People v. Sidebottom CA2/5

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Filed 2/10/26 P. v. Sidebottom CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B343303

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. SA040087)

TOMMY SIDEBOTTOM,

Defendant and
Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kathryn A. Solorzano, Judge. Dismissed.

Jennifer Peabody and Olivia R. Meme, under appointments
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, and Zee Rodriguez and Viet H. Nguyen,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Nearly two decades after a jury convicted Tommy
Sidebottom (defendant) of murder, three attempted murders and
other crimes, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent the trial court a letter identifying
what it believed to be clerical and other sentencing errors with
defendant’s sentence. The trial court eventually corrected one
clerical error, but declined to correct the purported non-clerical
error in his sentence. Defendant now appeals. We dismiss this
appeal because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to correct
defendant’s sentence unless defendant invoked a viable
procedural vehicle for doing so—and he has not.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
I. The Underlying Crimes
On September 10, 2000, Brandon Williamson, Sr.
(Williamson), Williamson’s son, and Clifton Smith, Sr. (Smith)
were standing next to a parked car in which Smith’s two children
sat. Defendant pulled up to them, got out of his vehicle while
holding a red bandana, said something about Culver City, and
then opened fire on the group with a semiautomatic handgun.
The bullets struck Williamson and Smith, and fatally injured
Smith. Defendant then got back into his vehicle, and while
driving shot at two other vehicles but missed their occupants.
Defendant then pulled up alongside a man riding a bicycle,
pointed his gun at him, and told him he was next.

1 We draw the relevant background facts from our prior
unpublished opinion in this case. (People v. Sidebottom (Apr. 8,
2003, B155260) 2003 Cal.App.Unpub.LEXIS 3477 (Sidebottom).)

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II. Charges, Conviction, Sentence and Direct Appeal
In the operative pleading, the People charged defendant
with (1) first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),2 for Smith; (2)
three counts of attempted murder (§§ 187, 664), for Williamson
and the occupants of the two moving cars; (3) assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)), for the bicyclist; (4) two counts of
shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246); and (5) dissuading a
witness (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)), for threatening the bicyclist “you’re
dead, fucker” after the bicyclist testified at defendant’s
preliminary hearing. The People further alleged the special
circumstance that defendant intentionally killed Smith while “an
active participant in a criminal street gang” (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(22)), that all of the crimes were committed for the benefit of,
at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§
186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and that defendant personally used or
discharged a firearm for all but the dissuasion count (§
12023.53).3
The jury convicted defendant of all the above-enumerated
charged offenses and enhancements.
The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for life
without the possibility of parole (LWOP), three consecutive life
sentences, a consecutive 50-year-to-life sentence, and a
consecutive 77 years and 8 months. The court calculated this
sentence as follows:

2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

3 Defendant was also charged with the attempted murders of
the two children in Smith’s car, Williamson’s son, and an
additional passenger in one of the vehicles he shot at while
fleeing, but the jury acquitted defendant of those charges.

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-- Murder. For the murder conviction and special
circumstance finding, the court imposed an LWOP sentence plus
25 years to life for the firearm enhancement, plus 10 years for the
gang enhancement.
-- Attempted murders.
-- For the attempted murder of Williamson, the
court imposed a life sentence with the possibility of parole,
plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement, plus 10
years for the gang enhancement.4
-- For the attempted murder of the first vehicle’s
occupant, the court imposed a life sentence with the
possibility of parole, plus 20 years for the firearm
enhancement, plus 10 years for the gang enhancement.
-- For the attempted murder of the second
vehicle’s occupant, the court imposed a life sentence with
the possibility of parole, plus 10 years for the firearm
enhancement, plus 10 years for the gang enhancement.
-- Assault with a firearm. For the assault with a
firearm conviction, the court imposed two years (one-third of the
midterm), plus 1 year and 4 months (one-third of the midterm)

4 Our previous opinion states that the trial court imposed a
total of 23 years, 4 months on the attempted murder convictions’
gang enhancements, which is supported by the minute order from
the sentencing hearing which indicates that the trial court
imposed only 3 years, 4 months for the gang enhancement
connected to the attempted murder of Williamson. (Sidebottom,
supra, 2003 Cal.App.Unpub.LEXIS 3477, *3.) However, the
sentencing hearing transcript and original abstract of judgment
reveal the minute order to be incorrect, as the court imposed the
full 10 years for each of the gang enhancements attached to each
of the attempted murders.

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for the firearm enhancement, plus 3 years and 4 months (one-
third of the midterm) for the gang enhancement.
-- Witness dissuasion. For the dissuading a witness
conviction, the court imposed one year (one-third of the midterm).
The court also imposed sentences on both of the shooting at
an occupied vehicle counts, but stayed those sentences pursuant
to section 654.
On direct appeal, we affirmed defendant’s convictions but,
consistent with section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5), ordered his
sentences on the attempted murder counts modified to eliminate
the consecutive 10-year sentences for the gang enhancements and
to instead impose a 15-year minimum term on each life sentence.
(Sidebottom, supra, 2003 Cal.App.Unpub.LEXIS 3477, *26.) On
remand, the trial court entered an amended abstract of judgment
reflecting these changes.
III. CDCR’s 2020 Letter
In October 2020, a case records analyst with the CDCR
sent a letter to the trial court indicating her view that
defendant’s sentence “may be in error,” and requesting that the
court review its file to “determine if a correction is required.” The
letter identified what amount to two purported errors with the
amended abstract of judgment or the sentence—namely, (1) that
the abstract of judgment (erroneously) reflected that two of the
attempted murder sentences had been stayed pursuant to section
654, and (2) that the trial court (erroneously) treated both fixed-
term (that is, determinate) sentences (the sentences for assault
with a firearm and witness dissuasion) as if they were
subordinate sentences with correspondingly reduced sentences
rather than treating one of them as a principal term with a full-

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term sentence and the other as a subordinate sentence with a
reduced sentence. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.451(a).)
IV. Trial Court’s Ruling In Response to CDCR’s Letter
In late 2024, the trial court acted on CDCR’s letter. The
court appointed counsel for defendant in August 2024 and held
hearings in September and December 2024. Defendant urged the
court to correct both errors identified by CDCR, and argued that
correcting the non-clerical error would effectively require
defendant to be resentenced, thereby rendering defendant’s
sentence non-final, such that defendant’s gang enhancements
would be subject to vacation under the recently enacted Assembly
Bill 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) that redefined and narrowed the
gang enhancement. The trial court declined to correct the non-
clerical error identified by CDCR, reasoning that the net effect of
fixing that error was to lengthen defendant’s sentence (because
one of the lesser subordinate sentences would have to be
increased to a longer sentence for a principal offense), and that it
would not otherwise be in the interests of justice to allow
defendant’s gang enhancements to be subject to vacatur.
V. Appeal
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s
order.
VI. Subsequent Correction of Clerical Error
While this appeal was pending, the trial court filed an
amended abstract of judgment correcting the clerical error
identified by CDCR, and thus unchecking the section 654 stay
boxes for the two attempted murder counts.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that (1) his sentence is unauthorized due
to the non-clerical error the CDCR identified—namely, that the

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court imposed two subordinate determinate sentences (rather
than one principal determinate sentence and one subordinate
determinate sentence), (2) the trial court was obligated to correct
this authorized sentence by conducting a full resentencing, and
(3) such a full resentencing renders his conviction non-final and
thus entitles him to take advantage of all of the ameliorative
changes in sentencing law that have happened over the last
quarter century, including the change that narrows the
applicability of the criminal street gang enhancement. The
People respond that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to correct
the unauthorized sentence, and that we correspondingly lack
jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.
The People are correct.
Once execution of a criminal sentence begins, the trial
court that imposed that sentence generally lacks jurisdiction to
modify or vacate that sentence. (People v. Howard (1997) 16
Cal.4th 1081, 1089; People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344;
see People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) There are
some exceptions: Trial courts retain the inherent power to
correct clerical mistakes (that is, scrivener-type errors that do not
involve the exercise of judgment) (In re Candelario (1970) 3
Cal.3d 702, 705; Mitchell, at p. 185), and courts may revisit a
sentence pursuant to any statutory authority conferred upon
them by our Legislature (People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
56, 69 (Boyd); e.g., §§ 1172.1, 1172.6). But trial courts lack any
inherent, free-floating jurisdiction to correct non-clerical errors in
a sentence like the one defendant seeks through a full
resentencing. (See People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 633;
Boyd, at p. 61; People v. Hernandez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1111,
1118, 1123; People v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783, 797-

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798; People v. Garcia (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 139, 144; but see
People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976 (Codinha).)
Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, we lack jurisdiction to
entertain this appeal. (King, at p. 634; People v. Chlad (1992) 6
Cal.App.4th 1719, 1725.)
Defendant resists this conclusion, pointing to the decision
in Codinha, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th 976, which extrapolates from
the general principle that an “unauthorized sentence” is not
subject to waiver a broader principle that trial courts possess an
inherent, free-floating authority to correct an “unauthorized
sentence” at any time—without any need to identify or invoke
any legislatively authorized vehicle for doing so. (Id. at pp. 988-
989.) Codinha so holds, but we side with the weight of authority
rejecting Codinha: Its extrapolation of the “unauthorized
sentence” doctrine is not compelled by precedent, and the net
effect of Codinha’s rule is to render habeas corpus and section
1473.7 superfluous, as they already provide the statutory vehicles
for revisiting unauthorized sentences while a sentence is being
executed (or, in the case of section 1473.7, after it has been
completed). (Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 68 [so noting].)
To be sure, we could construe defendant’s appeal as a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus addressed to us; indeed,
defendant has asked us to do so. We nevertheless decline to do
so. If a resentencing is warranted, it would require the court to
decide which of the two determinant sentences should be the
principal term, to select which base term (low, medium or high) is
appropriate for the principal sentence, and to assess whether the
trial evidence satisfies the more stringent definition of a

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“criminal street gang” adopted by Assembly Bill 333; these are
tasks better suited for the trial court in the first instance.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed, without prejudice to defendant,
the People, the trial court, or the CDCR seeking to correct
defendant’s sentence through a valid procedure.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, J.
BAKER

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

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The People v. Tommy Sidebottom
B343303

BAKER, J., Concurring

I have signed the opinion for the court, but the law on
whether the unauthorized sentence rule confers jurisdiction to
resentence a defendant is unsettled. There is a split in the
Courts of Appeal. (Compare People v. Boyd (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 56, 62; People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 633
with People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 993.) There
also appear to be conflicting observations in our Supreme Court’s
own case law. (Compare In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1129-
1130 [unauthorized sentence rule is “an exception to the waiver
doctrine” that cannot be invoked absent jurisdiction over the
judgment] with People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 338
[“Nor is Picklesimer’s obligation to register part of an
unauthorized sentence, which the trial court would have had
jurisdiction to correct at any time”], italics added; People v.
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1044-1045 [“[I]t is settled
that an unauthorized sentence is subject to correction despite the
circumstance that an appeal is pending. Because the trial court
was not authorized simply to waive sentencing on these counts,
any error in failing to impose sentence in this regard would have
been subject to judicial correction when it ultimately came to the
attention of the trial court or this court”], italics added.)
In concurring in the judgment, I have resolved the
ambiguity in precedent by deferring to the Supreme Court’s most
recent pronouncement on the unauthorized sentence rule in G.C.
But, to reiterate the Codinha court’s observation, it would be
better if the law in this area were clearer. (Codinha, supra, 92
Cal.App.5th at 993.)

BAKER, J.

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