People v. Green CA2/3

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Filed 1/23/26 P. v. Green CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B336366

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA057061
v.

COREY GREEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with directions.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Appellant Corey Green appeals the judgment entered for
his 2014 convictions for three violent sex offenses after the
superior court recalled his original sentence and resentenced him
under Penal Code section 1172.75.1 He argues that the court
abused its discretion when it declined to dismiss the prior serious
felony conviction enhancements as to each count. He also argues
that pursuant to section 1465.9, we should vacate the balance of
the restitution fine. We agree with both arguments. We vacate
the sentence and remand for resentencing with directions to
reconsider the request for dismissal of the enhancements under
section 1385 according to People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 215 (Gonzalez). We also direct the superior court to
vacate the balance of the restitution fine.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts2
In the early afternoon of July 11, 2012, Green approached
M. who was working on her car in a parking lot behind an
AutoZone store in Palmdale, California. M. declined Green’s
offers to help. M. further declined Green’s offer to pay her for
sexual intercourse.
When M. resumed working on the car, Green approached
her from behind. He placed one arm across her chest, and the
other on her lower abdomen. Green reached inside the front of

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2 We refer to the factual background from the opinion in
People v. Green (Feb. 19, 2015, B254805) [nonpub. opn.], which
affirmed the judgment of conviction.

2
M.’s pants and forcefully inserted a finger inside her vagina. M.
pushed Green away and told him to stop. Green grabbed M.’s
arm and held it tightly. Green let her go when a store employee
walked past them.
Green approached M. again. He grabbed M. and forced her
to her knees. Green held M.’s head and forcefully inserted his
penis into her mouth. M. pulled her head from Green and walked
away from him.
Green stood by M. as another store employee walked past
them. Green opened the driver’s side rear passenger door and
threw M. onto her stomach in the backseat. Green pulled off M.’s
pants and underwear and told her to spread her vagina for his
penis. M. believed she heard photographs being taken and told
Green not to take pictures. Green denied taking photographs.
and forcefully inserted his fingers into M.’s vagina. Suddenly,
Green jumped up, slammed the car door against M.’s legs, and
told her to hurry up and get dressed.
M. got dressed and exited the car. M. saw another store
employee and mouthed “help me” to her. The employee nodded at
M. and drove away. The employee returned and told her
coworkers what she had seen. The coworkers approached Green
and M. One of the coworkers told Green that they were calling
the police. Green walked away. He was arrested nearby with a
cell phone that contained video recordings of the incident.

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II. Procedure
a. Trial court proceedings
A jury convicted Green of forcible oral copulation (§ 288a,
subd. (c)(2)(a)3; count 1), and two counts of sexual penetration by
a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(a); counts 2 & 3). The jury
also found that Green was previously convicted of forcible rape
(§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), making him eligible for sentencing under the
One Strike Sex law (§ 667.61, subds. (a) & (d)) and the habitual
sex offender law (§ 667.71).
On December 18, 2013, the trial court found true
allegations that Green served a prior prison term under section
667.5, subdivision (b), and was convicted of a prior serious felony
conviction under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), which was also
alleged as a prior felony conviction under the Three Strikes law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(e)).
On January 9, 2014, the trial court imposed consecutive
indeterminate terms for each of the three counts under the One
Strike Sex law. The court doubled each minimum term of 25
years under the Three Strikes law. The sentence included five
years for each count for the prior serious felony conviction
enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and one year
for the prior prison term enhancement under section 667.5,
subdivision (b). The total aggregate sentence was 150 years to
life, plus a determinate term of 16 years.
Additionally, the trial court imposed a restitution fine of
$10,000 under section 1202.4, subdivision (b) and imposed and

3 The legislature renumbered former section 288a to section
287. (Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 49, pp. 3215–3218, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.)

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stayed $10,000 for a parole revocation restitution fine under
section 1202.45. As to each count, the court also imposed a $40
court operations assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and a $30
criminal facility assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)).
Green timely appealed. On February 19, 2015, this court
affirmed the judgment.4
b. Resentencing
On July 1, 2022, CDCR identified Green as a person
serving a sentence that included an invalid enhancement under
section 667.5, subdivision (b).
On March 26, 2024, the superior court conducted a
resentencing hearing pursuant to section 1172.75. Green’s
petition for resentencing requested that the court dismiss the
invalid prior prison term enhancement, the prior serious felony
conviction enhancement, and the prior felony conviction under
the Three Strikes law. The petition highlighted Green’s lack of
rule violations and disciplinary actions since his commitment to
state prison in 2014. According to the exhibits submitted with
the petition, Green’s security level was reduced due to good
behavior and compliance with prison rules. Green also completed
various rehabilitative programs while in prison. The petition
identified the mitigating factors of multiple enhancements in a
single case (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)) and an enhancement based on
a prior conviction over five years old (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H)).
Green’s petition noted that he was 52 years old and would
continue to serve the indeterminate sentence even if the court
granted his requests. It asserted that he posed no immediate

4 People v. Green (Feb. 19, 2015, B254805) [nonpub. opn.].

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public safety concern based on his age and the remaining term.
Green’s defense counsel reiterated the same points during the
resentencing hearing.
The superior court dismissed the prior prison term
enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b). But it denied
Green’s requests to dismiss the prior felony conviction under the
Three Strikes law and the prior serious felony conviction
enhancement as to each count.
Again, as to each count, the superior court imposed
consecutive terms under the One Strike Sex law. It doubled the
minimum term for each count under the Three Strikes law. The
court also imposed an additional five years to each count for the
serious prior felony conviction enhancement under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1). The total indeterminate term was 150 years to
life, plus a determinate term of 15 years. The court reimposed
the fines and fees, including the restitution fine, in their original
amounts.
On March 28, 2024, Green filed a notice of appeal.

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DISCUSSION
Green raises two challenges on appeal. First, he contends
that the superior court abused its discretion when it declined to
dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancement as to
each count based on its application of an incorrect standard for
the public safety exception under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2).
Second, Green asserts that any remaining balance for the
restitution fine imposed by the original sentencing court must be
vacated pursuant to section 1465.9. We agree with both
arguments.
I. Section 1385
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 amended
section 1385 to add subdivision (c). (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) provides, “Notwithstanding any
other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so . . . .” Section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2) requires that a sentencing court give “great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are
present.” One or more mitigating circumstances “weighs greatly
in favor of dismissing the enhancement.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
The statute provides an exception to the section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) requirement when “the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) further
states that “ ‘[e]ndanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood
that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical
injury or other serious danger to others.”

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When a trial court finds that dismissal of an enhancement
would endanger public safety, it must not exclusively consider
whether the defendant currently poses a danger to the public.
(Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.) “Although the
current dangerousness of the [petitioner] is an appropriate factor
to consider, as it will have some bearing on whether dismissing
the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial part of the
inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will impact the
length of the defendant’s sentence.” (Ibid.) The reviewing court
in Gonzalez illustrated this point by contrasting a “currently
dangerous defendant who will be released from prison within a
short timeframe” with a currently dangerous defendant “who has
no prospect of release from prison until he is elderly.” (Ibid.) A
trial court would find the former to pose a greater danger than
the latter.5
“[A]bsent a finding that dismissal would endanger public
safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss
enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the
enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.”
(People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029.) “Stated simply,
if the court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger
public safety, then mitigating circumstances strongly favor
dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the court must
determine whether dismissal is in the furtherance of justice.”
(Id. at p. 1036.)

5 Gonzalez also mentioned that for defendants serving
indeterminate sentences, “release from prison is contingent on
review by the Board of Parole Hearings,” which “will act as a
safety valve against a release that would endanger the public.”
(Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.)

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We review a trial court’s decision not to strike sentencing
enhancements under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. (People
v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) We must not
disturb an exercise of discretion on appeal “ ‘ “ ‘except on a
showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) A court abuses its discretion if
it bases “ ‘its decision on impermissible factors . . . or on an
incorrect legal standard.’ [Citations.]” (Gonzalez, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 225.)
During the resentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued
that the superior court should not reduce the sentence beyond
striking the prior prison term enhancement because Green posed
a threat to public safety based on the underlying facts of the
case.6 In response, Green’s counsel urged the court not to focus
on his current risk to public safety. She reasoned that Green
would still have to serve three consecutive life sentences even if
the court struck the prior serious felony conviction
enhancements.7

6 The prosecutor argued:
“The People would submit on the 667.5(b)
allegation. Beyond that, the facts demonstrate an
incredibly violent sexual offense by a stranger on a
stranger. [¶] The case has considerable issues
regarding public safety, and I think that on that
alone, the People would object to any—the court
exercising its discretion to strike any prior
enhancements or resentence in full.”

7 Defense counsel stated:
“I just want to clarify that I don’t think public
safety is an issue the same way it would be if we were

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The superior court highlighted Green’s prior conviction for
forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) in 2005, his prior conviction for
failure to register as a sex offender (§ 290) in 2010, and the facts
of the underlying offenses which occurred in 2012. The court
acknowledged Green’s participation in classes and his lack of rule
violations while in prison. The court concluded, “And, in this
case, given these facts and the defendant’s criminal history, the
court does not find that the classes that he’s taken and his lack of
discipline in prison is enough for the court to find that it was in
the–that it is in the interest of justice to strike that five-year
prior as to any of the three indeterminate terms here.” This
discussion of the underlying offenses and Green’s prior
convictions does not suggest a forward-looking inquiry. Instead,
the court relied on past conduct to determine Green’s present
dangerousness. The court applied a legal standard that was not
consistent with Gonzalez. (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 228, 230–231.)
Like the defendant in Gonzalez, Green is serving an
indeterminate sentence. Green’s minimum term before parole

asking for release. [¶] The request made today is for
the court to strike the prior strike and also consider
striking the three five-year priors that were imposed.
[¶] Even if the court struck all of that, Mr. Green
would still be left with three consecutive life terms to
serve, and so there is no risk–immediate risk to the
public. It would really only give him an opportunity
to [someday] be paroled.”
Based on the arguments by defense counsel during the
resentencing hearing and in the petition, we reject the Attorney
General’s contention that Green forfeited any challenge to the
superior court’s consideration of the public safety exception.

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eligibility on his indeterminate sentence alone is 150 years. He
will not be released on parole until far beyond a lifespan, even if
the 15 years for the enhancements are stricken. We recognize
that a forward-looking inquiry into the risk of endangering public
safety considers past conduct to predict the likelihood of future
behavior. But the record does not demonstrate that the superior
court considered whether Green would endanger public safety if
the enhancements were stricken and he was still subject to the
indeterminate term. We conclude that the superior court abused
its discretion by failing to consider Green’s future dangerousness
if the enhancements were stricken within the context of his
indeterminate sentence. (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 230–231.)
We do not question the superior court’s finding that Green
is currently dangerous based on the egregiousness of the
underlying convictions for violent sex offenses and his prior
conviction for a violent sex offense, notwithstanding his efforts at
rehabilitation while in prison. We only hold that the superior
court’s “singular focus” on Green’s past dangerous conduct
overlooked the “crucial part of the inquiry” required by Gonzalez,
that is, whether dismissing the enhancements “will impact the
length of the defendant’s sentence.” (Gonzalez, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 228.) This consideration was especially
significant for someone like Green “who has no prospect of
release from prison” during a reasonable life expectancy. (Ibid.)
The Attorney General argues that we should presume that
the superior court “ ‘ “correctly applied the law” ’ ” and conducted
a forward-thinking inquiry as to Green’s dangerousness. (People
v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637.) But the superior
court did not have the benefit of Gonzalez on the date of

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resentencing.8 We cannot presume the trial court knew a
standard that did not yet exist. (People v. Chambers (1982) 136
Cal.App.3d 444, 457 [presumption does not apply when the
sentencing law is not yet established]; see People v. Jones (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1092.)
The superior court’s comments gave no indication of how it
would have ruled if it had applied the correct legal standard.
Specifically, the record does not “clearly indicate” whether the
superior court would still have decided not to dismiss the
enhancements had it considered whether dismissal would cause a
future danger to public safety. (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58
Cal.4th 1354, 1391; People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424.)
“[T]he appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing.”
(Gutierrez, at p. 1391; Salazar, at p. 424.) On remand, in
determining the applicability of the public safety exception under
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), the court must apply the
standard established by Gonzalez. We express no position as to
how the court should exercise its discretion.
II. Restitution fine and section 1465.9
Green argues that in accordance with section 1465.9, we
must remand the matter and direct the superior court to vacate
any balance of the restitution fine imposed pursuant to section
1202.4, subdivision (b). The Attorney General concedes. We
agree with Green and accept the Attorney General’s concession.
Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) added
section 1465.9 to “eliminate the range of administrative fees . . .

8 Green’s resentencing hearing was held on March 26, 2024.
Gonzalez was filed on June 27, 2024.

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to fund elements of the criminal legal system and . . . eliminate
all outstanding debt incurred as a result of the imposition of
administrative fees.” (§ 1465.9, subd. (a).) Assembly Bill No. 177
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1465.9 to mandate that,
on or after January 1, 2022, a court deem “the balance of any
court-imposed costs” under section 1202.4 (as it read on
December 31, 2021) unenforceable and uncollectible.9 (§ 1465.9,
subd. (b).) Section 1465.9, subdivision (b) also mandated that the
court vacate any portion of a judgment imposing costs under
section 1202.4.
Effective January 1, 2025,10 Assembly Bill No. 1186 (2023–
2024 Reg. Sess.) also added subdivision (d) to section 1465.9,
stating, “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of
imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the
balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and
uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines
shall be vacated.” This amendment broadened the previous
mandate to include any balance of the restitution fine and not
limit it to costs.

9 Section 1465.9 also includes the costs imposed pursuant to
sections 1001.15, 1001.16, 1001.90, 1202.4, 1203.1, 1203.1ab,
1203.1c, 1203.1m, 1203.4a, 1203.9, 1205, 1214.5, 2085.5, 2085.6,
or 2085.7. (§ 1465.9. subd. (b).)

10 A statute enacted during the regular session of the
Legislature becomes effective on January 1 of the year following
its enactment except where the statute is passed as an urgency
measure and becomes effective sooner. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 7,
subd. (c); Gov. Code, § 9600, subd. (a); People v. Camba (1996) 50
Cal.App.4th 857, 865.)

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Section 1465.9, subdivision (d) became effective after the
superior court conducted the resentencing hearing on March 26,
2024, but it applies because the judgment after the resentencing
is not yet final.11 “ ‘ “[I]f the amendatory statute lessening
punishment . . . becomes effective prior to the date the judgment
of conviction becomes final then . . . it, and not the old statute in
effect when the prohibited act was committed, applies.” ’ ”
(Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 935.)
Section 1465.9, subdivision (d), expressly defines the 10-
year period to run after the “date of imposition” of the restitution
fine. Here, the trial court imposed the restitution fine on
January 9, 2014. The superior court must vacate the balance of
the restitution fine because more than 10 years have elapsed
since it was originally imposed.

11 “ ‘ “[F]or the purpose of determining retroactive application
of an amendment to a criminal statute, a judgment is not final
until the time for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court has passed.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 935 (Covarrubias).)

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DISPOSITION
We vacate the sentence and remand the matter for
resentencing with directions to reconsider the request for
dismissal of the enhancements under section 1385, in compliance
with Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at page 232. On remand,
the superior court is also to vacate the balance of the restitution
fine which was originally imposed on January 9, 2014, in
accordance with section 1465.9, subdivision (d).
The judgment is otherwise affirmed. Upon resentencing,
the superior court is to prepare an amended abstract of judgment
and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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