CourtListener 10786079•People v. Jones CA2/4
Full text
Filed 2/9/26 P. v. Jones CA2/4
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B320040
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA037935)
v.
MARCUS JONES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura C. Ellison, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Tracy J. Dressner, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 1996, when they were 15 years old, appellant Marcus
Jones and his cousin, Melvin Jones (Melvin), robbed a small
store. Melvin shot and killed the owner of the store during the
robbery. Appellant was convicted of robbery and murder and
sentenced to an aggregate term of 26 years to life in state prison.
In 2019, appellant sought resentencing pursuant to Penal
Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 After issuing an
order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing at the
direction of People v. Jones (Apr. 22, 2021, No. B304692) [nonpub.
opn.]), the trial court found appellant ineligible for relief as a
major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. This court affirmed that ruling. (See
People v. Jones (July 20, 2023, B320040) [nonpub. opn.].)
The Supreme Court granted appellant’s petition for review
and subsequently transferred the matter back to this court “with
directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light
of People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867 [(Emanuel)],” which
clarified the reckless indifference standard and its application in
the section 1172.6 context. In supplemental briefing (see Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b)), appellant argues that Emanuel
provides further support for his contention that the trial court
erred by finding that he acted with reckless indifference to
human life. We agree and reverse.
1 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute. We hereafter
refer to the statute as section 1172.6. All further statutory
references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties stipulated to the admission of the following
evidence at the section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary
hearing: (1) a transcript of percipient witness Antonio Ochoa’s
trial testimony; (2) an investigatory police report from the
Inglewood Police Department (police report); (3) a transcript of a
surreptitiously recorded conversation between appellant and
Melvin following their arrest shortly after the crime; (4) a
psychiatric report prepared in 1996 to determine appellant’s
fitness for juvenile court treatment (psychiatric report); (5) a
transcript of appellant’s trial testimony; (6) a probation report
prepared when appellant was sentenced; (7) the Supreme Court’s
opinion in People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667;
and (8) the opinion in appellant’s direct appeal, People v. Jones
(Sept. 25, 2001, B143098) [nonpub. opn.].
While there is some dispute about certain facts, namely
whether appellant fully entered the store or grabbed the money
after victim Won Hee Lee was shot, the parties generally agree
on the facts.
I. Incident, Escape, and Apprehension
Around 7:45 p.m. on May 23, 1996, victim Lee was inside
his small store, the Park Avenue Market in Inglewood. His
employee, Ochoa, was sweeping outside the only entry into the
store. Ochoa and other eyewitnesses saw two teenage Black
males, later identified as appellant and Melvin, emerge from a
“small alcove” and walk toward and enter the store. Although
there was evidence suggesting appellant had the gun at that
time, it is undisputed for purposes of this appeal that Melvin
procured the gun, wielded it during the robbery, and fired the
fatal shot at Lee.
3
Ochoa looked inside the store and saw Melvin pointing the
gun at Lee with an outstretched arm. Ochoa heard one of the
teens say, “Okay. This is –,” and then heard a gunshot. About 30
seconds later, Ochoa saw appellant and Melvin walk out of the
store, cross the street, and run away together.
Ochoa saw a police officer nearby and yelled that his boss
had been shot. He then got into his car and followed appellant
and Melvin as they fled. After he saw them jump a fence
surrounding an elementary school, Ochoa drove around the
school and saw them walking into “some apartments.” Police
officers who had also pursued appellant and Melvin arrived and
detained them at the apartments. Police later recovered
“numerous pieces of evidence” between the store and the
apartments, including a dollar bill and green button on the
sidewalk, a green scarf and a “blue rubber mask-like object” in a
nearby front yard, a gray sweatshirt by the school, and a revolver
lying in the front yard of the home next to the apartments. They
recovered $31 from appellant’s pants pockets when he was
booked.
Lee was pronounced dead at the hospital shortly after the
incident. An autopsy revealed that the cause of death was a
single gunshot wound to the head. The coroner observed “stifling
[sic]” and black powder near Lee’s mouth and concluded he was
shot at close range “of less than eighteen inches and probably as
close as six inches.”
II. Surreptitiously Recorded Statements
After arresting appellant and Melvin, the police placed
them in the back of a police cruiser that had a tape recorder
running. Appellant and Melvin proceeded to have an expletive-
laden conversation about the incident.
4
Appellant repeatedly told Melvin that he should not have
“blasted” or “busted” Lee in the face. Appellant further said,
many times in many ways, that Melvin had “fucked up.” At least
twice, appellant told Melvin that he, appellant, should have been
the one to hold the gun. Appellant remarked that after Melvin
shot Lee, “We can’t do shit but grab money, man, we fuckin’ just
sweatin’ like. . . .” Appellant also made an additional comment
suggesting he and Melvin became intoxicated for the purpose of
committing the robbery: “I didn’t want to do that shit, man,
that’s why we got faded out like a mother fucker.”
Appellant suggested several times that he and Melvin
would not have been caught if Melvin had not lost his apartment
keys, and said they should “break” or “run” from the police car,
“first chance we get.” He also expressed concern that he and
Melvin would get life in prison or “the electric chair.” At one
point, he added, “I bet we can’t get off on a fuckin’ first offense,
n*****”; he later reiterated, “If you wouldn’t have shot him in the
face it would have been our first offense.” He also stated, “You
should have never did this shit on me. If you wouldn’t have shot
that n***** in the face, we’d be out clean. Cause I would have
dumped it on somebody else. But we about to go to jail, n*****.
You shot that n***** in the face.”
III. Appellant’s Post-Arrest Statements
After he was advised of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, appellant told officers that he and
Melvin went to Melvin’s apartment after school on the day of the
incident. Around 5:00 p.m., they went to a liquor store and got
someone to buy them a bottle of vodka, which they shared. They
then walked around the area of the Park Avenue Market, which
Melvin had been talking about robbing since that morning,
5
“because they could get away with it here.” Appellant told
Melvin “he wasn’t ready to do this” and tried to persuade Melvin
not to rob the store. He also said, however, that he did not want
Melvin to go in alone “because he didn’t want him to get shot.”
The plan was to go into the store, tell everyone in there to
get down on the floor, “rush the cash register,” get the money,
and leave. Appellant “figured Melvin wouldn’t rob a liquor store
without” a gun, and, indeed, Melvin withdrew a revolver from his
sock right before they entered the store. Appellant did not know
where Melvin got the gun, and he stated that “[t]he plan wasn’t
to shoot anyone.” He also told the officers, “It never works like
you plan.”
Before they entered the store, appellant “put a black facial
thing around his head” and donned one black glove. Appellant
thought Melvin “might have put a blue beanie or something on
his head.” Melvin then entered the store, and appellant followed,
standing “between the doorway and the front counter.” Appellant
“‘heard the blam’ and saw the victim fall back.” He thought
Melvin “reached over the counter and took the money out of the
register.” Melvin gave the money to appellant, who had about
$17 before entering the store. Melvin and appellant then left the
store and ran to Melvin’s house, hopping the fence of a nearby
school on the way.
IV. Psychiatric Report and Supreme Court Opinion
In July 1996, psychiatrist Jack Rothberg, M.D., Ph.D.,
evaluated appellant to assess his suitability to be tried in juvenile
court.
According to Rothberg’s report, appellant stated that
Melvin wanted to rob the store for cash. Appellant was reluctant
to participate, “but was concerned that Melvin might get hurt,
6
and so he came along, in essence to protect him.” Appellant
“insist[ed] that he does not use drugs,” but admitted that he and
Melvin consumed alcohol before the incident. Appellant said he
had previously seen Melvin with a gun, but also said neither he
nor Melvin had experience using a gun; the report noted,“[w]hen
loading it they had apparently cocked the trigger, but had no idea
how to uncock it.”
When appellant and Melvin entered the store, it “seemed
only a matter of seconds before [appellant] heard ‘pow.’”
Appellant maintained that Melvin did not intend to shoot anyone,
and that the gun “simply discharged while he was pointing it at
the store owner.” The report continued, “Marcus explains that
after that he ‘did something stupid’ emptying the register and
running out.” Appellant said he was “‘not in my right mind,’
apparently because he had some alcohol to drink.” Rothberg
noted that appellant “expressed considerable remorse about the
crime, both with respect to the victim and the victim’s family.”
Rothberg concluded appellant would be an appropriate
candidate for juvenile court. The juvenile court agreed, but the
Supreme Court ulitmately determined appellant should be tried
as an adult. (See People v. Superior Court (Jones), supra, 18
Cal.4th 667.) In its opinion, the Supreme Court made two
statements appellant cites as facts in his briefing: (1) while in the
police car, Melvin said he grabbed the money2 (see People v.
2 The transcript of the surreptitious recording admitted at
the evidentiary hearing does not contain that statement. It
quotes Melvin as saying, “I know I did, too, then I wouldn’t have
shot, man. I was like fucked up. I just grabbed the
[unintelligible.].” The recording itself was not admitted at the
hearing and is not part of the appellate record.
7
Superior Court (Jones), supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 673); and (2) “The
minors waited in an alcove near the store for customers to leave.”
(Id. at p. 672.)
After the Supreme Court issued its opinion, appellant and
Melvin were tried together in criminal court. The jury convicted
Melvin of first degree murder and robbery, but the court declared
a mistrial as to appellant. Appellant was later retried separately,
in 2000. (People v. Jones (Sept. 25, 2001, No. B143098) [nonpub.
opn.].)
V. Appellant’s Trial Testimony
At his retrial, appellant “relied on an intoxication defense”
and testified on his own behalf. (People v. Jones (Sept. 25, 2001,
No. B143098) [nonpub. opn.].) He testified that he and Melvin
were both 15 years old at the time of the shooting; appellant was
one month older than Melvin and therefore was “over-protective”
of him. Melvin was like a brother to him; they spent the night at
each other’s homes, went to the same school and church, and
played on the same basketball team.
On May 23, 1996, while they were at school, Melvin told
appellant he wanted to “do something to get some money,” which
appellant understood to mean “[r]obbery, stealing something,
something illegal.” Melvin had made similar comments “in the
past,” “like a little here, a little there,” but appellant “shoved it
off” because he had never known Melvin to follow through.
After school, appellant and Melvin went to a friend’s house
to play video games. They smoked marijuana and shared a pint
of vodka with the friend. On the way home from the friend’s
house, appellant and Melvin stopped at the liquor store and got
someone to buy them another pint of vodka. Appellant and
Melvin shared the bottle as they walked toward Melvin’s house.
8
On the way, they stopped at a nearby elementary school where
they often hung out. Appellant felt very drunk by that point; he
vomited twice.
While appellant and Melvin were sitting outside the
elementary school, Melvin pulled a gun out of his sock and told
appellant, “he wanted to rob Mr. Lee’s store.” Melvin said it
would be “easy”: they would “go in there and get the money and
get out.” Appellant said he did not want to do it, and that it was
wrong. He also testified that he was scared of “the whole
situation,” because he “didn’t want to get killed” and “didn’t want
to go to jail.” Melvin used “peer pressure words” and taunted
appellant. Appellant steadfastly refused to participate, and
Melvin eventually said, “Fuck it. I’m going with or without you.”
When Melvin got up and started walking away, appellant felt
“like that was the last time I was gonna see my cousin, my
brother, alive again,” because he thought Melvin “was gonna get
himself killed.” Appellant decided to go with Melvin to prevent
him from getting hurt and “[k]eep him from hurting anyone.” He
continued his efforts to talk Melvin out of the robbery the whole
way to the store.
When they arrived, they stopped in an alcove near the
store. Melvin put on a mask and handed appellant a glove.
Appellant put the glove in his pocket and wrapped his basketball
bandana around his face. Appellant did not try to take the gun
away from Melvin because he “didn’t know if the gun was loaded”
and “wasn’t about to risk me accidentally getting shot or him
accidentally getting shot. Both of us drunk, tussling with a gun.
No. No.”
Melvin and appellant left the alcove, and Melvin entered
the store alone while appellant stood in the doorway to prevent
9
anyone from getting hurt. Melvin ran to the counter and
“bark[ed] a couple words” before appellant heard a gunshot.
Appellant then saw Melvin reach over the counter toward the
cash register. Appellant said, “What the fuck you doing?” and
wondered why Melvin was grabbing money when someone had
just been shot. From the doorway, appellant reached for Melvin
and tried to pull him out of the store. Melvin handed money to
appellant, who put it in his pocket before pushing Melvin out the
door.
Appellant ran away with Melvin toward the elementary
school. As they were running, Melvin asked for appellant’s
bandana; appellant “snatched it off and gave it to him.”
Appellant did not know what Melvin did with the bandana or his
own ski mask. He and Melvin ran through the schoolyard,
hopped some fences, and walked toward Melvin’s apartment.
Police arrived shortly thereafter and detained them. In the
police car, appellant “express[ed] [his] true feelings” to Melvin,
“that I felt like he fucked up our life personally.” Appellant said
he felt “helpless” at the time, because he had seen someone get
shot and “couldn’t stop it.”
On cross-examination, appellant admitted that he lied to
Rothberg about using drugs, though on redirect he said that he
thought Rothberg had been referring to hard drugs, not
marijuana. Appellant did not recall telling Rothberg that he had
previously seen Melvin with a gun. Appellant also said that he
told Rothberg that Melvin had cocked the trigger, because “both
of us can’t cock the trigger.” Appellant denied telling Rothberg, “I
did something stupid” by emptying the register. On redirect, he
explained that he told Rothberg that Melvin emptied the register.
10
Appellant stated that he watched Melvin load the gun
while they were sitting at the elementary school, contradicting
his earlier testimony that he did not know if the gun was loaded.
When pressed by the prosecutor about his understanding of the
plan and awareness that Melvin was loading the gun, appellant
explained that he was drunk but not “pissy drunk.” He further
agreed that he “knew at that time that in the course of robbing
that store, somebody could get killed.”
Appellant said he “wasn’t scared of” Melvin and “[d]idn’t
feel pressure” from Melvin’s taunts and use of what he called “the
usual peer pressure.” Appellant denied ever touching the gun or
even “paying attention” to it during the robbery. Because he had
“less maturity” at the time of the incident, he never tried to take
the gun away from Melvin or yell that he was armed; he thought
his mere “presence” in the doorway of the store would help the
situation. After the shooting, appellant did not shout for help or
check on Lee; he did not “want to see if Mr. Lee was alive”
because he had “never seen a dead body before, and I didn’t want
to see one.”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 22, 2000, a jury found appellant guilty of first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and second degree robbery
(§ 211). It also found true principal use firearm allegations
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). On July 13, 2000, the court sentenced
appellant to 25 years to life for the murder conviction, plus one
year consecutive for the related firearm enhancement. The court
stayed the sentence on the robbery conviction under section 654.
This court affirmed appellant’s convictions and sentence on direct
appeal. (See People v. Jones (Sept. 25, 2001, No. B143098)
[nonpub. opn.].)
11
On May 15, 2019, appellant, through counsel, filed a
petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The People
filed a response arguing that appellant was ineligible for
resentencing because he was a major participant in the crime
under People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and acted
with reckless indifference toward human life under People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). The trial court agreed and
denied the petition. On appeal, appellant contended the court
erred by making factual findings at the prima facie stage of the
case. This court agreed and reversed the trial court’s order. The
opinion remanded the matter with directions to issue an order to
show cause and proceed under section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
(See People v. Jones (Apr. 22, 2021, No. B304692) [nonpub. opn.].)
At the ensuing evidentiary hearing, the parties stipulated
to the admission of the evidence summarized above.3 The matter
then proceeded to argument. The People contended that
appellant was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life, emphasizing evidence suggesting he
took money from the store after Melvin shot Lee and his
statements that Melvin should not have had the gun. The People
further asserted that various portions of appellant’s trial
testimony were not credible, including his assertion that he never
entered the store during the crime.
3 Both parties offered Ochoa’s trial testimony, appellant’s
trial testimony, and the transcript of the surreptitious recording;
appellant offered the rest, including the police report he now
claims is inadmissible hearsay. The parties stipulated that
Ochoa was legally unavailable to testify at the evidentiary
hearing.
12
Appellant responded that the People failed to carry their
burden. He emphasized that he was only 15 years old at the time
of the crimes and was not the actual killer. Despite repeatedly
asserting that “the basic facts of this case are generally agreed
upon by both parties,” appellant maintained that he never
entered the store and that Melvin took the money. Appellant
argued that all the Banks factors indicated he was not a major
participant; he characterized his involvement in the planning and
execution of the crime as minimal, and asserted that he intended
only to “persuade Melvin out of it” and “keep Melvin from getting
killed or hurting anyone.” Appellant also argued that all the
Clark factors indicated that he did not act with reckless
indifference to human life. Appellant acknowledged that fleeing
the scene without aiding Lee was “not the most admirable course
of action he could have taken,” but asserted that it did not “tip
the scales in favor of him being convicted on murder on this case,
and it’s not probative of reckless disregard.” He also reiterated
that neither he nor Melvin had a history of violence, he “thought
that his presence during the robbery would minimize” the risk of
violence, and the shooting happened moments after Melvin
entered the store.
In its oral ruling, the trial court remarked that it was “very
important to consider . . . the defendant’s age at the time of this
incident.” It found, however, that the transcript of the post-
arrest conversation evinced appellant’s “sophistication,” “fears . . .
for himself,” and awareness that Melvin “shot the person in the
face.” The court also noted that appellant “lament[ed] the fact
that he didn’t have the gun instead of his younger cousin.” The
court explained that “[t]hose facts are very important to the court
for two reasons: one, they come directly from the defendant
13
himself, the petitioner himself. This is what the petitioner has in
his mind immediately after this heinous act; two, it shows that he
is not an unsophisticated typical 15 year old. He’s talking about
the money, . . . he talks about being in the pen for some while.
He’s very aware of the nature of what happened.”
After incorporating by reference “in my findings here all of
the factors” the People outlined,4 the court found that appellant
and Melvin planned the incident over a full day, that appellant
was present when the gun was being loaded, and that appellant
knew that an armed robbery “presents a whole other level of
dangerousness to a typical robbery.” The court further found
that appellant “was immediately interested in the money,” that
he and Melvin took steps to conceal their identities before the
robbery, and that they ran away together afterward rather than
rendering aid to Lee.
The court ultimately concluded that “the People have
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a
major participant, not only in the planning and the execution of
this crime, but in the getting away safely afterwards of the crime,
and he acted with absolutely reckless disregard for the life of Mr.
Lee. Both before when he planned the crime he had no fear about
the fact that they were going in with an armed gun, a loaded gun,
and afterwards he showed that he was absolutely indifferent to
whether or not Mr. Lee lived or died. His only concern at that
point was getting away, splitting the money, avoiding a life
sentence.” It accordingly denied the petition.
4 The court did not clarify whether it intended to incorporate
the People’s oral argument, written argument, or both. The
People asserted in both arguments that appellant entered the
store and took the money.
14
Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.6
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) “to amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 1, subd. (f); accord, § 189, subd. (e); People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) As amended by SB 1437, section
189 now limits liability under a felony-murder theory to “actual
killer[s]” (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)) and those who, “with the intent to
kill,” aid or abet “the actual killer in the commission of murder in
the first degree” (id., subd. (e)(2)). Individuals who do not fall
into those categories can be held liable for murder only if they
were “major participant[s] in the underlying felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of [Penal Code] Section 190.2” —the statute
defining the felony-murder special circumstance. (Id., § 189,
subd. (e)(3); see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708
(Strong).)
Section 1172.6 permits individuals who were convicted of
felony murder or murder under a natural and probable
consequences theory, but who could not be convicted of murder
following SB 1437’s changes to sections 188 and 189, to petition
the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and resentence on
any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Where, as here, the
petitioner makes a prima facie case for eligibility, the trial court
15
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing at which the People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt “that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under California law as amended by the
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
The court “may consider evidence previously admitted at
any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,
including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters
judicially noticed. The court may also consider the procedural
history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion.”
( § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Additionally, both the petitioner and the
People “may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their
respective burdens.” (Ibid.) “A finding that there is substantial
evidence to support a conviction for murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. If the
prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior
conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to
the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Ibid.) Resentencing is
unavailable if the petitioner was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710.) The trial court acts as
an independent factfinder and determines whether the
prosecution has met its burden. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 970, 984 (Ramirez).)
II. Standard of Review
On appeal from an order denying a section 1172.6 petition
after an evidentiary hearing, we review the trial court’s factual
16
findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Richardson (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 1085, 1090; People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 298 (Clements).) “We ‘“examine the entire record in the light
most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of
fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable
doubt.’”” (Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298, quoting
People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 657-658; see also
Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885.) “Our job on review is
different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While
the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate
and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to
credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to
determine whether there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s
findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Clements, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) We do not reweigh evidence or revisit the
trial court’s credibility determinations.5 (People v. Cody (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 87, 112-113.)
5 Appellant’s repeated assertions that he did not enter the
store and that “[t]he bulk of the evidence actually supports that
Melvin took the money” accordingly are not well-taken. Nor are
his suggestions that the trial court did not review all the exhibits
or appropriately apply the relevant case law because it did not
specifically cite them in its remarks. “In the usual case, the fact
that a court did not specifically mention certain evidence does not
mean that the court ‘ignored’ that evidence.” (People v. Jones
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1092.) Similarly, “courts need not
17
III. The Banks and Clark Factors
In Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788, the Supreme Court set out
a nonexhaustive list of considerations relevant to whether a
defendant’s participation in criminal activities known to carry a
grave risk of death is sufficiently significant to render him or her
a “major participant” in the crime. (See Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 705, citing Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 794.) Those
considerations are: “What role did the defendant have in
planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?
What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal
weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular
dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the
defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own
actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did
the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623, similarly set forth
a list of considerations relevant to determining whether a
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. The
first factor relates to weapons: was the defendant aware that
weapons would be used in the felony? Did the defendant use a
weapon? How many weapons were used in the crime? (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) The court cautioned that “[t]he mere
fact of a defendant’s awareness that a gun will be used in the
felony is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human
cite every case parties mention.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 585.)
18
life.” (Ibid.; see also id. at p. 617, fn. 74 [“A robbery in which the
only factor supporting reckless indifference to human life is the
fact of the use of a gun is what we meant by ‘a garden-variety
armed robbery’ in Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 802.”].) The
second factor is the defendant’s physical proximity to the murder
and the events leading up to it, and the opportunities that
proximity afforded to restrain the crime or aid the victim. (Clark,
supra, at p. 619.) The third factor is the duration of the felony,
particularly the duration of the interaction between victims and
perpetrators; more prolonged incidents provide “‘a greater
window of opportunity for violence.’” (Id. at pp. 620-621.) The
fourth factor is the defendant’s awareness of his or her
codefendants’ propensity for violence or likelihood of killing a
victim. (Id. at p. 621.) The final factor is the defendant’s efforts
to minimize the risk of violence during the felony, though the
court cautioned that “some effort to minimize the risk of violence
does not, in itself, necessarily foreclose a finding that defendant
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Id. at pp. 621-
622.) In cases where a defendant was a youth at the time of the
crime, his or her age may also be relevant to determining
whether he or she acted with reckless indifference. (See
Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885 fn. 6; In re Moore (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 434, 453-454 (Moore); Ramirez, supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at p. 987.)
No single Banks or Clark factor is determinative. (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618, 621–623.) “Lower courts should
take care to consider the presence or absence relating to each
relevant factor on its own merits before considering the evidence
in its totality.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 888.)
19
IV. Analysis
A. Major Participant (Banks)
We apply the Banks factors and consider the totality of the
circumstances. We conclude substantial evidence supports a
finding that appellant was a major participant in the robbery.
With regard to the first factor, appellant’s role in planning,
appellant asserts that the only evidence “came from appellant’s
statements” that Melvin was the mastermind and appellant’s
only role was, essentially, trying to talk Melvin out of it. “Thus,
this factor does not support that appellant had a role in planning
the robbery.” We disagree. Appellant’s testimony, originally
offered in support of his defense at trial, indeed minimizes his
planning role. Other evidence in the record suggests he was more
actively involved, however. The Supreme Court opinion
regarding suitability for juvenile adjudication—on which
appellant relies to support factual assertions—indicates that
appellant and Melvin frequently talked about “jacking” someone
for money, engaged in an ongoing “discussion” about the robbery
throughout the day, and took the preparatory step of acquiring
facial coverings from the lost-and-found at their school. (People v.
Superior Court (Jones), supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 672, 676.) Even
setting aside those statements, the psychiatric report suggests
appellant and Melvin jointly loaded and cocked the gun. More
telling are appellant’s surreptitiously recorded statements that
he got intoxicated to prepare himself for the robbery, and that
Melvin should have given him the gun, from which it can
reasonably be inferred that he was more extensively involved in
planning than his self-serving testimony indicated.
As to the second factor, his role in supplying or using lethal
weapons, appellant contends he was uninvolved in either aspect.
20
We agree. There is no dispute that Melvin alone procured the
gun and fired at Lee. At most, appellant was aware of the gun
and knew it was loaded.
The third factor is appellant’s awareness of particular
dangers posed by the crime, weapons used, or past experience or
conduct of other participants. Appellant acknowledges that he
“knew that an armed robbery was illegal and dangerous,” but
asserts that neither he nor Melvin had prior experience with
crime, violence, or guns, and appellant “had no reason to even
suspect that Melvin might actually fire the gun.” Respondent
Attorney General points out that the psychiatric report states
that appellant previously had seen Melvin with a gun.
Respondent also suggests, and we agree, that appellant’s
recorded comments that he should have been the one to hold the
gun evince some awareness that Melvin posed a danger with the
weapon,6 as does appellant’s testimony that he did not try to
disarm Melvin for fear of getting shot himself. Respondent’s
suggestion that Melvin’s possible status as a gang member
rendered him more dangerous is less well-taken; gang
membership alone does not demonstrate a propensity to commit
lethal violence. (See Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 810-811; In
6 Appellant maintains that the People and respondent “have
taken appellant’s comment out of context,” because he “said this
right after asking Melvin what he did with the gun,” such that
the “implication is that appellant was referring to the time
during which they were fleeing.” Even if we were to accept this
inference, which the standard of review precludes here, we note
that appellant omits any mention of the other time he said “I
know you shouldn’t have fuckin’ held the gun, man. I know you
fuckin’ shouldn’t have,” which is nowhere proximate to any
statements about fleeing.
21
re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 405.) Nevertheless, the
trial court reasonably could conclude that appellant recognized
that Melvin’s possession of the gun during the robbery increased
the risks associated with the crime.
The fourth factor considers whether appellant was present
at the scene and in a position to facilitate or prevent the murder,
and whether his actions or inaction played a particular role in the
death. Appellant concedes he was at the scene, but asserts the
shooting happened so quickly that he had no realistic opportunity
to prevent it. He also emphasizes Melvin’s recorded comments
suggesting the shooting was unintended. Respondent argues
that appellant was “actively involved in the execution of the
robbery, including the wearing of masks,” though it is unclear
what relevance appellant’s attire had to his presence or ability to
prevent Melvin from shooting. Ultimately, this factor is mixed:
appellant was at the scene and physically proximate to Melvin in
the small store, but there is little evidence appellant could have
timely intervened, as the shooting occurred before Melvin and
appellant even finished informing Lee he was being robbed.
The final factor is what appellant did after lethal force was
used. Appellant contends that he simply fled the scene with
Melvin; he disputes the People’s assertion that he disposed of
evidence. He also maintains that the “bulk of the evidence”
shows that Melvin was the one who took the money after Lee was
shot. As discussed above, we do not weigh the evidence on
appeal. Instead, we consider whether substantial evidence
supports the court’s adopted findings that appellant took the
money after Lee was shot and disposed of evidence. We conclude
it does. Appellant’s self-serving trial testimony indicated that
Melvin took the money, but the money was found in appellant’s
22
pocket, not Melvin’s, when they were arrested. The psychiatric
report also noted that appellant said he “‘did something stupid’
emptying the register and running out,” and appellant remarked
during the recorded conversation that after the shooting, “We
can’t do shit but grab money, man . . . .” A reasonable factfinder
could conclude from this evidence that appellant took the money
after Lee was shot, rather than rendering aid or even simply
fleeing. There was also evidence that various incriminating
articles were found along appellant and Melvin’s escape route.
We thus agree with respondent that “[t]his factor does not help
appellant.”
In sum, the record contains substantial evidence
supporting the trial court’s conclusion that appellant was a major
participant in the robbery.
B. Reckless Indifference (Clark)
There is significant overlap between being a major
participant and acting with reckless indifference to human life,
and “‘the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony
murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference
to human life.’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614-615.)
However, that does not necessarily mean that every major
participant in a crime acts with reckless indifference to human
life. Indeed, we find a disconnect here.
As the Supreme Court recently reiterated in Emanuel,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884, participation in a “‘variety armed
robbery’” is “insufficient without more to establish reckless
indifference.” The defendant must not merely be aware of the
foreseeable risk of death inherent in any violent felony; he or she
must knowingly create a grave risk of death to demonstrate
reckless indifference to human life. (Ibid.) The defendant’s
23
actions before and during the crime are important but not
determinative; the key inquiry is “what his actions reveal about
his mental state.” (Id. at p. 891.) We keep this guidance in mind
as we consider the Clark factors.
The first Clark factor overlaps with the second Banks
factor: what did the defendant know about the weapons used in
the felony? Did the defendant use a weapon? How many
weapons were used in the crime? (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p.
618.) Appellant did not use the sole weapon present during the
crime. His knowledge that Melvin had a weapon and therefore
posed a risk of death is not sufficient to establish reckless
indifference. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) The trial
court emphasized that appellant was present when the gun was
loaded, as well as his understanding that taking a loaded gun to
the crime scene “greatly increases the dangerousness of that.”
However, this does not elevate this robbery beyond the so-called
“garden variety armed robbery,” even if appellant was involved in
loading the gun. Appellant asserts that he “did not have any
reason to believe Melvin would fire the gun,” and, indeed, there is
no evidence that Melvin had a previous record of gun use or a
propensity for violence. Although appellant stated multiple times
that he should have been the one to hold the gun, there is no
evidence that he instructed or encouraged Melvin to use lethal
force. (See Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 988.) In short,
this factor predominantly favors appellant.7
7 In its supplemental briefing, respondent points out that the
defendant in Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 867, in which the
Supreme Court found insufficient evidence of reckless
indifference, did not use a gun and had no knowledge one would
24
The second Clark factor, the defendant’s physical proximity
to the murder and the events leading up to it, and the
opportunities that proximity afforded to restrain the crime or aid
the victim, is similar to the fourth Banks factor. This factor is
particularly significant where the “the murder is a culmination or
a foreseeable result of several intermediate steps, or where the
participant who personally commits the murder exhibits behavior
tending to suggest a willingness to use lethal force.” (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) “But where a crime unfolds quickly,
this factor—the failure to restrain a cohort—cannot be said to
weigh in favor of a finding of reckless indifference without some
evidence in the record indicating that the defendant had a
meaningful opportunity to do so.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 892.)
As already discussed, appellant was present throughout the
robbery and murder, and fled with Melvin afterward. Despite his
contentions that he did not enter the store or take money from
the register, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that
appellant did so and was an active participant in the robbery.
However, as appellant argues, this factor ultimately weighs
against a finding of reckless indifference because the shooting
happened quickly and unexpectedly, and there is no evidence
that appellant had a meaningful opportunity to stop it. (See, e.g.,
In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 679 (Scoggins) [“although
Scoggins was in close contact with his accomplices before the
shooting, he lacked control over their actions once they arrived on
the crime scene, especially given how quickly the shooting
be present during the crime. This is but one factor to consider in
the “‘fact-intensive, individualized inquiry’” into reckless
indifference. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 883.)
25
occurred”]; Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 452 [the “short
duration of the robbery and the sudden and unprovoked nature of
the shooting reinforce” the conclusion that a defendant present in
a car near the robbery did not act with reckless indifference];
Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 989 [“[t]he attempted
carjacking was executed quickly, providing Ramirez no realistic
opportunity to intervene before Rios opened fire”].)
A meaningful opportunity to intercede “requires some
awareness of the risk of impending lethal violence and time to
react.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 892.) As noted above,
Melvin fired the gun before the statement, “Okay. This is –” was
complete. There were no express threats to shoot, countdowns, or
warning shots. (See ibid. [distinguishing In re Loza (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 38, 53 and In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
999, in which “the shooters . . . made their intentions clear,
affording each defendant ‘the time to observe and react before the
murder’”].) “Without forewarning that [Melvin] would deploy
lethal violence, [appellant’s] inaction is less probative.”
(Emanuel, supra, at p. 892.)
Appellant’s conduct after the use of lethal force “may be
reflective of his . . . mental state during the offense.” (Emanuel,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 893.) Respondent emphasizes that
appellant “made no attempt to call 911 or otherwise assist the
victim,” and instead grabbed a few dollars and fled the scene. It
contends this behavior “is not that of a person surprised by the
shooting, but rather someone with a one-track mind to make sure
the robbery was successful, regardless of whether someone might
die, or was dying, in the process.” Yet, as explained in Emanuel,
“[h]owever contemptable [sic] we may find a defendant’s conduct
following a killing, the governing standard is not satisfied by
26
evidence that the defendant was generally indifferent to the fact
that someone has been killed; it requires evidence that, at the
time of the shooting, the defendant acted with indifference to the
grave risk that someone could be killed.” (Id. at p. 895 (emphases
in original).) “[E]ven if a defendant is unconcerned that the
planned felony resulted in a death, there must also be evidence
that the defendant was aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the felony was committed and
consciously disregarded the significant risk of death that his or
her actions created.” (Ibid.) Here, there is no evidence that
appellant planned or intended anything other than a garden-
variety armed robbery. He and Melvin planned to enter the
store, tell everyone to get down on the floor, get money from the
cash register, and leave. “The plan wasn’t to shoot anyone.”
Moreover, as in Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 894,
appellant “took no actions after the shooting that might prevent
or interfere with [Lee’s] ability to obtain or chances of receiving
aid.” The shooting occurred in an open business. As in Emanuel,
“numerous witnesses were nearby and heard the commotion,”
and law enforcement was summoned immediately. (Ibid.) The
presence of other persons made it more likely that Lee would
receive aid, and also could have motivated appellant “to flee the
scene as quickly as possible to avoid arrest, whether or not he
understood the extent of [Lee’s] injuries.” (Ibid.) This factor thus
generally favors appellant.
The third Clark factor, duration of the crime, also favors
appellant. “[C]rimes of longer duration present greater risk of
violence and therefore evince more reckless indifference.” (People
v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 740.) The robbery here was
brief; respondent concedes this factor “was at best neutral as the
27
shot was fired not long after the two entered the store.” We agree
with appellant that the short duration of the crime suggests a
lack of reckless indifference. “There was no prolonged period of
restraint” of Lee, and the crime’s short duration “did nothing to
heighten the risk of violence beyond that inherent in the robbery
itself.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 886.)
The fourth factor is whether the defendant was aware of
the codefendant’s propensity for violence or likelihood of killing a
victim. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 621.) This factor overlaps
the third Banks factor, and we incorporate our previous
discussion of the substantial evidence from which a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that appellant knew there was some
likelihood of violence. Appellant contends that “[m]ore telling
was the shock and surprise appellant expressed at the shooting
during his conversation with Melvin in the police car after their
arrest,” which “shows that appellant did not harbor a reckless
indifference to human life.” We are disinclined to ascribe
particular emotions to the cold record of the transcript or give
such emotions controlling weight in our analysis; “the cold record
seldom captures indications like facial expressions, tones of voice,
or hesitancy.” (People v. Poore (2022) 13 Cal.5th 266, 297.)
Appellant’s words speak for themselves, and they support the
inference that appellant recognized it was dangerous for Melvin
to handle the gun and proceeded with the crime regardless. That
said, they do not necessarily indicate that appellant foresaw or
intended the violent manner in which the robbery ultimately
unfolded, or that he disregarded the risk of death in a grossly
deviant fashion. (See Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
The final Clark factor is the defendant’s efforts to minimize
the risk of violence during the felony. “Efforts at the planning
28
stage to minimize the potential for violence . . . are viewed as a
distinct factor from efforts to restrain confederates once the
felony is underway.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 887-
888.) There need not be direct evidence that the felony was
planned with the express purpose of minimizing violence;
“circumstantial evidence regarding the plan itself may suffice.”
(Id. at p. 887.) Additionally, “the absence of such efforts does not
necessarily evince a subjective disregard for risk where the
objective circumstances of the planned crime suggest the risk of
violence posed is no more than that inherent in any violent
felony.” (Id. at p. 888.) Emanuel also teaches that a defendant’s
failure to prevent the underlying felony is of minimal import,
because “[p]articipation in the underlying felony is presupposed
but no longer sufficient to impose murder liability.” (Id. at pp.
888-889.)
In Clark, efforts to minimize violence included planning to
use an unloaded gun and scheduling the robbery when the store
was closed to minimize risks to employees. (See Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pp. 621-622.) In Emanuel, those efforts included
planning an unarmed robbery of the victim “in a public location
during daylight hours,” “in the open where witnesses might be
present to observe. . . .” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 887.)
Emanuel also contrasted those efforts with a hypothetical
defendant who “plans to commit an armed home invasion robbery
at 3:00 a.m., with knowledge of several armed occupants and a
methamphetamine operation within.” (Id. at p. 889.) In the
latter case, “a trier of fact might reasonably conclude that the
objective risk of violence posed by the crime and reasonably
anticipated by the perpetrator is graver than the risk of violence
inherent in any violent felony.” (Ibid.)
29
Appellant contends his efforts to minimize violence
included attempts to talk Melvin out of committing the robbery
and taking no action “that increased the risk of violence beyond
the risk inherent in Melvin carrying a loaded gun into the store
to obtain money.” He also points to the Supreme Court’s
statement that he and Melvin “waited near the store for
customers to leave” before entering, reiterates his claim that
Melvin stole the money, and asserts that his immediate flight
from the scene did nothing to heighten the danger to Lee. In an
apparent attempt to analogize the case to Emanuel, he asserts
multiple times in his supplemental brief that the robbery, which
took place shortly before 8:00 p.m., occurred “during the
daytime.”
Although the crime did not take place during the day, only
Lee was present when appellant and Melvin entered the small
store. Several witnesses were nearby, and appellant and Melvin
did not conduct themselves in a particularly discreet fashion or
attempt to conceal their intentions from bystanders. Most
importantly, the objective circumstances of the planned crime do
not suggest a risk of violence in excess of that inherent in a
typical armed robbery. The trial court’s reliance on appellant’s
involvement in the planning, awareness of the gun, and apparent
lack of concern toward Lee to conclude otherwise accordingly was
misplaced. (See Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 896 [“such a
mechanical focus on unsuccessful or inadequate efforts at
restraint risks imposing murder liability based solely on a
defendant’s participation in an underlying felony in which a
death occurs”].)
The trial court did, however, appropriately consider
appellant’s youthful age at the time of the crimes. At trial,
30
appellant cited his lack of “maturity” as a reason he believed he
could prevent injury by accompanying Melvin during the robbery.
In his appellate briefing, he characterizes himself as “a scared
and angry 15-year-old who, having joined his 15-year old cousin
in a planned robbery after failing to talk him out of it, saw his
cousin inexplicably shoot the store owner in the head seconds
after entering the store.” Citing Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th
434, Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 546, and Ramirez, supra, 71
Cal.App.5th 970, he contends his “youth significantly undercuts
any argument that appellant acted with reckless indifference to
human life.”
Appellant’s age at the time of the offense is relevant to
whether he acted with reckless indifference. Case law in this
area recognizes that youth are relatively more impulsive than
adults and may be vulnerable to peer pressure. (People v. Oliver
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 489.) It further recognizes that teens
in particular lack the experience, perspective, and judgment “to
adequately appreciate the risk of death posed by [their] criminal
activities.” (Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 454.)
The trial court concluded appellant was “not an
unsophisticated typical 15 year old” because he said he should
have carried the gun, was aware that Melvin shot Lee in the face,
and expressed concern about the consequences he and Melvin
faced after they were apprehended. While these facts reflect
some insight and maturity, they do not show that appellant
subjectively appreciated the risk of death posed by the robbery.
(See Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 884, 895.) The crucial
question is whether the totality of the circumstances shows that
appellant was aware, before the murder occurred, that he was
knowingly creating a grave risk of death. (Emanuel, supra, 17
31
Cal.5th at p. 884.) On balance, the Clark factors, particularly
when “viewed from the lens of [appellant’s] youth” (Moore, supra,
68 Cal.App.5th at p. 454), indicate that the answer to that
question here is no. Appellant and Melvin set out to commit a
garden-variety armed robbery of a small store. Their plans did
not elevate the risk to human life beyond those inherent in any
armed robbery. “The crime unfolded without a prolonged period
of restraint.” (Emanuel, supra, at pp. 895-896.) Melvin shot Lee
without warning shortly after he and appellant entered the store,
and they fled within seconds without hampering Lee’s ability to
obtain aid from nearby bystanders. Appellant’s participation in
the planning and commission of the robbery and failure to render
aid to Lee do not demonstrate that he acted with the requisite
reckless indifference to human life to be culpable of murder.
DISPOSITION
The order of the trial court is reversed. The matter is
remanded to the trial court with directions to grant appellant’s
petition for resentencing, vacate his murder conviction, and
resentence him. (See § 1172.6, subds. (d)(3), (e).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J. MORI, J.
32
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.