CourtListener 10778067•People v. Dickerson CA4/1
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Filed 1/22/26 P. v. Dickerson CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D087148
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. FSB23002768)
v.
JOHN T. DICKERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Gregory S. Tavill, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded with directions.
Denise M. Rudasill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney
General, Melissa Mandel and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
A jury found John T. Dickerson guilty of perjury by declaration (Pen.
Code,2 § 118, subd. (a)) and of offering a false instrument (§ 115, subd. (a)).
The court imposed an aggregate term of 16 months for the offense of offering a
false instrument and stayed a two-year term for the perjury conviction under
section 654.
On appeal, Dickerson contends insufficient evidence supported his
perjury conviction and that the jury instructions omitted an essential element
of the offense. The People concede the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
perjury conviction.
Dickerson further argues his excess presentence custody credits must be
applied to reduce his parole period, asserting that he is entitled to eight days of
parole credit. The People agree any excess credits should be applied to reduce
Dickerson’s parole period but contend he has only one excess day available for
that purpose.
We accept the People’s concession and reverse the perjury conviction,
which renders Dickerson’s instructional claim moot, and remand for
resentencing. As to custody credits claim, the record does not permit a
determination of the precise number of excess custody credits. Because we are
remanding for resentencing, we direct the trial court to calculate and
determine the appropriate application of those credits.
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., §
8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural background because our
opinion is unpublished and the parties are familiar with the facts of the case
and its procedural history. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851
[unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness of trial court’s decision
“does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].)
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
I.
Perjury By Declaration
The jury convicted Dickerson of violating section 118, subdivision (a),
based on findings that he knowingly provided materially false information on
sex offender registration documents while attesting the information was true.
Although the record is clear that Dickerson was charged with and convicted of
perjury under section 118, subdivision (a), he contends his conviction was
instead for perjury by false affidavit under section 118a.3 He bases this claim
on the trial court’s use of CALCRIM No. 2641, an instruction addressing
perjury by false affidavit, which requires proof that the defendant gave an
affidavit declaring or certifying before a competent officer or person, in
connection with a case that had been or would be filed, that a material matter
was true when the defendant knew it to be false. From this premise,
Dickerson argues insufficient evidence supported his perjury conviction
because the prosecution failed to establish that the false statements were made
before a person authorized to administer oaths, as required by section 118a.
Alternatively, he contends the statements were not made under penalty of
perjury, as required by section 118, subdivision (a). He further asserts the
version of CALCRIM No. 2641 given to the jury was erroneous because it
substituted the word “declaration” for “affidavit.”
3 Section 118a provides: “ Any person who, in any affidavit taken before
any person authorized to administer oaths, swears, affirms, declares, deposes,
or certifies that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify before any competent
tribunal, officer, or person, in any case then pending or thereafter to be
instituted, in any particular manner, or to any particular fact, and in such
affidavit willfully and contrary to such oath states as true any material matter
which he knows to be false, is guilty of perjury. In any prosecution under this
section, the subsequent testimony of such person, in any action involving the
matters in such affidavit contained, which is contrary to any of the matters in
such affidavit contained, shall be prima facie evidence that the matters in such
affidavit were false.”
3
The People agree that Dickerson’s perjury conviction must be reversed.
They contend a conviction under section 118, subdivision (a), requires proof
that the challenged statement was made under penalty of perjury, and that the
sex offender registration form signed by Dickerson did not contain such a
declaration. Because the statutory element was not established, they concede
reversal is required. We agree.4
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we review
the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Kraft
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) In conducting that review, we presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could
reasonably deduce from the evidence. (Ibid.) Reversal for insufficient evidence
is warranted only where it appears that, under no hypothesis whatsoever, is
there sufficient evidence to support the verdict. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18
Cal.4th 297, 331.)
Section 118, subdivision (a), provides that a person commits perjury
when he or she “certifies under penalty of perjury” and willfully states as true
any material matter that he or she knows to be false. Proof that the false
statement was made under penalty of perjury is therefore an essential element
of the offense. (People v. Tafoya (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 868, 902.)
Here, the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) Form 8102S
signed by Dickerson states: “I certify the information provided is true and
accurate. I understand failure to comply with the registration requirements,
providing false information on the form, or failing to provide accurate
4 The People argue their concession that Dickerson’s conviction requires
reversal moots his instructional claim. We agree and do not address this
argument.
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information is punishable as a criminal offense.” The form does not state that
the certification is made under penalty of perjury. Because the prosecution
failed to establish this essential statutory element, the evidence is insufficient
to support Dickerson’s conviction for perjury under section 118, subdivision (a).
Accordingly, the conviction on count 17 must be reversed, and the matter
remanded for resentencing.
II.
Presentence Credits
Section 2900.5 requires that all days a defendant spends in custody—
including time in jail or a rehabilitation facility—be credited against the
defendant’s term of imprisonment, which expressly includes any period of
parole prior to discharge. (§ 2900.5, subds. (a), (c); In re Ballard (1981)
115 Cal.App.3d 647, 650 [“section 2900.5 credits may be applied against either
or both of the period of incarceration and the parole period”].) When imposing
sentence, the trial court has an affirmative duty to determine the defendant’s
dates of admission to and release from custody prior to sentencing and to
calculate the total number of days of credit to which the defendant is entitled.
(§ 2900.5, subd. (d).) Those credits must be reflected in the abstract of
judgment. (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court sentenced Dickerson to a 16-month prison term,
followed by a three- to four-year parole period. On April 15, 2024, the court
ordered Dickerson released with credit for time served and directed him to
report to parole. At that time, the court calculated that Dickerson had
accumulated 488 total custody credits and estimated that either 486 or 487
days were required to satisfy the 16-month prison term.
Dickerson argues he needed only 480 days of presentence custody credit
to complete a 16-month sentence and therefore is entitled to have eight excess
days credited toward a reduction of his parole period. He reasons that a
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“month” of a prison sentence should be calculated as 30 days, such that 16
months equals 480 days. He further contends that even if the court improperly
calculated the first year of the term as 365 days and added 120 days for the
remaining four months, he would still have required only 485 days of custody
credit, leaving him entitled to an additional three days of parole credit.
The People agree that any excess custody credits must be applied to
reduce Dickerson’s parole period but dispute his arithmetic. They assert the
trial court effectively calculated one year as 365 days and one-third of a year as
121.66 days, yielding a total of 486.66 days, which rounds to 487 days for a 16-
month sentence. Under that calculation, Dickerson’s 488 days of presentence
custody credit would leave one remaining day to be applied toward his parole
term.
Both approaches are flawed. The Penal Code defines a “month” as a
“calendar month.” (§ 7, subd. (b)(13).) A calendar month is not a fixed number
of days but rather “the space of time from any day of any such month to the
corresponding day of the next,” and may therefore vary in length. (Oxford
English Dict. Online (2026) <https://www.oed.com/dictionary/calendar-
month_n?tab=meaning_and_use#10487755100> as of Jan. 21, 2026, archived
at <https://perma.cc/T3SR-4YUM>.) Consequently, a sentence expressed in
months cannot be converted into a predetermined number of days by
multiplying months by 30, nor by fractionalizing a year into parts. (See In re
Kemper (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 434, 439, fn. 2.)
Instead, the proper calculation depends on the defendant’s actual dates
of incarceration and release. (See People v. Superior Court (J.C. Penney Corp.,
Inc.) (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 376, 414, fn. 23 [a three-month statutory period
may range from 89 to 92 days depending on the specific dates involved].) Here,
although the record reflects that Dickerson was released on April 15, 2024, it
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does not disclose his precise date of incarceration. Without that information,
we cannot determine the exact number of days constituting his 16-month term.
Accordingly, this issue must be remanded for the trial court to calculate
Dickerson’s sentence based on his actual custodial dates and to apply any
excess custody credits to reduce his parole period as required by section 2900.5.
III.
Disposition
The conviction for perjury by declaration (count 17) is reversed and the
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The
judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
DO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, J.
RUBIN, J.
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