CourtListener 10779540•In re Z.M. CA1/1
Full text
Filed 1/26/26 In re Z.M. CA1/1
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re Z.M., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY, A173511
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Francisco City & County
v. Super. Ct. No. JD23-3206)
J.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Approximately three months after the juvenile court terminated
reunification services, J.G. (Mother) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 388 petition1 requesting a change in visitation and six additional
months of reunification services. The court summarily denied the petition
without an evidentiary hearing, and Mother appeals. We affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
1
BACKGROUND
This is the second case involving mother’s youngest child Z.M. (Minor).2
We incorporate by reference facts from our prior unpublished opinion, J.G. v.
Superior Court (May 7, 2025, A172430).
Proceedings Leading to Termination of Services
After minor was detained, due to various issues regarding Mother’s
mental health, substance use, and domestic violence, as well as Mother
leaving Minor and his sibling in maternal grandmother’s care, “despite
extensive concerns” about her ability to care for the children, Mother received
over 18 months of services. (J.G. v. Superior Court, supra, A172430.)
Review Period
“In its six-month review report, the [San Francisco Human Services
Agency (Agency)] reported Mother had been consistently attending parenting
classes since December 2023. She had also been participating in a domestic
violence group. There had been no new arrests during the reporting period,
although a June 2024 police report indicated Mother had been involved in a
domestic violence incident with her then-boyfriend, when he ‘punched a hole
in two doors,’ ‘shattered the shower glass door,’ and ‘threw kitchen knives’ at
Mother (June incident). The police report indicated Mother ‘protected herself
with a pan’ and sought an emergency restraining order. Mother also reported
the incident, stating a friend ‘became aggressive sexually and started
2 Mother has lost custody of minor’s three oldest siblings. (See In re
Gabriel K. (Sep. 11, 2020, A159108) [nonpub. opn.] [affirming order
terminating parental rights to minor’s siblings G.K.]; In re Z.M. (Mar. 27,
2025, A171125) [nonpub. opn.] [affirming order terminating parental rights
to minor’s three year-old brother, Zi.M. and noting Mother “ultimately
agreed” adoption was in G.K.’s and A.R.’s best interest].)
2
destroying her home.’ She maintained she had ‘ “cut them off completely” ’
and ‘ “got a restraining order.” ’
“Mother had been working with a new therapist since March 2024.
Mother’s psychiatrist, Dr. Wozniak, reported Mother ‘had not been seeing
him and currently was not on medication.’ However, they had recently had
an appointment in June 2024, and the psychiatrist reminded Mother ‘her
psychological evaluation had recommended medication.’ Mother did not
follow-up regarding medication.
“Mother had missed eight out of 36 scheduled visits. She cancelled a
‘few visits’ with Minor and brother, after reporting she had to go to the
emergency room because she had been experiencing ‘dizzy spells and
headaches.’ She also e-mailed Minor’s caregivers that she had ‘ “just found
out I have brain damage due to my car accident and abuse and that it’s
incurable and I have 9 years to live. I just wanted to let you know.” ’ When
the Agency requested a ‘release of information’ to talk with Mother’s doctors,
Mother responded she ‘was fine and that, “the doctor had mixed up the
charts.” ’ One visit was cancelled due [to] a court date, another because
Mother did not have funds for transportation, and another because ‘her dog
made her late.’
“Mother had tested 20 times, during the reporting period. All tests
were positive for marijuana, and one test was positive for alcohol.
“In an October 2024 addendum report, the Agency continued to
recommend termination of services. Mother’s therapist reported Mother was
‘actively participating and making progress, but there is still a lot of work to
be done on [Mother’s] end.’ Mother attended weekly anger management and
‘domestic [violence] survivor’s support’ groups. Additionally, Mother was
completing her ‘Family Treatment Court commitment as scheduled.’ Mother
3
reported she was no longer working with Dr. Wozniak, and she was ‘self-
medicating for her anxiety using marijuana.’ Mother had tested 21 times
during the reporting period, and all results were positive for marijuana, and
one was also positive for alcohol.
“While Mother had ‘demonstrated positive engagement in services and
interactions at visits over this short time period,’ the Agency remained
concerned about Mother’s ‘long standing history with domestic violence, prior
CWS history related to domestic violence, and as of this current case, leaving
the minor alone with an unfit adult who has past CWS history.’ The Agency
continued to recommend termination of services as it had not observed
Mother ‘exhibit safe behaviors for an extensive amount of time.’ Mother had
last been involved in a ‘domestic violence incident’ in June—four months
before the date of the report.
“In a January 2025 addendum report, the Agency’s recommendation
remained the same. Mother’s ‘domestic [violence] survivor’s’ support group
leader reported Mother’s attendance had been ‘very inconsistent during this
reporting period’ and that she felt Mother had ‘not [been] putting in the effort
to break herself from the cycle of domestic violence.’ Mother’s therapist
stated Mother had discussed ‘decreasing her THC usage and revisiting
getting psychiatric support to address her long standing diagnoses,’ but that
Mother did not often bring up issues with her ‘long standing history with
domestic violence.’ Mother tested 15 times out of 18 scheduled drug tests—
all were positive for marijuana, and two were positive for alcohol.
“The social worker had also followed up with Mother’s psychologist,
Dr. Watt, who had performed a second psychological assessment in March
2024, diagnosing Mother once again with bipolar disorder, posttraumatic
stress disorder, and unspecified personality disorder. Dr. Watt stated Mother
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‘was in need of ongoing psychological and medication treatment.’ She
recommended ‘medications that targeted [Mother’s] moods, anxiety, and
depression.’ During a monthly compliance meeting, Mother noted that ‘per
her attorney’s recommendation, she decided to re-explore the psychiatric
treatment for her diagnoses,’ and the Agency submitted a referral for a
psychiatric evaluation.
“Although Mother continued to participate in some of her support
services and engaged in ‘high quality’ visitation with Minor, the Agency
remained concerned Mother had not ‘completely mitigated the safety
concerns that continue to keep the family involved with the Agency.’
Mother’s longstanding domestic violence history, along with reports from
service providers noting Mother ‘does not prioritize her domestic violence . . .
challenges,’ gave the Agency ‘reason to believe that those behavioral patterns
have not been diminished.’ Additionally, Mother had been ‘slow to adhere to
[her psychologist’s] recommendations for psychotropic medication to treat her
mental health diagnoses,’ and it was ‘concerning that [Mother] has continued
prolonged marijuana use as a form of self-medicating despite [her
psychologist’s] trepidations about [Mother’s] use . . . impacting her mental
health and being used as a primary coping mechanism.’
“At the combined six-month, 12-month, and 18-month review hearing,
the court heard from Mother’s evaluator, her social workers, and counsel.
“Mother’s psychologist, Dr. Watt, testified as an expert ‘on the
psychological testing, evaluation, and interpretation for this hearing.’
Dr. Watt evaluated Mother in 2020 and in 2024. In the most recent
evaluation, Dr. Watt included an ‘observation of parent-child interaction
during one of the supervised visits.’ For both evaluations, Dr. Watt
diagnosed Mother with bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and
5
unspecified personality disorder. Dr. Watt stated symptoms related to
bipolar disorder can include mood swings, erratic behaviors, agitation and
impulse control, and often people with the disorder ‘stop taking their
medication.’ In Mother’s history with the Agency, Dr. Watt saw those
symptoms in Mother’s ‘erratic behaviors and aggressive behaviors that led to
her arrest in the past’ and in her ‘poor judgment in terms of leaving her
children with [maternal grandmother] who has a history of substance abuse
and poor mobility that would impair her ability to take care of the young
children.’ Dr. Watt opined Mother’s history indicated ‘symptoms of her
psychological disorders have an impact on her overall functioning, and this
will likely impact her parenting ability.’ Additionally, Mother’s diagnosis of
untreated unspecified personality disorder could be seen in Mother’s serious
impairments in relationships, such as ‘getting involved in dysfunctional,
volatile relationships.’ Dr. Watt recommended ongoing psychological and
medication treatment.
“Dr. Watt did not diagnose Mother with substance use disorder. But
she was concerned about Mother’s marijuana use and stated she was ‘at high
risk of developing serious addiction issues.’ Dr. Watt sent her evaluation to
the social worker. She recommended Mother be given verbal feedback
regarding the results of the evaluations. Although she does not normally go
over the evaluation results with parents, Dr. Watt informed Mother at the
beginning of both evaluations that she could contact her to go over the
results. Mother did not do so. During the second evaluation, Mother
mentioned that she felt she had been misdiagnosed during the 2020
evaluation. Dr. Watt did not discuss Mother’s diagnosis with her psychiatrist
or her therapist, but stated it was not standard procedure for her to do so.
6
“When social worker Sharon Anderson first came into contact with
Mother, Minor’s brother was in Mother’s care under a family maintenance
plan. She remained the social worker when both the brother and Minor were
removed in June 2023, and until July 2024. Initially, Anderson
recommended domestic violence, drug testing, general counseling, a
psychological evaluation, and psychotropic medication evaluation and
monitoring. Anderson sent a copy of Mother’s 2024 evaluation by Dr. Watt to
Mother’s attorney and her psychiatrist, Dr. Wozniak. Mother consistently
tested positive for marijuana and occasionally tested positive for alcohol.
After completing a substance abuse evaluation and assessment, it was
recommended Mother complete an outpatient program. Mother had been
seeing an individual counselor twice a month and had received supervised
visitation with Minor. Anderson expressed concern that Mother had already
taken a year and a half of domestic violence classes and graduated from a
program but continued to engage in domestic violence incidents.
Additionally, Mother had been involved in a car accident and had been
arrested for driving under the influence.
“Taylor Swayzer took over as the case social worker in July 2024.
Reunification services, including for a psychological assessment, psychiatric
assessment for medication management, individual counseling, domestic
violence counseling, and substance use testing, had already been ordered.
Swayzer met with Mother once a month and discussed services. Mother
provided her with updates. During Swayzer’s tenure, visitation progressed to
monitored community visitation. Mother wanted to progress to
unsupervised, and the Agency was continuing to assess if that would be
appropriate.
7
“Mother testified she took ‘full responsibility for [her] actions,’ and she
asked the court to return Minor to her care. She had stopped using
marijuana in January 2025—two weeks before the hearing—‘because of the
safety of [her] behavior and for [her] children.’ She also no longer consumed
alcohol. Mother was ‘very confused’ about her diagnoses because she had
been ‘diagnosed by multiple different people.’ No one had ‘actually sat down
and explained to [her] what [she was] diagnosed with.’ She began seeing
Dr. Wozniak six years ago and the ‘only thing he diagnosed [her] with was
adjustment disorder.’ In June 2024, D[r]. Wozniak wrote a letter stating he
and Mother ‘mutually agreed’ she would not take any more medication.
Mother was not sure when they ‘mutually’ came to this decision, or if
Dr. Wozniak knew about the June incident with her boyfriend. Mother said
she was ‘open to the new opportunities and ways of maybe being on
medication that can actually help [her].’ She stated she had ‘misdiagnosed’
herself when she told her social worker and Minor’s caregiver that she had
brain damage and only a few years left to live.
“Mother also testified she planned to avoid relationships involving
domestic violence. Before entering a relationship, she would ‘seek into
[herself],’ ‘read the bible,’ and ‘go grounding.’ She recognized ‘the signs of
somebody who could potentially be violent’ but was ‘still learning’ some ‘other
ones.’ At the beginning of her therapy, she had talked ‘a lot’ about ‘issues
related to domestic violence.’ But ‘since the incident in June, [she hadn’t] felt
a need to, but moving forward, we did discuss that there will be more
discussions regarding DV and the signs around it.’ She had not been
‘involved with anybody’ for eight months.
“Lydia DeGois, Mother’s case manager at Homeless Prenatal Program,
stated she ran a weekly peer parent support group for women. Mother
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consistently attended. DeGois described Mother and her participation in the
group positively. They talked about domestic violence ‘almost every week.’
DeGois acknowledged, however, that she had no formal training and her
advice to Mother was akin to ‘mentor advice.’ DeGois was aware Mother’s
drug tests ‘have came [sic] back positive for marijuana.’ Mother had ‘tried to
quit’ marijuana ‘a couple of times,’ but was not ‘able to fully quit.’ Finally,
DeGois recalled Mother sharing her diagnoses with her, but could only recall
‘depression for sure, PTSD. Those are the two that I know for a fact.’
“After hearing from counsel, the court found there was a substantial
risk of detriment to Minor’s safety if he was returned to Mother’s care.
Although Mother had ‘made progress’ and there were ‘lots of positive
developments in this case,’ Mother had not made ‘significant progress in
resolving the problems that lead to the child’s removal from the home.’ The
court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, reasonable services had
been offered throughout the duration of the case. The ‘requirements of
mother’s case plan were clear, and I think that the confusion, if any,
regarding medication compliance was the result of mother being in denial
about her mental health, and perhaps on Dr. Wozniak not having complete
information, not because the agency did not provide services.’ The court
disagreed with Mother’s ‘contention’ that ‘lack of a team meeting or a team
approach’ compelled a finding that she had not been offered reasonable
services. The court heard ‘evidence justifying and explaining the . . .
decisions around the team meeting, and . . . that the agency tried numerous
times to get in touch with Dr. Wozniak.’ The court also found the Agency was
‘justified in its decision not to progress visits given [Mother’s] lack of progress
on the domestic violence front, her decision to continue to use marijuana, and
on her intransigence around mental health treatment.’ The court
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additionally found extending services to 24 months was not in Minor’s best
interest, there were no exceptional circumstances warranting extending
services, and there was no possibility of return in the next six months.
Accordingly, the court terminated services and set the matter for a
section 366.26 hearing.” (J.G. v. Superior Court, supra, A172430, fns.
omitted.)
Mother sought writ relief, and this court denied mother’s petition for
extraordinary relief on May 7, 2025. (J.G. v. Superior Court, supra,
A172430.)
Section 388 Petition
Approximately three months after the juvenile court terminated
reunification services, but before this court issued its opinion denying
mother’s petition for extraordinary relief, mother, on April 30, filed a request
to change order pursuant to section 388.
Mother sought an additional six months of reunification services, an
increase in visitation, that visitation be made unsupervised, and Agency
discretion to progress to overnight visitation. Mother maintained there was a
substantial probability of return of Minor to her in the next six months, and
that the requested change in orders was in Minor’s best interest because
Mother had demonstrated, through visitation, “she is able to take care of the
child,” increasing visitation will “strengthen their bond,” Minor would have
“the opportunity to reunify” with Mother, and Minor had spent the first 14
months of his life in Mother’s care.
In regard to the change of circumstances, Mother acknowledged she
had missed approximately a month of visitation and services but stated
maternal great grandmother had passed away and she had to travel to the
East Coast for the funeral and “unfortunately encountered unforeseeable
10
delays returning from that trip.” Mother maintained she had kept in contact
with her service providers and engaged in ongoing services. Specifically,
mother had “a meeting with Dr. Amy Watt”; “attended three sessions of the
Building Safety Group, a domestic violence service”; although she had been
“unable to complete the eight-week program due to unforeseeable
transportation delays”; completed Family Treatment Court; completed a
relapse prevention course, enrolled in the contingency management program,
although she had missed “some sessions due to the unforeseeable
transportation delays”; and continued “her weekly therapy.”
The court scheduled a hearing to determine whether to grant an
evidentiary hearing. In the interim, the Agency filed its section 366.26 report
recommending termination of parental rights.3
Two weeks later, the court held a hearing on the section 388 petition.
Mother’s counsel began by noting the court had on February 4, 2025,
terminated Mother’s reunification services due to the Agency’s concerns
about mother’s ongoing issues with her mental health, substance use, and
domestic violence. Counsel acknowledged the June 2024 domestic violence
incident but stated mother maintained she “did everything right in the face of
that incident.” The crux of counsel’s argument was that the absence of
intervening incidents showed a change in circumstances. Counsel asserted a
“big part of [Mother’s] case” was timing—in that there had not been enough
time between the last incident “and the current day”—but now Mother has
shown, through “nearly one full year from . . . the last bad incident that
happened in this case,” a change of circumstance. Similarly, as to Mother’s
3 The court subsequently terminated rights on September 18, 2025,
and Mother appealed. That appeal, case No. A174382, is pending and is not
yet fully briefed.
11
substance abuse and mental health, counsel noted “there is nothing currently
before this court, indicating that that is an ongoing problem for which she
still requires ongoing treatment. . . . [P]art of change in circumstances is that
nothing negative has happened to my client, not because of any mental
health issues, . . . and not because of domestic violence. The omission of bad
things happening is the change of circumstances.” Additionally, counsel
noted Mother had continued with and completed Family Treatment Court on
March 3, 2025.
Counsel next acknowledged Mother’s month-long gap in services and
visitation. However, counsel stressed Mother had “encountered tremendous
issues regarding transportation back,” both visitation and therapy had since
resumed, and Mother had “maintained contact with her therapist” and the
Agency during that month.
Counsel further asserted it was in Minor’s best interest to reopen
reunification services, because Mother was now pregnant, and assuming
Mother’s pregnancy came to term, Minor would benefit from seeing his
younger sibling with Mother “presumably on a day-to-day basis.”
Additionally, counsel claimed Minor would be “emotionally” impacted by
seeing “his mother raising his sibling, but not raising him.” Counsel also
reiterated Mother had raised Minor until “he was approximately 14 months
old.”
Counsel for the Agency argued that although Mother was “engaged in
some services,” the issues leading to dependency had not been resolved.
Family Treatment Court “is a harm reduction system,” but it did not mean
Mother had “completely stopped using drugs,” and the Agency did not have
any evidence that was the case. Mother was “still working” on her mental
health issues, and Mother had “missed visits,” and so there was “no evidence
12
today that demonstrates that the circumstances have changed.” Counsel
asserted circumstances were “in the beginning stages of changing,” and so the
first prong had not been met. Nor had Mother met the second prong—that
the request was in Minor’s best interest. Counsel contended it was not in
Minor’s best interest to grant the request just because Mother is pregnant.
Finally, although Mother’s counsel argued there had been no new community
incidents, counsel for the Agency noted Mother was now engaged. While it
was the Agency’s hope that Mother “is working towards identifying a better
type of partner,” “historically Mother has picked partners that have led to
intimate partner violence.”
Minor’s counsel joined with the Agency in opposition to the request for
an evidentiary hearing. Although counsel was “glad” Mother had not “had
any major incidents involving intimate partner violence,” counsel argued it
was in Minor’s best interest to proceed with the “post-adoption agreement in
a place where he is being cared for and extremely bonded with caregiver and
enjoys time with Mother, but the Mother’s instability has unfortunately—he
is just safer, and we raised that it is in his best interest, if he stays with his
current caregiver.” Additionally, counsel noted there was no information in
Mother’s section 388 petition about any drug tests or the level of her current
use. Finally, it was “very concerning” that Mother had “unforeseen
transportation delays,” as a reason in “multiple sections of [her] 388” petition
for why she did not complete or attend services. Counsel stated, this spoke to
Mother’s “ongoing instability and leaving for over a month,” not because of
the funeral, but because she did not have “the organizational skills to get
13
there and to get back.” Counsel noted there were no details on why Mother
could not return sooner.4
The court denied the section 388 petition without an evidentiary
hearing. The court began by noting the case had been pending since July
2023 based on allegations of Mother’s mental health, intimate partner
violence, and substance use. At the combined six-, 12-, and 18-month
hearing, the court concluded Mother had not made significant progress in
alleviating the issues that brought the family to the Agency’s attention, that
returning Minor to Mother’s care would create a substantial risk of
detriment, and that there was no basis for an additional six months of
services.
Now, on the eve of the section 366.26 hearing, the evidence, even “when
liberally construed,” did not mandate an evidentiary hearing. There was
evidence at the termination of reunification services hearing, for example,
that Mother was participating in Family Treatment Court and that she had
completed “quite a lot of the course work and that she had been doing
therapy.” The court concluded the evidence showed “there are periods of
times” where Mother is engaged in services and periods where she is not, for
“whatever reason,” which has been “a consistent patten [sic] in this case” and
“demonstrates some instability” in Mother’s life. At best, this showed
changing and not changed circumstances. Nor did the court find Mother’s
pregnancy to be a “relevant material changed circumstance that would”
require an evidentiary hearing.
The court also ruled Mother had not shown the request to be in Minor’s
best interest. It was not in Minor’s best interest to prolong the period before
4 Father was not present, but his counsel agreed the juvenile court
should deny the petition and proceed with adoption.
14
the section 366.26 hearing to offer Mother additional services. The focus was
now on Minor’s permanency and stability, and although the court
commended Mother’s efforts, “those efforts do not take priority” over Minor’s
stability.
DISCUSSION
“Section 388 allows a parent to petition to change, modify, or set aside
any previous juvenile court order. [Citation.] ‘The petitioner has the burden
of showing by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there is new evidence
or a change of circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification would be
in the best interests of the child.’ ” (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 845
(J.M.); § 388, subd. (a).) “The juvenile court has discretion whether to
provide a hearing on a petition alleging changed circumstances.” (In re
Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.) However, a “ ‘ “parent need only
make a prima facie showing to trigger the right to proceed by way of a full
hearing.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 432.) “If the liberally construed allegations of the
petition do not show changed circumstances such that the child’s best
interests will be promoted by the proposed change of order, the dependency
court need not order a hearing.” (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
246, 250; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d)(1).)
“We normally review the grant or denial of a section 388 petition for an
abuse of discretion.” (In re Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478.) This
includes the juvenile court’s summary denial of a section 388 petition without
a hearing. (In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1079.)
Mother requested the juvenile court reinstate reunification services for
an additional six months and increase her visitation. The juvenile court
summarily denied the petition after concluding Mother failed to state a prima
facie case of changed circumstances or that the requested modifications
15
would be in Minor’s best interest. In this context, the court does not abuse its
discretion “if even a liberal interpretation of the proffered evidence of
changed circumstances might not justify modifying the order terminating
reunification.” (In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414.) We
conclude, even accepting Mother’s proffered evidence as true, the evidence did
not show changed circumstances that might justify modification of the
juvenile court’s prior orders.
Mother’s petition alleged she had “a meeting with Dr. Amy Watt,”
although there was no mention of what the two discussed during the meeting;
“attended three sessions of the Building Safety Group, a domestic violence
service,” although she had been “unable to complete the eight-week program
due to unforeseeable transportation delays”; completed Family Treatment
Court; completed a relapse prevention course; enrolled in the contingency
management program,5 although she had missed “some sessions due to the
unforeseeable transportation delays”; and continued “her weekly therapy.”
However, the record shows Mother had previously enrolled in and
participated in many of these services. Indeed, Mother had completed her
relapse prevention program less than three weeks after termination of
services, and as the trial court noted, Mother had substantially completed
Family Treatment Court prior to termination of services and completed it
less than a month after services were terminated.
5 It is unclear what this program addresses. The letter attached to
Mother’s petition states Mother enrolled in the program on January 17, 2025,
had been consistent with her attendance, but had notified them she would be
traveling on March 18, that she had stayed in contact during her absence,
and that she expected to resume treatment upon her return on April 21. It is
unclear if Mother did resume or complete the program.
16
The court concluded the evidence showed “there are periods of times”
where Mother is engaged in services and periods where she is not, for
“whatever reason,” which has been “a consistent patten [sic] in this case” and
“demonstrates some instability” in Mother’s life. That pattern continued
after termination of services. Mother filed her petition three months later
and missed a month of services “due to unforeseeable transportation delays.”6
Although, we commend Mother on her continued progress and acknowledge
Mother was out of town due in part to maternal great grandmother’s funeral,
we agree the evidence shows Mother’s pattern of inconsistent engagement in
services and instability in her life.
Mother compares her case to J.M., supra, 50 Cal.App.5th 833.
J.M. is distinguishable. There, the appellate court concluded the
Mother’s completion of all domestic violence training and lack of contact with
the abusing father for over a year constituted a change in circumstance
where domestic violence issues comprised “the entire basis for the sustained
dependency petition.” (J.M., supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 836, 346.) In
reversing the order denying the Mother’s section 388 petition, the court
stated the mother had presented “ample evidence that she had addressed the
sole basis for juvenile court jurisdiction—domestic violence—as well as every
other concern cited by the court in its order terminating reunification
services.” (J.M., at p. 846.) Namely, the Mother “had not been in contact
with [the] Father for over a year, had completed all required domestic
violence training, and nothing suggested [the] Mother was or had been in
another potentially violent or abusive relationship. [¶] Moreover, [the]
Mother offered . . . uncontroverted evidence that she had stable and
permitted housing, participated in individual therapy, completed parenting
6 Mother was “out of the state” from March 18 through April 22, 2025.
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and anger management programs, . . . no longer needed any psychotropic
medications or mental health services,” and she had “been drug testing and
receiving negative results.” (Id. at pp. 842, 846.)
That is not the case here. Here, domestic violence was not the only
basis for the dependency petition, rather as the parties acknowledged, there
were three concerns serving as the basis for the dependency proceedings:
substance use, mental health, and domestic violence issues. Mother asserts
she has shown a change in circumstances, given the absence of incidents.
However, beyond not being involved in further instances of intimate partner
violence, Mother also needed to address the ongoing issues underlying the
dependency proceedings. The absence of incidents does not mean any of the
ongoing concerns were being fully addressed. As we noted, in the three
months between termination of services and the filing of her section 388
petition, Mother had missed a month of services, including therapy and
visitation. Additionally, although Mother testified at the combined review
hearing, she had stopped using marijuana and no longer consumed alcohol,
there was no evidence Mother had followed through with that pledge.
Similarly, although Mother was again engaged in weekly therapy, there was
no evidence that she was addressing domestic violence in her therapy, as she
had testified she would begin doing. (J.M., supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 848
[The question when addressing a section 388 petition seeking reinstatement
of services is “whether the changes the parent made since then are
substantial enough to overshadow that prior determination, such that
reunification is now in the child’s best interest.”]; In re Ernesto R. (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223 [“To support a section 388 petition, the change in
circumstances must be substantial.”].) Thus, the period of reengagement in
18
services here was not a substantial change, rather it reflected “changing” and
not changed circumstances.
Given our conclusion that Mother did not meet her burden of showing
there has been a change in circumstances, we need not discuss in detail
whether Mother’s petition also showed a prima facie case that the requested
modification would be in Minor’s best interest. (In re G.B. (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157 [“the parent must sufficiently allege both a
change in circumstances or new evidence and the promotion of the child’s
best interests”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d)(1) [juvenile court may deny
a section 388 petition if petition “fails to state a change of circumstances or
new evidence that may require a change of order . . . or fails to show that the
requested modification would promote the best interest of the child”].)
Having concluded the proffered evidence, even if accepted as true,
would not support the modification of the court’s prior order, such evidence
does not show a prima facie case for relief, and the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion by denying the petition without proceeding to a full
evidentiary hearing.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
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_________________________
Banke, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Humes, P. J.
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
A173511, In re Z.M.
20
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