Riaz v. La Rocca CA5

CourtListener 10778922CalctappJan 23, 2026

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Filed 1/23/26 Riaz v. La Rocca CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

SAMREEN RIAZ,
F088880
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. VCU298300)
v.

LAWRENCE LA ROCCA, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Bret D. Hillman,
Judge.
Samreen Riaz, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Samreen Riaz appeals an order dismissing her lawsuit filed against her former
counsel. She contends the trial court erred in vacating defaults and in granting an anti-
SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). As explained below, Riaz’s brief is too
deficient to merit meaningful review. Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court’s order.
BACKGROUND
In an earlier case—Riaz v. Altura Centers for Health (F085852, Jul. 30, 2024
[nonpub. opn.] (Altura))—we upheld a verdict entered against Riaz where she had sued
her former employer for wrongful termination. In that matter, Riaz was represented by
Raoul Severo and Lawrence LaRocca—the subjects of this litigation.
Severo and LaRocca, in the Altura case, filed declarations expressing doubt as to
Riaz’s mental competence. Indeed, the attorneys fervently sought permission to
withdraw from the case and withdrawal was ultimately granted. We concluded
withdrawal was properly granted on direct appeal from that case. (Altura, supra,
F085852.)
The declarations from Severo and LaRocca in the Altura case generally form the
basis for the complaint in this case. Riaz primarily complained her lawyers conspired
with opposing counsel to undermine her allegations against the former employer by
establishing her mental incompetence, and otherwise rendered deficient or adverse
representation.
Defaults were entered against both LaRocca and Severo on the bases Riaz had
personally served them with a complaint and summons. LaRocca moved “to set aside the
default and permit an answer to the complaint” because he was not in fact served. The
trial court examined the facts and found there was neither personal service nor substituted
service. It accordingly granted the motion on the basis default was void (Code Civ.
Proc., § 473, subd. (d)) and allowed LaRocca to file his “proposed answer[.]” The case
against Severo concluded with substantially similar procedure and rulings.

2.
LaRocca then filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Riaz’s complaint. The trial
court concluded “the litigation privilege”—Civil Code section 47—supplied an
insurmountable hurdle for Riaz to prevail. It then struck the complaint in its entirety.1
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Riaz argues the trial court erred in vacating both defaults, erred in
granting the anti-SLAPP motion, and erred in failing to recuse or disqualify itself. Her
brief, however, fails to fairly summarize all facts. When a challenge involves resolving
facts, appellants “ ‘ “are required to set forth in their brief all the material evidence on the
point and not merely their own evidence. Unless this is done the error is deemed to be
waived.” ’ ” (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 749
(Myers).) We find waiver applies to all issues.
For example, LaRocca stated he was not personally served and the individual who
was served was not his agent. Severo, similarly, claimed he was not personally served
and the served individual—the same individual involved in the alleged LaRocca
service—was not his agent. Both LaRocca and Severo alleged they no longer worked at
the address listed on each proof of service. The trial court of course impliedly accepted
these representations by vacating the defaults, but Riaz does not mention these facts in
her brief. Waiver is appropriate in this circumstance. (Myers, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at
p. 749.)
A self-represented party like Riaz “ ‘is entitled to the same, but no greater,
consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, we may
disregard factual contentions that are not supported by citations to the record [citation] or
are based on information that is outside the record [citation]. We may disregard legal

1 The record is unclear as to the status of the Severo case after that default was
vacated as void. In other words, it is unknown how, or even if, that case resolved.

3.
arguments that are not supported by citations to legal authority [citation] or are
conclusory[.]” (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520, fn. omitted.)
Riaz’s brief, in addition to failing to fairly summarize the facts, is rife with
conclusory argument. She, for example, repeatedly accuses the trial court of
“conceal[ing]” facts simply because the court’s written rulings do not explicitly address
every single point and argument she alleged. “The doctrine of implied findings,”
however, “requires the appellate court to infer the trial court made all factual findings
necessary to support the judgment.” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 42, 58.) She also claims the “trial court ignore[d] multiple valid proofs of
service,” again ignoring the fact Severo and LaRocca each disputed effective service.
These conclusory points, like all points in Riaz’s brief, do not merit discussion.
Finally, as noted above, this case originates in Severo’s and LaRocca’s efforts to
withdraw as counsel in the Altura matter. We previously upheld withdrawal on direct
appeal in Altura, supra, F085852. There is no reason to revisit the issue.2
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s October 22, 2024, order is affirmed. No costs are awarded on
appeal.

2 A recurring theme in many of Riaz’s appeals is her challenge to disqualification
of the trial court judge. Again, “ ‘[t]he determination of the question of the
disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ
of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the
parties of the decision and only by the parties to the proceeding.’ ” (People v. Panah
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 444.)
Notably, this court recently declared Riaz a vexatious litigant in Riaz v. Fahoum
(F087833, Oct. 10, 2025 [nonpub. opn.].) Because this appeal was filed before that
finding, we of course do not apply the vexatious litigant rules in this case.

4.
SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

PEÑA, J.

5.

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