In re Esteban R.S. CA4/1

CourtListener 10779545CalctappJan 26, 2026

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Filed 1/26/26 In re Esteban R.S. CA4/1
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re ESTEBAN R.S., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
D085413
THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J244259)

v.

ESTEBAN R.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Marissa A. Bejarano, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski, and Flavio Nominati, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Esteban R.S. appeals an order transferring him from the juvenile court
to a court of criminal jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section

707.1 He asserts the People failed to show he could not be rehabilitated in a
Secure Youth Treatment Facility (SYTF) before the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction expired and, thus, the court abused its discretion when it granted
the transfer order. Because we conclude the court’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Esteban’s Past Adjudications
Prior to the charged offenses, when Esteban was 15 years old, police
officers responded to a report that six males were vandalizing an alley with
paint. The officers found Esteban and five other juveniles surrounded by
gang graffiti. Esteban attempted to flee the area, but the officers stopped
him. Within his discarded backpack, an officer found a loaded revolver, five
ammunition rounds, and six rolled marijuana cigarettes. The officers
arrested him for possession of a firearm, ammunition, and marijuana, as well
as vandalism over $400 and resisting an officer. Esteban admitted it was
true he possessed a firearm, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The
juvenile court adjudged him a ward of the court.
Following several probation violations and intervention attempts, the
court committed Esteban to Urban Camp. It was there, when he was 16
years old, that Esteban punched another youth in the face 11 times, without

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

2
provocation. This incident led to a true finding for assault with a means
likely to produce great bodily injury.
II.
Charged Offenses
Twenty-two days after Esteban’s release from Urban Camp and while
he was still 16 years old, the People filed a section 602 petition, alleging he
attempted to murder another youth, named E.C., for the benefit of a criminal
street gang and, in doing so, he intentionally and personally discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a), 186.22,
subd. (b)(1), 12022.53, subd. (d).) The People also alleged he assaulted E.C.
and another youth, M.C., with a semi-automatic firearm, along with a
personal use of a firearm, gang, and great bodily injury enhancements. (Pen.
Code, §§ 245, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7,
subd. (a).) Lastly, the People alleged he unlawfully possessed a firearm and
ammunition. (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), 30305, subd. (a).)

E.C. and M.C. attended a party.2 E.C. was in a gang and wore a red
jacket with his identifying gang moniker on it. When E.C. and M.C. left the
party, two males were standing across the street. One of the males ran
towards them, shouting “Fuck Southeast” in reference to E.C.’s gang. The
male shot E.C. five times before fleeing the scene.
After the shooting, E.C.’s relative received messages from a social
media account that is known to belong to Esteban. The messages included
asking, “How’s [E.C.] (with a smiling/laughing emoji face)” and a picture of

2 As the parties do, we derive the facts from the Probation Department’s
transfer report filed in connection with the People’s motion to transfer the
matter to a court of criminal jurisdiction.

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E.C.’s back while he wore his red jacket, with an explosion imposed on the
image and a song that included the lyrics “your [dead] homie.”
A detective reviewed Esteban’s social media account and cellphone,
finding several messages related to the shooting. One of Esteban’s messages
said, “All I said was fuck southeast n lit bluhd up.” Another said, “[you know]
whats crazy foo [E.C.] saw me n [just] let me walk behind him.” When the
recipient of the message replied, “You got the homie from the back,”
Esteban’s responses included, “Hella did, tell him to look around foo,” “easy
ass walk up,” “Easiest skit,” “[everyone] there knew we were there,” and “He
fucked up bad by letting me walk past em.” Esteban also told members of his
gang to talk about the shooting, saying “[he] need[ed] another tat.” The day
after the shooting, Esteban questioned if E.C. died, wanting confirmation
“[b]efore I get shit tatted.” When Esteban learned E.C. had survived, he
responded, “BROOO WHATTTTT,” “fuckkkkkkkk,” “Bluhd made it.” He then
sent sad face emojis.
Detectives searched Esteban’s room and found a handgun wrapped in a
sock inside Esteban’s laundry basket in his closet, along with a high-capacity
magazine loaded with 9mm ammunition.
III.
Motion To Transfer
The People filed a motion to transfer Esteban from juvenile court to a
court of criminal jurisdiction.
Pursuant to section 707, the Probation Department filed a 49-page
transfer report addressing Esteban’s amenability for rehabilitation under the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction. This report detailed Esteban’s history of
delinquency, individual and family history, prior probation interventions, the
circumstances of the alleged offenses, a psychologist’s recommendations for

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rehabilitative services, and a summary of the services available in the HOPE
and SYTF programs.
At the transfer motion hearing, an expert witness testified for the
defense and opined that Esteban was amenable to rehabilitation in the
juvenile justice system. After considering the expert’s testimony and the
evidence presented regarding Esteban’s past, the circumstances of the
current allegations, and Esteban’s progress in custody while pending the
hearing, the court ordered Esteban’s transfer to criminal court pursuant to
section 707. Within the 13-page written order, the court detailed the basis
for its decision as to each criterion and concluded that it found “by clear and
convincing evidence . . . [Esteban] is not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
DISCUSSION
I.
Legal Framework
“Section 707 sets forth the procedures for transferring a minor from
juvenile court to criminal court. It provides that whenever a minor aged 16
years or older is alleged to have committed a felony, the prosecutor may move
‘to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.’
(§ 707, subd. (a)(1).) The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the
minor should be transferred. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(a).)” (In re
Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 164 (Miguel R.).)
“In order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of
criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence
that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) “[C]lear and convincing evidence
demands a degree of certainty greater than that involved with the

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preponderance standard, but less than what is required by the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th
989, 998.) The evidence must “leave no substantial doubt.” (In re Terry D.
(1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 890, 899.)
In making that determination, the court must consider five criteria:
(1) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor; (2) whether
the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s

jurisdiction;3 (3) the minor’s previous delinquent history; (4) success of
previous attempts to rehabilitate the minor; and (5) the circumstances and
gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the
minor. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)–(E).) The weight given to each of the criteria is
within the court’s discretion. (Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 173, 186 (Kevin P.).)
“A minor . . . is not required to establish innocence in order to show
amenability to the juvenile court system.” (People v. Superior Court
(Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 682.) Instead, “the criteria . . . are based on
the premise that the minor did, in fact, commit the offense” (ibid.), and the
purpose is to determine whether the minor would nonetheless be amenable to
treatment under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court (Kevin P., supra, 57
Cal.App.5th at p. 186). If the court decides to order a transfer of jurisdiction,
it must recite the basis for its decision and include the reasons it found the
minor was not amenable to rehabilitation under the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)

3 While the second criterion sounds similar, it is distinguishable from the
ultimate determination that the court must make (whether the minor is
amenable to rehabilitation while under juvenile court jurisdiction). (Miguel
R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 167–168.)

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We review the juvenile court’s order for abuse of discretion. (Miguel R.,
supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “ ‘The abuse of discretion standard is not a
unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a
trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are
reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.’ ” (Ibid.) The court’s findings as to each of the specified
criterion and its ultimate finding “ ‘that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court’ ” are findings
of fact reviewed for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) However, “we do not
reweigh the evidence and we do not substitute our discretion for the
discretion exercised by the trial court.” (In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
205, 211.)
II.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
We conclude the juvenile court’s findings as to each of the statutory
criterion and its ultimate conclusion are supported by substantial evidence.
A. Criminal Sophistication
When evaluating the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the
minor, the court was required to “ ‘consider the whole picture, that is, all the
evidence that might bear on the minor’s criminal sophistication, including
any criminal sophistication manifested in the present crime.’ ” (Kevin P.,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 192.) Factors for consideration include, but are
not limited to, “the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical,
mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s
impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal
behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions;

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the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the existence of
childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care
system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual
abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication.” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) Positive factors such as normal intellectual capacity “do
not affirmatively demonstrate criminal sophistication,” but they can support
transfer “to the extent [the positive factors] fail to mitigate other evidence
that does affirmatively demonstrate criminal sophistication.” (Kevin P., at
p. 193.)
Esteban witnessed his father’s alcoholism and abusive behavior
towards others but idolized him. His father “presented himself in a ‘gangster’
and ‘tough’ manner,” and he was incarcerated for drug-related offenses
around the time Esteban was eight years old. After his father’s
incarceration, Esteban went to counseling, and he continued to perform well
in school. But by age 11, Esteban started using alcohol “ ‘almost daily.’ ”
Esteban transitioned to a new school at 12 years old, where his behavior,
scores, and attendance worsened. Esteban’s mother opined the recent loss of
his paternal grandmother, her own absence due to work commitments, and
the family’s frequent relocations were harmful to Esteban. He began
associating with the “ ‘wrong crowd’ ” and not going to school. By age 13, he
started using marijuana, and at 14, he joined a gang. At 15, he used cocaine
“twice.” And by 16 (five months before the charged offenses), he had been
shot in the leg in a gang-altercation.
The court considered Esteban’s age, substance use, and past trauma,
and determined “[w]hile these circumstances no doubt contributed to
Esteban’s personality, functioning, and emotional well-being, and may
provide insight as to why Esteban was attracted to the gang life,” these

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factors do not mitigate that he is criminally sophisticated. It found Esteban’s
“high degree of criminal sophistication . . . is evidenced in part from the
offense that brought him before the court, his conduct while detained, and his
conduct while out in the community.” The court considered but rejected the
defense expert’s opinion that this criterion did not weigh in favor of transfer
to criminal court. The court explained in its ruling that it was not persuaded
by the defense expert, “in part, because of [the expert’s] interpretation of the
evidence as to the alleged offense, which formed a basis for her opinion.”
As the trier of fact, the court was free to discredit the expert witness’s
testimony (In re J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 212), and we must give
due deference to that determination (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.
5th at p. 996.) We conclude that the court’s finding is supported by
substantial evidence.
Before the alleged offenses, Esteban knew he was on probation and
there are consequences to violations, including increased time in custody.
Esteban was very familiar with the juvenile justice system. He discussed
among his peers the different judges in the juvenile court, varying
dispositions that could come from the court, and the fact that he needed his
misconduct to go undetected while he remained on probation. Before the
shooting, Esteban explained in social media messages with others he was
pretending to be good so he could get off probation and “move back to the
hood.” He stated he knew probation was “about to hit his house” and he
“stashed” his firearm to avoid detection. He also had conversations with
other individuals about deleting their social media accounts to avoid review
by probation and how to avoid detection of drug use in a drug test.
Esteban admitted he was the actual shooter. He was neither provoked
nor acting in the heat of passion or in self-defense. By his own words, he

9
intended to kill the victim so he could “earn[ ]” a tattoo. A gang detective
testified that getting a tattoo after having shot or killed someone is
significant in that it is done to get “recognition within the gang.” And while
the defense expert opined that bragging about the shooting after the fact did
not demonstrate criminal sophistication, the gang detective testified this type
of bragging is common in juvenile and adult gang members and is meant to
“show that they are higher ups, that they’re doing work.”
We conclude there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find Esteban’s criminal sophistication weighed in favor of
his transfer to adult court.
B. Potential for Rehabilitation During Remaining Juvenile Jurisdiction
When evaluating whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the “court shall give weight to
any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to
grow and mature.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).)
Esteban was 17 years and 10 months old at the time of the transfer
hearing. The court correctly noted that if Esteban was not transferred to the
criminal court, the juvenile court would have jurisdiction over Esteban until
he reached the age of 25. (§§ 607, subd. (c), 707, subd. (b)(12), (14), 1769,
subd. (b).) The court determined this criterion weighed in favor of transfer
because Esteban “has learned to perform within the structure of the court’s
rehabilitative custodial programs, in order to successfully complete the
programs and return to the community,” where he then immediately reverts
to negative behavior.
Esteban contends he can be rehabilitated within the time remaining for
juvenile jurisdiction because during the time leading up to his transfer
hearing, he showed maturation “by refraining from assaultive behavior,

10
programming as expected, and disengaging completely from all gang
associations.” He asserts the court’s determination to the contrary is a result
of the court’s “cynicism,” and his improvement in custody while pending the
transfer hearing demonstrated “real—as opposed to superficial—change[ ].”
This argument fails to persuade us because it asks us to substitute our
discretion and improperly reweigh the evidence by giving more weight to the
progress Esteban has made while pending the transfer hearing. (See In re
J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 211.)
Esteban asserts the evidence is insufficient relying on J.N. v. Superior
Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706 (J.N.), and Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th
173. He argues these cases hold that for there to be substantial evidence,
“there must be ‘expert testimony concerning the programs available, the
duration of any of the programs, or whether attendance would rehabilitate
[the minor] before termination of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.’ ”
According to Esteban, the “record contains no such evidence.” But neither
section 707 nor these cases hold that expert testimony is required, and
Esteban fails to appreciate the contextual differences present in J.N. and
Kevin P.
Section 707, subdivision (a)(2), provides that after the petitioner moves
to transfer the individual to a court of criminal jurisdiction, “the juvenile
court shall order the probation officer to submit a report on the behavioral
patterns and social history of the individual.” Section 707, subdivision (a)(3),
adds the court must consider this report and “any other relevant evidence
that the petitioner or the minor may wish to submit.” Nothing in section 707
requires either party to submit expert testimony.
In J.N., the Court of Appeal explained experts “may testify on the issue
of the availability of treatment programs in the juvenile court system and the

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amenability of the minor to those programs. In those cases where the
juvenile court might decide treatment as a juvenile would be in the minor’s
best interest, the court could still find the minor unfit if those experts
testified that rehabilitation might require treatment beyond the date of his
mandatory discharge.” (J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 721–722 [cleaned
up].) This portion of J.N. quotes from Jimmy H. v. Superior Court (1970) 3
Cal.3d 709 (Jimmy H.). In Jimmy H., the Supreme Court explained if the
time required for rehabilitation “is the determinative factor in the court’s
decision . . . there must be substantial evidence in the record that successful
treatment might require the extra time.” (Jimmy H., at p. 715.) But in doing
so, it did not provide that expert testimony was the only means to provide
such evidence, explaining courts “may consider a minor’s past record of
delinquency . . . and must take into account his behavior pattern as described
in the probation officer’s report,” and expert witnesses may provide guidance
for the court’s decision. (Id. at p. 714 [cleaned up].) And in J.N., the reason
the evidence was insufficient is because it was based solely on the probation
officer’s unsupported conclusion, which included no evidence of why the
minor was unlikely to be rehabilitated in the juvenile system. (J.N., at
pp. 721–722.)
In Kevin P., the Court of Appeal rejected a probation officer’s
assessment that the second criterion weighed in favor of transfer because
that analysis “was based on nothing specific about [the minor] except ‘the
circumstances of the current offense.’ ” (Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at
p. 200.) Kevin P. affirmed that “while the circumstances of an offense are key
to evaluating section 707’s gravity criterion, they cannot be the sole basis for
concluding under the rehabilitation criterion that the minor is unlikely to be
rehabilitated before juvenile jurisdiction expires.” (Id. at p. 201.)

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Here, unlike J.N. and Kevin P., the court did not rely on the gravity of
the offense alone and it had specific evidence that Esteban was unlikely to be
rehabilitated while under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Esteban had
previously shown maturation and growth in the juvenile court system,
receiving positive reviews in custody and earning early release from his
custodial commitment. But within days of being released from custody he
was bragging about possessing a weapon and successfully hiding it from
probation, and within 22 days, he committed the charged offenses. None of
the services that Esteban received in confinement stopped this, and if
Esteban were to remain under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the services
available would largely be the same as the services he already completed and
earned early release from.
When Esteban was previously committed to Urban Camp, his main
challenges were deemed to be “violent behavior, substance use, and gang
affiliation.” There, he worked directly with the alcohol and drug program
specialist, engaged in individual counseling, family therapy, group therapy,
and other programs (including Life Skill and Project AWARE) targeted at
education, social skill development, empathy, problem-solving skills, building
self-esteem, anti-gang violence, and peer support. He was released early
from his 250-day Urban Camp commitment because his performance was
“commendable.” He he had volunteered to facilitate a session in his
substance use disorder group, his average behavior was rated as an “ ‘A,’ ”
and his mental health clinician “ ‘[did] not see him needing much re-
direction. . . . He [was] engaged and open in sessions and [sought] out
support when needed.’ ”
After Esteban shot E.C., a psychologist evaluated him and determined
he had a “ ‘Moderate’ risk rating for future violence, with concerns related to

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violence, probation violations, home violence exposure, gang association, and
impulsive behaviors.” The psychologist recommended “a residential inpatient
setting for at least three months to provide the necessary structure,
supervision, and access to therapeutic services.” The psychologist determined
this should include individual therapy, family therapy, group therapy, social
skills development, vocational training, and psychiatric medication
evaluation (to assess the effectiveness of his current medication treatments).
He opined the therapy should focus on, among other things, problem-solving
skills, substance abuse treatment, and social skills development to help
Esteban improve his self-esteem. The defense expert’s opinion aligned with
the psychologist’s recommendation, including that Esteban should receive
vocational, educational, and prosocial programming. The defense expert also
believed Esteban had received only substance abuse education classes in the
past and opined he would benefit from more extensive substance abuse
treatment.
However, Esteban had received more extensive substance abuse
treatment. Before the charged offenses, he met with a drug and alcohol
program specialist one to two times a week during his custodial commitment.
And while the psychologist recommended a residential inpatient setting to
provide “structure, supervision, and access to therapeutic services” for at
least three months, this course of intervention had already been attempted as
well. The juvenile court previously committed Esteban to Urban Camp for a
period of more than three months. There, he received structure, supervision,
and access to therapeutic services, focusing on the very same concerns that
the psychologist had identified. A SYTF would provide similar services to
Urban Camp, “including Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), academic
support, individual and family therapy, gang intervention through Project

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AWARE, . . . music production through David’s Harp Foundation,” and
“college programs, vocational training, and journaling.”
Therefore, even considering Esteban’s progress in custody following his
arrest for the charged offenses and leading up to the transfer hearing (where
he was again excelling in the services provided), the court had substantial
evidence from which it could determine this criterion weighed in favor of
transfer. Esteban had “learned to perform within the structure of the court’s
rehabilitative custodial programs,” performing so exceptionally that he
earned early release, yet none of it was effective when Esteban left custody
and reentered the community. The court knew what Esteban needed, and
the juvenile court provided for those needs during lengthy custodial
commitments to no avail. Six minutes before the shooting, Esteban had been
in contact with his mother, and he had a rideshare company en route to pick
him up. He could have chosen to leave and not commit the alleged violent,
life-endangering, offenses and none of the services he received—and excelled
in—stopped him. Thus, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude this criterion
weighed in favor of transfer because Esteban’s needs were unlikely to be met
at a SYTF where potentially more intensive but similar interventions would
be employed in the time remaining.
C. Previous Delinquent History
When evaluating a minor’s previous delinquent history, the “court shall
give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the
seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history and the effect of the
minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the
minor’s previous delinquent behavior.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii).)
Here, the court found Esteban’s history of delinquency weighed in favor
of transfer because he progressed “from engaging in [the] non-violent, albeit

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dangerous gang activity, of possessing a firearm and vandalizing the
community, to assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, to now
attempted murder with a firearm for the benefit of his gang.” The court
considered Esteban’s delinquent history in light of his family and community
environment, and childhood trauma. The court determined that while these
factors provide context for Esteban’s behavior, they “[do] not mitigate the
actual delinquent history.” We conclude the court’s finding is supported by
substantial evidence. While Esteban faced difficulties as a child, a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that those difficulties do not mitigate
Esteban’s increasing misconduct, given the positive factors that were also in
his life.
Esteban has a supportive family “with positive influences from family
members, including his mother, stepfather, maternal grandmother, and
maternal aunt.” While Esteban’s father was absent from his life, Esteban’s
stepfather “effectively assumed [the] role [of a parent], developing a
particularly close relationship with Esteban.” And his mother, stepfather,
and maternal grandmother were actively invested in Esteban’s success, to
include moving to a new area to distance Esteban from negative peer
influences.
Despite the positive influences in his life, Esteban’s misconduct only
escalated in severity with time. When Esteban was 15 years old, he was
found wearing gang-related clothing near recently painted gang-graffiti, and
he had a loaded firearm and marijuana in his backpack. Esteban was placed
on probation but ran away from home, associated with gang members, and
was expelled from school for fighting with six other juveniles. Esteban was
given a chance to remain with his mother rather than being committed to
Urban Camp, and he ran away again with his whereabouts unknown for over

16
a month. When Esteban was found, arrested, and was awaiting his probation
violation hearing, he engaged in in two gang-related fights. The court
committed Esteban to Urban Camp for 130-days, which he successfully
completed. But then once released, he ran away from home again, obtained a
large gang tattoo, and was shot in the leg in a gang-related altercation. In
his resulting Urban Camp commitment for 250-days, he then participated in
a riot, and engaged in multiple fights, to include punching another youth in
the face 11 times without provocation. Following the unprovoked assault, the
court gave Esteban the opportunity to complete his 250-day commitment to
Urban Camp. Given that opportunity, Esteban altered his behavior at Urban
Camp and through his demonstrated behavioral improvements and
participation in intensive family therapy, he earned his early release.
But once he was released, he committed the charged offenses, and
while pending his transfer hearing, he was involved in seven violent incidents
while in custody. Given the severity of his delinquent history, there is
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that
this criterion weighs in favor of transfer.
D. Previous Rehabilitation
When evaluating the minor’s previous rehabilitation, the “court shall
give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy
of the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs.” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(D)(ii).) The court found this criterion weighed in favor of
transfer. The court heard arguments regarding the adequacy of the previous
services provided to Esteban and found, contrary to the defense expert’s
opinion, Esteban was provided adequate services to address his needs. This
finding is also supported by substantial evidence.
Esteban was provided extensive rehabilitative services in the

17
community and in custody that were tailored to his specific identified needs.
Early on, the probation department assessed Esteban’s needs and employed
services directed to his specific needs with the cooperation of Esteban’s
mother, including education, individual therapy, family therapy, and group
therapy, focused on behavior, substance abuse, problem solving, social
development skills, and gang intervention These services increased as
Esteban’s misconduct persisted.
Probation addressed Esteban’s substance use first through substance
abuse groups in the Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program, then he was
referred to Substance Abuse Services. Esteban worked with an Alcohol and
Drug Program Specialist one to two times a week and participated in groups
focused on substance use. In the ATD program, he also began a three-month
individual counseling program focused on better decision-making. Following
this program, probation increased Esteban’s number of counseling sessions
and provided for his one-on-one counseling both in custody and in the
community, and his counseling evolved to address his violent behavior and
trauma. Esteban and his mother were also provided continuous family
counseling. He also attended group sessions, workshops, and programs
addressing gang violence and life skills.
Esteban received mentoring and academic support from the CHOICE
program over the course of a year, both in and out of custody, completing
classwork while in custody and independent study after his release from
custody, while Probation monitored his grades. In the CHOICE program, he
received “intensive support through daily contacts, . . . home and school
visits, community outings, recreational activities, and incentives to deter
gang involvement and prevent recidivism.”

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Because the services were tailored to meet Esteban’s specific needs and
were provided both in and out of custody to facilitate continued progress in
the community, there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of
fact could conclude that Esteban received adequate services. Yet, despite the
adequacy of the services, Esteban reverted to criminal activity. Thus, a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude this criterion weighed in favor of
transfer.
E. Circumstances and Gravity of the Charged Offense
When evaluating the circumstances and gravity of the charged
offenses, the court “shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not
limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person,
the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually

caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development.”4
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii).) The court found this criterion weighed in favor of
transfer, explaining attempted murder is “one of the most serious offenses”
and, here, it was alleged to have been “singularly committed by [Esteban]
without provocation.”
Esteban asserts the court “refused to consider [his] age, childhood
trauma, or adolescence brain development as mitigating factors.” But the
court considered Esteban’s “mental state and his mental and emotional
development,” to include Esteban’s “own trauma and anxiety, while also
experiencing adolescence and continued brain development.” The court did
not refuse to consider these factors, it simply disagreed they mitigated the
circumstances and gravity of the offense because “the offense was a willful

4 If the evidence indicates the victim trafficked, sexually abused, or
sexually battered the minor, the court should also consider that evidence.
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(iii).) No such evidence exists in this case.

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premeditated shooting, it was not an impulsive act[,] and it was committed
without provocation.”
We conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s finding on this
criterion. As the court explained, Esteban waited outside the party for the
victim and shot him five times at close range. The “victim suffered gunshot
wounds to his chest, abdomen, and hands.” Esteban shot the victim, without
provocation, in order to “earn[ ]” a gang tattoo. His own statements revealed
he hoped the victim died. The victim experienced significant trauma,
requiring several urgent surgeries and intensive care. After the shooting,
Esteban tormented the victim’s family and bragged about what he did. He
caused the victim physical and emotional harm, and the victim’s family
emotional and financial harm.
F. Conclusion
In sum, considering each of the five criterion and viewing the record as
a whole, we conclude there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could make the ultimate finding, concluding by clear and
convincing evidence, that Esteban was not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. While the court’s order did not
mention the SYTF program by name in its ruling, we reject Esteban’s
assertion this means the court “did not meaningfully consider” the facility as
an option. The court reviewed the transfer report prepared by probation,
which specifically focused on the potential for rehabilitation at a SYTF or
HOPE program. And the defense expert’s opinion that Esteban could be
amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile court system was directly tethered
to her opinion that he could benefit from the services offered at a SYTF.

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DISPOSITION
The court’s order is affirmed.

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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