People v. Gutierrez CA1/5

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Filed 2/2/26 P. v. Gutierrez CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
A170780
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. FCR332353)
JESUS GUTIERREZ, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.

Jesus Gutierrez, Jr. (appellant), appeals from the trial court’s denial of
his Penal Code section 1172.61 petition for resentencing following an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2018, following a jury trial, appellant and codefendant Christopher
Johnson were found guilty of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). The
jury found true an allegation that Johnson personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm in the commission of the crime (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
Appellant was sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life, and this court

1 All undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

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affirmed the judgment. (People v. Gutierrez et al. (Oct. 1, 2021, A159878,
A159997) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2023, appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel and found appellant established a
prima facie case. At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution relied on the
trial transcript and two trial exhibits.2 Appellant presented one new witness.
The trial court denied appellant’s resentencing petition, finding the evidence
established beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of murder
under current law as a direct aider and abettor or, in the alternative, as a
major participant in Johnson’s criminal conduct acting with reckless
indifference to human life.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Trial Testimony
Samantha F. testified that, on the evening of August 20, 2017, she and
her friend Victoria C. went to an acquaintance’s house. Johnson was
standing outside next to a white picket fence and Victoria joined him.
Appellant arrived in a black Impala and parked nearby. Not long thereafter,
a gold car drove by slowly, and then left. Johnson said, “Did you see that? It
was kind of suspicious,” and walked to appellant’s car, saying, “Let’s go.”
Johnson and appellant drove away, following the gold car. Samantha heard
gunshots and then appellant and Johnson returned. Johnson looked scared
and appellant’s car was “all shot up.”
Jessica F. testified that, on the night of the shooting, she was inside her
house, listening through an open window to a young man and young woman
she did not know talking in front of her white picket fence. When two men

2 The bench officer presiding over the resentencing petition had also

presided over the jury trial.

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walked out of a nearby alleyway, Johnson appeared to recognize them, pulled
a gun out of his pants, and stood with the gun by his side. After the two men
walked away, Johnson put the gun away. Subsequently, a tan Acura drove
by, and Johnson got into the passenger seat of a dark car parked nearby,
yelling at the driver, “Go get them. Follow them.” As the dark car sped
away, Jessica saw Johnson with the top half of his body outside the open
passenger window, holding a gun in his hand. Jessica heard gunshots and
tires screeching, then the dark car returned and Johnson got out, yelling at
everyone to get into the house.3
Jordan H., a close friend of the victim, Gary Cromwell, Jr., testified
under a grant of immunity. On the night of the shooting, he and Cromwell
took Cromwell’s silver Acura with tinted windows to sell marijuana. Both
Jordan and Cromwell had guns with them. After parking, they walked down
an alley to meet the buyer, but the buyer never showed up, so they returned
to Cromwell’s car. As they were leaving the area, a dark car pulled up beside
them on the wrong side of the road and Jordan saw someone with their upper
body out of the passenger window, pointing a gun at Cromwell’s car. Jordan
grabbed his gun and started shooting. Cromwell was shot and subsequently
died.
Appellant testified in his own defense. At the time of the shooting, he
was 18 or 19 years old. That evening, he drove his Chevy Impala to a friend’s
house, where he saw Johnson standing outside talking to a woman.
Appellant had known Johnson since middle school. At some point, a car with
tinted windows slowly drove by. The car then sped off, and Johnson got in

3 Jessica called 911 and a recording of the call was admitted into

evidence at trial and was part of the evidentiary record before the
resentencing court.

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appellant’s car and told him to follow the car. Appellant did not see anything
in Johnson’s hands. Johnson did not tell appellant why he wanted to follow
the car or give any indication that he knew who was in the car. Appellant
caught up with the car and pulled up alongside it, but could not see inside the
tinted windows. As he and Johnson were trying to see who was in the car,
someone from the car started shooting at them. Appellant ducked and froze,
heard close gunshots that sounded like they were coming from his car, and
then drove off.
Expert Testimony
At the resentencing evidentiary hearing, appellant presented Dr.
Francesca Lehman, an expert in adolescent development. Dr. Lehman did
not interview appellant but reviewed a psychosocial history prepared by
someone else. Dr. Lehman testified that at the time of the shooting,
appellant was in the stage of late adolescence, which takes place from age 18
to 21. Individuals in this stage are more likely to make impulsive decisions
influenced by peer pressure and without considering long-term consequences.
The psychosocial history reviewed by Dr. Lehman reported that
appellant suffered a severe brain injury when he was five weeks old, and that
his brother had been shot nine days before Cromwell was shot. Dr. Lehman
opined that these factors could contribute to poor decisionmaking.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues the trial court’s findings lack substantial evidence.
As explained below, we conclude there is substantial evidence that appellant
directly aided and abetted second degree murder by aiding and abetting

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Johnson’s commission of a life-endangering act, to wit, pursuing a car while
openly displaying a gun.4
“At the [section 1172.6] evidentiary hearing, ‘the burden of proof shall
be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner
is ineligible for resentencing.’ (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Thus, ‘it is the [trial]
court’s responsibility to act as independent fact finder and determine whether
the evidence establishes a petitioner would be guilty of murder under
amended sections 188 and 189 and is thus ineligible for resentencing under
section [1172.6].’ ” (People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 110 (Cody).)
In our review of such a determination, “ ‘[t]he test is not whether the
People met their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [a
defendant in a section 1172.6 proceeding] was ineligible for resentencing, but
rather “whether any rational trier of fact could have” made the same
determination, namely that “[t]he record . . . disclose[s] . . . evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find [as did the superior court].” ’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘ “In applying this test,
we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
presume in support of the [order] the existence of every fact the [superior
court] could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.]
‘Conflicts [in the evidence] . . . subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify
the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge

4 Because of this conclusion, we need not and do not decide whether, as

the parties dispute, (1) appellant established a prima facie case for
resentencing relief; (2) substantial evidence supports a finding that Johnson
pursued the Acura with the intent to kill its occupants and appellant knew of
such intent; and/or (3) substantial evidence supports a finding that appellant
was a major participant in Johnson’s criminal activity and acted with
reckless indifference to human life.

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. . . to determine the . . . truth or falsity of the facts upon which a
determination depends.’ ” ’ ” (Cody, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 111.)
Following the “ ‘elimination of natural and probable consequences
liability for second degree murder, an aider and abettor who does not
expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree
murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of
another and acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 990.) “ ‘[D]irect aiding and abetting is based on the combined
actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own mens rea.
[Citation.] In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the
perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider
and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the
commission of the life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied
malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid
the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The
mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor,
is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid
the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is
dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.’ ”
(Id. at pp. 990–991.)
Appellant concedes that “pursing the [Acura] while displaying a gun
was a life-endangering act because it made gun violence by one side or the
other highly likely.” He further concedes that substantial evidence supports
the findings that appellant knew Johnson intended to commit this act and
intended to aid Johnson in its commission. However, appellant argues no
substantial evidence supports the findings that he knew the act was
dangerous to human life and acted in conscious disregard for human life,

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because his “immaturity made him unable to subjectively appreciate the
danger to life of Johnson’s conduct.” Appellant characterizes Dr. Lehman’s
testimony as “substantial evidence supporting the inference that appellant
felt peer pressure to assist Chris Johnson” and thereby acted without
reflecting on the danger of Johnson’s conduct. But whether the record
contains substantial evidence supporting such an inference is immaterial; the
question before us is whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding. (Cody, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 111.) The trial court expressly
considered Dr. Lehman’s testimony and found it did not change the outcome:
“I’m mindful of the testimony of the doctor, and those are important issues
and the Court considered them, but they’re not enough for the Court to adopt
a different finding.” The court was free to make such a finding; Dr. Lehman’s
testimony did not compel a finding that appellant was unable to understand
the danger.
Appellant’s argument that Cromwell and Jordan “were the aggressors”
by twice approaching Johnson has no bearing on whether appellant knew
Johnson’s conduct was dangerous to human life and consciously disregarded
that danger. We also reject appellant’s contention that the trial court relied
on evidence not in the record in stating Johnson told appellant “to follow the
car and to get [Jordan] and Cromwell.” Jessica testified Johnson told
appellant to “get them,” and further testified that Johnson appeared to
recognize the two men who had come out of the alley shortly before the Acura
drove by. It is a reasonable inference that, in telling appellant to “get them,”
Johnson was referring to Jordan and Cromwell. In any event, the matter is
immaterial to the issue of whether appellant understood that the conduct of
following a car while openly displaying a gun is dangerous to human life.

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In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
appellant aided and abetted Johnson’s second degree murder.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

SIMONS, J.

We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.

(A170780)

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