CourtListener 10781906•In re K.M. CA1/1
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Filed 1/30/26 In re K.M. CA1/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re K.M., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A173984
v.
(City & County of San Francisco
K.E.,
Super. Ct. No. JD22-3253)
Defendant and Appellant.
K.E. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights
over her daughter, K.M. She argues that the order must be reversed because
the juvenile court erred in declining to apply the beneficial relationship
exception under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(B)(i).1 She further contends that inquiry under the Indian Child
Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; see § 224 et seq.; ICWA) was
inadequate. We conditionally reverse the order and remand for the limited
purpose of compliance with ICWA.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Detention Through Six-Month Review
In September 2022, the San Francisco Human Services Agency
(Agency) received a referral from a mandated reporter stating that then one-
year-old K.M. had been brought to an emergency room after displaying
symptoms of drug ingestion. After a positive toxicology report revealed that
K.M. had cocaine in her system, the Agency filed a section 300 petition
alleging that K.M. was at risk of serious physical harm because Mother failed
to adequately protect her, and that K.M.’s father, who lived separately from
Mother, was unable to protect K.M. from Mother’s neglect.
The juvenile court declared K.M. a dependent, removed her from her
parents’ care, and placed her with a relative. Mother was to receive
supervised visitation.
In its jurisdiction/dispositional report and an addendum report filed in
February 2023, the Agency sought a continuance of the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing. The addendum report explained that while Mother was
ruled out as the source of the drugs ingested by K.M., she could not explain
how K.M. obtained the drugs, and the Agency needed time to inspect
Mother’s residence and identify safe adults to care for K.M.
In an addendum report filed in March 2023, the Agency recommended
the court sustain the allegations in the petition. Mother had agreed to a
“safety plan” to ensure K.M. did not have access to drugs and was supervised
only by certain individuals. K.M.’s caregiver agreed to facilitate visits with
the parents.
Another addendum report filed in March 2023 recommended that the
case be transferred to Contra Costa County, where Mother currently resided.
2
At the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court
sustained the amended2 petition, declared K.M. a dependent, and ordered
reunification services and supervised visitation for both parents. The court
also transferred the case to Contra Costa County.
A few months later, in July 2023, the case was transferred back to San
Francisco County after the social worker learned that Mother was living with
K.M.’s maternal grandfather in San Francisco.
In a status review report filed in December 2023, the Agency
recommended the termination of reunification services for both parents. The
report explained that neither parent had completed any of their court-ordered
services, and it was difficult to maintain regular contact with them, as they
“have moved from one city to another so much and been so unstable over the
year.”
A maternal aunt, S.S., expressed interest in adopting K.M. K.M. was
placed in the care of S.S. in January 2024.
After the six-month review hearing was continued, the Agency filed an
addendum report in February 2024, again recommending the termination of
reunification services. The social worker reported having a hard time
maintaining regular contact with the parents, and minimal progress had
been made on their case plan. Additionally, Mother had been “very
inconsistent” with visitation.
2 The section 300 petition was amended to reflect that both cocaine and
a medication called Haloperidol were found in K.M.’s system, that Mother
had tested negative for those drugs, that the maternal grandparents had a
history of drug use or possession, and that Mother was struggling to provide
for K.M.’s basic needs.
3
In March 2024, Mother filed a trial brief objecting to the termination of
reunification services on the ground that the Agency failed to provide her
reasonable services. She also argued that the Agency improperly delegated
all authority over visitation to K.M.’s caregiver and did not offer her any
visits between September 2023 and November 2023.
After the contested review was continued, the Agency filed an
addendum report recommending that Mother receive a 30-day extended visit
with K.M. Mother had made “significant” progress on her case plan and had
been more consistent with visitation in the last two months. The Agency
stated it would offer Mother six additional months of reunification services if
her 30-day trial went well.
At a subsequent hearing, the court granted the Agency discretion to
give Mother unsupervised and overnight visitation.
The Agency filed an addendum report in May 2024, recommending that
reunification services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set. The
report explained that, per S.S., Mother had been “very ‘hit or miss’ ” with
visitation. The report listed 12 visitation dates that Mother had missed in
the last three months.
In a subsequent addendum report, the Agency again recommended the
termination of reunification services. According to the report, “it has
continued to be extremely challenging to meet and communicate with both
parents.” S.S. reported that Mother had missed half of her visits with K.M.
since mid-March 2024. Mother later told the social worker that S.S.’s
information was inaccurate though Mother did not provide further comment.
At the review hearing in July 2024, the court terminated Mother’s
reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing for November 2024.
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B. The Section 366.26 Proceedings
In October 2024, the Agency filed a section 366.26 report
recommending that adoption be approved as K.M.’s permanent plan and that
parental rights be terminated. Mother had missed “almost all of her visits”
with K.M. and would only see her “sporadically.” When K.M. was initially
detained, the Agency tried to schedule supervised visits “in the community”
but Mother did not complete an intake. The Agency then attempted to
schedule visits that would be supervised by K.M.’s caregiver, but Mother “did
not follow through.” Because visits with Mother had been “very minimal,”
K.M. was “not attached” to Mother, and their relationship was “minimal.”
The Agency determined that K.M. was likely to be adopted. She had
been in S.S.’s care for nine months and had adjusted well to the family. S.S.
wished to adopt K.M.
The section 366.26 hearing was continued multiple times. The Agency
filed an addendum report in April 2025, reiterating that Mother’s visitation
with K.M. had been inconsistent. S.S. provided the social worker with a list
of the dates on which visits occurred between July 2024 and March 2025.
The list showed that Mother visited K.M. one to three times a month, for a
total of 15 visits. S.S. said the visits usually happened when she contacts
Mother “and not the other way around.” The social worker also reported that
she heard K.M. refer to S.S. as “mommy” and that K.M. called Mother by her
first name.
The Agency filed another addendum report in June 2025 with no
change in its recommendation. According to the report, S.S. had to call the
police in late April because Mother took K.M. to her apartment and refused
to return her. Before that visit, Mother had not seen K.M. since mid-March,
and S.S. had to reach out to Mother about visiting K.M.
5
The report further explained that Mother had been inconsistent with
visiting K.M. “since the beginning of the case.” Early in the case, Mother had
“ ‘limited phone contact’ ” with K.M., and K.M.’s caregiver usually initiated
that contact. Mother had a “ ‘formal’ ” visitation schedule with visits
supervised by a “ ‘tech,’ ” but by March 2023, she “ ‘had been taken off the
schedule’ ” after missing “ ‘a bunch of visits.’ ” In June 2023, K.M.’s prior
caregiver reported that Mother did not attend any formal visits after the case
was transferred to Contra Costa County. They would see each other during
family gatherings, which was difficult for K.M., and she often became
“ ‘dysregulated’ ” after the meetings.
At the time of the report, K.M. had lived with S.S. for 16 months, and
she looked to S.S. for emotional support and to meet her daily needs.
Mother filed a pretrial statement contesting the recommendation to
terminate her parental rights. She argued that she had regularly visited
K.M. “to the extent made possible by the current caregiver, given the
Agency’s lack of involvement in arranging and supervising visitation” for
nearly the entire case. She further asserted that she had a beneficial
relationship with K.M. and that K.M. would benefit from continuing that
relationship.
The contested section 366.26 hearing was held on June 16, 2025. At
that time, K.M. was almost four and one-half years old. The court admitted
into evidence the Agency’s section 366.26 report and its addendum reports
filed in April and June 2025. The court also admitted into evidence two
exhibits submitted by Mother, a “compilation of delivered service logs” and
text messages that Mother exchanged with S.S. between January 2024 and
April 2025. Mother and a social worker testified at the hearing.
6
1. The Social Worker’s Testimony
Taniuska Navarro was assigned to this case in September 2024, after
reunification services were terminated. She testified that K.M. had been out
of Mother’s care since she was 15 months old and had been with her current
caregiver, S.S., for the past 16 months.
When Navarro was assigned to the case, the Agency had no “formal”
visitation; visits were being scheduled with the caregiver. Both S.S. and
K.M.’s previous caregiver reported that for “the majority of the time,” they
had to reach out to Mother to see if she wanted to visit K.M. Visitation “has
been very infrequent.”
Navarro testified that after Mother failed to return K.M. from a visit in
April 2025, S.S. was no longer comfortable supervising visits. Thus, in May
2025, Navarro attempted to schedule an Agency-supervised visit but was not
able to reach Mother, and Mother did not call to set up a visit.
According to Navarro, S.S. reported that Mother visited K.M. one to
three times a month between July 2024 and April 2025, for a total of 15
visits. Visits would be about three to four hours at the park. If Mother had
attended all visits to which she was entitled during that time period, she
would have had 46 visits with K.M.
Navarro testified that K.M. had a positive relationship with S.S. K.M.
“runs towards [S.S.]. She calls her mommy. She kisses her. She hugs her.”
In contrast, K.M. calls Mother “by her name, so it is basically a friend or a
cousin or maybe an aunty.” Navarro said she did not believe that K.M. would
suffer any negative impact or emotional instability if visits with Mother were
terminated.
On cross-examination, Navarro confirmed she had received information
indicating that Mother sometimes picked K.M. up from daycare on days she
7
did not have a scheduled visit. Navarro also acknowledged that she never
supervised a visit between Mother and K.M. or saw them interact. When
asked if she had “direct” knowledge of the “quality” of Mother’s relationship
with K.M., Navarro said that when she was visiting K.M., she heard K.M.
refer to Mother by her first name.
2. Mother’s Testimony
Mother testified that she started coordinating visits directly with S.S.
about a year ago. Since then, she would get K.M. every weekend except for
those weekends that S.S. had plans with K.M. She did not specify how often
S.S. had weekend plans. Mother’s weekend visits with K.M. would be
unsupervised, though Mother knew that the court ordered only supervised
visitation. Mother further testified that she picked K.M. up from school every
Tuesday for about two months. She later stated that when she could no
longer pick K.M. up from school on Tuesdays, “that is when [she] would get
[K.M.] every weekend.”
Mother submitted text messages from January and April that were
between her and S.S. She said she always had to reach out to S.S. about
visiting K.M.
Regarding her relationship with K.M., Mother testified that K.M. called
her “mommy.” On visits, they would watch movies, cook, color, and do nails,
or they would go to the park. “We do all the fun stuff she wants to do.” At
bedtime, Mother would give K.M. a bath, and they would “chill and watch
movies and things.” When K.M. had to return to S.S., she “cries and tells me
she wants to stay and that she doesn’t want to leave me.” According to
Mother, K.M. is always happy to see her and always calls her “mom” or
“mommy.”
8
Since late April 2025, Mother saw K.M. once “in the neighborhood.”
She said that she called and texted S.S. to visit K.M. but S.S. never
responded.
3. Trial Court’s Ruling
K.M.’s counsel joined in the Agency’s recommendation to terminate
parental rights. Mother’s counsel did not contest K.M.’s adoptability but
argued that visitation between Mother and K.M. should continue. The
juvenile court found it likely that K.M. would be adopted, found that neither
parent had met their burden to show the beneficial relationship exception
applied, and terminated both parents’ parental rights.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Beneficial Relationship Exception
Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in declining to apply the
beneficial relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
We disagree.
1. Governing Principles
“The sole purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select and
implement a permanent plan for the child after reunification efforts have
failed.” (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 851–852 (J.D.).) At this
hearing, the court has three options: (1) terminate parental rights and order
adoption as the permanent plan; (2) appoint a legal guardian for the child; or
(3) order the child placed in long-term foster care. (In re Fernando M. (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated
in In re K.H. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 406, 417–418.) “Adoption is the
preferred plan and, absent an enumerated exception, the juvenile court is
required to select adoption as the permanent plan. [Citation.] The burden
falls to the parent to show that the termination of parental rights would be
9
detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions.” (Ibid.; § 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(A), (B)(i)–(vi).)
One of the exceptions to the preference for adoption is the beneficial
relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) To establish that the
beneficial relationship exception applies, the parent bears the burden of
proving the following elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a
relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3)
the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631 (Caden C.), italics omitted.) On appeal,
we apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the first two
elements, which are “essentially . . . factual determination[s].” (Id. at
pp. 639–640.) However, we review “the ultimate decision—whether
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to the
child’s relationship with his parent”—for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.)
Because Mother argues that the court erred in concluding she had not
met her burden of proof, the more precise question is “whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the [parent] as a matter of law.” (In re I.W.
(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other grounds by
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010 & fn. 7; see In re Aurora
P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1153.) We ask “whether the [parent’s]
evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it
was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., at p. 1528.)
2. Regular Visitation
Mother argues that she proved she had regular and consistent visits
with K.M. We disagree. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding on
the first prong—that visitation was infrequent and inconsistent over the life
10
of the dependency case. In other words, the court determined that Mother
failed to meet her burden to show regular visitation and contact with K.M. to
the extent permitted by the court order. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632 [“[t]he question is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into
account ‘the extent permitted by court orders’ ”].)
Mother contends the juvenile court’s finding of inconsistent visitation
was based on inaccurate and incomplete Agency reports and “one-sided
caregiver evidence.”3 (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) Specifically, she
contends her testimony established that she had unsupervised weekend visits
with K.M. that were not reported to the Agency. She claims that when she
informed the social worker that S.S.’s account of visitation was inaccurate,
the social worker did not investigate the matter. Mother also asserts that the
text messages she admitted into evidence at the section 366.26 hearing
exemplifies the inaccuracies in the Agency reports because the messages
show that additional visits likely occurred. Mother further notes an
inconsistency in the Agency reports in that a May 2024 report stated that
Mother had missed only two visits after she and S.S. agreed on a visitation
schedule, while an October 2024 report stated that Mother had only seen
K.M. “ ‘on a few occasions’ ” after K.M. was placed with S.S.
Mother is essentially asking us to reevaluate the credibility of
witnesses and reweigh the evidence. This is not our role. On appeal, “a
reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts.”
(People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) “Moreover, unless the
testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a
3 Mother clarifies in her reply that her argument is not that the Agency
reports are unreliable because they are based on information from K.M.’s
caregivers but rather that her evidence demonstrated the unreliability of the
reports.
11
single witness is sufficient” to uphold a judgment. (Ibid.; see In re S.A. (2010)
182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1148.) Testimony is inherently improbable only if it is
physically impossible, or its falsity is apparent without resorting to
inferences or comparing it to other evidence except judicially noticeable facts.
(People v. Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 728–729.)
Here, the Agency’s evidence regarding the consistency and frequency of
visitation is not inherently improbable on its face. The single discrepancy
that Mother identifies in the Agency reports does not mean the Agency’s
evidence as a whole meets this standard. “[I]nconsistencies and conflicts in
the evidence go to credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence, which
are matters for the trial court.” (In re S.A., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1149; see In re John F. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1378 [“even if the
[agency’s] assessment is incomplete in some respects,” the “deficiencies will
go to the weight of the evidence”].) Moreover, we would have to resort to
inferences or deductions to conclude that the Agency reports were incomplete
based on the text messages cited by Mother because the text messages do not
establish that additional visits actually occurred. Rather, they show Mother
asking to see K.M. and S.S. agreeing to the visits.
As support for her substantial evidence challenge, Mother cites J.D.,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 833 for the proposition that an agency’s reports should
provide “objective, disinterested information” (id. at p. 861), but she quotes
that language out of context. The J.D. court reversed the termination of
parental rights because it could not be certain that the juvenile court, in
determining whether the second element of the beneficial relationship
exception was satisfied, did not consider factors deemed improper by the
California Supreme Court in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614, which was
published while the appeal was pending. (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at
12
p. 854.) In conducting its analysis, the appellate court noted that the agency
“provided very little information in its prior reports during the case about the
quality of [the parent’s] relationship with [the child].” (Id. at p. 860.)
The J.D. court went on to state, however, that “it was not the agency’s
burden to disprove the existence of the beneficial relationship exception—the
burden of proof on this issue was squarely on mother. [Citation.] Moreover,
there is tension in the case law concerning the extent to which the agency
must address facts pertinent to the beneficial relationship exception in the
section 366.26 report itself. We express no opinion here about the adequacy
of the agency’s section 366.26 report.” (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 861.)
Thus, the J.D. court did not reverse the order terminating parental rights for
the inadequacy of the agency reports. The case therefore does not support
Mother’s claim that reversal is required here for that reason.
In her reply, Mother asserts that she is not asking this court to reweigh
the evidence. Rather, she is claiming that her evidence is “ ‘uncontradicted
and unimpeached,’ ” compelling a finding that she met her burden as a
matter of law. We disagree. Mother’s testimony that she had unsupervised
weekend visits with K.M. is contradicted by Navarro’s testimony that visits
were infrequent and supervised. Moreover, “[a] trier of fact is free to
disbelieve a witness, even one uncontradicted, if there is any rational ground
for doing so.” (In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1043; see
Adoption of Arthur M. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 704, 717 [“the trial court is not
bound by uncontradicted evidence”].) In this case, the juvenile court could
have rejected Mother’s testimony on the ground that she was not a
disinterested witness. (See Jennifer K. v. Shane K. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th
558, 579 [“ ‘ “[i]n passing on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be
given their testimony, the trier of fact is entitled to consider their interest in
13
the result of the case, [and] their motives” ’ ”]; South Bay Transportation
Co. v. Gordon Sand Co. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 650, 657 [while
“[u]ncontradicted testimony should not be arbitrarily rejected by the fact
finder, . . . it may be self-impeaching and warrant disbelief for a number of
reasons, such as . . . obvious bias”].)
Even if we were to credit Mother’s documentary evidence as irrefutable
proof that Mother “informally arranged unsupervised visitation” with S.S.,
we would find no grounds for reversal. The text messages admitted into
evidence show S.S. agreeing to two visits that were not reported to the
Agency and Mother asking to see K.M. on another date with no response from
S.S. The service logs show that Mother “sometimes” picked K.M. up from
daycare. At most, this evidence shows that S.S. may have omitted a few
visits from her count and failed to report that Mother occasionally picked
K.M. up from daycare. It does not refute the evidence that “most often times”
it was the caregiver reaching out to Mother about visitation and that Mother
missed dozens of scheduled visits with K.M. in the year leading up to the
section 366.26 hearing. The juvenile court had discretion to credit those
portions of the Agency’s evidence even if it believed other portions to be false
or inaccurate. (See In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 591.)
Further, the trial court expressly concluded that even if it credited
Mother’s testimony about recent overnight visits, it would still find that
visitation had not been regular.4 Substantial evidence supports this finding.
At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, K.M. had been out of Mother’s care
4 Based on this comment by the juvenile court and the substantial
evidence supporting the court’s finding that visitation had not been regular
over the life of the case, we reject Mother’s argument that the court
discredited her testimony for an improper reason because any such error was
harmless.
14
for nearly three years. Mother initially had formal supervised visitation but
was “ ‘taken off the schedule’ ” after missing “ ‘a bunch of visits,’ ” and she
failed to complete an intake form for supervised visits “in the community.”
Thereafter, the Agency tried to schedule visits that would be supervised by
K.M.’s caregivers, but the visits were infrequent and inconsistent aside from
two months in 2024 when Mother missed only two visits. Mother’s testimony
regarding her weekend visits with K.M. was limited to the last 10 months or
so of this three-year period and did not specify the frequency of those
weekend visits. On this record, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court
erred in finding Mother failed to “ ‘visit consistently’ ” to “ ‘the extent
permitted by court orders.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
Finally, Mother contends the juvenile court improperly focused on
“older evidence” of her visitation patterns instead of the more recent evidence
of her “consistent and meaningful contact” with K.M. We disagree. The court
looked “over the life of this case” to determine whether Mother visited K.M.
consistently and to the extent permitted by court orders. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) This was proper. (See In re C.F. (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 549, 554 [visitation consistent near the section 366.26
hearing, but sporadic overall, is insufficient to meet the first prong of the
beneficial relationship exception]; In re I.R. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 201, 212
[significant lapses in visitation fatally undermines any attempt to finding
beneficial parental relationship exception].) Mother does not provide any
authority to the contrary.
Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s finding on prong one of the
beneficial relationship exception.
15
3. Beneficial Relationship
Even if there had been sufficient visitation, the record does not show
Mother had a beneficial relationship with K.M. To satisfy the second prong
of the beneficial relationship exception, the juvenile court is required to
examine the record to ascertain whether the parent has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that “the child has a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 636, italics added.) The focus is on the child, and the factors
to be considered are: (1) the age of the child, (2) “ ‘the portion of the child’s
life spent in the parent’s custody,’ ” (3) “ ‘the “positive” or “negative” effect of
interaction between parent and the child,’ ” and (4) “ ‘the child’s particular
needs.’ ” (Id. at p. 632.)
In finding that Mother had not met her burden on the second element,
the juvenile court noted that K.M. was young, had spent half her life outside
of Mother’s care, and had lived with S.S. for about 16 months, and that there
was evidence that Mother’s relationship with K.M. “[was] minimal, that there
is no attachment, and that the child would not be negatively affected by not
seeing [Mother].” The court accepted Mother’s testimony “that the visits go
well and that the child enjoys the visits” and does not want them to end, but
it concluded “on balance” that Mother had not satisfied the second prong
because she had not established “an emotional attachment where the child
views the parent as more than a mere friend or playmate.”
In arguing to the contrary, Mother focuses on only one of the above
factors—the positive effect of interaction between her and K.M. She says she
demonstrated that she had a loving, parental relationship with K.M. based
on her testimony describing the activities she and K.M. would do during
16
weekend visits and her testimony that K.M. called her “mommy” and would
cry at the end of visits and say she did not want to leave. This evidence does
not compel a finding on the second element as a matter of law.
To avoid termination of parental rights, Mother must “do more than
demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact[,]’ [citation] an emotional bond with
the child, or that [they] find their visits pleasant.” (In re Derek W. (1999)
73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) “Friendly or affectionate visits are not enough.”
(In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 25; see In re Katherine J. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 303, 318 [“the beneficial relationship exception demands
something more than the incidental benefit a child gains from any amount of
positive contact with her natural parent”].)
“A positive attachment between parent and child is necessarily one that
is not detrimental to the child but is nurturing and provides the child with a
sense of security and stability,” and “an emotional attachment is one where
the child views the parent as more than a mere friend or playmate and
[whose] interactions with the parent were not ambivalent, detached or
indifferent.” (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230, italics added.)
Even assuming, as the juvenile court did, that K.M. generally enjoyed
her visits with Mother and was sad when they ended, Mother’s testimony
does not compel the conclusion that K.M. viewed her as more than a friend
and had a “ ‘significant’ ” emotional attachment to her. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 633; see In re M.V. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1185 [“the
second element is not, ‘Is there a bond?’ ”].) After all, it is undisputed that
Mother had limited contact with K.M. for approximately half of K.M.’s life, if
not more. (See In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1073–1074 [noting
that, in affirming termination of parental rights, the minor hardly knew
mother after being detained at age two and spending nearly four years in
17
foster care].) Even if the court credited Mother’s testimony about recent
overnight visits, it is unclear from the record whether those visits occurred
often enough to give Mother the opportunity to provide K.M. with a sense of
stability and security. (See In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575
[“[t]he significant attachment from child to parent” usually “arises from day-
to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences”]; In re Angel B.
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 459, 467–468 [while evidence showed visits with
the minor “went well,” other evidence showed the minor had “spent relatively
few hours visiting with Mother, versus many hours being parented by the
foster family”].)
Additionally, there was evidence that K.M. was not negatively affected
by the lack of contact with Mother, “act[ed] rebellious” after visits with
Mother, and looked to S.S. to meet her daily needs, and that K.M. had
behavioral issues that improved after being placed with S.S. The court could
reasonably infer from this evidence that any attachment K.M. had to Mother
was not substantial or positive. (See In re B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1230 [“A positive attachment between parent and child is necessarily one
that is not detrimental to the child”]; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503,
533 [while there was evidence that the child was affectionate with the
mother, the child “easily separated from Mother at the conclusion of visits,
and readily returned” to her caregiver, and “[m]any toddlers are cuddly,
effusively loving, and affectionate”].) In reviewing factual determinations for
substantial evidence, it is not our job to “ ‘reweigh the evidence, evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ ” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
Mother further argues that the juvenile court erroneously relied on
social worker Navarro’s testimony in concluding that K.M. had no
18
attachment to Mother. Mother reasons that Navarro never personally
observed her and K.M. interacting with each other, and thus Navarro’s
testimony on the nature of their relationship was speculative and could not
constitute substantial evidence. We reject this argument. The evidence
shows that Navarro had observed K.M. on multiple occasions when she
visited K.M. at daycare and at S.S.’s home. Navarro also had information
from S.S. and the prior social workers assigned to the case about Mother’s
inconsistent visitation with K.M. throughout the dependency period, and she
heard K.M. refer to Mother by her first name. Thus, Navarro had a basis for
her conclusions that K.M. would not be negatively affected by the termination
of visitation and that K.M.’s relationship with Mother was “minimal.”
Further, to the extent the juvenile court may have improperly relied on
Navarro’s assessment of Mother’s relationship with K.M., we review rulings,
not reasoning. (In re Zamer G. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1271.) In this
case, the Agency reports and the exhibits admitted into evidence establish
that many of the Caden C. factors—including K.M.’s age and the portion of
her life spent out of Mother’s care—weigh against a finding in favor of
Mother on the second element of the beneficial relationship exception.
Therefore, even if part of the court’s reasoning may have erroneously
considered Navarro’s opinions, reversal is nonetheless not warranted because
substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion that Mother had not
satisfied the second element.
Mother again relies on J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 833 for her
substantial evidence challenge, noting that the J.D. court stated it was “not
appropriate” that the agency provided “very little information in its prior
reports . . . about the quality of mother’s relationship with [the child] or even
the nature of her interactions with him during visitation.” (J.D., at p. 860.)
19
As previously discussed, however, the J.D. court did not determine whether
reversal was required for the inadequacy of the agency’s reports. (Id. at
pp. 840, 861.) Thus, the case does not support Mother’s argument that the
juvenile court erred in relying on Navarro’s testimony.
In sum, we conclude the juvenile court could reasonably find on this
record that Mother failed to show K.M. had a “substantial, positive,
emotional attachment” to her. We need go no further. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 636; In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 322,
fn. 10 [a parent’s failure of proof on any one of the three elements of
beneficial relationship exception is fatal].)
B. ICWA Inquiry
Mother contends the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply
was based on an inadequate inquiry. As the Agency concedes, this point is
well taken.
Under ICWA, the juvenile court and the Agency have an “affirmative
and continuing duty to inquire” whether K.M. is or may be an Indian child.
(§ 224.2, subd. (a).) Because this duty is a continuing one, a juvenile court
has a present duty of inquiry even if it previously found a child was not an
Indian child and that order has become final. (See In re Isaiah W. (2016)
1 Cal.5th 1, 10; In re Michael V. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 225, 233–234.) The
duty of inquiry includes asking not only the child and parents, but also
“extended family members, and others who have an interest in the child
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (In re D.F. (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) This duty of inquiry “ ‘continues throughout the
dependency proceedings.’ ” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1132.)
20
The September 2022 detention/jurisdiction report showed that the
social worker asked Mother and K.M.’s father whether they have Native
American ancestry. They reported no Native American ancestry.
At the detention hearing in September 2022, Mother’s counsel informed
the juvenile court that Mother said “she might have some Native American
Indian ancestry.” K.M.’s father also informed the court of his belief that he
had Native American ancestry on his side of the family, and he said his aunt
may have relevant information. Later in the hearing, Mother’s counsel
stated that Mother “now says she does not believe she has any Native
American Indian ancestry.” The court nonetheless ordered the Agency to
conduct further inquiry.
The November 2022 jurisdiction/disposition report stated that K.M.’s
father said he was not aware of any family members who are registered
members of a tribe, lived on a reservation, received services from a tribal
agency, or attended an Indian school. Mother reported no Native American
ancestry.
At the March 2023 jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court
found that ICWA did not apply. The next day, the court ordered the case
transferred to Contra Costa County, and the transfer order stated that ICWA
applied to the case. When the case was transferred back to San Francisco
County, the transfer order stated that the court had not yet determined
whether ICWA was applicable. It does not appear from the record that the
court made any additional ICWA findings.
The record shows that the Agency was in contact with multiple
relatives, including a paternal cousin and a maternal aunt, and was aware of
the existence of a few other relatives, including K.M.’s paternal grandfather.
21
There is no indication the Agency sought information from them about
possible Native American ancestry.
In sum, although the Agency had the names and contact information of
additional relatives, the record indicates that the Agency contacted only
Mother and K.M.’s father about possible Native American ancestry. This
inquiry did not satisfy the requirement of inquiry of extended family
members and others with an interest in K.M. to determine whether she
might be an Indian child. (See In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 566.)
As the parties also agree, in these circumstances, the appropriate
remedy is a conditional reversal for the Agency to carry out an adequate
inquiry under ICWA. (See In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152.)
III. DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed. The
matter is remanded to the juvenile court for compliance with ICWA’s inquiry
and notice requirements. If the juvenile court finds there has been an
adequate further inquiry and concludes ICWA does not apply, the court shall
reinstate its order terminating parental rights. If the juvenile court
concludes ICWA applies, it shall proceed in accordance with ICWA and
California’s implementing provisions. (See In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1152.)
22
_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
HUMES, P. J.
_________________________
SMILEY, J.
In re K.M. / A173984
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