CourtListener 10780779•People v. Ellis CA5
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Filed 1/28/26 P. v. Ellis CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089056
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F12907460)
v.
KATHRYN ANN ELLIS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. F. Brian
Alvarez, Judge.
Michelle T. LiVecchi-Raufi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Levy, J. and Snauffer, J.
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, appellant and defendant Kathryn Ann Ellis (defendant) was convicted
after a jury trial of the premeditated first degree murder of her husband, Robert Wayne
Ellis. The jury found true the financial benefit special circumstance and that she
personally discharged a firearm causing death. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison
without possibility of parole (LWOP) for murder with the special circumstance, plus
25 years for the firearm enhancement. She filed a direct appeal but dismissed it on her
own motion.
In 2024, defendant filed a petition in the trial court pursuant to Penal Code1
section 1172.6 for resentencing of her first degree murder conviction. The court denied
the petition for failing to state a prima facie case because the record of conviction showed
the jury was not instructed on any now-invalid imputed malice theories.
In this appeal from the denial of her section 1172.6 petition, appellate counsel
filed a brief with this court pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 and
People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, which summarized the facts and procedural
history with citations to the record, raised no issues, and asked this court to independently
review the record. Defendant filed a lengthy supplemental letter brief.
After independent review of the record and the contentions raised in defendant’s
letter brief, we affirm.
1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2.
FACTS2
Defendant and her husband Robert Wayne Ellis (Ellis) lived in a residence in
Kingsburg with their teenage child. Ellis worked at California Engineering and
Manufacturing Company. Defendant did not work outside the home.
On the evening of September 19, 2012, defendant called 911 and said she needed
help because “someone’s broken in and my husband’s been shot.” The dispatcher asked
if she knew who shot him. Defendant said she “never saw anybody.”
The first dispatcher patched the call through to an EMS dispatcher, who asked
defendant where it happened. Defendant said: “Ah in our home. Um, we were, we were
back on the bed and, just watching TV, my husband thought he heard something—and
we have a gun—he got the gun—and he told me, he told me to stay in the room—and so I
did—and he came out and I heard just some noise and then I heard the shots go off.”
In response to the dispatcher’s questions, defendant said her husband was on the
couch, he was bleeding, he was shot in the chest, and she did not know what happened.
“[Dispatcher]: Okay so somebody shot him or did he accidentally
shoot himself?
“[Defendant]: No, somebody shot him.”
The dispatcher instructed defendant to put pressure on the wound with a towel,
and asked if he had only one wound. Defendant said she did not know, but “the gun went
2 After notice to the parties and without objection, this court takes judicial notice of
the entirety of the records before this court, including the appellate briefing, filed in
defendant’s nonpublished order People v. Kathryn Ann Ellis (Sept. 4, 2015, F068127).
The following factual summary is from the transcript of defendant’s jury trial. It
is included for the limited purpose of giving context to the issues raised in defendant’s
letter brief. This summary does not include the entirety of the evidence introduced at
defendant’s jury trial and will not be relied upon to address the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s section 1172.6 petition.
3.
off a whole bunch of times so I wouldn’t think so.” The dispatcher asked if he was
breathing. Defendant said, “[N]o, no, he’s dead, I know he’s dead.” The dispatcher
instructed defendant to put him on the floor, flat on his back. Defendant said he was
dead, and she could not lift him because he was too big.
First Officer at the Scene
At 7:55 p.m., Officer Rick Mejia of the Kingsburg Police Department was the first
officer to arrive at the residence. Defendant was standing in front of the house at the
curb. Mejia asked where Ellis was, and she pointed to the open garage door, which led to
a door into the house. Defendant’s clothes were clean and there was no blood on her.
Mejia ran into the house, and found Ellis lying face-up on his back on the living
room couch. His eyeglasses were correctly placed on his face and were not askew.
Ellis’s right arm was lying across his body, just below his chest, and his left arm was at
his side. Ellis had a visible gunshot wound to the chest. Ellis was not breathing and did
not have a pulse.
Mejia tried to move Ellis from the couch to the floor to perform CPR, but needed a
second officer’s help because of Ellis’s size.3 The two officers moved Ellis to the floor.
Mejia performed CPR compressions on him and got a lot of blood on his arm.
Emergency medical personnel arrived and took over from Mejia. The EMTs
determined Ellis was not breathing and did not have a pulse. They continued to
administer CPR for another eight to 10 minutes with no results, and then pronounced
Ellis dead.
The Scene
No one else was in the house when the officers arrived. There were no signs of a
physical struggle or disturbance in the house, and nothing had been taken.
3 Ellis was six feet tall and weighed 259 pounds.
4.
There was blood on the living room couch, the couch’s cushions and throw pillow,
and the adjacent carpet where Ellis had been moved to the floor. There was no blood
anywhere else in the house. A blanket was neatly folded and lying straight across the
back of the couch, and there was no blood on it.
The waterbed in the master bedroom was neatly made, the top sheets were not
disturbed, and it appeared as if no one had sat or lied down on it.
The televisions were on in both the living room and master bedroom. The EMTs
slightly moved the couch and turned off the living room television while they worked on
Ellis.
The Gunshot Wounds
The pathologist testified Ellis died as a result of gunshot wounds that perforated
his heart and lungs and caused massive internal bleeding.
Ellis suffered four gunshot entry wounds, and was shot three or four times. The
pathologist could not determine the shot sequence, and identified the entry wounds as
wounds A, B, C, and D.
Wound A entered the left front side of Ellis’s chest near the shoulder. Wound A
was a contact wound because there were soot depositions at the margins, which suggested
the gun was fired while the muzzle was touching Ellis’s clothing. This bullet went
through the upper left lobe of his lung. The path of the bullet was front to back.
Wound A would have caused blood to spatter. There was blood spatter on the left
side of Ellis’s face but none on the right side. The pathologist testified Ellis would have
survived wound A if he received appropriate treatment.
Wound B was the fatal wound and caused significant bleeding, and immediate
death occurred within four to seven minutes. The bullet’s entry point for wound B was
the front left side of Ellis’s chest near the breast. This bullet went through the right
ventricle of the heart and lower lobe of the right lung, and exited toward Ellis’s back right
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side. The bullet traveled from left to right, and very slightly front to back. This was not a
contact wound.
The bullet for wound C entered Ellis’s body near the center line. It was a graze
wound that traveled under the skin, did not enter the chest cavity, and exited on the right
side of his chest, close to the right nipple. It was not a contact wound.
Wound D was an entry wound in the inside of Ellis’s right arm, and the bullet
lodged in his arm. Wound D could have been caused by a separate gun shot. It also
could have been a re-entry wound because it corresponded to wound C’s exit wound.
The pathologist testified Ellis suffered internal bleeding that resulted in significant
pooling of blood on the right internal side of his chest, consist with Ellis lying on his right
side. Based on the internal bleeding and blood spatter on the left side of Ellis’s face, the
pathologist believed Ellis could have been lying on his right side on the couch when he
was shot.
Defendant’s Statements at the Scene
Detectives Dewayne Chatman and Sergio Toscano jointly interviewed defendant
that night, while they were seated in a police car parked by her residence. Defendant said
that sometime around 4:45 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., she left the house to drive their teenage son
to his school for an event, and he was supposed to return home around 9:00 p.m. or 9:30
p.m. As defendant and their son were leaving their house, Ellis arrived home. After
taking their son to the school, defendant drove home, and then left again to buy take-out
food for dinner. Defendant and Ellis ate dinner in the living room, they watched “The
Big Bang Theory” on the living room television from 7:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m., and she
cleaned up the kitchen and threw out the garbage in their trash cans in the back alley.
Defendant said the next episode of “The Big Bang Theory” aired from 7:30 p.m.
to 8:00 p.m., and defendant and Ellis decided to watch it on the master bedroom’s
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television. Defendant said they sat on top of the sheets of their waterbed in the master
bedroom and watched the program.4
Defendant said that close to 8:00 p.m., toward the end of the second episode of
“The Big Bang Theory,” she started to hear noises at the house’s doggie door, as if the
flaps were opening. Defendant told Ellis that someone had to check it out. Defendant
said Ellis retrieved her gun, a Smith & Wesson .38-caliber special. Defendant had owned
it for about 15 years. Ellis told defendant to go into the bathroom with their dog and
close the door.
Defendant said Ellis took the gun, left the master bedroom, and walked down the
hallway. When she was inside the bathroom, she heard Ellis say, “ ‘Hey,’ ” followed by
three or four gunshots. She did not hear yelling or a struggle. Defendant left the
bathroom, walked out, and did not see anyone leaving the house.
Defendant said she found Ellis lying on the living room couch and called 911. She
placed a towel on his gunshot wounds as instructed by the dispatcher, panicked, and went
outside.
As the interview continued, Chatman again asked defendant what she did after she
found Ellis on the couch. Defendant said she checked him for breathing and then
performed chest compressions. Chatman asked if she raised Ellis’s shirt to check for
wounds, and defendant said no.
Chatman asked defendant if Ellis was familiar with guns. Defendant said he used
to be a hunter in his teens and twenties, and they still go hunting. Chatman asked if they
4 The prosecution introduced evidence that on September 19, 2012, KMPH channel
26 broadcast “The Big Bang Theory” from 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., followed by “The
X Factor” from 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
When the officers arrived, the television in the master bedroom was still on and
tuned to Channel 47. On September 19, 2012, Channel 47 broadcast “The Insider” from
7:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m., “Entertainment Tonight” from 7:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., and
“Comics Unleashed” starting at 2:07 a.m., on September 20, 2012.
7.
had any financial issues. Defendant replied, “ ‘Well, I imagine everyone has some, you
know….’ ” Chatman asked if Ellis was suicidal. She said no.
Chatman asked if Ellis had life insurance. Defendant said they had insurance
through Ellis’s work that was $100,000 for Ellis and $50,000 for her. Defendant said
they got the policy in 2007, and it was a “good thing that they did because her husband
had a heart attack around about 2008.” Defendant did not say that she had recently
inquired about increasing the amount of Ellis’s life insurance policy.
Chatman asked defendant if she had any problems with Ellis, if he did anything
for this to happen, or if the shooting was an accident. Defendant said no, and denied
having anything to do with Ellis being shot.
Defendant was asked why they did not call the police if they thought an intruder
was in the house. Defendant said there were no telephones “in the back part of the
house.” Defendant was asked why she did not use the telephone in the master bedroom,
and she said there was not one there. However, the detectives determined there was a cell
phone in the master bedroom and a telephone in a bedroom office.
After this interview ended, defendant waited at the scene so she could get her dog
from inside the residence and go to her mother’s house, but officers were still conducting
the investigation inside the house. She kept checking with Chatman about whether they
were done so she could go inside.
Chatman wanted to ask defendant more questions based on his review of the
scene. When defendant next asked if she could get the dog and leave, Chatman said he
wanted to talk to her again. Defendant said she did not want to answer any more
questions, she was tired, and she wanted to go to her mother’s house to be with her
family.
The Firearm
On the night of the homicide, defendant’s hands were tested for gunshot residue.
The results showed gunshot residue on both of defendant’s hands. Ellis also had gunshot
8.
residue on both hands, which could have been consistent with being shot multiple times,
including once at close range, while lying on the couch. The criminalist testified that the
gunshot residue on defendant’s hands could have been consistent with either firing the
weapon or when she touched his body.
The officers obtained a search warrant and emptied the contents of the Ellis’s trash
cans. A firearm fell out in the midst of the garbage, and it had not been on top of the
trash. The weapon was a .38-caliber Smith & Wesson Model 60 revolver with a two-inch
barrel. This type of firearm would not eject the casings. The revolver was registered to
defendant, and it contained five expended shell casings.
An expended and flattened bullet, consistent with hitting a hard surface, was found
at the base of the television in the living room.
The bullets recovered from Ellis’s body and found at the scene were fired from
defendant’s Smith & Wesson revolver.
Both defendant and Ellis were familiar with firearms. A few days before the
homicide, defendant and Ellis went to a shooting range with their son and his friend, and
defendant’s mother.
Arrest of Defendant
Around 1:00 p.m. on September 20, 2012, Chatman and Toscano arrived at the
house of defendant’s mother to ask defendant more questions. Defendant’s mother
invited them in, and said defendant and her son were sleeping and could not meet with
them. Toscano separately spoke with defendant’s mother in another room, and asked
what happened between defendant and Ellis. Defendant’s mother left the room, went
back to Chatman, and told him in an aggressive tone, “ ‘Don’t you do anything.’ ” The
mother got on the telephone and made several calls.
Defendant entered the living room. She was very concerned and wanted to know
why the detectives were there. Chatman testified defendant wanted to know “what was
going to happen to her is what she kept saying. She said that she was full of anxiety, and
9.
she was physically shaking that I could see. I could see at one point that she was crying
and sobbing to the point to where she was face down in the living room on the floor. Her
mother … at one point had brought her a blanket so that she can wrap herself into a
blanket. [Defendant] said that she felt like she was bursting at the seams.” Defendant
never mentioned Ellis and she “was only concerned as to what was going to happen to
her and what was going to happen to her son.”
Toscano testified they arrested defendant that day. After defendant was placed in
their squad car, a woman drove up to the mother’s house, and this person was later
identified as “Maggie.”
Financial Evidence
The prosecution introduced extensive evidence that defendant and Ellis had
financial problems at the time of the murder.
There was also evidence that in the late summer of 2012, defendant contacted the
insurance agent who issued Ellis’s life insurance policy through his employer. Defendant
was the beneficiary. Defendant asked the agent about the life insurance policy, and the
agent explained it was for $100,000 and double that amount if there was an accidental
death. Defendant asked the agent if she could increase the policy amount, and said she
did not want Ellis to know about it because he had “mortality issues and didn’t want to
deal with it,” and he left everything “up to her.”
In August 2012, defendant contacted the financial advisor who previously set up
an IRA for Ellis. Defendant asked for the balance of Ellis’s IRA account and how they
could access the money. The advisor explained he was working for a different financial
institution, and Ellis had to request the information directly from the original financial
institution. Defendant asked if she could get life insurance on Ellis without having a
medical underwriting examination “due to his health concerns.” About two weeks later,
the financial advisor called defendant and gave quotes on various life insurance policies,
and defendant said to email the information to her. Defendant told the agent that
10.
insurance “was a touchy subject” for Ellis, and she was concerned that Ellis might be
upset that she was trying to find life insurance for him. The financial advisor said he
needed to speak with Ellis. He emailed the information to defendant and did not hear
back from her. When the financial advisor saw the television news report about the
murder of Ellis, he called law enforcement and reported his conversations with defendant.
Shortly before the murder, defendant instructed their teenage son to call a financial
institution, claim he was Ellis, and say he wanted to access certain funds. The son
followed her instructions, but he did not understand what defendant was doing or why
she told him to do that.
Defendant’s Recorded Jail Calls
Defendant was held in jail while awaiting trial. During a recorded call that
defendant placed to her mother from jail, the mother said she wanted to talk to Margaret
Mims (the Sheriff of Fresno County) and tell her to let defendant come home since other
“scums” were being released. Defendant agreed that she should be released because she
was not a flight risk. Defendant’s mother said she would talk to defendant’s trial counsel.
Defendant replied: “I’m not a risk of doing anything again, or I mean, I mean, just put an
ankle monitor on me and let me go home and I’ll show up to every court on time, I
mean.” (Italics added.)
The prosecution introduced evidence about another recorded call from jail
between defendant and her mother. During this call, defendant’s mother told defendant
that she “talked to Magi tonight finally” who was “there that day,” and “Magi” said “I
want you to know, that all of the happenings that day and all of our conversations I am
considered . . . part of legal advice and she said so everything between you and I is
confidential and she goes and nobody could ever ask me to repeat anything I ever said to
you and I said okay thank you.”
11.
Defendant’s Trial Testimony
At trial, defendant testified and said she made the calls to the financial advisors at
Ellis’s direction and with his consent, including the call she told her son to make. When
checks from these institutions arrived at the house, defendant signed Ellis’s name with his
consent and deposited the money into their joint account. Defendant admitted that a few
years ago, she withdrew money from her son’s bank account without his knowledge or
consent, she used the money to pay for the son’s birthday presents, and she never repaid
the money into that account.
Defendant testified that on the night of the homicide, she picked up food and ate
dinner with Ellis in the living room. They watched the end of the television news, and
then switched to “The Big Bang Theory” at 7:00 p.m., broadcast on a local channel.
After dinner, she threw out the garbage in their trash can in the back alley.
Defendant and Ellis left on the television in the living room, went into the master
bedroom, laid down on top of the sheets on their waterbed, and watched the 7:30 p.m.,
episode of “The Big Bang Theory” on the bedroom television. Defendant testified Ellis
had the remote control and he usually switched channels during commercial breaks, and
then switched back to the episode. Defendant could not explain why the channel on the
bedroom television was left on local Channel 47 that did not broadcast “The Big Bang
Theory.” She thought Ellis was probably channel surfing.
Defendant testified while they were watching television, they heard “a rattling
sound” from “the doggy door” in the back, but their dog was in the master bedroom with
them. Defendant was not sure if they heard the noise when Ellis had switched channels
or they were still watching the episode. Defendant testified the noise “bothered him
enough” to say that he was going to check on it. They got off the bed on defendant’s
side, and Ellis said he wanted defendant’s .38-caliber gun. Defendant testified she had
the gun for about 25 years. The gun held five rounds when fully loaded, but she only
kept four rounds in the weapon. Ellis loaded the fifth chamber so it was fully loaded that
12.
night. Ellis told defendant to take their dog into the bathroom and lock the door while he
checked. Defendant admitted that she did not previously tell the detectives that Ellis
loaded a fifth round into the revolver.
Defendant testified that when she retrieved the gun for Ellis, she got off the
waterbed and straightened out the top comforter they had been sitting on, because she
was “a little bit OCD or overly tidy.” In her prior statement to the detectives, she did not
mention that she straightened the bed covering because she did not think it was
important.
Defendant testified they did not call the police because there was no telephone in
the master bedroom, and the “first available . . . cordless phone” was in the office, which
was halfway up the hallway. Defendant later discovered that Ellis left his cell phone in
the bedroom but she did not know that at the time, and thought he took it with him.
Defendant also testified they did not think “there was somebody out there,” a neighbor’s
dog probably got into their yard, and Ellis took the gun in case it was an unfriendly big
dog.
Defendant testified that while she waited in the bathroom, she thought Ellis said
something like “Hey,” and then heard three to four gunshots. She was not sure if the
shots sounded like they were fired from her revolver. She did not hear yelling or sounds
of a struggle.
Defendant left the bathroom, looked into the living room, called for Ellis, and saw
him lying on the couch. He was lying on his back and facing up, and there was blood on
his chest. She grabbed the cordless telephone in the kitchen and called 911. She
followed the dispatcher’s instructions and put a towel on his chest wound. She pushed on
his chest and touched his neck, and realized he did not have a pulse and was not
breathing. She did not touch the parts of his body where there was blood. The dispatcher
told her the police were on the way, and she went outside to open the garage door for
them.
13.
Defendant testified that when she put the towel on Ellis’s chest, she was standing
on the backside of the couch, and leaned over the area where the blanket was folded to do
so. She placed her hands on both of Ellis’s cheeks, and then to his nose area, to check for
breathing and a pulse. She did not put pressure on the chest wound and it was not
bleeding.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Okay. Was this an accident? What happened
to [Ellis]? You know, were you involved in some type of gun accident with
[Ellis]?
“[DEFENDANT:] No.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] No?
“[DEFENDANT:] No.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Did you shoot and kill your husband?
“[DEFENDANT:] I did not. I would not.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Did you, you know, use your firearm and throw
it in your trash can?
“[DEFENDANT:] No. No.”
Defendant did not know how her revolver ended up in the trash can. She did not
shoot and kill Ellis to get the insurance money because of their financial situation.
Defendant was asked about her recorded call from jail with her mother, when she
said that she would not do anything “again” if she was released from custody. Defendant
testified that she was talking about being released on an ankle monitor, that she would not
do anything that would violate being released on an ankle monitor and “I wouldn’t go out
and about.”
Defendant was asked about another recorded call from jail to her mother, when her
mother said she “finally” talked to Maggie who said she would not repeat anything that
she saw or heard that day. Defendant testified that as she was being arrested and taken
away from her mother’s house, she saw Maggie arrive there. Defendant testified Maggie
14.
was her mother’s close friend, this person “is also an attorney, and mom had called
Magg[ie] for assistance” when the detectives arrived. Defendant testified that her mother
told her that she thanked “Magg[ie]” for being “there for her and helped her” through the
situation.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 7, 2012, an information was filed in the Superior Court of Fresno
County charging defendant with first degree premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a),
189), with the special circumstance that the murder was committed for financial gain
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)); and the enhancement that defendant personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm which proximately caused death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
On August 1, 2013, defendant’s jury trial began.
On August 21, 2013, defendant was convicted of first degree murder, and the jury
found true the financial gain special circumstance and personal discharge enhancement.
On September 25, 2013, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial
and conducted the sentencing hearing. The court heard statements from members of
Ellis’s family, who expressed their grief at his murder and urged the court to sentence
defendant to the maximum term. Defendant addressed the court and again denied that
she killed Ellis.
The trial court found the evidence was very strong and defendant’s explanation for
his death “simply did not match the evidence, and it did not make sense. It made no
sense that Bob Ellis would have left his room, where there was a cell phone, and
confronted an intruder with a firearm that he’s skilled at and capable of using, and then
he would have somehow put himself in a position where that person could take that gun
from him without even having fired a shot, and then shot and killed him in a position
where he was found.”
The trial court sentenced defendant to LWOP plus 25 years to life for the personal
discharge enhancement.
15.
Direct Appeal
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. The entirety of the record was filed
with this court, appellate counsel was appointed, and the appeal was fully briefed by the
parties. In her appellate brief, defendant asserted the trial court committed evidentiary
and instructional errors, and the suspended parole revocation fine must be stricken since
defendant was sentenced to LWOP. The People agreed the suspended fine should be
stricken and argued defendant’s other contentions lacked merit.
On September 4, 2015, however, defendant filed a letter with this court that she
personally signed, stating that “after having communicated with counsel about the matter,
[she] hereby abandons her appeal and requests an order for its dismissal.” On the same
day, this court filed an order granting defendant’s request and dismissed her direct
appeal.
Habeas Petitions
According to defendant’s letter brief filed in this appeal, she subsequently filed
writ petitions in the superior court, California Supreme Court, and federal court while
represented by counsel, and the petitions were denied.
SECTION 1172.6 PETITION
On September 18, 2024, defendant filed a petition in the trial court for
resentencing of her first degree murder conviction and LWOP sentence pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (a), and requested appointment of counsel.
Defendant’s supporting declaration consisted of a preprinted form where she
checked boxes that stated (1) a complaint, information, or indictment was filed against
her that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice
is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) she was convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial, or accepted a plea offer in
16.
lieu of a trial at which she could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder; and
(3) she could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019. On October 9, 2024,
the trial court appointed counsel.
On October 11, 2024, defendant’s counsel filed a brief with the trial court, and
asserted that her petition was facially valid and she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
On November 18, 2024, the People filed opposition supported by the jury
instructions and the verdict forms from defendant’s trial. The People argued defendant
was ineligible for resentencing because the jury was not instructed on any imputed malice
theories that were now invalid.
The Trial Court’s Denial of the Petition
On December 4, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s petition.
Defendant’s counsel was present and defendant appeared by videoconference. The court
stated it had reviewed the pleadings, and invited arguments.
Defendant’s counsel stated defendant filed a facially-valid petition that established
a prima facie case, and an order to show cause should be issued for an evidentiary
hearing. Counsel agreed the trial court could review the record of conviction to make the
prima facie determination but it could not weigh the evidence. The district attorney
submitted on the opposition pleading.
The trial court held the record of conviction, consisting of the jury instructions and
verdict forms, refuted defendant’s petition. “[T]he instructions given to [defendant’s]
jury show that the jury was not charged with considering whether she aided or abetted a
principal, nor was any instruction given on natural and probable consequences or for
felony murder, or any other theory where malice might be imputed to her,” and defendant
was convicted of first degree murder on a finding that she personally committed willful,
premeditated and deliberate murder. The court denied defendant’s petition for failing to
state a prima facie case.
17.
On December 13, 2024, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, appellate counsel filed a brief with this court pursuant to Wende
and Delgadillo. The brief also included counsel’s declaration that defendant was advised
she could file her own brief with this court. This court advised defendant by letter that
she could file a supplemental letter or brief raising any arguable issues. Defendant filed a
lengthy letter brief and raises several issues.
I. Section 1172.6
We begin with the trial court’s denial of defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing.
“Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017−2018 Reg. Sess.)
amended the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e). [Citation.] It
provides that a participant in the qualifying felony is liable for felony murder only if the
person: (1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill,
acted as a direct aider and abettor; or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony
and acted with reckless indifference to human life. [Citation.] The Legislature also
amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine by adding subdivision (a)(3) to
section 188, which states that ‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on
his or her participation in a crime.’ ” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50–
51; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708; People v. Reyes (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 292, 295.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.) amended
former section 1170.95 in several respects, codified the holding in People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis), and clarified that, in some circumstances, the same relief
available to petitioners convicted of murder is also available to petitioners convicted of
attempted murder or manslaughter, and addressed various aspects of the petition
procedure including the petitioner’s right to counsel, the standard for determining the
18.
existence of a prima facie case, the burden of proof at the hearing to determine whether a
petitioner is entitled to relief, and the evidence a trial court may consider at that hearing.
(People v. Birdsall (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859, 865 & fn. 18; People v. Hurtado (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 887, 892.) Former section 1170.95 was subsequently renumbered as
section 1172.6 without further changes. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449.)
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) thus states a person may file a petition for resentencing if
“convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or manslaughter . . . .”
The petitioner must declare: “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was
filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of
felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. [¶]
(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1)–(3); People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558.)
“[W]hen a petitioner files a facially sufficient petition, the trial court must appoint
counsel to represent the petitioner. The trial court may consider the record of conviction
to determine whether the petitioner makes a prima facie showing only after the
appointment of counsel and the opportunity for briefing has occurred.” (People v. Reyes,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 298; People v. Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 559.)
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In making the prima facie determination, the court “may look at the record of
conviction . . . to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie” showing.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) “ ‘[T]he record of conviction will necessarily inform
the trial court’s prima facie inquiry . . . , allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.’ ” (People v. Antonelli (2025) 17
Cal.5th 719, 731.) The charging documents, jury instructions, and verdict forms are part
of the record of conviction and may be reviewed to make the prima facie determination.
(People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865; People v. Harden, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at p. 56.)
The trial court may deny a section 1172.6 petition for failing to state a prima facie
case if the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 966.) We review de novo whether the court properly made the prima facie
determination. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.)
Analysis
The trial court herein complied with section 1172.6 upon receipt of defendant’s
petition by appointing counsel, providing for further briefing, conducting a hearing on the
petition, and giving reasons for finding defendant’s petition did not state a prima facie
case and she was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. The court relied on the
jury instructions and verdict forms, and did not make any factual findings. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (b), (c).)
The trial court correctly found defendant failed to state a prima facie case for
resentencing because the record of conviction shows she is ineligible for resentencing as
a matter of law. Defendant was the only person charged in the information with the
murder of her husband. The jury was instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 520 and 521, on
first and second degree murder, express and implied malice, and premeditation,
deliberation, and willfulness. The jury received CALCRIM No. 730 on the definition and
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elements of the financial gain special circumstance, and CALCRIM No. 3150 on the
section 12022.53 personal discharge enhancement.
The jury was not instructed on principals and accomplices, aiding and abetting, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, target and nontarget offenses, the
felony-murder rule, or any other theory of imputed malice that is now invalid. Defendant
was convicted of first degree murder, with the special circumstance.
The record of conviction thus establishes that defendant was convicted as the
actual killer who acted with premeditation and the intent to kill. Her conviction was not
based on any theory of imputed malice that is now invalid under section 1172.6.
II. Defendant’s Letter Brief
In her letter brief, defendant does not raise any issues relevant to the trial court’s
denial of her section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. Instead, she requests this court “to
address other appealable issues” because “I’m actually innocent of the first-degree
murder” of Ellis, and “this issue was never addressed by any court following my
conviction.”
Defendant states she lied at her jury trial when she testified that an intruder entered
the house and shot and killed Ellis, and she did not murder him “in cold blood for
financial gain.” Defendant claims she “interrupted [Ellis] trying to kill himself and then
we struggled for the gun. It was during that struggle that [he] died.”
Defendant states she was not truthful with her trial counsel about what happened
because she felt shame and guilt that her husband was trying to kill himself. She wanted
to protect their teenage child from the truth, and she “was too ashamed for [his] attempted
suicide to come to light.”
Defendant states her trial counsel did not believe “the intruder story,” but he “drew
that story from me on direct examination question by question . . . and then didn’t
mention it again during his closing argument.” Defendant claims trial counsel argued in
closing that “the attempted-suicide-struggle-for-the-gun theory was a plausible alternative
21.
to the prosecution theory of cold-blooded murder. I had no idea he was going to do that.
While [trial counsel] was correct in his assessment about what happened, the problem is
he neither presented nor developed any evidence supporting it.”
Defendant stated they had financial problems and Ellis had health issues, he was
depressed, he had suicidal tendencies, and he was under psychiatric observation at the
time of his death. On that evening, defendant said they ate dinner in the living room and
watched television. She went outside to throw out the trash after dinner. Ellis was lying
on the couch and continued to watch television. When she returned to the living room,
she “heard the click of [Ellis] pulling back the hammer of a revolver we kept in the
house. I ran to and reached him just before or as the first shot was fired. (I came up to
him from behind the couch, which was facing the fireplace and TV; the back of the couch
was not against a wall, but rather faced the hallway from the bedrooms.) During the
struggle, another 3 shots were fired, all going in different angles in the other direction
(toward the TV). He was mortally wounded.”
Defendant states she had filed habeas petitions in state and federal court, and that
her habeas attorney “pointed out” that trial counsel “tried to draw the truth out of me by
having my mother write me a letter telling me I should tell him the truth about [Ellis’s]
death and that no matter what, she would still love me.” Defendant’s habeas attorney
also “submitted evidence from both a forensic pathologist and a forensic psychologist
supporting the attempted suicide and subsequent struggle for the gun theory.”
Defendant admits that after she realized her husband was fatally wounded, she
threw the gun away in the trash can behind her house. She claims that after her
conviction, she saw a psychologist who attributed this conduct to “Acute Stress Disorder
from the entire incident” and blamed herself, which is why she made up the story that an
intruder killed her husband.
22.
Defendant states none of this evidence was introduced at her jury trial, and blames
trial counsel for failing “to develop or present any evidence to support it as was done on
habeas.”
“Unfortunately, the evidence my habeas attorney developed was never
considered on habeas by any reasoned opinion. The Superior Court denied
my second habeas petition (where this evidence was first developed) as
successive, the [Attorney General] argued the same as to the habeas petition
before the California Supreme Court, while a different [Attorney General]
from the same office argued on federal habeas that my attorney blew the
statute [of] limitations. Although equitable tolling was argued, it was never
addressed by the [United States] district court. The [Ninth] Circuit denied a
certificate of appealability without comment.”
Defendant requested this court “institute proceedings where these facts can be
properly addressed and considered.” She again acknowledged she committed felony
perjury at trial, but she had already been in custody for almost 13 years.
Analysis
In her letter brief, defendant acknowledges she voluntarily dismissed her direct
appeal, and that her writ petitions filed in state and federal court were denied. Defendant
cannot raise these claims in this appeal from the denial of her section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing.
“Section 1172.6 does not create a right to a second appeal, and [a petitioner]
cannot use it to resurrect a claim that should have been raised in [the] . . . direct appeal.”
(People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865.) “The mere filing of a
section [1172.6] petition does not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims
of trial error . . . . The purpose of section [1172.6] is to give defendants the benefit of
amended sections 188 and 189 with respect to issues not previously determined, not to
provide a do-over on factual disputes that have already been resolved.’ ” (People v.
Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.)
23.
After independent review of the record, we find no reasonably arguable factual or
legal issues exist.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order of December 4, 2024, denying defendant’s section 1172.6
petition for resentencing, is affirmed.
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