CourtListener 10782983•People v. Pineda CA4/3
Full text
Filed 2/2/26 P. v. Pineda CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064450
v. (Super. Ct. No. 24NF0469)
SALVADOR PINEDA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Lance P. Jensen, Judge. Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina and Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Salvador Pineda was convicted of stealing a vehicle and evading
arrest while driving recklessly. Pineda asserts he was wrongfully denied the
opportunity to represent himself at trial in violation of his Sixth Amendment
rights as outlined in Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). He
contends the trial court erred by denying his Faretta motion as untimely. We
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Pineda stole a 2018 Hyundai Elantra from the Buena Park Mall.
The vehicle owner saw Pineda driving his car and attempted to stop him, but
Pineda drove away. A nearby officer then began pursuit, and Pineda
attempted to evade arrest by speeding and failing to stop at multiple stop
signs. Pineda ultimately crashed the car and was arrested.
In his defense, Pineda claimed he was not the driver, but was
simply a passenger in the vehicle, which was driven by a friend of a friend he
knew only as “Soldier.” Pineda claimed he did not even know the vehicle was
stolen until he was already riding in the car and Soldier began evading
police. Pineda testified Soldier abandoned the vehicle while it was moving,
leaving Pineda to try to get control of the car as he moved from the passenger
seat to the driver’s seat, which is when the vehicle crashed.
Pineda was charged with: (1) unlawfully taking a vehicle (Veh.
Code, § 10851 subd. (a)); (2) receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496d
subd. (a)); (3) evading arrest while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2);
and (4) possessing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd.
(a)). He made several personal appearances in court prior to trial. The first
was about a month after the arraignment, when a jury trial date was set. He
then appeared on the initial trial date and answered not ready. On the
continued trial date, all parties answered ready and the case was transferred
2
to the trial courtroom. Pineda and his appointed counsel appeared that same
day in front of the newly assigned trial judge to discuss case status, jury
selection, potential evidentiary issues, and trial procedures. The judge ruled
on most of the pretrial motions, leaving only a few issues to be decided on the
following Monday. Pineda gave no indication at any of these hearings that he
wanted to represent himself or that he was dissatisfied with his counsel.
When the parties appeared for trial, potential jurors had arrived
and jury selection was about to begin. That is when Pineda first asked to
represent himself pursuant to Faretta. Pineda told the court he was not ready
to proceed with trial and initially asked for a two-week continuance to
prepare himself for trial. When pressed by the court, he increased the length
of the requested continuance to “about three weeks.” Pineda gave no reason
for wanting to represent himself or for why the trial delay was necessary. The
trial court did not press him for reasons.
The prosecution confirmed its readiness to start trial, stating all
witnesses had been subpoenaed, including a civilian (the vehicle owner) who
had rearranged his schedule to testify the next day. Similarly, defense
counsel confirmed she was prepared. The court then commented about the
work it had done to prepare for trial, including reviewing and ruling on
pretrial motions, preparing jury instructions and verdict forms, and having a
direct conversation with Pineda about case issues.
The court denied Pineda’s motion for self-representation based on
the following conclusions: (1) all parties (and the court) had prepared for and
3
1
were ready to proceed; (2) Pineda had not waived his right to a speedy trial ;
(3) he had not raised the issue of self-representation at any of the multiple
prior hearings; and (4) he asserted he was unable to proceed with trial that
day, necessitating a delay. The court found granting the request “at this
stage of the proceeding would delay the trial and/or cause interference and
disruption of the orderly process of justice that would be unreasonable under
the circumstances of this case.” The court further explained its decision was
based on the “totality of the circumstances,” which included the quality of
defense counsel’s representation, the length and stage of the proceedings, and
the inevitable disruption and delay that would result if the motion were
granted.
Immediately after the trial court ruled on the Faretta motion,
Pineda made an oral Marsden motion to substitute his appointed counsel.2
The court denied the Marsden motion and promptly proceeded to jury
selection.
DISCUSSION
Pineda argues his Faretta motion was timely and unequivocal
and should have been granted as a matter of right. The Attorney General
does not challenge the knowing and unequivocal nature of Pineda’s request
but maintains the trial court correctly denied the motion because it came too
1
The court did not ask if Pineda would be willing to waive his
right to a speedy trial and Pineda did not offer to do so. Viewed in context, it
appears the court’s reference to Pineda’s nonwaiver of his speedy trial rights
was to underscore the substantial amount of work everyone had already done
to be ready for trial within the statutory time period.
2
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
4
late. We conclude the motion was untimely and the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying it.
I.
APPLICABLE LAW
A criminal defendant has a right of self-representation under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Faretta, supra,
422 U.S. at p. 807.) To invoke that right, however, the defendant’s request for
self-representation must be knowing, intelligent, and timely. (People v. Welch
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729.) The timeliness element is necessary “to avoid
unjustifiable delay or disruption of orderly court proceedings.” (People v. Ruiz
(1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 780, 791.)
A Faretta motion is timely if it is asserted “within a reasonable
time prior to the commencement of trial.” (People v. Windham (1977) 19
Cal.3d 121, 128 (Windham).) Because what constitutes “a reasonable time”
before trial will vary, “timeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a
fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the
circumstances that exist in the case at the time the self-representation
motion is made.” (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 724 (Lynch),
abrogated on other grounds in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610.)
Factors to consider include the amount of time between the motion and the
scheduled trial date, as well as “whether trial counsel is ready to proceed to
trial, the number of witnesses and the reluctance or availability of crucial
trial witnesses, the complexity of the case, any ongoing pretrial proceedings,
and whether the defendant had earlier opportunities to assert his right of
self-representation.” (Lynch, supra, at p. 726.)
5
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a trial court has denied a Faretta motion as untimely,
appellate review begins with the question whether the defendant timely
invoked his right to self-representation. (People v. Perez (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th
893, 903 (Perez).) The California Supreme Court has not determined whether
denial of a Faretta motion as untimely should be reviewed de novo or under a
less stringent standard such as substantial evidence or abuse of discretion.
(People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 501.) We need not dwell on that
issue because, as we explain below, even under the more demanding de novo
standard, Pineda’s Faretta motion was not timely.
Once a Faretta motion is deemed untimely, “self-representation
no longer is a matter of right but is subject to the trial court’s discretion.”
(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1365.) We will not disturb the
denial of an untimely Faretta motion absent an abuse of discretion. (People v.
Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 426.) “A trial court abuses its discretion
when its ruling falls outside the bounds of reason.” (People v. Powell (2011)
194 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1278 (Powell).)
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S FARETTA MOTION
A. The Faretta Motion was Untimely
There is no dispute Pineda’s request for self-representation was
knowing, intelligent, and unequivocal. The only element at issue is
timeliness.
Though not an absolute rule, eleventh hour Faretta motions are
“‘extreme’” and “disfavored” and generally are considered to be untimely.
(Powell, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1277–1278.) Pineda’s Faretta motion
6
was made on the morning of trial, moments before jury selection was set to
begin, which is about as late as one can get when it comes to timeliness.
In ruling on Pineda’s motion, the trial court’s inquiry addressed
most of the Lynch factors. The court noted counsel for both parties were
ready to proceed to trial, witnesses had been subpoenaed and were ready to
testify, pretrial proceedings were completed, and jury selection was about to
begin. The court further noted Pineda had personally appeared in court on
multiple previous occasions, including once when the assigned trial judge
questioned him and explained trial procedures. Pineda gave no indication in
any of those previous appearances he might make a Faretta motion.
Although the trial court did not specifically address the two
remaining Lynch factors—the complexity of the case and whether witnesses
were unavailable or reluctant to testify—the record contains facts relating to
them. The record shows witnesses had been subpoenaed and had arranged to
be present to testify at trial. There is no indication any witness was reluctant
to testify. Moreover, the record shows the case was not complex. Trial
consumed a single day of testimony, at which only three witnesses testified,
the arresting officer, the vehicle owner, and Pineda.
Pineda relies on People v. Herrera (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 167 to
argue his motion was timely, but that case does not help him. Herrera
suggests a Faretta motion may be found timely if the defendant makes the
request at his “earliest opportunity” to do so, even if that “earliest
opportunity” is “shortly before trial.” (Herrera, at p. 174.) However, Pineda
does not assert the first day of trial was his “earliest opportunity” to bring his
Faretta motion, nor would the record support such an argument. Moreover,
unlike Pineda, the defendant in Herrera did not ask for a trial continuance.
(Id. at pp. 175–176.)
7
Pineda next argues it was reasonable to bring the motion on the
day of trial because there were only 62 days between his arraignment and the
start of trial. He notes a similar time frame existed in a federal case that
overturned the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s Faretta motion.
(Chapman v. United States (5th Cir. 1977) 553 F.2d 886, 896.) However, that
is the only similarity the Chapman case shares with this one. The Chapman
defendant had communicated his wish for self-representation to his counsel
prior to the first day of trial. (Id. at pp. 894–895) He also made the request to
the court the first time he appeared in front of the trial judge. Neither of
those things is true here, and thus Chapman is unhelpful to Pineda.
Based on our complete review of the record, we conclude Pineda’s
Faretta motion was not made “within a reasonable time prior to the
commencement of trial” (Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128) and
consequently was untimely. This is true under any standard of review.
Accordingly, the trial court was not required to grant the request. It did,
however, retain discretion to grant the request despite its untimeliness. We
therefore turn to the question of whether the trial court abused that
discretion.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying the Untimely
Faretta Motion
Even when a defendant’s Faretta motion is untimely, the trial
court “must exercise its discretion to determine whether the request should
be granted or denied,” and in doing so must consider specific factors related
to the request. (Perez, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 903.) Those factors are: (1)
the quality of counsel’s representation of the defendant to date; (2)
defendant’s prior proclivity to substitute counsel; (3) reasons for the request;
(4) length and stage of the proceedings; and (5) the disruption or delay which
8
might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a motion.
(Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128.)
At the time Pineda made his Faretta motion, he did not raise any
3
issues or concerns about the quality of his counsel’s performance. In denying
Pineda’s motion, the trial court specifically noted it had considered this
factor. Pineda had given no prior indication he wanted to represent himself
despite multiple opportunities to do so. Having just spent considerable time
ruling on the parties’ pretrial “402” motions, the court was in a position to
4
evaluate the quality of counsel’s representation. Pineda plainly
demonstrated no “prior proclivity” to relieve his counsel.
The court also noted it considered “the length” of the proceedings,
and the “stage of the proceeding” at which Pineda made his motion. The
prosecution had subpoenaed witnesses for trial, one of whom was a “civilian
witness who has put their day aside from whatever their employment is in
order to be with us.” The court further acknowledged all trial preparation had
been completed (by all counsel and the court), that “everybody is basically
ready to go” and that “jurors [were] sitting down in a jury room about to walk
down to this courtroom to start” the jury selection process.
3
Pineda did not make his oral Marsden motion until after the
court had denied his Faretta motion. But even during the Marsden hearing,
Pineda acknowledged he had no complaints about his counsel or her
performance; he simply was seeking to buy time to locate and subpoena
additional witnesses for trial.
4
Evidence Code section 402 sets forth procedures for the court to
decide preliminary questions of fact upon which the admissibility of evidence
depends. In finding Pineda’s Faretta motion untimely, the trial court
referenced (among other things) “all the time it spent on 402’s.”
9
Pineda argues that a delay of trial is not, by itself, a sufficient
ground for denying his motion, citing Fritz v. Spalding (9th Cir. 1982) 682
F.2d 782, 784 [a party cannot be deprived of his right to self-representation,
even if it would result in a delay of trial, as long as there are “bona fide
reasons for not asserting his right” sooner, and as long as the request is not
made specifically to secure a delay or to gain tactical advantage]. But delay
was not the only relevant factor identified in Windham and was not the only
factor addressed by the trial court here.
Pineda contends he made the request because he wanted more
time to investigate and locate witnesses to testify in his favor. However, he
did not communicate this to the court when he made his Faretta motion.
Indeed, during the hearing on his motion, he failed to offer any reason for
wanting to represent himself. Even if he had (or if the court had elicited such
information from him), the trial court still would not have abused its
discretion in denying the motion considering the lateness of the request, as
well as the other Windham factors.
A Faretta motion may be denied based on evidence that
defendant’s purpose was to delay proceedings. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15
Cal.4th 1, 26.) Pineda’s request for delay was not made based on any genuine
dispute with his counsel or any stated desire to make his own decisions about
how his case would move forward. It appears to have been made for the
tactical advantage of gathering more witnesses after discovery was complete.
The court explicitly considered the quality of Pineda’s counsel’s
representation, the lack of any earlier indication by Pineda that he was
dissatisfied with counsel, the length and stage of the proceedings, and the
disruption a last-minute continuance would cause to witnesses, parties, and
10
the court. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pineda’s
untimely motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GOODING, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DELANEY, J.
SCOTT, J.
11
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.