbery and a burglary. In a separate proceeding, the
trial court found defendant had previously been convicted of two serious felonies under
California’s “Three Strikes” law. The court sentenced defendant to life in prison without
the possibility of parole.
In 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. On the
petition, defendant checked the box indicating that he had been “convicted of 1st degree
felony murder and could not now be convicted.” The petition required defendant to
check the reasons he could no longer be convicted of murder and indicated that “all must
apply.” Despite this instruction, defendant did not mark the box to indicate that he “was
not the actual killer.”
3
Defendant attached several documents to his petition, including a “letter of
remorse” (capitalization omitted) addressed to Sussdorf, which stated: “On January 21,
2005[,] I entered your place of business with the intent and purpose on robbing you, yes
by force and by threat, but never with the intent on murdering you. . . . [¶] When I hit
you with that hammer on your head and knocked you down to the ground, I forced you to
respond by defending your life and for that I am truly sorry. . . . [¶] I acted as a bully
and a coward who wanted to cut corners to rob and harm someone rather than to work
hard to get the things I wanted and needed. I am deeply and profoundly sorry for all the
harm I caused you, (which led to your death).” Defendant also attached a “letter of
remorse” (capitalization omitted) addressed to the Sussdorf family, which stated: “I am
very, very sorry for murdering and taking the life of Mr. Daryl Sussdorf.” And defendant
attached a “letter and statement of accountability” (capitalization omitted), which stated,
among other things: “All this led up to the day that I entered the place and business of
Mr. Daryl Sussdorf and murdered him and caused physical and emotional trauma and
scars to Daryl Sussdorf and his loving family which I am deeply sorry for my action.”
The prosecution conceded that defendant had made a prima facie showing of
eligibility, and the trial court issued an order to show cause why defendant should not be
granted relief. Prior to the hearing on the order to show cause, the prosecution filed a
brief and submitted evidence, including the transcripts from defendant’s trial. The
prosecution argued the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was
still guilty of murder under current law, either as the actual killer or as a major participant
in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Defendant filed a reply brief arguing the evidence did not establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was guilty of murder under current law. He argued the court
should ignore his statements taking responsibility for the robbery and murder because his
meaning was unclear and he may have been pressured to make such statements.
Defendant also argued he lacked the intent to be guilty of an underlying felony and that
4
hitting someone repeatedly in the head with a hammer does not necessarily constitute
malice. And, if the court believed the evidence showed Adcock used the hammer,
defendant argued he did not aid or abet the murder and was not a major participant acting
with reckless indifference to human life.
At the hearing, the parties reiterated their arguments but did not introduce
additional evidence. The trial court first explained it had read and considered the parties’
briefs and all the evidence attached to the prosecution’s brief. After hearing argument,
the court noted that it had previously granted Adcock’s resentencing petition but
defendant was “in a bit of a different boat.” The court indicated it believed the
admissions in defendant’s letters, explaining: “I don’t think you admit to taking
someone’s life easily.”
The trial court did not decide whether defendant would be guilty of robbery under
current law, instead focusing on whether he committed implied malice murder. The court
found that 11 blows to the head with a hammer could not indicate anything less than a
mental state of implied malice, explaining: “You could say maybe one blow was not
implied malice, but by the time you get to the sixth blow or the ninth blow, that is clearly
-- if that’s not a specific intent to kill, it is clearly a reckless disregard for human life.
And then not to summon any medical assistance and have a man basically bleed out in his
own business shows a callousness as well.” The court found defendant was not eligible
for resentencing under section 1172.6.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to
determine defendant’s liability for murder beyond a reasonable doubt.3 We disagree.
3 Defendant also argues that, if trial counsel failed to preserve the issue, counsel
performed ineffectively by doing so. We conclude defendant did not forfeit the issue of
5
At an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d), the burden
of proof is on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is
guilty of murder under current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Defendant contends, “[T]he
record fails to demonstrate that the trial court applied the proper burden of proof to the
issue at hand,” but this argument reverses the basic principles of appellate review that
guide our consideration of this appeal. “On appeal, we presume that a judgment or order
of the trial court is correct, ‘ “[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support
it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” ’ ”
(People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666.) “ ‘[A] trial court is presumed to have
been aware of and followed the applicable law.’ ” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1107, 1114.) “Thus, where a statement of reasons is not required and the record is silent,
a reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper basis for a particular finding or
order.” (Ibid.)
Following these principles, we cannot agree with defendant’s assertion the trial
court failed to determine he was guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Both
parties stated the appropriate statutory standard of proof in their briefs and the court never
mentioned any other standard of proof at the hearing or in its ruling. Accordingly,
defendant cannot overcome the presumption that the court knew and followed the law.
Defendant argues our presumption that the trial court knew and followed the law
should be overcome because the court misstated the elements of implied malice. As
relevant here, “[m]urder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing is
proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life,
which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his[, her, or their]
conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for
whether the trial court applied the proper standard of proof, so we do not address this
second argument.
6
life.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988; see §§ 187, subd. (a), 188,
subd. (a)(2); CALCRIM No. 520.)
In context, and indulging all intendments and presumptions that support the trial
court’s order, we cannot view the court’s wording as evidence that it did not understand
the applicable law. When discussing what 11 blows with a hammer to the victim’s head
evidenced about defendant’s mental state, the court stated: “You could say maybe one
blow was not implied malice, but by the time you get to the sixth blow or the ninth blow,
that is clearly -- if that’s not a specific intent to kill, it is clearly a reckless disregard for
human life. And then not to summon any medical assistance and have a man basically
bleed out in his own business shows a callousness as well.”
This explanation demonstrates the trial court understood the difference between
express malice and implied malice and was referring to the elements of implied malice as
defined in case law and the applicable jury instructions. Using the phrase “reckless
disregard for human life” instead of conscious disregard for life in this context indicates
the court was paraphrasing, not that the court applied the incorrect standard. Given the
principles of appellate review, we cannot find prejudicial error for not precisely quoting
the statute.
Finally, defendant contends the trial court relied on evidence from Adcock’s
resentencing proceedings, which means the court’s order is not supported by substantial
evidence. This argument should have been stated under a separate heading and supported
by citation to authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.360(a), 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
Nevertheless, we will briefly dispense with the issue. The trial court mentioned
Adcock’s case to explain that the legal issues involved were distinct—under current law,
an accomplice who never entered the building has a different path to relief under
section 1172.6 than the person who has admitted killing the victim. (Compare § 189,
subd. (e)(3) with §§ 187, subd. (a), 188, subd. (a)(2).) Hence, the court’s conclusion that
defendant was “in a bit of a different boat.”
7
This legal juxtaposition does not indicate the trial court relied on improper
evidence. To the contrary, the court stated what evidence it reviewed at the outset of the
hearing and it did not mention the evidence in Adcock’s case. Again, the principles of
appellate review do not permit the conclusion that the court relied on improper evidence
merely because it juxtaposed the two cases when discussing the applicable legal
framework. (Cf. People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1092 [“In the usual case,
the fact that a court did not specifically mention certain evidence does not mean that the
court ‘ignored’ that evidence”].)
Given our presumption that the trial court did not rely on improper evidence, we
have no trouble concluding the court’s ruling is supported by substantial evidence.
Defendant’s letters admitting the robbery and murder are buttressed by the evidence from
the trial and are more than sufficient to uphold the court’s finding that defendant
murdered Sussdorf with implied malice.
8
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s resentencing petition is affirmed.
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
DUARTE, J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
9
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.