People v. Ayala CA4/1

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Filed 1/21/26 P. v. Ayala CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084713

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE418567)

JOYCE ADELI AYALA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
John M. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded
with directions.
Stephanie M. Adraktas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Anastasia Sagorsky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
A jury convicted Joyce Adeli Ayala of one count of inflicting corporal

injury on a child (Pen. Code, § 273d, subd. (a)).1 The trial court sentenced
Ayala to 365 days in jail, but stayed the term pending successful completion
of four years of formal probation. On appeal from the judgment, Ayala
asserts the trial court erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury on her right to
reasonable parental discipline and modifying the self-defense pattern
instruction, (2) failing to instruct on lesser included offenses, and (3) failing
to instruct on unanimity. In addition, Ayala asserts the probationary term
imposed by the court that authorizes the search of her electronic devices is
unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and
unconstitutionally overbroad.
As we explain, we reject Ayala’s first three appellate contentions but
agree that the electronic search condition is unreasonably broad under Lent.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction in part and remand with
instructions to strike the electronic search condition and consider whether a
more narrowly tailored or alternative condition would be reasonable. The
judgment is otherwise affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Case
On June 28, 2023, 15-year-old J.I. and his younger sister were at home
with their mother, Ayala, when J.I. heard Ayala arguing on the telephone
with their father, L.I. At the time, Ayala and L.I. were separated and in the
process of divorcing. When the call ended, Ayala stormed into J.I.’s bedroom
and asked him to help her with the laundry. J.I. testified that he “wasn’t
feeling the best” that day, and had been dealing with headaches and
congestion all week. J.I. responded to Ayala’s request with a “little attitude”

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
and she walked out of his room. J.I. said his mother thought she heard him
call her a “fucking retard,” which caused her to storm back into his room and
hit him. J.I. testified that he did not say those words, but did mutter under
his breath that he did not want to help.
J.I. testified that he could not remember if Ayala hit or slapped him,
but knew she tried to grab his cell phone from his hand. J.I. said he was
lying on his bed and Ayala climbed on top of him, straddling J.I. between her
legs. Ayala continued to hit J.I. as she demanded that he give her his phone.
J.I. testified that Ayala also bit his arm hard. J.I. stated that as he tried to
get out from under Ayala by sliding down off his bed, she choked him with
her legs around his neck. J.I. stated he could not breathe and thought he was
going to pass out. His vision became blurry and started to dim, but he was
able to use his hand to slide out onto the floor.
Once free, J.I. ran into the hallway. J.I. and Ayala then ended up on
the floor, but J.I. could not remember how they got there. He testified that
Ayala again bit him hard, this time on the leg. J.I. did not remember exactly
how the altercation, which was a year before trial, ended. He did remember
that Ayala eventually went outside to load the laundry into her car and she
“threw an apple sauce at” him before leaving. J.I. testified that he never hit
his mother or tried to fight back, and he did not pull her to the ground in the
hallway. He said he repeatedly asked her to stop her attack and let him call
his father. J.I. also testified that Ayala hit him both with a closed fist and
slapped him with an open hand.
During the altercation, Ayala’s downstairs neighbor heard loud
banging and thought furniture was being thrown above. The commotion
caused a light fixture to fly off her wall onto the floor. The neighbor also
heard J.I. begging his mother to stop and leave him alone. The neighbor then

3
witnessed Ayala and her daughter leave the apartment and get into her car.
She heard Ayala screaming back to J.I. that he was “a narcissist” and “[w]hy
were you raised like a narcissist?” She then saw J.I. sitting on the stairwell
near her front door crying, and she called the police. The neighbor testified
Ayala was irate and did not appear injured or afraid. The neighbor also
testified that she had heard Ayala curse and yell at her children frequently in
the past.
Another neighbor, who lived below Ayala and one apartment to the
side, also heard the altercation. As she was vacuuming, she heard banging.
She turned off her vacuum and went outside to see what was going on. The
neighbor then heard J.I. screaming for help. Moments later, the neighbor
saw Ayala run down the stairs to her car, where her daughter was, and heard
Ayala scream at the top of her lungs, “this is what happens when you have
sex with a narcissist, you have a narcissist for the child.” The neighbor
testified that Ayala was walking normally and did not appear injured. This
neighbor also heard Ayala banging on her own apartment door and yelling,
“let me in.”
Shortly after Ayala left, Sheriff’s Deputy Christina Rodriguez arrived
at the apartment in response to the neighbor’s report. Rodriguez spoke with
J.I. and the neighbors. She noticed J.I. had redness on his neck and arms,
and bruising on his face. J.I. was visibly upset and told Rodriguez what
happened. Rodriguez also saw that J.I. had bite marks on his left wrist and
one of his legs, and scratch marks on his neck. At some point later,
Rodriguez met with Ayala. At that time, Ayala had an injury to her leg,
which was wrapped, and she was using crutches.
J.I.’s younger sister, who was ten years old at the time of trial, testified
that she saw her mother on top of J.I. and did not see her brother hit her

4
mother or put her in a headlock. L.I. testified that at the time of the incident
he and Ayala were in the midst of divorcing, and that J.I. had been having
some behavioral issues, but the issues were minor, “typical teenage stuff,”
like “mouthing off back.”
B. Defense Case
Ayala testified in her own defense. She told the jury that she and J.I.’s
father were divorcing at the time of the altercation with J.I. Around the
same time, J.I. had started to become more volatile and disrespectful, which
Ayala attributed to him being a teenager. She explained that on the day of
the fight, she and her daughter were gathering clothes to put into the car to
take to the laundromat, while J.I. played video games in his room. When she
asked J.I. to help, he refused and made disrespectful comments into his
gaming headset to his friends about Ayala.
Ayala heard the comments and responded by trying to take J.I.’s phone
away from him. She denied hitting or slapping J.I., but explained that the
interaction became physical because he was resisting her from taking the
phone. Ayala testified that she and J.I. began “wrestling and fighting” over
the phone. She said any injury J.I. sustained was from Ayala defending
herself. She also stated that J.I. choked her by putting his arm on her neck,
and that she bit his arm instinctively to force him to release her. Ayala
testified that if she bit J.I.’s leg it was also in self-defense, and that if she
climbed on top of him it was “to stop [him from] putting hands on his
mother.”
Ayala testified that after the fight ended, she had bruises all over her
body, and that during the wrestling, J.I. flipped her over and her foot hit a
door. When the fight ended, Ayala left to go to the laundromat. When she

5
arrived, Ayala realized her foot injury was severe, so she drove herself to the
hospital.
On cross-examination, Ayala accused J.I. of lying on the witness stand
and said that it was J.I.’s fault that he and his sister were no longer in
Ayala’s custody. She testified that J.I. had “narcissistic tendencies” and told
the jury that the prosecution was using “narcissistic tactics” against her.
C. Verdict and Sentencing
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Ayala guilty of the single
charge she faced, inflicting corporal injury upon a child in violation of
section 273d, subdivision (a). The following month, the court sentenced Ayala
to 365 days in county jail, but stayed the term pending Ayala’s successful
completion of four years of formal probation.
Ayala timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
The Trial Court Properly Rejected a Jury Instruction on Reasonable Parental
Discipline and Modified the Self-Defense Instruction
A
Additional Background
During the discussion of jury instructions between the trial court and
the parties, Ayala’s counsel brought up CALCRIM No. 3405, which defines

6
the parental right to reasonably discipline a child.2 After reviewing the
instruction, the court stated, “I’m not so sure the facts suggest that physical
force was used for purposes of discipline.” Defense counsel replied, “And I
don’t necessarily disagree with that, Your Honor; however, I think the fact
that discipline was mentioned during the testimony, I think that it should be
given just in an abundance of caution. The … punishment was essentially
the taking away of the phone, and so the force used to take the phone. I
think that the … bite allegation is something separate.”
The court and the parties then discussed how to properly word the
instruction. The court stated, “If I start it by saying, ‘A parent is not guilty of
the crime charged if she used justifiable physical force in the taking of the
phone,’ that’s an incorrect statement of the law.” The court continued, “Then
what happens after the—if there was a confrontation, where she initiates the
physical activity, then she could be guilty of the crime, and she’s not absolved
of guilt merely by the fact that she did not use excessive force in taking the
phone. You see what I’m saying? I don’t know how to … address it. Because
this isn’t … the gravamen of this case is not a suggestion that some method of
discipline was inappropriately applied.” The court then asked Ayala’s
counsel how to word the instruction without misstating the law, and she
responded that she was struggling to find appropriate wording.

2 The instruction states: “A [parent] is not guilty of <insert crime> if
(he/she) used (justifiable physical force/ [(a/or) another] justifiable method) to
discipline a child. (Physical force/ [or] <insert other method of punishment>)
is justifiable if a reasonable person would find that punishment was
necessary under the circumstances and that the (physical force/ [or] method)
used was reasonable. [¶] The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the (force/ [or] method of punishment) used was not justifiable. If the
People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of
<insert crime>.” (CALCRIM No. 3405.)
7
The court posited that the defense was entirely self-defense: Ayala did
not deny physical contact with J.I., but testified that any contact was only to
defend herself. Ayala’s counsel agreed, stating, “it’s a self-defense case and
that is the crux of the argument.” The court and counsel then discussed
CALCRIM No. 822, which defines the elements of inflicting corporal injury on
a child, and states as its third element: “When the defendant acted, she was
not reasonably disciplining a child.” (CALCRIM No. 822.)
The court stated, “I really don’t see how I can … word 3405. It’s not the
… law given the facts of this case or the charge that Ms. Ayala is facing. It
clearly isn’t … You can’t … submit something to [the jury] to say [Ayala] is
not guilty of Count 1 if she used reasonable force or a reasonable method to
discipline the child, because the method—the discipline of the child was the
taking of the phone. She didn’t throw him in a corner or put him in a bin or
anything of that nature. There was no … suggestion that he was being
struck because of … ‘I was mad at him so I was spanking him.’ She didn’t
testify to that.” Ayala’s counsel then reiterated that she was struggling with
how to correctly word the instruction and suggested “leav[ing] it as general as
possible.” The court responded “the general instruction as to the facts of our
case is embodied in Element 3 of 822” and defense counsel submitted on the
issue. The court concluded it was rejecting the parental discipline
instruction, over defense counsel’s objection, because it was “not intended for
the facts of our particular case.”
With respect to self-defense, the court stated, “[CALCRIM No.] 3470 is
the right to self-defense and that now has to be given based upon Ms. Ayala’s
testimony. I modified it … only in the sense that … it’s not defense of
another, it’s not immediate danger of being touched unlawfully. This was
immediate danger of suffering … bodily injury.” The pattern instruction

8
reads, in part, “1. The defendant reasonably believed that she was in
imminent danger of suffering bodily injury [or was in imminent danger of
being touched unlawfully].” Ayala’s counsel offered no comment on the court
deleting the bracketed portion of the instruction.
The court instructed the jury as to Count 1 that the People had to
prove: “1. The Defendant willfully inflicted cruel or inhumane physical
punishment or an injury on a child. [¶] 2. The punishment or injury inflicted
by the defendant caused a traumatic physical condition to the child. [¶]
3. When the defendant acted, she was not reasonably disciplining a child.”
The court also provided CALCRIM No. 3470, on self-defense, which
instructed the jury, “The defendant is not guilty of the crime if she used force
against another person in lawful self-defense. The defendant acted in lawful
self-defense if [¶] 1. The defendant reasonably believed that she was in
imminent danger of suffering bodily injury; [¶] 2. The defendant reasonably
believed that the immediate use of force was necessary to defend against that
danger; [¶] and [¶] 3. The defendant used no more force than was reasonably
necessary to defend against that danger.”
B
Legal Standards
A court may only instruct the jury as to correct statements of the law.
(People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835.) Argumentative or confusing
instructions must not be given. (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 805.)
In determining the adequacy of jury instructions, a reviewing court evaluates
“the entire charge of the court and assume[s] jurors are intelligent people

9
capable of understanding and correlating all the instructions given.” (People
v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1316.)
This court reviews claims of instructional error de novo. (People v.
Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) Further, “[w]e look to the instructions as a
whole and the entire record of trial, including arguments of counsel.
[Citation.] Where reasonably possible, we interpret the instructions ‘ “to
support the judgment rather than to defeat it.” ’ ” (People v. Mason (2013)
218 Cal.App.4th 818, 825.)
C
Analysis
Ayala argues that the trial court erred by not providing CALCRIM
No. 3405 because there was substantial evidence that she used reasonable
discipline at the beginning of the altercation. Specifically, she asserts the
instruction was required because the law allowed her to use reasonable force
to take J.I.’s cell phone from him. Ayala also contends the court erred by not
providing the instruction because it was not, as the court stated, inconsistent
with her theory of self-defense. Finally, she argues the error was
“compounded” by the trial court’s modification of the self-defense instruction
to remove a portion concerning a defendant’s right to defend against simple
battery.
The Attorney General responds that the court’s decision not to give
CALCRIM No. 3405 was appropriate because there was no evidence that
Ayala was attempting to use reasonable force to discipline J.I. at the start of
the altercation. Further, he asserts that the trial court correctly concluded
that the instruction was incompatible with the defense’s theory that Ayala
was not guilty because she acted only in self-defense. Finally, the Attorney
General asserts that Ayala’s argument concerning the court’s removal of the

10
portion of the self-defense instruction concerning simple battery was forfeited
and, in any event, any error on this point was harmless.
As an initial matter, we agree with the Attorney General that Ayala’s
failure to object to the trial court’s modification of the self-defense instruction
forfeited the claim of error on appeal. (See People v. Mora and Rangel (2018)
5 Cal.5th 442, 471 [“failure to object to wording of jury instruction forfeits
appellate claim of error”].) Even if the issue had not been forfeited, however,
we hold the trial court did not err by excluding the bracketed portion of the
pattern instruction pertaining to unlawful touching. “[T]he trial court must
instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the
evidence.” (People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 239.) The court’s omission
of this portion was appropriate because there was no evidence showing Ayala
reasonably believed she was in imminent danger of simple battery by J.I.
Rather, her testimony was that J.I. was “wrestling and fighting” with her, he
“chok[ed]” her to the point that she thought she would faint, and she had
bruises over her entire body and injury to her foot due to J.I. “flipping” her.
This conduct was beyond the realm of simple battery. Accordingly, the trial
court appropriately chose to exclude that portion of the instruction.
Likewise, the trial court appropriately concluded there was no evidence
to support Ayala’s assertion that CALCRIM No. 3405 was required. Further,
any error was harmless because the instruction for the crime of which Ayala
was convicted, CALCRIM No. 822, required the jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that “[w]hen the defendant acted, she was not reasonably
disciplining a child.” As the trial court noted during the discussion about the
instruction, the only evidence presented concerning discipline was Ayala’s
statement that she intended to take J.I.’s phone away from him for refusing
to help with the laundry and using disrespectful language. There was no

11
evidence that Ayala used any “physical force” or “method of punishment” to
take away J.I.’s phone. Further, Ayala’s act of taking the phone away from
J.I. did not form the basis for the charge against her. Rather, Ayala was
accused of physically attacking J.I.—specifically, repeatedly punching and
hitting him, strangling him between her legs, and biting him twice. This
evidence did not support an instruction on reasonable parental discipline.
In addition, Ayala did not assert that her physical assault on J.I. was a
form of discipline. Rather, her sole defense was that J.I. was attacking her
for taking his phone and that any injury he sustained was a result of Ayala
trying to defend herself. This self-defense theory, as the trial court found,

was incompatible with Ayala’s defense of reasonable parental discipline.3
(See People v. Checketts (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1197 [“It is well settled
that the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on a particular defense
‘ “only if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there

3 Ayala cites People v. Whitehurst (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045 to support
her argument that there was sufficient evidence for the instruction on
reasonable parental discipline. In Whitehurst, the defendant slapped his
stepdaughter after she repeatedly interrupted his conversation with her
mother and was later convicted of inflicting corporal injury on a child
resulting in a traumatic condition. (Id. at pp. 1047–1048.) In reversing the
judgment based on the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on reasonable
parental discipline, the Court of Appeal explained, “Defendant’s theory of the
case as presented from not only his testimony but that of his wife and his
stepdaughter as well was that he simply was disciplining [his stepdaughter]
for continuing to interrupt and that he did not hit her very hard.” (Id. at
pp. 1049–1050.) Indeed, defendant’s only theory was that he was reasonably
disciplining his stepdaughter. (Ibid.) In contrast, Ayala’s only defense was
that J.I. attacked her when she tried to take his phone and that any injury he
sustained was the result of self-defense. As Ayala’s attorney acknowledged in
the discussion of CALCRIM No. 3405, she did not assert that J.I.’s injuries
were sustained as a result of reasonable parental discipline.
12
is substantial evidence supportive of such defense and the defense is not
inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.” ’ ”].)
II
The Trial Court Did Not Err by Failing to Instruct
the Jury on Lesser Included Offenses
Ayala next contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury
on the lesser included offenses of simple assault and simply battery. The
Attorney General responds that the error was invited by Ayala’s counsel and
thus waived for purposes of appeal and, even if not waived, any error was
harmless.
During discussion of the jury instructions, defense counsel stated,
“With regard to lessers, I do think that simple assault and simple battery are
lessers. However, I just wanted to make a record that I am not requesting
those because I think it’s either self-defense or it’s not, and so I don’t
necessarily know that we need those at this time.” The court replied that the
record would so reflect, and did not instruct on either lesser included offense.
As a general rule, courts must instruct on lesser included offenses that
are supported by the evidence, even over a defendant’s objection. “ ‘ “ ‘ “It is
settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court
must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by
the evidence. [Citations.] ...” [Citation.] That obligation has been held to
include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence
raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense
were present [citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense
was less than that charged. [Citations.] The obligation to instruct on lesser
included offenses exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not
only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being

13
given.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Medellin (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 525 (Medellin),
citing People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 114.)
Despite this policy, “ ‘the claim may be waived under the doctrine of
invited error if trial counsel both ‘ “intentionally caused the trial court to
err” ’ and clearly did so for tactical reasons. [Citation.] Invited error will be
found, however, only if counsel expresses a deliberate tactical purpose in
resisting or acceding to the complained-of instruction.’ ” (Medellin, supra, 45
Cal.App.5th at p. 525.) The invited error doctrine applies here.
In Medellin, the court applied the doctrine where the defense attorney
told the court the defense was not asking for lesser included offenses and
responded, “Yes, your honor” to the trial court’s question as to whether there
were legitimate strategic purposes for making the request. (Medellin, supra,
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 524.) Here, Ayala’s counsel did not have to be asked.
Rather, she volunteered for the “record” that she was “not requesting those
because I think it’s either self-defense or it’s not,” expressing a clear tactical
purpose for refusing the instructions. Ayala’s reasons were logical in light of
her reliance on the defense that she injured J.I. only in self-defense, and that
she did not intentionally assault him. Given the weight she placed on her
defense, Ayala apparently decided the evidence was strong enough to create
reasonable doubt and the possibility of a complete acquittal.
“Allowing the defense to cause the error, lose at trial, and automatically
obtain a reversal on appeal would reward the defense’s failed gambit and
eliminate the [invited error] rule’s purpose.” (Medellin, supra, 45
Cal.App.5th at p. 526.) This case presents a textbook example of invited
error in the context of lesser included offense instructions. Accordingly, we
hold the trial court’s failure to give the instructions here does not require
reversal.

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III
The Trial Court Did Not Err by Failing to Provide a Unanimity Instruction
Ayala next asserts the court erred by not instructing the jury on
unanimity. Specifically, she contends that because the evidence indicated
she inflicted several injuries on J.I., slapping, punching and biting him, the
jury was required to agree on one specific act to convict her of inflicting
corporal injury on a child. The Attorney General responds that because
Ayala was charged with, and the evidence showed, one continuous assault on
J.I., the jury did not need to agree on a single underlying assaultive act. The
Attorney General also argues that any error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
As discussed, “ ‘[a]ssertions of instructional error are reviewed de novo.’
[Citation.] Whether or not the trial court should have given a ‘particular
instruction in any particular case entails the resolution of a mixed question of
law and fact,’ which is ‘predominantly legal.’ [Citation.] As such, it should be
examined without deference.” (People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th
559, 568 (Hernandez).)
The requirement that the jury be instructed on unanimity in certain
cases is based on the foundational principle that “[i]n a criminal case, a jury
verdict must be unanimous.” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132
(Russo).) “[C]ases have long held that when the evidence suggests more than
one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the crimes or the
court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act. [Citations.]
[¶] This requirement of unanimity as to the criminal act ‘is intended to
eliminate the danger that the defendant will be convicted even though there

15
is no single offense which all the jurors agree the defendant committed.’ ”
(Ibid.)
“A unanimity instruction is required only if the jurors could otherwise
disagree which act a defendant committed and yet convict him of the crime
charged.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 423.) “[T]he unanimity
instruction is appropriate ‘when conviction on a single count could be based
on two or more discrete criminal events,’ but not ‘where multiple theories or
acts may form the basis of a guilty verdict on one discrete criminal event.’
[Citation.] In deciding whether to give the instruction, the trial court must
ask whether (1) there is a risk the jury may divide on two discrete crimes and
not agree on any particular crime, or (2) the evidence merely presents the
possibility the jury may divide, or be uncertain, as to the exact way the
defendant is guilty of a single discrete crime. In the first situation, but not
the second, it should give the unanimity instruction.” (Russo, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 1135.) “A requirement of jury unanimity typically applies to
acts that could have been charged as separate offenses.” (Maury, at p. 422.)
California case law has developed an exception for cases involving a
“continuous course of conduct.” (People v. Lueth (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 189,
196 (Lueth).) The “ ‘continuous-course-of-conduct exception’ to the
requirement of a unanimity instruction,” however, is really “a catch-all term,
which, somewhat confusingly, embraces two wholly distinct principles. [¶]
First, the continuous-course-of-conduct exception applies ‘ “when ... the
statute contemplates a continuous course of conduct of a series of acts over a
period of time” [citation].’ [Citation.] For example, where the defendant is
charged with one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child (… § 288.5),

16
even if based on a series of acts over time, a unanimity instruction is not
required.” (Lueth, at p. 196.)
“Second, the continuous-course-of-conduct exception applies when
(1) ‘the acts are so closely connected in time as to form part of one
transaction,’ (2) ‘the defendant tenders the same defense or defenses to each
act,’ and (3) ‘there is no reasonable basis for the jury to distinguish between
them. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘This exception “ ‘is meant to apply not to all
crimes occurring during a single transaction but only to those “where the acts
testified to are so closely related in time and place that the jurors reasonably
must either accept or reject the victim’s testimony in toto.” ’ ” ’ ” (Lueth,
supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 196.)
However, it is not “clear that this is truly an exception.” (Lueth, supra,
206 Cal.App.4th at p. 196.) Rather, more accurately, “in this situation, a
unanimity instruction is required, but the failure to give one is harmless.
(See People v. Arevalo–Iraheta (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1589 [‘the
omission of a unanimity instruction [is] harmless if the record reveals “no
rational basis ... by which the jury could have distinguished between [the acts
which would constitute the offenses]” ’].)” (Lueth, at p. 196.) Stated another
way, the failure to give a unanimity instruction is harmless “where the
defendant offered the same defense to all criminal acts, and ‘the jury’s verdict
implies that it did not believe the only defense offered.’ ” (Hernandez, supra,
217 Cal.App.4th at p. 577.)
Here, J.I. testified to being slapped, punched, strangled, and bitten
twice by his mother. Each action was merely an alternate way of proving the
element that Ayala “willfully inflicted cruel or inhuman physical punishment
or injury on a child,” rather than each act constituting a separate chargeable
offense. The multiple assaultive acts constituted the single criminal event of

17
Ayala inflicting corporal injury on J.I. In other words, the acts formed a
continuous course of conduct and one transaction. Thus, the jury was not
required to agree on one underlying act, and no unanimity instruction was
necessary in this case.
IV
The Electronic Search Condition Is Not Reasonable
Ayala’s final contention is the court erred by imposing a probation
condition that required her to submit to searches of her computers,

recordable media, and electronic devices.4 She argues this condition is not
reasonable under Lent and is also unconstitutionally overbroad. The
Attorney General argues the condition satisfies the requirements of Lent.
However, he tacitly concedes that “the term is overbroad in terms of [Ayala]’s
constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment, and her privacy rights”
by presenting no argument against this conclusion.
A
Legal Standards
“The Legislature has placed in trial judges a broad discretion in the
sentencing process, including the determination as to whether probation is
appropriate and, if so, the conditions thereof.” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at
p. 486.) Under this grant of discretion, a trial court may impose any

4 The probation condition states in full that Ayala shall “[s]ubmit person,
vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, and recordable
media including electronic devices to search at any time with or without a
warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by [a
probation officer] or law enforcement officer.” At sentencing, Ayala’s counsel
asked the court to “delete computers, recordable media, and electronic devices
from the Fourth waiver or narrowly tailor that Fourth waiver to ensure
compliance with the criminal protective order that will be sought by the
prosecution.” The court denied the request without explanation.
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“reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end
that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach
of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and
generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the
probationer.” (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) “[W]e ‘ “review conditions of probation for
abuse of discretion.” ’ [Citation.] Specifically, we review a probation
condition ‘for an indication that the condition is “arbitrary or capricious” or
otherwise exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.’ ” (In re
Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118 (Ricardo P.).)
In Lent, the Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to determine
whether a probation condition is reasonable and, therefore, statutorily valid.
“ ‘Generally, “[a] condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it
‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted,
(2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or
forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality....’
[Citation.]” [Citation.] This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be
satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.’ (People v.
Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379, quoting Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.)
Furthermore, ‘[a] probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s
constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of
the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.’ (In
re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) ‘The essential question in an
overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate
purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s
constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such

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matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some
infringement.’ ” (In People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723.)
B
Analysis
The People do not dispute that the first two prongs of the Lent test are
satisfied. Therefore, we focus our attention on the third prong—whether the
electronic device search condition is reasonably related to future criminality.
(Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Our inquiry on this subject is guided by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th 1113.
In that case, a juvenile defendant admitted two counts of felony
burglary and made statements to his probation officer indicating he may
have been under the influence of marijuana when he committed the offense.
(Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1116–1117.) The juvenile court placed
the defendant on probation and, as a condition of probation, required him to
submit his electronic devices, including passwords, to warrantless searches.
(Ibid.) Although there was no indication the defendant used an electronic
device or social media in connection with the burglaries, the juvenile court
imposed the electronic device search condition to monitor his compliance with
other probation conditions prohibiting his use or possession of illegal drugs.
(Id. at pp. 1115, 1122.) The juvenile court justified the electronic device
search condition on grounds “ ‘that minors typically will brag about their
marijuana usage or drug usage, particularly their marijuana usage, by
posting on the Internet, showing pictures of themselves with paraphernalia,
or smoking marijuana. It’s a very important part of being able to monitor
drug usage and particularly marijuana usage.’ ” (Id. at p. 1117.) On appeal,

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the Supreme Court concluded this rationale did not justify the broad
electronic device search condition.
As the Supreme Court explained, “Lent’s requirement that a probation
condition must be ‘ “reasonably related to future criminality” ’ contemplates a
degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation
condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition.” (Ricardo P.,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1122.) In the case of an electronic search condition, the
probationer’s privacy interest is “significantly burden[ed]” due to the sheer
scope and nature of information stored on modern electronic devices. (Id. at
p. 1123.) This heavy burden on the probationer’s privacy interests does not
render all electronic device search conditions categorically invalid. (Id. at
pp. 1128–1129.) However, it requires a “correspondingly substantial and
particularized justification” for the condition. (Id. at p. 1126.) There was no
such justification in Ricardo P., given that “nothing in the record suggest[ed]
that [the defendant had] ever used an electronic device or social media in
connection with criminal conduct.” (Id. at p. 1122.) In the absence of a
proportional justification for the condition, the condition was not “reasonably
related to future criminality and [was] therefore invalid under Lent.” (Id. at
p. 1128.)
The facts here are similar to those at issue in Ricardo P. and compel us
to conclude the electronic search condition imposed on Ayala is not
reasonably related to her future criminality. Like the condition struck in
Ricardo P., the condition challenged in this case imposes a heavy burden on
the probationer’s privacy interests because it permits a probation officer or
law enforcement officer, “at any time with or without a warrant,” to conduct
searches of the probationer’s computer and cell phone. Further, as in
Ricardo P., there is no indication that Ayala used a computer or cell phone to

21
engage in criminal conduct. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1116.) Nor is
there any indication in the record that she will use such devices in connection
with a criminal offense. On this record, we conclude the burden the
electronic device search condition imposes on Ayala is substantially
disproportionate to the state interests furthered by the condition.
The Attorney General contends the broad electronic device search
condition is justified because the probation officer who evaluated Ayala
recommended a term of imprisonment and doubted her ability to comply with
the terms of probation. In addition, the probation officer’s report stated
Ayala told the officer she wanted J.I. to live with her, but the court imposed a
criminal protective order preventing Ayala from contacting J.I. for four years.
Thus, the Attorney General argues the electronic search condition is
appropriate to ensure Ayala is not contacting J.I. by electronic means in
violation of the protective order. However, there was no evidence showing
that Ayala’s criminal conduct—physical child abuse—was related in any way
to her use of electronic devices or computers. Thus, we cannot conclude that
the unconstrained electronic search condition was sufficiently related to

Ayala’s potential future criminality under Lent’s third prong.5
As the Attorney General suggests, on remand the trial court may
impose a condition that Ayala’s electronic devices are subject to search only
with respect to “any modes and means of possibly contacting [J.I.], such as
social media platforms, applications, email, text messaging, and phone
functions,” and excluding medical, legal, or financial records. As the Attorney
General states, a more limited term could both serve the state’s legitimate

5 Because we conclude the electronic search condition is unreasonable
under the Lent test, we do not consider whether it is unconstitutionally
overbroad.
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interest in preventing Ayala from violating the criminal protective order
while also limiting any infringement on her privacy rights.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed in part and the matter is remanded with
instructions to strike the portion of Ayala’s probation condition requiring her
to submit her “computers, and recordable media including electronic devices”
to warrantless searches. The trial court may consider whether to impose a
more targeted or alternative condition consistent with this opinion and
Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th 1113. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

KELETY, J.

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