People v. Lopez CA2/5

CourtListener 10780776CalctappJan 28, 2026

Full text

Filed 1/28/26 P. v. Lopez CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B340407

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA158765)
v.
REDACTED VERSION
GREGORY LOPEZ, OF OPINION

Defendant and Appellant. Redacted material from
confidential record. (Pen.
Code, § 1369.5, subd. (a);
Cal. Rules of Court, rules
8.45, 8.46, (f)(1) and (f)(2).)

 The record on appeal includes confidential psychological
assessment reports regarding Lopez. In accordance with Penal
Code, § 1369.5, subdivision (a) and California Rules of Court,
rules 8.45 and 8.46, (f)(1) and (f)(2), we have prepared both a
public (redacted) and a sealed (unredacted) version of our
opinion.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Maria Andrea Davalos, Judge. Affirmed.
Sanger, Hanley, Sanger & Avila and Sarah S. Sanger,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________

Gregory Lopez challenges the trial court’s findings that he
was competent to stand trial and competent to be sentenced after
the court had previously declared a doubt at each of these stages
of the proceedings. We conclude that substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s competency findings, and we affirm the
judgment.

PROCEEDINGS

Lopez was arrested in connection with several robberies
committed on July 14, 2022. He was referred to a competency
court where he was evaluated and found competent.
On December 14, 2023, counsel declared a doubt as to
Lopez’s competency. [REDACTED] The court suspended criminal
proceedings and referred Lopez for psychiatric evaluation.
On December 28, 2023, Dr. Rebecca Najera evaluated
Lopez [REDACTED]

2
At a hearing on December 28, 2023, the court found, based
upon Dr. Najera’s report, that Lopez was competent to stand
trial. The court reinstated criminal proceedings.
Lopez waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial was
held on February 22, 23, and 27, 2024. On February 27, 2024,
the court found Lopez guilty of three counts of second degree
robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211, counts 1, 3 & 5), three counts of
assault with a semi-automatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b), counts 2,
4 & 6), and one count of convicted felon in possession of a firearm
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), count 7). The court found true the
allegation that Lopez had suffered a prior strike conviction
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). As to counts 1, 3,
and 5, the court found true the allegation that Lopez personally
used a firearm. The court also found true, as to all eight counts,
the aggravating circumstances that the offenses involved acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421, subd. (a)(1)), that Lopez had
suffered numerous prior convictions of increasing seriousness
(Id., subd. (b)(2)), and that Lopez had served a prior prison term
(Id., subd. (b)(3)). As to counts 1, 3, and 5, the court found true
the aggravating circumstance that Lopez was armed and used a
weapon at the time of the offense. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421, subd. (a)(2).)
Counsel requested that the matter be put over for
sentencing to have Lopez psychiatrically evaluated as part of a
mitigation package that counsel proposed to provide to the court.
The court agreed. On March 25, 2024, Dr. Haig Kojian evaluated

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3
Lopez. In a report dated April 8, 2024, Dr. Kojian stated
[REDACTED]
On April 10, 2024, the matter was called for sentencing.
Counsel informed the court that Dr. Kojian evaluated Lopez and
opined that Lopez was not competent to be sentenced pursuant to
section 1368. Counsel represented that Dr. Kojian was unable to
conduct Lopez’s general mental health evaluation for purposes of
the mitigating circumstances package due to Lopez’s
incompetence. Accordingly, counsel declared a doubt as to
Lopez’s competency to be sentenced. The court again suspended
criminal proceedings.
At a hearing on April 24, 2024, counsel submitted on Dr.
Kojian’s April 8, 2024 report. The People requested that Dr.
Daniel King be appointed to conduct a psychiatric evaluation of
Lopez.
In a report dated June 9, 2024, Dr. King opined
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
At a hearing on July 1, 2024, defense counsel asked that
Dr. Kojian be appointed to write a report that would explain the
discrepancies between his conclusion that Lopez was incompetent
and Dr. King’s conclusion that Lopez was competent. The trial
court agreed.
Dr. Kojian wrote a report dated July 25, 2024, based on his
July 12, 2024 interview of Lopez. [REDACTED]
At the hearing on July 30, 2024, defense counsel stated
that there had been a significant lapse in time between Dr.
Kojian’s original evaluation finding Lopez incompetent

4
(March 25, 2024 interview) and his second evaluation finding
Lopez competent (July 12, 2024 interview). Dr. King and Dr.
Kojian were now in agreement that Lopez was currently
competent and could be sentenced. Accordingly, defense counsel
believed that Lopez was ready to go back to criminal court. The
court made a “weak finding” that Lopez was competent, but
emphasized that Lopez needed ongoing psychiatric treatment and
that counsel would need to work with Lopez to ensure that he
complied with his treatment.
At the sentencing hearing on August 26, 2024, the trial
court sentenced Lopez to 20 years eight months in prison.
Lopez timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Principles

“A defendant is incompetent to stand trial when ‘as a result
of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the
defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal
proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a
rational manner.’ (§ 1367, subd. (a); see People v. Wycoff (2021)
12 Cal.5th 58, 81–82.)” (People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 28
(Parker).) “If at any time during a criminal proceeding a doubt
arises regarding the defendant’s competence to stand trial, the
court must hold a competency hearing. (§§ 1368, 1369.)” (People
v. Carr (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1143.) “ ‘Penal Code section
1369 sets forth the procedures for the trial in which the question
of the mental competence of the defendant is to be determined. It
provides that such a trial may be made “by court or jury”

5
[citation]. . . . It also provides for the appointment by the court of
one or more experts to examine the defendant [citation], the
introduction of evidence by the defendant and the People
[citation], and the presentation of argument by each thereafter
[citation]. It states that “[i]t shall be presumed that the
defendant is mentally competent unless it is proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally
incompetent.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “In a hearing to determine
competence, the defendant shall be presumed competent to stand
trial unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant is mentally incompetent.” (§ 1369, subd. (c)(3); see
also People v. Jackson (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 374, 392 (Jackson).)
“The trial court’s ‘duty to assess competence is a continuing one.’
(People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 236, fn. 5.) The obligation
to suspend proceedings and hold a competency trial is triggered
whenever ‘ “the court is presented with substantial evidence of
incompetence, that is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona
fide doubt concerning the defendant’s competence to stand trial.” ’
(People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 575.)” (Parker, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 28.)
“We review the trial court’s findings that [a defendant] was
competent to stand trial for support by substantial evidence in
the record—that is, for evidence that is reasonable, credible, and

6
of solid value. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 31.)”
(Jackson, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 392.)

B. Analysis

1. Competency to Stand Trial

Lopez contends that Dr. Najera’s report does not provide
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that he
was competent to stand trial. Lopez argues that Dr. Najera’s
report is speculative and summarily concludes that he
“understands the nature of the criminal proceedings against him
and can rationally assist in his defense[,]” but provides no
foundation for the doctor’s conclusions. Lopez likens his case to
Jackson, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th 374. He argues that, like the
defendant in Jackson, his ability to answer questions about the
legal process does not evidence his competency.
Jackson is readily distinguishable. In Jackson, the trial
court relied on a report based on information obtained about 20
months earlier to find the defendant competent. (Jackson, supra,
22 Cal.App.5th at p. 393.) Over several years, a series of doctors
had opined that, because of the developmental nature of the
defendant’s mental incompetence, there was little to no
possibility that the defendant’s condition would change and his
competency would be restored. (Id. at p. 394.) One of the
defendant’s evaluators wrote: “ ‘He is unable to name the
President and he states that there are “thirty-one and sometimes
thirty” months in a year. He does not know how many days are
in a week. He cannot complete simple addition or subtraction
problems . . . . His memory for distant and recent events is

7
somewhat confused and simplified. Insight is absent.’ ” (Id. at
p. 381.) Staff at the mental hospital where the defendant was
treated ignored this fundamental obstacle and instead “put [the
defendant] through drills aimed at teaching him the rudiments of
the judicial system. They wrote that despite his ‘innate,
biological intellectual ability,’ ‘he has demonstrated adequate
though rudimentary understanding of court processes.’ They
noted, however, that ‘he requires assistance to effectively weigh
options in problem solving and make well-informed decisions. He
responds best to simplistic, concrete communication that is
repeated to him numerous times.’ (Italics added.) [Staff] . . .
point[ed] to the answers [the defendant] was able to give their
repeated, simplistic questions about plea bargains, judges,
prosecutors, and evidence to show he had attained competency.”
(Id. at pp. 394–395.)
In light of the foregoing, the Jackson court concluded that
“the basis for [the trial court’s] ruling [that the defendant was
competent to stand trial] was essentially nil[,]” and reversed the
judgment. (Jackson, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 392.) The court
emphasized that “[e]very single evaluation of [the defendant] in
this case concluded he was mildly mentally retarded, had
extremely limited intellectual abilities, and had great difficulty
grasping and retaining the legal concepts necessary for him to
understand his legal circumstances and assist his attorney in his
defense. Even the two reports in which [mental hospital] staff
found [the defendant] had ‘regained’ competency emphasized that
he had a limited intellect, learned legal concepts only by rote, and

8
responded accurately only if prompted with simple, targeted
questions.” (Id. at pp. 392–393.)
In contrast to the report in Jackson, here Dr. Najera’s
report was based on current information. Dr. Najera interviewed
Lopez on the day of the hearing in which the court found Lopez
competent to stand trial. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] There was no evidence that Lopez was
“drilled” on legal process as the defendant in Jackson was or that
Lopez had to be asked simple, pointed questions multiple times to
elicit an appropriate response.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Lopez was competent to stand trial.

2. Competency to be Sentenced

Lopez contends that, contrary to our Supreme Court’s
holding in People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1343, here the
trial court failed to “expressly and unmistakably state on the
record, . . . its determination as to whether the defendant is
mentally competent to stand trial.” This is inaccurate. The trial
court stated: “Based on [Dr. Kojian’s second report] and the
submissions of counsel, the Court’s going to find that—and it’s a
weak finding, but I’m going to find this person is competent to
stand trial.” The trial court’s finding was express—the court
found Lopez currently competent, but in light of the psychiatric
reports the court concluded that Lopez’s continued competency

9
depended on Lopez receiving treatment, which counsel would be
obligated to ensure occurred.
Lopez argues that there could not be a basis for the court to
find him competent because, although Dr. King’s report and
Dr. Kojian’s second report concluded that Lopez was competent,
Dr. Kojian’s first report concluded that Lopez was not competent.
This is tantamount to arguing that Lopez could not be restored to
competency. Unlike the defendant in Jackson, supra, 22
Cal.App.5th 374, here there were no psychiatric evaluations
stating that Lopez could not be restored to competency or even
that it was unlikely he would be restored to competency. With
the exception of Dr. Kojian’s April 8, 2024 evaluation, all of the
reports in the record concluded that Lopez was competent. In
both of his reports, Dr. Kojian opined that Lopez’s competency
could be restored and/or maintained with appropriate medication.
Dr. Kojian’s first interview of Lopez, which led Dr. Kojian
to conclude that Lopez was not competent, took place on
March 25, 2024. Dr. Kojian’s second interview, after which he
found Lopez competent, took place on July 12, 2024, nearly four
months later. In the interim, Dr. King interviewed Lopez and
determined that he was competent on June 6, 2024.
[REDACTED] There was sufficient time between Dr. Kojian’s
first and second evaluations for Lopez to be restored to
competency, and the reports demonstrate that this was the case.
Lopez’s attempt to argue that some of the findings in Dr. King’s
and Dr. Kojian’s reports may have undermined their ultimate
conclusions that Lopez was competent is an argument for us to
re-evaluate or re-weigh the evidence, rather than determine

10
whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings.
That is not our role.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that Lopez was competent to assist his attorney in
his defense in sentencing proceedings.

11
DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J. KIM (D.), J.

12

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.