CourtListener 10786183•People v. Smith CA6
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Filed 2/9/26 P. v. Smith CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H052440
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1894414)
v.
HAYLEYANN SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Hayleyann Smith was convicted by jury of two counts of grand theft
and two counts of embezzlement. The jury also found true an allegation that the offenses
involved an aggregate taking of more than $100,000, for which the trial court imposed a
two-year sentencing enhancement under Penal Code section 186.11 and a former version
of Penal Code section 12022.6. (Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.)
On appeal, defendant contends her convictions must be aggregated into one count of
grand theft and one count of embezzlement because the offenses were committed as parts
of a single plan. She also argues the sentencing enhancement must be reversed due to the
repeal of former section 12022.6, or alternatively reduced to one year because a two-year
enhancement could only be imposed based on facts not found by the jury. As we will
explain, we conclude defendant’s convictions should stand and a sentencing enhancement
could be applied in her case under section 186.11. But we agree with defendant that the
two-year enhancement must be reduced to one year. We will thus reverse the judgment
and remand for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged with two counts of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a); counts 1
and 2) and two counts of embezzlement (§ 503; counts 3 and 4). It was alleged that the
offenses constituted “a pattern of related felony conduct,” as defined in section 186.11,
involving a taking of more than $100,000 but not more than $500,000.
A. PROSECUTION CASE
Jerry Dong met defendant on a dating website in 2012, and they went on several
dates that year. In August 2012, Dong suffered a brain injury in a bicycle accident.
Defendant visited him while he was hospitalized. Defendant talked to Dong about
making him part of her “family” and them “taking care of” one another. After Dong was
released from the hospital, defendant moved in with him and his former housemate
moved out. Dong paid defendant about $3,000 or $4,000 per month to act as his
caretaker. Defendant introduced Dong to her daughter, Leyah Gibson, who defendant
said was a bookkeeper. Dong hired Gibson to help him manage his finances and paid her
about $1,000 or $2,000 per month.
In 2013, defendant suggested to Dong that they purchase a business together.
Defendant proposed purchasing a bar and grill in San Clemente and said she could
manage the business. Gibson, who lived near the business, would serve as its
bookkeeper. Dong agreed and withdrew approximately $380,000 from various
investment accounts to purchase the business and a liquor license. Defendant and Dong
agreed that Dong would initially own 90 percent of the business and defendant would
own 10 percent. If the business was successful, defendant’s ownership share could
increase to 50 percent. Dong intended that monthly salaries for himself and defendant
would be determined after all business expenses were paid. Although Dong asked
defendant for monthly profit and loss statements, which defendant said she would have
Gibson prepare, Dong never received them.
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Defendant opened a bank account for the business. Bank records indicated
defendant was the sole owner and signatory associated with the business account. Dong
requested access to the account, but defendant denied him access. Defendant and Dong
did not discuss defendant’s living arrangements, and Dong understood that the business
account would not be used for personal expenses. Dong provided defendant with a
Macy’s credit card to purchase work-appropriate attire. Defendant was generally evasive
when Dong asked her for updates about the business, and he did not think she was
managing the business well.
At some point, defendant told Dong the restaurant had black mold and she was
withholding rent as a result. In December 2013, after the property owner won a judgment
against the business, Dong asked defendant whether the business would have enough
money to pay its rent the following month. Defendant replied that she was “ ‘waiting for
the 90,000.’ ” She later sent Dong another message saying, “ ‘The 90,000 just got
deposited.’ ” At the time, Dong did not know what defendant was referring to. Later, in
June 2014, Dong was notified of a lawsuit being filed against him relating to a $90,000
loan that had been obtained in his name. Dong testified that he was not aware of the loan
and had not authorized the loan application. An expert in “forensic document
examination” testified that it was “highly probable” Dong did not sign the application.
Bank records showed that in 2013 and 2014, 37 direct transfers totaling $117,000
were made from the business bank account to defendant’s personal account. Over the
same time period, 42 cash withdrawals totaling $80,463.92 were made from the business
account. The business account was used for personal expenses (as determined by a
forensic accounting expert) totaling $45,024.22. Defendant also paid five months of rent
for her personal residence using $15,000 from the business account.
B. DEFENSE CASE
Defendant testified on her own behalf. She said she met defendant in 2011 and
moved in with him after he was released from the hospital in 2012. While defendant was
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living with Dong, he asked her to marry him. Defendant said it was Dong who had
suggested they purchase a business together. After they purchased the restaurant,
defendant moved to San Clemente. Defendant acknowledged having paid rent for her
personal residence using money from the business bank account, but said Dong had
agreed to that arrangement. She also acknowledged purchasing clothing with a business
credit card on several occasions, but said the purchases were work-related. Defendant
recalled paying $20,000 or $30,000 to address the restaurant’s black mold problem, and
said most of those payments were made in cash with money from the business account.
She did not recall transferring any money from the business account to her personal
account.
Defendant’s daughter Gibson had “credit problems” that meant she could not
“sign on to” the business bank account, but defendant testified that she shared the account
information with Gibson and gave Gibson “full access” to the account for bookkeeping
purposes. Defendant said she also gave Gibson access to her personal account. Gibson
handled financial matters for both defendant and the business, and defendant said she did
not regularly review bank statements because she was “too busy.” At some point,
defendant realized Gibson was stealing money from the business and not paying its bills.
Defendant believed Gibson had transferred money from the business account into
defendant’s personal account and forged defendant’s signature on numerous unauthorized
checks. Gibson also had access to defendant’s cell phone, and defendant believed Gibson
had used her phone to send Dong a text message about the $90,000 loan. Defendant said
she did not apply for the loan and learned of it only after a lawsuit was filed against her.
C. VERDICT AND SENTENCING
The jury found defendant guilty on all four counts. It also found true the
allegation that the offenses involved “a pattern of related felony conduct” and a taking of
more than $100,000 but not more than $500,000. The trial court sentenced defendant to
three years four months in prison, consisting of a 16-month lower term on count 1 plus a
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two-year white collar crime enhancement. (§ 186.11, subd. (a)(3); see former § 12022.6,
subd. (a)(2) (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 5).) Defendant stipulated to $953,661.82 in victim
restitution owed to Dong. Lower term sentences on counts 2, 3, and 4 were imposed and
stayed under section 654.
II. DISCUSSION
A. THE CONVICTIONS NEED NOT BE AGGREGATED
Defendant contends her four convictions must be merged into two: one count of
grand theft and one count of embezzlement. She bases her contention on People v.
Bailey (1961) 55 Cal.2d 514, 519, in which the California Supreme Court stated that “a
defendant may be properly convicted upon separate counts charging grand theft from the
same person if the evidence shows that the offenses are separate and distinct and were not
committed pursuant to one intention, one general impulse, and one plan.” Courts
consistently interpreted Bailey as holding “that multiple acts of grand theft pursuant to a
single scheme cannot support more than one count of grand theft” until the California
Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 742 (Whitmer).
Whitmer disapproved those cases’ interpretation of Bailey and held that “a defendant may
be convicted of multiple counts of grand theft based on separate and distinct acts of theft,
even if committed pursuant to a single overarching scheme.” (Whitmer, at p. 735.) “But
given the numerous, and uncontradicted, Court of Appeal decisions” stating otherwise
over a period of many years, the Supreme Court concluded that its holding should apply
only prospectively. (Id. at p. 742.)
The parties correctly agree that because the offenses alleged here were committed
before Whitmer was decided in July 2014, we must apply Bailey and its pre-Whitmer
progeny. Under that line of cases, a defendant’s convictions on multiple theft counts
must be aggregated if there is no evidence “from which the jury could have reasonably
inferred that the defendant acted pursuant to more than one intention, one general
impulse, or one plan.” (People v. Jaska (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 971, 984 (Jaska).)
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“However, Bailey does not prohibit multiple convictions where the defendant commits a
series of thefts based on separate intents, even if the defendant acts pursuant to the same
intent on each occasion.” (Id., at p. 984.) In Jaska, for example, multiple theft
convictions were upheld where evidence suggested the defendant “stole various sums of
money in an opportunistic manner, essentially whenever the need and/or occasion arose.”
(Id. at p. 985.) Here, the jury could have reached a similar conclusion. There was
evidence that defendant used multiple methods to steal and embezzle money from Dong
and the business through dozens of separate transactions over a period of months. Given
that evidence, defendant cannot show that her convictions must be aggregated as a matter
of law. (Ibid.)
We note that the jury’s true finding on the section 186.11 allegation does not
affect our analysis of the aggregation issue. Defendant asserts that because the jury
found she engaged in a pattern of related felony conduct, it must have found that the
offenses were committed as parts of a single plan. She relies on language from Whitmer
stating that under the circumstances of that case, the jury’s true finding on an
enhancement allegation under former section 12022.6 (not section 186.11) meant it
“necessarily found that the grand thefts arose ‘from a common scheme or plan.’ ”
(Whitmer, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 742.) Former section 12022.6, subdivision (b) provided
that victim losses from multiple theft offenses could be aggregated to determine the
proper sentencing enhancement under that statute if the losses arose “from a common
scheme or plan.” (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 5.) Significantly, section 186.11 contains no
such requirement. Section 186.11 defines a “pattern of related felony conduct” more
expansively as “engaging in at least two felonies that have the same or similar purpose,
result, principals, victims, or methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics, and that are not isolated events.” (§ 186.11, subd. (a)(1).)
The jury did not find that the offenses arose “from a common scheme or plan” under
former section 12022.6; rather, the jury found “a pattern of related felony conduct” under
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section 186.11 which does not preclude a finding that defendant “acted pursuant to more
than one intention, one general impulse, or one plan.” (Jaska, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at
p. 984.)
B. THE REPEAL OF FORMER SECTION 12022.6 DOES NOT BAR THE
ENHANCEMENT
The jury found true an allegation under section 186.11 that defendant engaged in a
pattern of related felony conduct. Section 186.11, subdivision (a) specifies the
sentencing enhancement to be imposed under such circumstances: “If the pattern of
related felony conduct involves the taking of, or results in the loss by another person or
entity of, more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), the additional term of
punishment shall be two, three, or five years in the state prison.” (§ 186.11, subd. (a)(2).)
“If the pattern of related felony conduct involves the taking of, or results in the loss by
another person or entity of, more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), but not
more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), the additional term of punishment
shall be the term specified in paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 12022.6.”
(§ 186.11, subd. (a)(3).)
Section 12022.6 provides for its own sentencing enhancements in felony cases
involving property loss or damage. Until January 1, 2018, former section 12022.6,
subdivision (a) provided a one-year enhancement for losses exceeding $65,000 and a
two-year enhancement for losses exceeding $200,000. (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 5.) On
January 1, 2018, former section 12022.6 was repealed in accordance with former
section 12022.6, subdivision (f), which read: “It is the intent of the Legislature that the
provisions of this section be reviewed within 10 years to consider the effects of inflation
on the additional terms imposed. For that reason this section shall remain in effect only
until January 1, 2018, and as of that date is repealed unless a later enacted statute, which
is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.” (Stats. 2010, ch. 711,
§ 5.) A new version of section 12022.6 had not been enacted at the time defendant was
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prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced. She thus argues that no enhancement could be
imposed in her case under section 186.11, subdivision (a)(3), which incorporated the
penalty provisions of former section 12022.6, subdivision (a). Because former
section 12022.6 was in effect when defendant committed her offenses in 2013 and 2014
but was repealed before she was sentenced in 2024, we consider whether the Legislature
intended that she be subject to the penalty provisions incorporated in section 186.11,
subdivision (a)(3). (See In re Pedro T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041, 1045; Bourquez v.
Superior Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1286.)
Other courts have rejected similar arguments where the enhancements were
imposed under former section 12022.6, not section 186.11. In People v. Abrahamian
(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 314, 336, the jury found true an allegation under former
section 12022.6. Although Abrahamian was sentenced in March 2018, after former
section 12022.6 was repealed, the Court of Appeal upheld a two-year enhancement
imposed under the repealed statute. (Abrahamian, at pp. 336–338.) The Abrahamian
court reasoned that the Legislature’s apparent intent in enacting former section 12022.6
was “to apply the provision’s enhanced punishment to offenses committed throughout its
effective period.” (Abrahamian, at p. 337.) Similarly, in People v. Medeiros (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1147, former section 12022.6 was repealed after Medeiros
committed his offenses but before he was sentenced in September 2018. The Court of
Appeal upheld an enhancement imposed under former section 12022.6 because “the text
of the statute and history of the legislation make clear that the purpose of section 12022.6
was to provide harsher penalties for theft of high dollar amounts of property as an
important tool for law enforcement in combatting white collar crime.” (Medeiros, at
p. 1154.) “The express language of the sunset provision itself states its purpose is to
allow the Legislature to review the threshold amounts of the enhancement for inflation,
not to allow the Legislature to consider whether the enhancements should continue to
apply or whether the statute should be repealed.” (Ibid.)
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Defendant attempts to distinguish her case from Abrahamian and Medeiros by
noting that former section 12022.6 had already been repealed at the time she was
criminally charged in 2018, whereas it was still in effect when Abrahamian and Medeiros
were charged and was repealed during the pendency of their cases. But defendant does
not explain why the date of the pleading is more significant for sentencing purposes than
the date of sentencing, and we do not see that an immaterial distinction should affect our
analysis. To the extent this case does meaningfully differ from Abrahamian and
Medeiros, the differences do not support defendant’s argument. Abrahamian and
Medeiros received enhanced sentences based on allegations found true under former
section 12022.6, which was repealed before their sentencing dates. Although the length
of defendant’s sentencing enhancement also appears to have been based on the penalty
provisions of former section 12022.6, the enhancement imposed derived from an
allegation found true under section 186.11. A conclusion that no enhancement could be
imposed based on the jury’s finding under section 186.11—even though that section
remained in effect at the time of sentencing—would render the language of
section 186.11, subdivision (a)(3) superfluous. We see nothing to suggest the Legislature
intended that result.
C. ONLY A ONE-YEAR ENHANCEMENT WAS AUTHORIZED
Alternatively, defendant contends the enhancement imposed must be reduced from
two years to one year. She notes that the penalty provisions of former section 12022.6
required more than $200,000 in losses for a two-year enhancement to be imposed, while
losses of more than $65,000 but not more than $200,000 provided for a one-year
enhancement. (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 5.) Following the structure of section 186.11,
subdivision (a), the jury found that defendant’s takings totaled more than $100,000 but
not more than $500,000; the jury was not asked whether defendant’s takings exceeded
$200,000.
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The Attorney General appears to suggest the trial court had discretion to make its
own finding as to the amount of loss for sentencing purposes, but there is no indication in
the record that defendant waived her right to a jury trial on that issue. To the contrary,
the jury was asked to make a finding as to the amount of loss—but its finding does not
include the specific information required to support a two-year enhancement. Although a
forensic accounting expert testified that total takings from the business account exceeded
$250,000, defendant testified that she was not the only one with access to the account.
She also disputed the expert’s characterization of certain expenses as personal rather than
business-related, and testified that Dong had agreed she could use money from the
business account to pay the rent for her personal residence (where she had moved in
order to manage the business). Had the jury been asked whether defendant’s takings
exceeded $200,000, there was evidence from which it could have found the allegation not
true.
Because the jury found defendant’s takings exceeded $100,000 but was not asked
whether they exceeded $200,000, only a one-year enhancement could be imposed under
section 186.11 (incorporating former section 12022.6). We will therefore reverse the
judgment and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for resentencing.
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____________________________________
Grover, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
Lie, J.
____________________________
Wilson, J.
H052440
The People v Smith
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