People v. Trejo CA2/2

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Filed 1/21/26 P. v. Trejo CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B338654

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA089026)
v.

PETE TREJO, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.

Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________

Defendant and appellant Pete Trejo, Jr. (Trejo), appeals
from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95).1 Because
Trejo is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts2
In 2009, Trejo was a member of the 12th Street Sharks
gang. (Trejo, supra, B259298 at p. 2.) In November 2009, a
fellow gang member, Robert Caballero (Caballero), sent Trejo a
text message asking for his help, explaining that Caballero
needed to “‘fix’” “‘two hoes that [were talking] about [his] bike
ride’” which referred to an incident earlier that year in which
Caballero “had been riding on a bicycle and asking about [a
murder victim] moments before [he] was gunned down[.]” (Trejo,
supra, B259298 at p. 3.) “When Caballero asked if Trejo knew
what he meant, Trejo responded, ‘GT THT.’” (Ibid.)

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
For simplicity, we refer to the section by its current numbering.

2 We provide these facts, drawn from our nonpublished
opinion in Trejo’s direct appeal from his conviction (People v.
Trejo (May 26, 2016, B259298) [nonpub. opn.] (Trejo)), for context
only.

2
Soon thereafter, Trejo got in a car with Caballero and two
women, Jessica Garcia (Garcia) and Lorainne Minjarez
(Minjarez). (Trejo, supra, B259298 at p. 3.) The group was
driven to Mount Baldy, and exited at a roadside turnout. Trejo
retrieved a shovel from the trunk before the driver left. (Ibid.)
“Caballero, Minjarez and the others picked a path through
the chaparral away from the turnout. As they walked, Trejo
tested the dirt with the shovel ‘a couple of times.’ When Minjarez
saw what Trejo was doing, she told Caballero she wanted to go
back. Caballero then asked her what she thought of death and
began pushing her forward along the path. When the group was
approximately a quarter of a mile away from the turnout,
Caballero or Trejo determined that the ‘dirt was rich.’ Caballero
ordered Minjarez and Garcia to sit on a nearby rock. As Trejo
began digging a grave, Caballero asked the women how they
wanted to die—by gunshot, by strangulation, or by being
‘chopped up.’ Minjarez began to sob, asking why. Caballero
replied that she knew too much and that he ‘had to do it.’ As
Minjarez and Garcia looked on, Caballero and Trejo took turns
digging the grave.
“Someone slipped a rope around Minjarez’s neck. Trejo led
Garcia, her wrists bound, behind a rock, leaving Caballero with
Minjarez. Garcia heard Caballero tell Minjarez that he loved her
and that it was ‘for the best’ before he announced that ‘it’s time.’
Garcia heard the sound of feet scuffling on the dirt as Caballero
said, ‘Go to sleep’ again and again. A few minutes later, the
scuffling stopped.
“Caballero whistled. Trejo eventually led Garcia back
around the rock, where she saw Minjarez lying face down in the
dirt, dead. Caballero then ordered Garcia to cut the rope away

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from Minjarez’s neck, to stab Minjarez 18 times in the neck, and
to urinate on her body so that Garcia’s DNA would be left behind.
Caballero led Garcia back to the turnout, as Trejo remained
behind to bury Minjarez’s body in a shallow grave.” (Trejo, supra,
B259298 at pp. 3–4.)
II. Conviction, Sentence and Direct Appeal
On August 14, 2014, a jury convicted Trejo of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). As relevant here, it also found true the
special circumstances that Trejo “intentionally killed [Minjarez]
by means of lying in wait” (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) and committed
the murder while “engaged in the commission of the crime of
kidnapping” (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Trejo was also convicted of
kidnapping Garcia. (§ 207, subd. (a).)
The trial court sentenced Trejo to life in prison without the
possibility of parole, plus an additional 16 years for various
sentencing enhancements. On direct appeal, this court struck
one enhancement and remanded for resentencing. (Trejo, supra,
B259298 at p. 22.) In all other respects, we affirmed the
judgment. (Ibid.)
III. Resentencing Petition and Appeal
In October 2021, Trejo filed his third and operative petition
for resentencing under section 1172.6.3 The trial court appointed
counsel and ordered briefing. The prosecution opposed, and Trejo
filed a reply.4

3 Trejo filed two prior resentencing petitions, which were
summarily dismissed. It does not appear that Trejo appealed
from either of those denials.
4 Trejo also filed a new petition for resentencing under
section 1172.75. That petition is not at issue in this appeal.

4
The trial court denied the petition. The court found that
Trejo was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because both
the lying in wait special circumstance instruction and the aiding
and abetting instruction “required an intent to kill[.]”
Trejo timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) substantively amended sections 188 and 189 to
“eliminate[ ] natural and probable consequences liability for
murder as it applies to aiding and abetting[ ] and limit[ ] the
scope of the felony-murder rule. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) While the bill narrowed the
scope of felony murder and eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and other forms of imputed malice as a
basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder, “a defendant may
still be liable for murder as a direct aider and abettor because a
direct aider and abettor must possess malice aforethought.”
(People v. Lopez (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1248.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also added a procedural mechanism
allowing defendants who could no longer be convicted of murder
because of the changes made to sections 188 and 189 to petition
for resentencing. (Lewis, supra, at p. 959.) To obtain relief, a
defendant convicted of murder must allege that he could have
been convicted under the felony murder rule, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or another theory of
imputed malice (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)); and could not now be
convicted “because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)).

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When a properly pleaded petition for resentencing is filed,
the trial court must conduct a prima facie analysis to determine
the defendant’s eligibility for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3) & (c);
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708; Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 957, 960.) “[T]he prima facie inquiry . . . is limited
. . . . “ ‘[T]he court takes [a] [defendant]’s factual allegations as
true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the
[defendant] would be entitled to relief if his or her factual
allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to
show cause’ ” ” and set the matter of an evidentiary hearing.
(Lewis, at p. 971.)
In making this assessment, the trial court may consider the
defendant’s record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 970–971.) In particular, if jury instructions delivered at trial
foreclose the possibility, as a matter of law, that a defendant was
convicted on a now-invalid theory of murder, the trial court may
deny the petition at the prima facie stage. (See People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 470.)
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to deny a section
1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Ervin (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)
II. Analysis
The record here conclusively establishes the jury convicted
Trejo based on his intent to kill the victim. The jury returned
two special circumstance findings regarding the murder
conviction, each of which required a specific finding that Trejo
intentionally killed the victim. (CALJIC. No. 8.81.15.1 [“To find
that the special circumstance [of] . . . murder by means of lying in
wait is true, each of the following facts must be proved: [¶] [(1)]
[T]he defendant intentionally killed the victim . . . .”; CALJIC

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No. 8.81.17.1 [“To find that the special circumstance [of] . . .
murder in the commission of kidnapping is true, it must be
proved: [¶¶] [(2)] [t]he defendant had the specific intent to kill.”];
see also CALJIC 1.11 [the word “defendant” applies “to each
defendant”]).) We presume the jury understood and followed
these instructions (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852),
especially where, as here, the language of the instruction was
repeated on the verdict form, and required the jury to find true
that Trejo “intentionally killed the victim by means of lying in
wait[.]”
Trejo argues that the general special circumstances
instruction contained in CALJIC No. 8.80.1 “created an
ambiguity” suggesting the jury could return true special
circumstance findings if he had either “an intent to kill” or “was a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.”5 He says this is especially so, because his trial was held in
2014, before our Supreme Court clarified legal standards guiding
interpretation of the terms “major participant” and “reckless

5 CALJIC No. 8.80.1 reads, in relevant part: “If you find that
a defendant was not the actual killer of a human being,
or if you are unable to decide whether the defendant was the
actual killer or an aider and abettor, you cannot find the special
circumstance to be true as to that defendant unless you are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such defendant with the
intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted any actor in the commission of
the murder in the first degree, or with reckless indifference to
human life and as a major participant, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted in the
commission of the crime of kidnapping which resulted in the
death of a human being.”

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indifference to human life” (People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th
788; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522). Trejo urges there
remains a possibility that he was convicted based on an improper
theory of murder liability.
Not so. Our Supreme Court has declared “‘[i]t is
fundamental that jurors are presumed to be intelligent and
capable of understanding and applying the court’s instructions.’
[Citation.] ‘“A defendant challenging an instruction as being
subject to erroneous interpretation by the jury must demonstrate
a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction
in the way asserted by the defendant.”’” (People v. Bryant, Smith
and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 433 (Bryant et al.).) We
cannot presume the jury misunderstood or failed to follow the
court’s instructions on the law. (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6
Cal.5th 367, 431.)
It is also not reasonably likely that the jury misinterpreted
the instructions. As described above, both special circumstances
jury instructions (CALJIC Nos. 8.81.15.1, 8.81.17.1) required the
jury to find that Trejo harbored an independent intent to kill the
victim. These intent requirements correspond with the first half
of CALJIC No. 8.80.1, which provides that a special circumstance
finding can be found true when an aider and abettor acts with
intent to kill. Trejo’s theory of instructional ambiguity would
require the jury to ignore the express intent requirements in
CALJIC Nos. 8.81.51.1 and 8.81.71.1, and instead apply the
alternate major participant standard, which appears nowhere
else in the jury instructions and was not on the verdict form. The
jury would also have to disregard the instruction to “not single
out any particular sentence or any individual point or instruction

8
and ignore the others[,]” but to “[c]onsider the instructions as a
whole and each in light of all the others.” (CALJIC No. 1.01.)
Read together as a whole, in order to find the lying in wait
and kidnapping murder special circumstance instructions true,
the jury had to find that Trejo personally acted with an intent to
kill.6 (See Bryant et al., supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 433 [“‘“‘[T]he
correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the
entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an
instruction or from a particular instruction’”’”].) The jury
necessarily found that Trejo intended to kill the victim. Thus, he
is not eligible for relief because he could not now be convicted of
murder “because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)).
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.
SIGGINS*
We concur:

6 Our conclusion that the jury necessarily found that Trejo
intended to kill the victim renders moot his alternate argument
that alleged ambiguities in the aiding and abetting instructions
allowed the jury to improperly apply an imputed malice theory.

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
RICHARDSON

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