CourtListener 10784759•People v. Andreotti CA3
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Filed 2/5/26 P. v. Andreotti CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Colusa)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, C100522
v. (Super. Ct. No. CR63382)
PHILLIP JEFFORDS ANDREOTTI,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Phillip Jeffords Andreotti sexually abused his two stepdaughters
over the span of several years. A jury convicted him on one count of continuous sexual
abuse of a child and three counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child.
As to each count, the jury also found true a one strike allegation that defendant
committed an enumerated sex offense against more than one victim, mandating an
indeterminate term of 15 years to life for each count. (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subds. (b),
1
(e)(4).)1 After striking one count of lewd conduct pursuant to section 1385, the trial court
sentenced defendant to an aggregate indeterminate term of 45 years to life in state prison.
Defendant now contends his sentence amounts to cruel and/or unusual punishment
under the United States and California Constitutions. We conclude the contention is
forfeited because defendant did not challenge the constitutionality of the sentence in the
trial court. Anticipating our conclusion, defendant asserts in the alternative that his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance. But because defendant’s constitutional challenge
to his sentence lacks merit, his trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by
failing to raise it in the trial court. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In November 2004, defendant and his then-wife moved into a house with his
wife’s daughters T. and J. T. was seven years old at the time, and J. was four years old.
Defendant and his wife also had a daughter, A., who was born sometime after they moved
in.
When T. entered puberty around the age of eight, defendant began to sexually
abuse her. The first incident she could recall involved defendant orally copulating her.
The abuse continued for about four years, mostly involving sexual intercourse.
T. estimated over 100 such incidents occurred and continued until her mother moved her
and her sisters out of the house in June 2009.
Defendant did not begin his sexual abuse of J. until after they moved out.
Because A. was defendant’s biological daughter, she would visit him on the weekends
and J. would often come along. When J. was about 11 years old, defendant had sex with
her in his bedroom. Defendant penetrated J.’s vagina from behind. J. testified that
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
defendant had sex with her on four to six other occasions over a period of almost two
years.
Defendant testified in his own defense. He denied sexually abusing either of his
stepdaughters. He also testified that he used methamphetamine between 2004 and 2009,
and began to abuse alcohol in 2013. The latter testimony corroborated certain testimony
from T. and J. For example, T. testified that defendant became “strange” and “erratic”
and “would stay up all night.” J. testified that defendant drank alcohol while she was
visiting the house and that he slurred his words and smelled like alcohol most of the time.
A defense psychologist evaluated defendant for pedophilia and concluded that
defendant did not have any traits associated with pedophilia or child molestation.
DISCUSSION
Defendant claims his sentence of 45 years to life for three one strike sex offenses
committed against his stepdaughters amounts to cruel and/or unusual punishment under
the United States and California Constitutions.
A
Because the determination of whether or not a sentence imposed in a particular
case violates the constitutional proscription against cruel and/or unusual punishment
is “fact specific, the issue must be raised in the trial court.” (People v. DeJesus (1995)
38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 (DeJesus); see People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229,
1247 [cruel and/or unusual claim “forfeited on appeal if it is not raised in the trial
court”].)
Here, the only mention of cruel and unusual punishment made in the trial court
is a single sentence in defendant’s sentencing statement. That statement argued for a
grant of probation based on a number of circumstances, including defendant’s lack of
a criminal record and the defense psychologist’s conclusion that he was not a pedophile.
The statement concluded by noting that defense counsel would argue for probation at
the sentencing hearing and would also argue that the probation report’s recommended
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sentence of 60 years to life would amount to cruel and unusual punishment. At the
subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court struck one of the counts and imposed
a sentence of 45 years to life. Defendant concedes that his trial counsel “neglected
to object to [this] sentence on cruel and unusual punishment grounds.” The claim
is therefore forfeited.
B
Anticipating forfeiture, defendant asserts that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance. This alternative assertion is arguably also forfeited for failure to adequately
brief the issue. The entirety of the argument spans a single sentence with a string cite
attached. However, if it were true that the sentence imposed in this case amounted to
cruel and/or unusual punishment, failing to raise the issue before the trial court would
fall below the standard of reasonable competence and defendant would thereby be
prejudiced by having to serve an unconstitutional sentence. (See, e.g., DeJesus, supra,
38 Cal.App.4th at p. 27 [addressing merits despite forfeiture to forestall a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel].) We therefore address the merits of defendant’s claim.
The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual punishment” and
“contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’
[Citation.]” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 [155 L.Ed.2d 108], italics
added; see Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 72 [155 L.Ed.2d 144].) While this
proportionality principle “ ‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and
sentence,’ ” it does prohibit “ ‘extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate”
to the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing, at p. 23; see Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S.
957, 1001 [115 L.Ed.2d 836].) “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.”
(Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 272 [63 L.Ed.2d 382].)
Similarly, the California Constitution prohibits “cruel or unusual punishment.”
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 17, italics added.) A punishment may violate this provision
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“although not cruel or unusual in its method, [if] it is so disproportionate to the crime
for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions
of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424.) The California Supreme
Court has described three techniques to evaluate a claim under California Constitution’s
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment: “(1) an examination of the nature of the
offense and the offender, with particular attention to the degree of danger both pose to
society; (2) a comparison of the punishment with the punishment California imposes for
more serious offenses; and (3) a comparison of the punishment with that prescribed in
other jurisdictions for the same offense.” (In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 973; see
People v. Haller (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1092 (Haller).)
Defendant does not analyze the issue separately under each constitutional
provision. Instead, he simply argues his sentence “violates both.” Although he
acknowledges that his crimes were “repugnant” and that “it seems likely that the
emotional wounds suffered by [T. and J.] will never truly heal,” defendant nevertheless
argues his sentence of 45 years to life amounts to cruel and/or unusual punishment
because he will not become eligible for parole until he is over 80 years old, substance
abuse played a role in his crimes, he was also sexually abused as a child, he has no prior
criminal record, and his risk of re-offense is low. But caselaw indicates otherwise.
Under the federal provision, defendant’s sentence of 45 years to life is not grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of his crimes. Indeed, as this court noted in People v.
Crooks (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 797 (Crooks), “[t]he defendant in Harmelin was lawfully
sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for possessing a large quantity of drugs.”
(Id. at p. 806.) As in Crooks, defendant’s crimes are more serious and his one strike
sentence was less than the LWOP sentence upheld in Harmelin.
People v. Reyes (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 62 is also instructive. There, the appellate
court upheld an LWOP sentence where the defendant committed forcible rape and
forcible oral copulation against a minor victim during a residential burglary.
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(Id. at p. 85.) In this case, although defendant’s crimes did not require the use of force,
they were committed against his stepdaughters over the course of several years. T. was
between the ages of eight and 12. J. was between the ages of 11 and 13. They were
“particularly vulnerable victims.” (Id. at p. 84.) And, as already noted, defendant was
sentenced to a lesser sentence than the LWOP sentence upheld in Reyes. (See also People
v. Andrade (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1310 (Andrade) [upholding sentence of 195
years to life for “numerous sexually violent crimes against five young women”]; People
v. Retanan (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1230-1231 (Retanan) [upholding sentence of
135 years to life for “numerous sex crimes against four young girls”].) We acknowledge
that 45 years to life is a severe sentence, but caselaw indicates it is not grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of defendant’s crimes.
For many of the same reasons, defendant’s sentence does not violate California’s
constitutional provision. As in Andrade, defendant’s argument is limited to the first
technique used to assess the constitutionality of his sentence, i.e., an examination of
“the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of
danger both present to society.” (Haller, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092.) We have
already addressed the nature of defendant’s crimes, the seriousness of which he does not
dispute. We add here that in enacting section 667.61 -- authorizing increased punishment
for the commission of an enumerated sex offense against more than one victim -- “the
Legislature had significant concerns regarding recidivism of One Strike offenders and
the serious nature of the offenses they commit.” (People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th
99, 129.) “A defendant has a considerable burden to overcome when he challenges
a penalty as cruel or unusual. The doctrine of separation of powers is firmly
entrenched in the law of California and the court should not lightly encroach on matters
which are uniquely in the domain of the Legislature. We must always be aware that it
is the function of the legislative branch to define crimes and prescribe punishment.”
(People v. Bestelmeyer (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 529.)
6
Even accepting defendant’s argument that substance abuse and prior sexual abuse
played a role in his crimes, and acknowledging that he has no prior criminal record and
his “sexual re-offense potential” was determined by the probation department to be
“below average,” those considerations are not dispositive. In Andrade, the court
acknowledged the defendant’s “lack of criminal history” and the fact that “the probation
department report assessed him as a low risk for recidivism,” but nevertheless concluded
his sentence of 195 years to life did not violate California’s constitutional provision
because “his convictions involved numerous sexually violent crimes against five young
women” and he “demonstrated an intent to avoid detection by intimidating his victims.”
(Andrade, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1310.) The court concluded: “Under the
circumstances, his sentence is neither shocking nor inhumane when the nature of the
offenses and offender are considered.” (Ibid.)
Similarly, here, regardless of the reasons for defendant’s behavior, and
notwithstanding his below average recidivism risk and lack of a prior criminal record,
he engaged in the repeated sexual abuse of his stepdaughters over the course of several
years. Caselaw establishes that his sentence does not shock the conscience or offend
fundamental notions of human dignity.
Finally, as in Retanan, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th 1219, “defendant makes no effort
to compare his sentence with more serious offenses in California or with punishments
in other states for the same offense, which we take as a concession that his sentence
withstands a constitutional challenge on either basis.” (Id. at p. 1231; see Crooks, supra,
55 Cal.App.4th at p. 808.)
Because defendant’s constitutional challenge to his sentence fails, his trial counsel
did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to raise it in the trial court. (See People
v. Jones (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 820, 827 [counsel is not required to advance meritless
claims].)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, J.
We concur:
/S/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/S/
MESIWALA, J.
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