In re M.Z. CA2/4

CourtListener 10781415CalctappJan 29, 2026

Full text

Filed 1/29/26 In re M.Z. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re M.Z., B344543

a Person Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP03571)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

N.W.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Nancy Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed.
Tracy M. De Soto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County
Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
N.W. (mother) appeals the jurisdictional findings made by the juvenile
court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,1 arguing they are not
supported by substantial evidence. Mother also challenges the juvenile
court’s dispositional order removing her child (M.Z.) from her care. We
affirm, concluding that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and
removal order are supported by substantial evidence. As the parties are
familiar with the facts and procedural history of the case, we do not restate
those details in full here. Below, we discuss only the facts and history as
needed to resolve—and provide context for—the issues presented on appeal.

DISCUSSION
I. Justiciability
The original section 300 petition set forth counts against M.Z.’s mother
and father. The juvenile court sustained jurisdiction on all counts against
both parents. Only mother appealed; father is not a party to this appeal.
Respondent, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (Department), argues mother’s appeal is non-justiciable, correctly
pointing out that where there is an uncontested basis for jurisdiction under
section 300, we need not consider whether the evidence would also support
other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction.
We agree that in this instance, our review of the jurisdictional findings
against mother is discretionary. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283.)
Mother asks that we nevertheless exercise our discretion to hear her appeal.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise stated.
2
Appellate courts have “inherent discretion to decide certain challenges
to juvenile court jurisdictional findings, notwithstanding mootness.” (In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 285.) Several factors may be considered in
deciding whether to review jurisdictional findings in an otherwise moot
appeal. (Id. at pp. 283–286.) These factors include whether the challenged
jurisdictional findings serve as the basis for dispositional orders that are also
challenged on appeal. (Id. at p. 283.) Other factors include whether the
jurisdictional finding is based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing
conduct and the reason why the appeal became moot. (Id. at pp. 285–286.)
These factors are not exhaustive, and no single factor is dispositive as to
whether this court should exercise its discretion. (Id. at p. 286.)
On appeal, mother challenges the juvenile court’s dispositional order
removing M.Z. from her care. As the findings against mother form the basis
of the juvenile court’s removal order, we elect to exercise our discretion to
reach the merits of mother’s appeal.

II. Legal Standards
A. Jurisdictional Findings
At the jurisdictional stage, the juvenile court must determine by a
preponderance of the evidence if a child is described by section 300. (§ 355,
subd. (a); Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248.) The
juvenile court here asserted jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), allows a juvenile court to exercise
jurisdiction over a child if the “child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of
. . . [¶] [t]he failure or inability of [his or her] parent . . . to adequately
supervise or protect the child.” Subdivision (b)(1) requires only that a parent

3
has failed or is unable to adequately supervise or protect the child. The
statute does not require negligent or culpable conduct by the parent. (In re
R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629–630 (R.T.).)
To show the child faces a risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction
hearing, there “must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the
alleged conduct will recur.” (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136.)
“While substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must
be ‘a product of logic and reason’ and ‘must rest on the evidence’ [citation];
inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot
support a finding [citations].” (Kuhn v. Department of General Services
(1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633.)
Yet, “[t]he juvenile court need not wait until a child is seriously injured
to assume jurisdiction if there is evidence that the child is at risk of future
harm from the parent’s . . . conduct.” (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th
987, 993.) The court may consider past events as an indicator of whether the
child faces a current risk of harm because “[a] parent’s past conduct is a good
predictor of future behavior.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.)
Similarly, a parent’s denial of wrongdoing or failure to recognize the negative
impact of their conduct is also relevant to determining risk under section 300.
(In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293; In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11
Cal.App.4th 1036.)
We review a juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial
evidence. (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.) We will affirm the
findings if they are supported by evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value. (In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.) We review the
record in the light most favorable to the court’s findings and draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of those findings. (R.T.,

4
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633.) “Evidence from a single witness, even a party,
can be sufficient to support the trial court’s findings.” (In re Alexis E. (2009)
171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)

B. Dispositional Removal Order
Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) provides the juvenile court may remove a
child from the custody of a parent if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence,
“[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were
returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s
physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the
minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” The court must also determine
“whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for
removal.” (§ 361, subd. (e).)
“It is not required that the parent be dangerous or that the child have
been harmed before removal is appropriate. [Citation.] ‘The focus of the
statute is on averting harm to the child.’” (In re D.D. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
985, 996.) In determining whether a child may be safely maintained in the
parent’s physical custody, “the [juvenile] court may consider the parent’s past
conduct as well as present circumstances.” (In re Cole C. (2009) 174
Cal.App.4th 900, 917.) The juvenile court must consider “‘not only the
parent’s past conduct, but also current circumstances, and the parent’s
response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention.’” (In
re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 967.) “The jurisdictional findings are
prima facie evidence the minor cannot safely remain in the home.” (In re
T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 135, citing § 361, subd. (c)(1).)

5
We affirm the removal order if it is supported by substantial evidence.
(In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154.) When conducting a substantial
evidence review of a finding made under the clear and convincing evidence
standard: “[A]n appellate court must account for the clear and convincing
standard of proof when addressing a claim that the evidence does not support
a finding made under this standard. When reviewing a finding that a fact
has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the
appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found it highly
probable that the fact was true. In conducting its review, the court must
view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and
give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the
credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn
reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989, 1011–1012 (O.B.).)

III. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional Findings and
Dispositional Orders Against Mother

Three counts were alleged against mother in the section 300 petition
filed by the Department. Count b-2 alleged mother “knew or reasonably
should have known” that father was under the influence of
methamphetamine while M.Z. was in his care and failed to protect M.Z.
Count b-3 alleged mother had an “extensive history of substance abuse,
including methamphetamine, marijuana and Xanax” and was also a “current
abuser” of all three substances. Mother also kept methamphetamine in her
home. Count b-4 alleged that mother suffered from several mental and
emotional issues, including depression, extreme anxiety, and panic attacks.

6
It further alleged that mother failed to take the medication prescribed to her
to treat those conditions or otherwise maintain consistent medical health
treatment to address those conditions. The juvenile court sustained each
count asserted against mother and entered a dispositional order removing
M.Z. from mother’s care. M.Z. was 12 years old at the time of removal.
On appeal, mother raises identical arguments regarding the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional findings and removal order. Mother does not dispute
the allegations of substance abuse or mental health issues. Instead, mother
contends there was not substantial evidence showing that her substance
abuse or mental health problems posed a sufficient risk of harm to M.Z. to
justify jurisdiction under section 300 or removal under section 361. We
disagree.
While mother addresses her substance abuse and mental health issues
separately, the record establishes that they are interrelated. Accordingly, we
discuss them together.
During the Department’s investigation, mother admitted that she
suffers from extreme anxiety, depression, and panic attacks. These issues
significantly impacted mother’s daily life. Mother described herself as having
panic attacks nearly every day when she wakes up. She also stated that her
depression left her unable to get out of bed in the morning.
Mother also admitted that she previously saw a psychologist who
prescribed her five different medications to address her mental health issues.
Mother told the Department that she decided to forgo her prescription
medication and instead self-medicated with substances such as Xanax and
methamphetamine because she “figured that doing methamphetamine was
better than taking five different medications.” Mother admitted that she
used methamphetamine every other day and used Xanax every day. She also

7
told the Department that she had been addicted to Xanax for 10 years. She
also reported experiencing withdrawal symptoms when she tried to stop
taking Xanax.
Mother acknowledged that she was unable to function without
methamphetamine or Xanax, stating that she could not get out of bed in the
morning without using one of those substances. Yet, mother also downplayed
the significance of this drug dependency. For example, mother equated her
methamphetamine use to drinking coffee in the morning for energy. Mother
also admitted to using Xanax while caring for M.Z., but minimized its
significance, stating, “it is not like I took it in front of her.”
There is evidence in the record demonstrating that mother’s substance
abuse and mental health issues cumulatively impacted her ability to care for
M.Z. and therefore created a risk of harm to M.Z. For example, mother was
often late or unable to fulfill her responsibilities to M.Z. As a result, mother
was not a custodial parent and M.Z. instead lived with father in her paternal
grandmother’s house. M.Z. reported to the Department that she only saw her
mother infrequently when mother would pick her up from school and take her
home. M.Z. also reported that mother was frequently late to pick her up.
Mother corroborated these reports and recounted to the Department that she
recently tried to pick M.Z. up, but M.Z. refused to come with her because she
was eight hours late. While mother was supposed to pick M.Z. up at 2:00
p.m., she instead arrived at 10:00 p.m. Mother herself attributed her
tardiness to her “extreme anxiety.” Mother also recounted a separate
incident where she was supposed to take M.Z. to school in the morning, but

8
could not get out of bed. After it was too late to take M.Z. to school, mother
turned to methamphetamine and marijuana to self-medicate.2
M.Z. also reported that she did not like spending time with mother and
described mother’s behavior as “erratic” and “agitated.” M.Z. also said that
mother could “not speak in coherent sentences” and often slept for extended
periods of time in the middle of the day. M.Z.’s caregiver similarly reported
that mother was late for her scheduled visits with M.Z. and acted erratically
during visits. These observations were corroborated by Department social
workers, who characterized mother as “fidgety and anxious,” “pacing back
and forth,” “present[ing] with scattered thought processing,” and “chang[ing]
topic[s] and idea[s] . . . mid-sentence.” The Department also noted that
during visits mother was acting inappropriately by openly discussing the case
with M.Z. or in her presence. Mother admitted that she felt “overwhelmed”
during her visits with M.Z.
There is also evidence in the record suggesting she presented a risk of
physical harm to M.Z. When the Department first spoke to mother, mother
was bleeding from her hand. Mother could not explain what caused her
injury, stating that she recently had an anxiety attack and “[could] not
remember what happened during [it].”
We also note there is no evidence suggesting mother took any steps to
address her substance abuse or mental health issues during the proceedings
below. Mother did not enter a substance abuse treatment program, seek
mental health services, or resume taking her prescribed medications. (In re
Cole C., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 918 [parent’s failure to acknowledge
underlying problem supports removal].) Further, while mother volunteered

2 Mother also admitted that she was on final warning at work for chronic
tardiness.
9
to drug test for the Department, she missed all five of the tests scheduled for
her. (See In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1384 [“a missed drug
test, without adequate justification, is ‘properly considered the equivalent of
a positive test result’”], disapproved of on another ground in In re N.R. (2023)
15 Cal.5th 520, 560, fn. 18; accord, In re Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th
178, 186.)
In reviewing for substantial evidence, we must view the record in the
light most favorable to the juvenile court’s removal order. (O.B., supra, 9
Cal.5th at pp. 1011–1012.) Viewed in this light, the record shows that
mother’s dependence on—and addiction too—illicit substances prevented her
from taking the medications prescribed to her to treat her severe anxiety and
depression. Mother’s refusal to address her mental health issues through the
use of proper prescription medication, counseling, therapy, or other services
directly impacted her ability to get out of bed in the morning without abusing
illicit substances. This, in turn, impacted her ability to care for or supervise
M.Z. There was also evidence that mother posed a risk of physical harm to
M.Z. as mother apparently could not control herself, or recollect what she did,
while experiencing severe episodes of anxiety.
The case law cited by mother bears no similarity to the facts before us
here. In In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 829–830, the appellate
court concluded that a single positive drug test during pregnancy was
insufficient to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
where there was no evidence that this single incident of drug use affected the
mother’s ability to care for her child.
Similarly, in In re L.C. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 646, 649–650, a legal
guardian’s occasional methamphetamine use outside the child’s home was
insufficient to support jurisdiction under subdivision (b)(1) where the

10
evidence showed his drug use did not interfere with his ability to care for the
child. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the guardian was
actively involved in the child’s care, had sought treatment for substance
abuse, and subsequently tested negative for methamphetamine on multiple
occasions.
In In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022, a single incident of
drunk driving was held insufficient to support jurisdiction under (b)(1) where
the evidence showed that, aside from the one incident, the parents rarely
drank and therefore did not present a current risk of future harm from
alcohol abuse.
And in Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322,
1345–1346, the appellate court concluded that a single positive test for
marijuana, coupled with some missed drug tests, was insufficient to support
removal where the petition did not allege substance abuse and the evidence
showed that mother had completed parenting courses and counseling,
completed drug treatment, acted appropriately during visits, and had
otherwise substantially complied with her reunification plan.
Here, by contrast, mother had a decade-long history of substance abuse
and addiction, which, coupled with her untreated mental health issues, left
her unable to care for or adequately supervise M.Z. Mother took no steps to
address these concerns and instead continued to eschew her prescribed
medication in favor of the daily abuse of either Xanax or methamphetamine.
The cases cited by mother bear no similarity to the facts of this case.

11
Based on the record before us, we conclude that substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings against mother as well as
the dispositional order removing M.Z. from her care.3

DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders are
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

MORI, J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

3 In her reply brief, mother argues for the first time that the juvenile
court could not remove M.Z. from her care because she was not a custodial
parent. Mother forfeited any claim of error in this regard by failing to raise
this objection below or in the opening brief on appeal. (See In re S.B. (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a
challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the
trial court”]; In re T.G. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1, 14; American Indian Model
Schools v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 258, 275–
276.)
12

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.