People v. Davies CA1/1

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Filed 2/4/26 P. v. Davies CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171116
v.
PATRICK JAMES DAVIES, (Lake County
Super. Ct. No. CR969539)
Defendant and Appellant.

After defendant Patrick James Davies pled no contest to several
offenses, the trial court denied him probation and sentenced him to five years
in state prison. Davies contends the trial court abused its discretion in
denying probation. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Offenses1
1. Case no. CR969734
In February 2024, police officers contacted R.S., who was in a sexual,
dating, and cohabitation relationship with Davies, after she reported having

1 The following facts are taken from the probation department’s

presentencing report. The presentencing report is part of a confidential
clerk’s transcript, so we limit our discussion of the information in the report
to that addressed in the parties’ appellate briefs, which were filed without
redactions or a sealing request. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.47(c)(2) [to
maintain confidentiality, a party may file a motion to file a document under

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been battered and kidnapped by Davies at their residence. R.S. told the
officers that Davies strangled her and then later shoved her out of their
residence and tackled her.
In March 2024, police officers were dispatched to Davies’s residence for
a “911 hang up.” Upon arriving at the residence, the officers instructed
Davies and R.S. to come outside, but he refused and told R.S. to not open the
door or go outside. Davies said to the officers, “[y]ou break and enter, this is
a stand-your-ground state” and “you make entry, and I will defend myself.”
At some point, R.S. came outside and began walking to a gate where the
officers stood. Davies started yelling and “walk[ing] aggressively” towards
R.S. and the officers. The officers told Davies to back up several times. They
then said he would be placed in handcuffs, prompting Davies to turn and run
into the garage. After the officers got R.S. to safety, she told them that she
was napping when Davies got mad and tripped her, causing her to fall. R.S.
had a “fresh bruise with redness and an abrasion on her right cheek.”
When Davies emerged from the garage, the officers attempted to grab
him, and a struggle ensued. Davies “got into a fighting stance” and hit one of
the officers in the face. Then, when Davies pushed one of the officers, the
officer’s foot became lodged in the gate. Davies repeatedly slammed the gate
onto the officer’s ankle. The officers tased Davies twice so that the officer
could free his leg from the gate. Davies then barricaded himself in his house
with a knife. Backup arrived and negotiated with Davies for hours before he

seal]; People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 617, fn. 38, overruled on
other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13,
and superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Zamudio
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 356.) All rule citations are to the California Rules of
Court unless otherwise indicated.

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was taken into custody. Officers discovered that Davies was in possession of
33.7 grams of cocaine.
On March 27, 2024, Davies was charged with 19 counts, consisting of
one count of false imprisonment for purposes of protection from arrest (Pen.
Code,2 § 210.5; count 1); one count of willfully inflicting corporal injury
(former § 273.5, subd. (a); count 2); two counts of false imprisonment (former
§ 236; counts 3, 17); one count of criminal threats (former § 422, subd. (a);
count 4); one count of dissuading a witness from testifying (former § 136.1,
subd. (a)(1); count 5); three counts of preventing an executive officer from
performing a duty (§ 69; counts 6, 7, 8); two counts of felony battery on a
peace officer (former § 243, subd. (c)(2); counts 9, 10); three counts of assault
by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4);
counts 11, 12, 18); one count of misdemeanor possession of a controlled
substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 13); two counts of
misdemeanor battery on a peace officer (former § 243, subd. (b); counts 14,
15); one count of corporal injury on a cohabitant (former § 273.5, subd. (a);
count 16); and one count of battery resulting in serious bodily injury (former
§ 243, subd. (d); count 19). As to counts 16 through 18, the complaint alleged
that Davies personally inflicted injury upon R.S., who was not an accomplice
to the offenses. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).)
2. Case no. CR969539
Between January 2022 and July 2023, Davies entered into at least four
separate written or verbal agreements with various homeowners to perform
contractor services. In all instances, he was operating as an unlicensed
contractor under the name “Pat Clarke Construction.” The homeowners who

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code unless

otherwise indicated.

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contracted with him paid Davies several thousand dollars each for his
services, but Davies either did not complete their projects or performed no
work whatsoever on the projects.
On May 8th, 2024, Davies was charged with five counts of diversion of
funds intended for services (§ 484b; counts 1, 5, 9, 12, 15); five misdemeanor
counts of contracting without a license (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7028, subd. (a);
counts 2, 6, 10, 13, 16); five misdemeanor counts of charging an excessive
downpayment (id., § 7159.5, subd. (a)(3); counts 3, 7, 11, 14, 17); and two
counts of advertising as a contractor without a license (id., § 7027.1, subd. (a);
counts 4, 8).
B. Court Proceedings
Davies pled no contest to one count of misdemeanor battery on a
cohabitant for his battery on R.S. during the March 2024 incident (former
§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) and one count of assault by means of force likely to cause
great bodily injury for his assault on the police officer whose leg was stuck in
the gate (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) in case no. CR969734, and to three counts of
diversion of construction funds (§ 484b) and three counts of misdemeanor
contracting without a license (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7028, subd. (a)) in case
no. CR969539. The remaining counts in case nos. CR969539 and CR969734
and all counts in a third case were dismissed.
In a presentencing report, the probation department recommended that
Davies be denied probation based on the criteria in rule 4.414, including that
the victims were vulnerable, that the defendant was armed with a weapon,
and that “the manner in which the crime was carried out demonstrated
criminal sophistication or professionalism on the part of the defendant.”
(Rule 4.414(a)(2), (3), (8).) The report also listed nine factors in aggravation
under rule 4.421 that the probation department believed applied to Davies

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and his offenses, including that the crime “involved great violence, great
bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high
degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness.” (Rule 4.421(a)(1), (b)(1).)
At the initial and continued sentencing hearings, defense counsel
disputed the application of many of the aggravating factors mentioned in the
presentencing report. First, defense counsel argued that the March 2024
incident did not involve great violence because Davies’s assault conviction
arose from a brief struggle with the police when he was trying to close the
gate, and his misdemeanor battery conviction was based on him tripping R.S.
According to the defense, the officer and R.S. sustained minimal injuries from
the incident. The defense argued that no other facts from the March 2024
incident could be considered absent a Harvey waiver3 because the remaining
counts from that incident were dismissed.
The prosecution disagreed, arguing that the court was allowed to
consider the “totality of the circumstances” of the March 2024 incident, which
showed that Davies was “aggressive and confrontational with the officers
from the beginning” and had caused a “two-hour standoff” with the officers.
The prosecution further argued that the incident involved a threat of great
bodily harm because Davies told the officers he was armed with a knife and
had a right to stand his ground.
Regarding whether the victim was vulnerable, the defense initially
argued this factor was not a factor in aggravation but then later agreed that
the victim was vulnerable. The prosecution asserted that the officer was
“physically vulnerable” when his leg became stuck in the gate.

3 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.

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Finally, the defense argued that there was no evidence to support the
probation department’s claims that Davies was armed during the March 2024
incident, that his offenses involved professionalism or planning, or that he
threatened witnesses.
The defense also cited a few mitigating factors, arguing that Davies
was remorseful, as evidenced by an apology letter he sent to the police, and
that he had no prior criminal history. The defense further argued that
Davies’s substance abuse issues affected his behavior. It provided the court
with a letter stating that Davies had been accepted into a rehabilitation
program. Finally, the defense claimed that Davies was a victim of identity
theft and had his money stolen, and this was why he was unable to render
contractor services to the victims in case no. CR969539. Based on these facts,
the defense requested that the court grant probation and place Davies in a
rehabilitation program.
The prosecution responded that Davies’s apology letter “demonstrates
somebody doing the bare minimum” and did not mention the victims Davies
defrauded in case no. CR969539. The prosecution further contended that
Davies was “downplaying” his drug use based on remarks he made to the
probation department. The prosecution also noted that while Davies
produced evidence that he had made an insurance claim for identity theft,
there was no evidence that he had reported the identity theft to the police or
to his bank.
As an additional factor in aggravation, the prosecution noted that
Davies had pending charges in other jurisdictions for financial crimes similar
to those in case no. CR969539.

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After the parties submitted, the trial court denied probation,
concluding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.
The court sentenced Davies to an aggregate term of five years in state prison.
II. DISCUSSION
Davies contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying him
probation. The gist of his argument is that the court should have granted
probation based on five factors in mitigation—his expression of remorse, his
lack of a criminal history, his voluntary acknowledgement of wrongdoing at
an early stage, his willingness to rehabilitate, and his drug abuse issues.
(Rules 4.414(b)(1), (3), (7), & 4.423(b)(1), (2).) We disagree that the trial
court’s denial of probation was an abuse of discretion.
A defendant who is denied probation bears a heavy burden to show the
trial court has abused its discretion. (People v. Aubrey (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th
279, 282.) A denial of probation generally rests within the broad discretion of
the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that
the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, that
is, when that court has exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances being considered. (People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th
899, 909–910.) “ ‘In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is
presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its
discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968,
977–978, superseded by statute on other grounds as indicated in People v.
Lynall (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1102.)
Rule 4.414 provides criteria for the trial court to consider in granting or
denying probation. The court may also consider additional criteria not listed

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in rule 4.414, provided those criteria are reasonably related to that decision
and they are stated on the record by the sentencing judge. (Rule 4.408(a).)
Here, at the outset of the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated it
had reviewed the presentencing report. In the report, the probation
department advised against granting probation based on eight factors in rule
4.414. In addition to the factors previously mentioned, such as the
vulnerability of the victim, the factors included that Davies “was an active
participant” in the offenses (rule 4.414(a)(6)) and that the crimes were not
committed “because of an unusual circumstance, such as great provocation,
which is unlikely to recur” (rule 4.414(a)(7)). The court agreed that the “facts
of the whole event” underlying Davies’s convictions in case no. CR969734
constituted “aggravating factors,” and it determined that the aggravating
factors outweighed the mitigating factors. In denying probation, the court
expressly relied on the high degree of violence involved in case no. CR969734,
the callousness with which Davies committed his offenses in both cases (rules
4.414(a)(1), 4.421(a)(1)), and his pending charges for similar financial crimes
(rule 4.414(b)(1)).
These circumstances support the validity of the trial court’s denial of
probation. (See People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1311, 1313–
1318 [trial court properly denied probation based on factors listed in rule
4.414 and other factors “reasonably related to the court’s decision whether to
grant or deny probation”], overruled on another ground in People v. Cook
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 922.) “A single factor in aggravation is a sufficient basis for
a sentencing choice,” and the court here relied on several aggravating factors
in deciding to deny probation. (People v. Castellano (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d
608, 615, called into doubt on another ground in People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730, 764–765; see People v. Robinson (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 609,

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615, disapproved on another ground in People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331,
353, fn. 16; People v. Ramirez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1530 [“even if
there were several mitigating factors that might weigh in favor of probation,
this does not necessarily mean that the trial court abused its discretion in
deciding against granting probation”].)
Further, the trial court was free to “minimize or even entirely disregard
mitigating factors without stating its reasons.” (People v. Salazar (1983)
144 Cal.App.3d 799, 813, disagreed with on other grounds in People v. Key
(1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 897; accord, People v. Lamb (1988)
206 Cal.App.3d 397, 401.) There is evidence in the record that the court
could have relied on in discounting at least some of the mitigating factors
cited by Davies. For example, Davies’s apology letter did not mention the
victims or his crimes in case no. CR969539. Based on that fact and the lack
of evidence showing Davies reported the alleged theft of his identity to the
police or his bank, the parties disputed the weight that should be given to the
mitigating factor of the defendant’s remorse.4 (Rule 4.414(b)(7).)
Davies does not dispute that the record contains sufficient evidence to
support the aggravating factors relied on by the trial court in denying
probation. His sole contention is that the court should have granted him
probation based on the five mitigating factors mentioned above. He argues
that a “five-year prison sentence, for a remorseful individual who is willing to
attend a rehabilitation program, fails to achieve” any of the goals of
California’s penal system. Davies’s argument requires this court to reweigh

4 We note that the trial court stated, after reviewing documents

submitted by the defense at the sentencing hearing, that Davies’s claim of
identity theft “lacks some credibility on its face.” The defense documents are
not in the record before us, and thus we must resolve the credibility issue
against Davies. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–1296.)

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the evidence or factors the trial court considered in denying probation. We
decline to do so. (See People v. Weaver, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311
[“ ‘In reviewing [a trial court’s determination whether to grant or deny
probation,] it is not’ ” the appellate court’s function to substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court; its function “ ‘is to determine whether the trial
court’s order . . . is arbitrary or capricious or exceeds the bounds of reason
considering all the facts and circumstances’ ”]; People v. Jordan (1986)
42 Cal.3d 308, 317 [“The Court of Appeal . . . erred when it reweighed the
circumstances in mitigation rather than limiting its review to whether the
sentencing court abused its statutory discretion”].)
In his reply brief, Davies argues that the trial court failed to fully
consider the mitigating factors in this case. We reject this argument. The
relevant criteria “shall be deemed to have been considered unless the record
affirmatively reflects otherwise.” (Rule 4.409; see People v. Castellano, supra,
140 Cal.App.3d at p. 615; People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310
[trial court’s focus on violence of defendant’s crimes does not mean it
considered only that factor].) Davies does not point to anything in the record
that suggests the trial court declined to consider the factors cited by the
parties in exercising its discretion.
In sum, Davies does not challenge those factors that supported the trial
court’s decision to deny probation or demonstrate that the court failed to
exercise informed discretion, and thus he has not met his burden to show
that the court’s assessment of those factors and its decision to deny probation
was “irrational or arbitrary.” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez), supra,
14 Cal.4th at p. 977.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
HUMES, P. J.

_________________________
SMILEY, J.

People v. Davies / A171116

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