CourtListener 10784761•Foppiano v. Valera CA1/1
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Filed 2/5/26 Foppiano v. Valera CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
LUIS FOPPIANO, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents A172112
v. (Mendocino County
. SUSAN VALERA, Super. Ct. No. 21CV00971
Defendant and Appellant,
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
In this partition action, defendant Susan Valera (Valera) appeals from
an interlocutory order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs
Louis M. Foppiano (individually and as trustee under the Helaine Noreen
Foppiano and Louis Michael Foppiano 1997 Trust), Carol Ryan (individually
and as trustee of the Rodney Foppiano Trust), Mark Trione (individually and
as trustee of the Rodney Foppiano Trust), Paul Foppiano (individually), and
Gina M. Hocker (individually and as trustee of the Gina Marie Hocker
revocable Trust). The defendants included Valera (individually and as
1 We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to
California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1(2).
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trustee of the Foppiano Trust for the benefit of James Valera), and Joseph,
James, and Anthony Valera.2 We affirm.
The property at issue is a 5,200-acre parcel in Mendocino County.
Numerous people and trusts hold interests in the property. All parties agree
the property should be partitioned, but they disagree on the method by which
the partition should be accomplished. Plaintiffs sought to have the property
sold, with the proceeds divided among the interest holders in proportion to
their interests. Valera, in contrast, sought to have the property physically
divided in order to receive a separate parcel. She did so in an attempt “to
retain ownership of the parcels containing [her] primary residence and
improvements.”3 The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs, and it entered
interlocutory summary judgment in their favor under Code of Civil
Procedure, section 872.720.4
The law governing the selection of a method to partition property is
straightforward. If the trial court finds that a plaintiff is entitled to
partition, it may select partition “ ‘in kind’—i.e., physical division of the
property [citation]—according to the parties’ interests as determined in the
interlocutory judgment. (§ 872.810; see § 873.210 et seq.) Alternatively, if
the parties agree or the court concludes it ‘would be more equitable,’ the court
2 We refer to Joseph, James, and Anthony Valera by their first names
so as not to confuse them with defendant. Judgment against Joseph was
entered by default, and he did not appeal. James and Anthony participated
in the trial court proceedings, but neither appealed.
3 Plaintiffs alleged that Valera installed a modular home on the
property’s “best area” without their permission, and made further
improvements over their objection. At oral argument, Valera claimed
plaintiffs did not express objections until after she had installed the modular
home.
4 All statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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may order the property sold and the proceeds divided among the parties.
(§ 872.820; see § 873.510 et seq.)” (Cummings v. Dessel (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th
589, 597.) “Partition in kind is favored in law and in the absence of proof to
the contrary the presumption in favor of in kind division will prevail.
[Citation.] A forced sale is strongly disfavored,” and the burden of proof is on
the party trying to obtain such a sale. (Butte Creek Island Ranch v. Crim
(1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 360, 365 (Butte Creek).) Still, “ ‘[in] many modern
transactions, sale of the property is preferable to physical division since the
value of the divided parcels frequently will not equal the value of the whole
parcel before division. Moreover, physical division may be impossible due to
zoning restrictions or may be highly impractical, particularly in the case of
urban property.’ ” (Ibid.)
There are generally two types of evidence that are sufficient to justify a
partition by sale: evidence that the property is situated in such a way that
division into subparcels of equal value “cannot be made,” or evidence that
“division of the land would substantially diminish the value of each party’s
interest.” (Butte Creek, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d at pp. 366–367.) “[A] partition
suit is in equity” and “[a] court of equity has broad powers and comparatively
unlimited discretion to do equity.” (Richmond v. Dofflemyer (1980)
105 Cal.App.3d 745, 766.)
The standards by which we review a summary judgment are also
straightforward. Summary judgment is warranted if “all the papers
submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (§ 437c,
subd. (c).) A party moving for summary judgment may meet its initial
burden of production by showing “one or more elements of the cause of
action . . . cannot be established”; the burden then shifts to the other party to
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show a triable issue of material fact exists. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); see
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849 (Aguilar).) We
consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. (Id.
at p. 843.) A dispute alone, however, is not sufficient to raise a triable issue
of material fact; controverting evidence is required. (Sinai Memorial
Chapel v. Dudler (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 190, 196–197.)
As a court of review, we “ ‘independently review the parties’ papers
supporting and opposing [a motion for summary judgment], using the same
method of analysis as the trial court. Essentially, we assume the role of the
trial court and apply the same rules and standards.’ ” (Apex Solutions, Inc. v.
Falls Lake National Ins. Co. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1249, 1256.) The burden
on appeal, however, “is on the objecting party to renew any relevant
objections by arguing the issue with relevant authority and legal analysis.”
(Taylor v. Financial Casualty and Surety, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 966,
980.) Our review is limited to those issues that have been adequately raised
and supported in the appellant’s brief. (See Meridian Financial Services,
Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 708 [judgment is presumed correct
even on de novo review of a summary judgment].) Because the appellant has
the burden affirmatively to demonstrate error, the appellant must identify a
triable issue by citing the record. (Claudio v. Regents of the University of
California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 230.) Specifically, to establish a
disputed fact, the appellant must point to “evidence in the record.”
(Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 178, fn. 4.)
An application of these standards here demonstrates that Valera’s
appellate claims are meritless. Valera asserts a general argument and
several specific arguments, none of which are persuasive. Generally, she
argues that the trial court “accepted [plaintiffs’] evidence at face value while
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disregarding or minimizing [her] contradictory evidence.” But the record
shows that she did not object to the plaintiffs’ evidence and that none of her
alleged contradictory evidence was admitted into evidence, because the
plaintiffs’ objections to it were sustained. Not only did she fail to object to the
plaintiff’s evidence in the trial court, but she also does not challenge the
evidentiary rulings on appeal with analysis and citations to legal authority.
Her evidentiary arguments have therefore been doubly forfeited. (See
Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 452, fn. 3 [party’s
failure to object to evidence presented in connection with a motion for
summary judgement bars evidentiary objections on appeal]; Badie v. Bank of
America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785 [party must reassert evidentiary
objections on appeal to preserve them].) As a result, we are left with a record
containing plaintiffs’ unopposed evidence and no conflicting evidence.
Valera’s specific arguments fare no better. She first disputes the trial
court’s finding that 11 people and entities hold interests in the property,
insisting that there are instead “four to five.” But the plaintiffs submitted
evidence, including a title insurance guarantee, establishing that there were
10 interest holders when this action was initiated and that Valera
transferred a part of her interest to Anthony while the case was being
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litigated, creating an 11th one.5 Valera introduced no evidence in support of
her claim that there are only four or five interest holders, and her statements
to that effect in her appellate brief are not evidence. (See Smith, Smith &
Kring v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 573, 578.)
Valera also contends that “various portions of the property” could be
suitable “for residential use.” And she maintains that the trial court failed to
adequately consider the “proper treatment of timber rights for the
approximately 2,500 acres designated as Timber Production Zone.” She
presumably makes these arguments to advance a position that an in-kind
partition could be accomplished in a way that would enable the owners to
receive parcels with values proportionate to their interests. But again, she
produced no evidence regarding the property’s residential potential or timber
rights, and she fails to explain with meaningful analysis why these factors
would compel the trial court to exercise its equitable discretion by granting
an in-kind partition.
Valera also argues that the plaintiffs’ experts “lacked qualifications in
hydrology,” but she does not cite to the record where she objected to the
experts’ qualifications, meaning she has once again forfeited the objection. In
5 The 10 interest holders are: (1) Susan Valera, with a 1/9th interest;
(2) Susan Valera, as trustee of the Foppiano Trust for Susan Valera, with a
14.8155 percent interest; (3) Susan Valera, as trustee of the Foppiano Trust
for James Valera, with a 2.4692 percent interest; (4) Joseph Valera, with a
3.7038 percent interest; (5) James Valera, with a 1.2346 percent interest;
(6) Louis M. Foppiano and Helaine Noreen Foppiano as trustees of the
Helaine Noreen Foppiano and Louis Michael Foppiano 1997 Trust, with a
1/9th interest; (7) Louis M. Foppiano, with a 22.22345 percent interest;
(8) Carol Ryan and Mark Trione as the trustees of the Rodney Foppiano
Trust, with a 1/9th interest; (9) Gina M. Hocker as trustee of the Gina Marie
Hooker Trust, with an 11.1117 percent interest; and (10) Paul Foppiano, with
an 11.111 percent interest. During the pendency of this action, Valera
transferred a 0.222 percent interest of her individual ownership to Anthony.
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any event, we would reject the claim on its merits. One of the plaintiffs’
witnesses to whom she refers is a licensed real estate appraiser and real
estate agent, who has decades of experience and has been qualified as an
expert witness in numerous jurisdictions. He personally “walked” the
property for several hours on a couple of occasions. The other witness to
whom she refers is a licensed surveyor, who has been employed at a civil-
engineering firm since 2015, and his crew worked on the property. Both
witnesses testified that the property “consists of steep and hilly areas, areas
with oak and fir trees in a high fire area where in the past, livestock was
grazed on it, seasonal creeks, heavy poison oak stands in many places and
few level parts with limited water from a spring.” This testimony about the
property’s characteristics was based on their observations and surveys, not
on any particular expertise. (See People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351,
366 [limitations on expert testimony do not apply when expert testifies as to
facts within the expert’s special knowledge], disapproved on other grounds in
People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 912–915.) To the extent Valera
disagreed with the testimony of these witnesses, she could (and should) have
presented contrary evidence. In her appellate brief, Valera states that the
“spring serving [her] residence . . . produces more than two gallons per
minute during the dry season.” Again, this assertion is not evidence, and
does not in any event contradict the witnesses’ testimony that the property
has limited water sources and has other characteristics that leave it
unamenable to an in-kind partition.
We agree with the trial court that the uncontradicted evidence shows
that the property has numerous owners with unequal legal interests, varying
topography and terrain, limited water sources, and little flat terrain. This
evidence supported the court’s conclusion that a partition in kind cannot be
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accomplished equitably because the property cannot fairly be divided into
parcels to reflect the various interests without diminishing the overall value
of the property. Despite Valera’s conclusory assertion to the contrary, there
was ample, and certainly substantial, evidence supporting the trial court’s
equitable determination to proceed with a partition by sale. Valera has not
met her burden of showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (See
Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.)
The trial court’s October 8, 2024 order granting summary judgment in
favor of plaintiffs is affirmed.
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_________________________
Humes, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Banke, J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
Foppiano et al. v. Valera A172112
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