People v. Zaczkiewicz CA4/1

CourtListener 10777526CalctappJan 21, 2026

Full text

Filed 1/21/26 P. v. Zaczkiewicz CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084817

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN442815)

SUAVEA ANTHONY ZACZKIEWICZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Laura E. Duffy, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, Andrew Mestman, and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
After a night of socializing, Alana G. spurned the romantic advances of
Suavea Anthony Zaczkiewicz, a community college classmate who suffers
from delusional disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and
substance abuse issues. Over the next month, Zaczkiewicz sent hundreds of
troubling text messages, e-mails, and social media communications to Alana,
including messages threatening to slit her throat, make her bleed out, throw
her body in a ditch, kill her four-year-old son, and kill himself. He also
accosted Alana in public. Based on this conduct, a jury found Zaczkiewicz
guilty of one count of felony stalking and two counts of making criminal
threats.
On appeal from the judgment of conviction, Zaczkiewicz presents two
claims of error. First, he contends the trial court erred by denying his motion
for pretrial mental-health diversion because substantial evidence does not
support the court’s factual finding that he posed an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety. Second, he argues Penal Code section 654 required
the trial court to stay the punishment for two of his three convictions because
they all arose from the same physical act or, alternatively, he acted pursuant

to a single criminal objective.1
We reject Zaczkiewicz’s argument concerning the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the trial court’s pretrial diversion ruling. We also reject
his claim that section 654 required the court to stay the punishment for two
of his three convictions. However, we conclude that section 654 required the
court to stay the punishment for one of his two criminal threat convictions

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
(counts 2 and 3). Therefore, we modify the judgment to stay the punishment
for count 3. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
II
BACKGROUND
A second amended information charged Zaczkiewicz with one count of
stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a); count 1) and two counts of making a criminal
threat against Alana (§ 422; counts 2 & 3). It alleged he suffered three prior
strike convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12), and two serious felony priors (§ 667, subd. (a)). It
also alleged two aggravating circumstances: (1) his prior criminal convictions
were numerous and of increasing seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(b)(2)); and (2) he served a prior prison term (id., rule 4.421(b)(3)).
As we will discuss, the defense filed a motion for pretrial diversion to
postpone the criminal proceedings and allow Zaczkiewicz to undergo mental
health treatment. After a hearing, the trial court found Zaczkiewicz was not
suitable for pretrial diversion because he posed an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety. Therefore, the court denied the pretrial diversion
request and the case proceeded to trial.
A. Prosecution Case
Alana met Zaczkiewicz in August 2022, while they were both students
at the same community college. They had classes together in the fall 2022
semester and another class together in the spring 2023 semester. Their
relationship was cordial and platonic. They occasionally socialized and
studied together with other students. She also gave him rides to a bus stop
on the way to pick up her four-year-old son from preschool.

3
On February 27, 2023, Zaczkiewicz sent a text message to Alana while

she was at a shopping center with her friend, Sarah.2 Zaczkiewicz offered to
give a tablet device to Alana’s son. Alana felt uncomfortable accepting the
gift, but she and Sarah agreed to meet Zaczkiewicz for a drink at a food hall
in the shopping center. The group met that afternoon, had drinks, and spent
a few hours at the food hall.
At about 5:00 p.m., after Sarah left, Zaczkiewicz and Alana continued
hanging out. Zaczkiewicz accompanied Alana as she picked up her son from
preschool, stopped at a gas station for beer, and drove to her mother’s home.
There, Alana made dinner for Zaczkiewicz, her son, her mother, and herself.
Alana put her son to bed and the three adults watched television.
At about 10:00 p.m., Alana asked Zaczkiewicz to leave because it was
getting late. He told her he was ordering an Uber, but he apparently never
requested one. A half hour later, she again asked him to leave, and he again
said he was ordering an Uber. While they were ostensibly waiting for the
Uber, Alana received a phone call from her boyfriend and took the call from
the bathroom. Zaczkiewicz banged on the bathroom door and became upset,
frustrated, and argumentative. At another point in the evening, Zaczkiewicz
kissed Alana on the lips. She described the encounter as “weird and
awkward,” and she backed away when he kissed her. As the night wore on,
Alana and her mother asked Zaczkiewicz to leave the house dozens of times,
and he finally left shortly after midnight.
When Alana awoke the next morning, she had received dozens of angry
and troubling text messages from Zaczkiewicz. In one message, he said,
“don’t ever in your life talk to another dude you fucking with around me.” In

2 Unless otherwise noted, all dates referenced in this opinion shall be to
dates from the year 2023.
4
another message, he said, “I’m just mad, Alana. That’s it. Like, I fucking
hate my life.” In another message, he asked her to allow him to sleep in her
car because he was homeless. He also called her vulgar names and claimed
she had disrespected him. Alana replied to Zaczkiewicz and told him she was
not romantically interested in him, he had made her mother uncomfortable,
and she did not want to be in “this situation” with him.
Alana reported Zaczkiewicz’s text messages to the police and the
community college she and Zaczkiewicz attended. The community college
initially instituted a no-contact order, which prohibited Zaczkiewicz and
Alana from communicating with each other, and later expelled Zaczkiewicz.
Alana also blocked text messages and calls from Zaczkiewicz’s phone number.
However, he circumvented these efforts by sending her text messages from
different phone numbers, e-mailing her, and messaging her on social media
platforms.
In one e-mail to Alana, Zaczkiewicz wrote, “Ay, real talk. If I’m
incarcerated, being I don’t care if you believe it or not but God sent me to you.
So I’m not giving up.” In another e-mail, he wrote, “And if you’re gonna be
weird on shit and try to avoid me, I’ll help you out by making it weirder.
LOL. Don’t trip. You’ll see what’s up.”
On March 10, Zaczkiewicz sent Alana a message that said, “You are the
devil and I pray to God that God takes you off this planet. The last person
that tried to fuck with my life got hit by a semi-truck. I don’t need to hurt
you. The universe will get rid of your gray-haired ugly ass soon. Never
wished death upon anyone, but I hope you die. Please go do coke and
overdose, dope fiend slut.” That same day, Zaczkiewicz also sent Alana a
website link to an obituary of someone she did not know.

5
The following day, on March 11, Zaczkiewicz sent Alana a message that
read, “If I were you, I’d hide because his friends [presumably, the friends of
the deceased person referenced in the obituary] are going to kill you.”
On March 14, Zaczkiewicz sent Alana a message that stated, “Ay, bitch.
Check it out. On my muthafuckin life you will get dealt with accordingly. I
don’t give a fuck about rules or the law. So fuck that school and fuck the
police. You ruin my life. So get ready for the consequences. We could have
talked this out through Ashley, but you had to go to extremes. Bet ... you

think you’re crazy? I’m a fuckin sociopath. I’ll see you at school tomorrow.”3
On March 14, Zaczkiewicz sent Alana another message that read, “I’ll
blow my head off in front of [your son’s] preschool. How about that? I think
that suffices. I was going to do it in the student equity center but those
people don’t deserve that trauma. You and Alana do. I’m gonna kill myself
in your presence. Go ahead. Press charges. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is the reason why the police can’t do shit about anything I’m doing.”
On March 15, Zaczkiewicz called Alana 12 times and sent her 14 text
messages. One of the messages read, “FYI I don’t stalk. If I did, I’d go to
your house and watch your every move. IDGAF who you are. No one ignores
me. The day before I beat this dude’s ass for calling me a monkey, I blew his
fucking up. Anyone who ignores me or pisses me off will experience this. I
definitely don’t discriminate. The fuck I look like stalking you for?”
On March 17, Alana received two sets of text messages from
Zaczkiewicz, which formed the basis for counts 2 and 3. The first set of text
messages stated, “You[’re] gonna get your throat sl[i]t and thrown in a ditch
if you ever step foot on that campus again[]. [¶] You will get murderer. [¶]

3 According to Alana, Ashley was an employee who worked for the
community college program in which Alana and Zaczkiewicz were enrolled.
6
Dead fucking serious.” The second set of text messages read, “I can’t wait
until I look into your eyes while you bleed out to death. [¶] This is all your
fucking fault and I’ll make your suffer. I’ll even kill your son if I have to[]. [¶]
This is Mike [by the way]. [¶] You[’re] gonna die next week and that’s for a

fact.”4
After reading these messages, Alana left San Diego for a week out of
fear for her safety. She also dropped out of her community college program
and removed her son from preschool.
On March 22, Zaczkiewicz sent Alana a text message that stated, “I
might kill someone or myself. I do everything with pure intentions and get
handed a pile of shit in return. This would’ve never happened if I didn’t
think about you and your son when I got that tablet. [The community
college] was my escape from pain and having a good heart stole it all away
from me. I promise on my sister’s life I’m going to shoot any cop that tries to
talk to me about you. This shit ain’t over. Stupid ass bitch. So go ahead and
get an innocent person killed because you wanna be a dumb bitch.”
On March 28, after Alana returned to San Diego, she and Sarah went
to Pacific Beach together. While they were walking down the boardwalk,
Zaczkiewicz and two other people walked by them in the opposite direction.
Zaczkiewicz approached the women and repeatedly asked Alana if they were
“good.” Sarah replied, “You know, we’re not good.”
The parties went their separate ways and, an hour later, Zaczkiewicz
sent several text messages to Alana. One message read, “I feel like you’ve
been following me. You a weird ass bitch in God. I won’t press the issue but
remember you’re nothing but trash. Dumb bitch. I got eyes on you too. Get

4 Alana testified she did not know who Zaczkiewicz was referencing
when he identified himself as “Mike.”
7
the fuck out of [Pacific Beach]. Dirty bitch.” Another message stated, “Tell
your ho ass friend to mind her fucking business. She’s lucky as fuck I didn’t
spazz out on her stupid ass.” Another message read, “The two dudes I was
with both had automatic Glock and the other a regular pistol. If you got an
old white dude following, please let him know he’ll get killed if he keeps
following me. This isn’t a threat to you. It’s for whoever is tracking me on
Google. Like dead as they will get shot.”
B. Defense Case
Zaczkiewicz testified in his own defense and told the following version
of events. Prior to February 2023, Zaczkiewicz and Alana were on friendly
terms. They did homework together and hung out once outside of class, and
she sometimes gave him rides to the bus stop. He was aware she had a
boyfriend and denied making any romantic advances towards her before they
spent the night at her mother’s house.
Zaczkiewicz testified that Alana acted flirtatiously towards him on the
night they went to her mother’s house, so he thought it would be the “perfect
move” to kiss her. However, he sensed she did not enjoy the kiss. He denied
intentionally overstaying his welcome and claimed he was merely trying to
arrange a ride from a friend. He left around midnight and Alana was
screaming at him when he left.
The next day, Zaczkiewicz was embarrassed that he had missed “the
social cues that [he] had to leave,” and claimed the prior night had been a
“drunk mistake.” He texted Alana the next morning to apologize for his
conduct at the house and for sending text messages to her after he left. He
continued texting her because his feelings were hurt, he knew he had messed
up, and he could not control himself. He did not deny sending any of the
messages that were discussed at trial, but he did not remember sending all of

8
them either. Specifically, he did not recall sending the message in which he
threatened to slit her throat and throw her in a ditch. He claimed he did not
mean the things he wrote, he would never hurt her, and he did not own a
weapon. He also denied knowing she would be in Pacific Beach when he ran
into her there.
Dr. Morgan Shaw, a clinical psychologist, testified for the defense.
Dr. Shaw reviewed Zaczkiewicz’s records, interviewed him, and administered
tests to him. She diagnosed him with schizoaffective disorder, borderline
personality disorder, unspecified trauma- or stressor-related disorder, and
multiple substance abuse disorders, including methamphetamine use
disorder, cannabis use disorder, and alcohol use disorder. When a person
suffers from schizoaffective disorder, they meet the criteria for both
schizophrenia and a major mood disorder, which in Zaczkiewicz’s case was
bipolar disorder. Dr. Shaw opined that Zaczkiewicz exhibited signs of manic
behavior, disinhibition, and paranoid and delusional thinking.
C. Verdict and Sentencing
After deliberations, the jury found Zaczkiewicz guilty of all three
charges. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the three prior
strike allegations and the two serious felony prior allegations. The court also
made true findings on the aggravating circumstance allegations.
Prior to sentencing, the defense filed a sentencing memorandum asking
the court to strike two of the three prior strikes under People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, stay the punishments for counts 2 and
3 pursuant to section 654, and strike the two serious felony priors. The
defense requested a prison sentence of 10 years.
In its sentencing memorandum, the prosecution opposed the defense’s
Romero motion, argued section 654 was inapplicable, and requested the

9
imposition of both serious felony priors. The prosecution sought a prison
sentence of 50 years to life, plus 30 years.
At sentencing, the trial court granted the Romero motion and denied
the defense’s requests to strike the serious felony priors and stay the
punishments for counts 2 and 3. The court imposed a second-strike prison
sentence of 18 years 8 months, calculated as follows: six years for count 1
(the mid-term of three years, doubled), plus 16 months each for counts 2 and
3 (one-third the mid-term, doubled), plus ten years for the serious felony
priors.
III
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Motion for Pretrial Diversion
Zaczkiewicz contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his motion for pretrial mental-health diversion. He claims the court erred
because substantial evidence does not support the court’s factual finding that
he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. By contrast, the
People argue that the court properly exercised its discretion to deny pretrial
diversion because sufficient evidence supports the court’s dangerousness
finding. We agree with the People.
1. Additional Information
Before trial, the defense filed a motion requesting pretrial diversion for
the purpose of postponing the criminal proceedings and allowing Zaczkiewicz
to undergo mental health treatment. Together with the pretrial diversion
request, the defense filed a psychological evaluation and addendum prepared
by a psychologist, Dr. Raymond Murphy. Dr. Murphy interviewed
Zaczkiewicz, administered tests to him, and reviewed his police reports,
detention records, and a behavioral health forensic psychiatry report finding

10
him competent to stand trial. The defense also submitted a diagnosis form
from the County of San Diego Mental Health Services stating that
Zaczkiewicz suffered from major depressive disorder, alcohol dependence,
cannabis dependence, and cocaine dependence.
In his motion for pretrial diversion, Zaczkiewicz argued he suffered
from several qualifying mental disorders recognized by the latest edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V),
including delusional disorder, PTSD, alcohol use disorder, amphetamine use
disorder, and major depressive disorder. He claimed his mental disorders
played a significant factor in the commission of his offenses because he was
experiencing a psychotic episode—namely, delusions with persecutory
themes—at the time of the offenses. He asserted he would respond well to
treatment; he consented to pretrial diversion; and he agreed to treatment as
a condition of pretrial diversion. Further, he contended he did not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety because he had no history of
“carrying out any of [his] threats or committing other crimes of [a] violent
nature.”
Dr. Murphy’s psychological evaluation provided a diagnostic impression
that Zaczkiewicz suffered from delusional disorder with persecutory and
grandiose themes, PTSD related to childhood trauma, alcohol use disorder,
and amphetamine use disorder. Dr. Murphy described Zaczkiewicz as a
“highly problematic gentleman [who] exhibits a rather difficult diagnostic
picture,” as he “appears very stable and well directed,” but “when stimulated
to exhibit his emotional distress, it is quite clear that Mr. Zaczkiewicz
experiences problematic delusional functioning.” Dr. Murphy observed that
Zaczkiewicz exhibited delusional perception, suspicious persecution, anxiety,

11
and unusual thought content, as well as conceptual disorganization,
grandiosity, and lack of judgment and insight.
Dr. Murphy opined that treatment intervention “may be quite
problematic as it is unlikely that medication by itself will alleviate the
delusional perceptions.” Dr. Murphy also noted that Zaczkiewicz reported he
had participated in several prior substance abuse rehabilitation programs
and, with only one exception, he either did not graduate from the programs or
did not find them helpful. Nonetheless, Dr. Murphy recommended that
Zaczkiewicz participate in a “full spectrum therapeutic program,” including
psychiatric screening, medication supervision, substance abuse treatment,
individual counseling, residential treatment, cognitive behavioral therapy,
and treatment intervention dealing specifically with the effects of trauma.
As part of the psychological evaluation, Dr. Murphy administered the
Historical Clinical and Risk Management 20 (HCR-20) test to Zaczkiewicz to
assess his potential for aggressive or assaultive behavior. According to Dr.
Murphy, Zaczkiewicz’s score placed him in the “moderate range of risk,” and
“certainly indicate[d] that some potential for aggressive functioning may be
related to his mental health issues ....” However, in an addendum to the
psychological evaluation, Dr. Murphy opined there was “little likelihood”
Zaczkiewicz would reoffend or commit a super strike offense if he fully
participated in a rehabilitation program.
The prosecution opposed the defense’s motion for pretrial diversion. It
conceded Zaczkiewicz was eligible for diversion because he was diagnosed
with two qualifying mental disorders (delusional disorder and PTSD), and at
least one of his mental disorders was a significant factor in the commission of
the charged offenses. However, the prosecution argued he was not suitable
for diversion because he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public

12
safety. The prosecution claimed he presented a serious risk of danger to
public safety due to the violent nature and duration of the threats he made
against Alana and her son, his criminal history, and the escalating
seriousness of his crimes.
According to the prosecution, Zaczkiewicz’s criminal history included
three prior strikes arising from two criminal cases. He received his first
strike after he placed demand notes on two vehicles stating he had installed
bombs on the vehicles and would blow them up unless the owners paid him.
He also installed a fake bomb on one of the vehicles, which resulted in the
deployment of a bomb squad. The bomb squad determined the bomb was
fake, though it included all the elements of a legitimate bomb. Zaczkiewicz
pleaded guilty to making a criminal threat and was placed on probation.
While Zaczkiewicz was on probation for his first strike, he committed
his second and third strikes. Zaczkiewicz incurred these strikes after he tried
to enter the apartment of two college students he had met the prior evening.
He also sent the students several menacing and violence-filled text messages,
including messages in which he threatened to murder the students, detonate
a bomb, kill police officers, and “create a new world without peace.”
Zaczkiewicz was found guilty of two counts of making a criminal threat and
sentenced to prison for six years four months.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for pretrial diversion.
Ruling from the bench, the court found Zaczkiewicz was unsuitable for
pretrial diversion because he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety. In reaching this determination, the court emphasized Zaczkiewicz’s
“significant and serious criminal history,” as well as the persistent and
violent nature of the crimes charged in the present case.

13
2. Legal Principles
“In June 2018, the Legislature enacted Penal Code sections 1001.35
and 1001.36, which created a pretrial diversion program for certain
defendants with mental health disorders.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th
618, 624, citing Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 24, fn. omitted.) “ ‘Pretrial diversion’
means the postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or permanently,
at any point in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is
charged until adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health
treatment ....” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1).) “If mental health diversion is granted
and the defendant satisfactorily completes the court’s approved mental
health treatment program, then the defendant’s criminal charges are
required to be dismissed and the defendant’s arrest on the charges ‘shall be
deemed never to have occurred.’ ” (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
1067, 1078 (Gerson); § 1001.36, subd. (h).)
The stated purpose of the pretrial diversion program “is to promote all
of the following: [¶] (a) Increased diversion of individuals with mental
disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal
justice system while protecting public safety. [¶] (b) Allowing local discretion
and flexibility for counties in the development and implementation of
diversion for individuals with mental disorders across a continuum of care
settings. [¶] (c) Providing diversion that meets the unique mental health
treatment and support needs of individuals with mental disorders.”
(§ 1001.35, subds. (a)–(c); see Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 882, 887 (Sarmiento) [the program “was designed to encourage
trial courts to broadly authorize pretrial mental health diversion, providing
treatment for qualifying mental disorders that result in criminal behavior”].)

14
Section 1001.36, subdivision (b) sets forth two statutory criteria that
must be satisfied for a defendant to be eligible for pretrial diversion. First,
the defendant must be “diagnosed with a mental disorder as identified in the
most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders,” subject to exclusions not pertinent here. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).)
Second, the defendant’s mental disorder must have been “a significant factor
in the commission of the charged offense.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
If the defendant satisfies these eligibility requirements, the trial court
must then determine whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) A defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion if four
criteria are met: “(1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the
defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or
motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment.
[¶] (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the defendant’s right
to a speedy trial .... [¶] (3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment as
a condition of diversion .... [¶] (4) The defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if
treated in the community.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)–(4).)
“If the defendant is both eligible and suitable, the trial court must also
be satisfied ‘that the recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental
health treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of
the defendant.’ ” (Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 134,
quoting § 1001.36, subd. (f)(1); see Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892
[“subdivision (f)(1) of section 1001.36 read as a whole appears to contemplate
an ongoing assessment to assure that defendants will receive appropriate
treatment for their particular conditions as part of the diversion program”].)

15
Even if the defendant satisfies the express statutory requirements for
pretrial diversion, the trial court still retains residual discretion to deny
diversion. (See § 1001.36, subd. (a) [“the court may, in its discretion, ... grant
pretrial diversion”], italics added; Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1080
[“diversion under section 1001.36 is discretionary, not mandatory, even if all
the requirements are met”].) This “ ‘residual’ discretion must be exercised
‘ “consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law.” ’ ”
(Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892.) “Where the court chooses to
exercise this residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement of reasons
should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and
explain why diversion would not meet those goals.” (Id. at p. 893.)
An appellate court reviews a denial of pretrial diversion for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448–449 (Moine).) A
court abuses its discretion when it renders a decision that is so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it, applies the wrong
legal standard, or bases its decision on factual findings that are not
supported by substantial evidence. (Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 391, 402 (Lacour).) Substantial evidence is evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1079.)
“ ‘When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and
convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the
record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ [Citation.]
In ‘making this assessment the appellate court must view the record in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to
how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved

16
conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the
evidence.’ ” (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 401–402; see Gerson,
supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1079 [“ ‘Although we must ensure the evidence is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive
province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and
the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends.’ ”].)
3. Analysis
Only one pretrial diversion criterion is at issue in this appeal—namely,
whether the trial court erred in finding Zaczkiewicz posed an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety if he were treated in the community.
Under section 1001.36, an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety
is “ ‘an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent [super
strike].’ (§ 1170.18, subd. (c).) Thus, a defendant is not suitable for diversion
if the defendant is ‘too dangerous to be treated in the community because he
[or she] would commit a new violent super strike.’ ” (People v. Graham (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 787, 798–799 (Graham).) Qualifying super strikes include
homicide, attempted homicide, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a
machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction,
any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, and
certain sexual offenses against minors. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).) When
determining whether a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, the court “may consider the opinions of the district attorney,
the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the
defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history,
the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems
appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)

17
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we
conclude sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s implied finding that
Zaczkiewicz would be likely to commit a super strike if he were treated in the
community. Zaczkiewicz was charged—and ultimately convicted—of
threatening and stalking after he sent hundreds of messages to his victim
over a prolonged timeframe, including violent and graphic death threats. He
told the victim “[t]he universe [would] get rid of” her, and unnamed
assailants were “going to kill” her. His threats became even more worrisome
from there, as he told the victim she would “get murder[ed],” have her “throat
slit,” and “get thrown in a ditch,” and he would kill her four-year-old son,
“look into [her] eyes while [she] ble[d] out to death,” and “kill [himself] in
[her] presence.” These threats culminated in a frightening incident where
Zaczkiewicz accosted the victim in-person with two companions who,
according to Zaczkiewicz, were armed with firearms. These circumstances
supported the court’s finding of an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4) [court may consider “current charged offense”
in assessing risk to public safety]; Graham, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 799
[court properly denied diversion based “on the serious and violent nature of
defendant’s charged crimes and defendant’s actions during the commission of
those crimes”]; People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 862 [“there is
nothing in section 1001.36, with respect to either eligibility or suitability,
that precludes a trial court from relying primarily, or even entirely, on the
circumstances of the charged offense or offenses in denying a motion for
diversion”].)
The trial court also stated that it relied on Zaczkiewicz’s “significant
and serious criminal history” to find him unsuitable for pretrial diversion.
Before the events giving rise to this case, Zaczkiewicz suffered three prior

18
strikes arising out of two separate incidents. In the first incident,
Zaczkiewicz placed demand notes on the vehicles of strangers, threatened to
blow up the vehicles, and placed a fake bomb—which included all the
elements of a real bomb—on one of the vehicles. In the second incident,
Zaczkiewicz tried to enter the apartment of two college students he had
recently met and then sent them death threats. As these incidents illustrate,
Zaczkiewicz not only has a worrying history of making unprovoked death
threats against strangers; he has also taken concrete steps—trying to break
into an apartment and installing a fake bomb—that increased the risk of
violence. Based on Zaczkiewicz’s history of making death threats against
strangers, the circumstances surrounding the making of those threats, and
Zaczkiewicz’s failure to rehabilitate after he sustained his prior strike
convictions, the court could rationally infer there was an intolerably high risk
Zaczkiewicz would make, and ultimately effectuate, violent threats if treated
in the community.
Zaczkiewicz argues his criminal history and the charges in the current
case do not support the court’s finding of an unreasonable risk of danger
because none of his crimes were super strikes. However, the pretrial
diversion statute contains no requirement that a defendant must already
have committed a super strike to pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety; rather, it mandates an assessment of the defendant’s likelihood
of committing such a crime in the future if treated in the community.
Although his prior crimes were not themselves super strikes, the court could
rationally find—based on the sustained nature of his threats, the increasing
severity of the threats, and his recalcitrance—that Zaczkiewicz “could commit
an even more serious, violent felony in the future, and therefore posed an
unreasonable risk under section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4).” (People v.

19
Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 124; see People v. Hall (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 [rejecting claim that a “court may only exercise its
discretion to find an unreasonable risk to public safety when considering an
offender who has previously committed a super strike offense”].)
Though it is barely discussed by the parties in their appellate briefs, we
note that certain aspects of Dr. Murphy’s psychological evaluation also
supported the court’s finding that Zaczkiewicz posed an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety. After administering the HCR-20 test, Dr. Murphy
concluded there was a moderate risk Zaczkiewicz would engage in aggressive
or assaultive behavior. He added that Zaczkiewicz’s score on the HCR-20
showed “some potential for aggressive functioning.” In an addendum,
Dr. Murphy stated it was unlikely Zaczkiewicz would commit a super strike
offense if he fully participated in a rehabilitation program. However,
Dr. Murphy also opined that treatment intervention would be “problematic”
for Zaczkiewicz because “it is unlikely that medication by itself will alleviate
[his] delusional perceptions.” Further, as Dr. Murphy noted in the
psychological evaluation, Zaczkiewicz did not complete several prior
substance abuse rehabilitation programs in which he was enrolled, thus
casting serious doubt on his ability to complete rehabilitation programs in the
future.
In arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s
finding of an unreasonable danger to public safety, Zaczkiewicz analogizes
his case to Moine. In Moine, the defendant was charged with assault and
making criminal threats based on his involvement in two separate incidents
at the offices of medical care providers. (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at
p. 444.) In the first incident, the defendant got into a fistfight with another
patient, and each fighter blamed the other for starting and escalating the

20
confrontation. (Ibid.) In the second incident, the defendant questioned
certain medication he had been prescribed and became upset after his
psychiatrist referral had not been approved. (Ibid.) Office staff claimed the
defendant said he could get his gun from home, return to the office, and shoot
them, while the defendant and his mother said the defendant merely advised
the office staff members not to be rude to strangers because they could
respond violently. (Id. at p. 445.) The trial court denied the defendant’s
motion for pretrial diversion, finding he posed an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety. (Id. at p. 443.) The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the
evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s factual finding. (Id. at
p. 444.)
Moine does not compel a reversal in the present case. “When we decide
issues of sufficiency of evidence, comparison with other cases is of limited
utility, since each case necessarily depends on its own facts.” (People v.
Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 516.) And here, several key facts differentiate
this case from Moine. Unlike the defendant in Moine, who experienced a
brief outburst of anger, Zaczkiewicz made numerous violent threats against
the victim and her family that escalated in severity and persisted over many
weeks. Further, the Moine defendant did not have any prior felony
convictions, two psychiatrists found that he posed a low risk of committing a
future assault, and the trial court itself had released the defendant into the
community on bond for over two years. (Id. at pp. 450–451.) By contrast,
Zaczkiewicz sustained three prior strike convictions for making death threats
against strangers, Dr. Murphy opined that he is in the moderate range of risk
for assaultive behavior, and Zaczkiewicz was kept in custody throughout his
trial. These distinguishing facts support the trial court’s finding that there

21
was an unreasonable risk that Zaczkiewicz would perpetrate a super strike,
like homicide or attempted homicide, if he were treated in the community.
Zaczkiewicz also relies on People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1138, but that case is distinguishable as well. In Whitmill, the defendant
suffered from PTSD and began to feel unwell while he was dropping his
girlfriend off to visit with a friend. (Id. at p. 1142.) The friend approached
the defendant to see what was wrong and the defendant, who seemed to be
experiencing hypervigilance, warned the friend to stay away. (Ibid.) The
defendant then fired a single shot into the air, ran away from the friend,
discarded the firearm, and turned himself into law enforcement. (Id. at
pp. 1442–1143.) The trial court denied the defendant’s request for pretrial
diversion on the ground he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety, and the Court of Appeal reversed. (Id. at pp. 1146–1147.) In
reversing the court’s dangerousness finding, the Court of Appeal reasoned the
defendant’s conduct—warning the friend, running away, discarding his
firearm, and turning himself in—showed he had “presence of mind” about his
mental illness, and “indicate[d] a likelihood that appellant would not commit
a super strike.” (Id. at p. 1153, italics added.) In contrast to the Whitmill
defendant, Zaczkiewicz took no protective measures to safeguard others.
On the contrary, Zaczkiewicz repeatedly sent graphic death threats to
his victim and accosted her in person—merely the latest episode in his
history of making violent and disturbing threats against others. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment of conviction, we
conclude substantial evidence supported the court’s finding that Zaczkiewicz
posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Because Zaczkiewicz
does not challenge the court’s pretrial diversion ruling on any other basis, we

22
decline his request to reverse the judgment and remand the matter for
further mental-health diversion proceedings.
B. Section 654 Prohibited Multiple Punishments for Counts 2 and 3
At sentencing, the trial court imposed consecutive prison terms of six
years for the felony stalking conviction (count 1) and 16 months for each of
the two criminal threats convictions (counts 2 and 3). On appeal, Zaczkiewicz
claims section 654 required the court to stay punishment for two of his three
convictions because they all arose from the same physical act or,
alternatively, he harbored a single criminal objective—to harass Alana. The
People, on the other hand, contend separate punishments were warranted for
each of the three convictions.
1. Legal Principles
Section 654 states, in relevant part, “An act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).)
“[S]ection 654 protects against multiple punishment, not multiple
conviction.” (People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 336.) “To avoid double
punishment, a sentencing court applying section 654 will impose the sentence
for one offense while staying the imposition of the sentence on the other
offense.” (People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 367 (Mathis).)
“Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under
section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an
‘act or omission’ may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course
of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective.
[Citations.] We first consider if the different crimes were completed by a
‘single physical act.’ [Citation.] If so, the defendant may not be punished

23
more than once for that act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more
than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider whether that
course of conduct reflects a single ‘intent and objective’ or multiple intents
and objectives.” (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311–312; see also
Mathis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 367 [“Under section 654, a defendant
may not receive more than one punishment for a single act, nor may a
defendant receive multiple punishments for acts that comprised a single,
indivisible course of conduct in service of a single objective.”].)
“ ‘Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for
the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in making its
determination.’ [Citation.] The court’s express or implied findings in support
of its determination that section 654 does not apply will be upheld on appeal
if substantial evidence supports them.” (People v. Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
715, 737 (Cruz).) Meanwhile, the applicability of section 654 to settled facts
presents a question of law. (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.)
2. Section 654 Did Not Require the Court to Stay the Punishments for
Either the Stalking Conviction or the Criminal Threat Convictions
Zaczkiewicz claims the trial court violated section 654 by failing to stay
either the punishment for his stalking conviction or the punishments for his
criminal threat convictions because the jury might have based its stalking
verdict on the same acts giving rise to the criminal threat convictions—

specifically, his sending of text messages to Alana on March 17.5 According

5 The first set of text messages stated, “You[’re] gonna get your throat
sl[i]t and thrown in a ditch if you ever step foot on that campus again[]. [¶]
You will get murder[]. [¶] Dead fucking serious.”
The second set of text messages stated, “I can’t wait until I look into
your eyes while you bleed out to death[.] [¶] This is your fucking fault and I’ll
make you suffer. I’ll even kill your son if I have to[]. [¶] This [is] Mike [by the
way]. [¶] You[’re] gonna die next week and that’s for a fact[.]”
24
to Zaczkiewicz, the same physical acts may have formed the basis for the
convictions because the jury was not asked on the verdict forms to identify
which specific act(s) constituted stalking.
The criminal statute prohibiting stalking provides, “Any person who
willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or willfully and maliciously
harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to
place that person in reasonable fear for their safety, or the safety of their
immediate family, is guilty of the crime of stalking ....” (§ 646.9, subd. (a).)
In the present case, the prosecution proceeded under the theory that
Zaczkiewicz stalked Alana by willfully and maliciously harassing her and
making a criminal threat against her or her son. The second amended
information alleged he stalked her between February 27 (the night he kissed
her at her mother’s house) and March 28 (the day he accosted her in public).
During closing arguments, the prosecution argued to the jury that it could
convict Zaczkiewicz of stalking based on any “two or more” of the texts, phone
calls, or e-mails he made or sent during this timeframe. The prosecutor then
highlighted several of the troubling messages Zaczkiewicz sent in this
timespan, including—but not limited to—the two text messages he sent on
March 17.
On this record, we conclude the trial court rationally found that section
654 did not preclude separate punishments for the stalking conviction, on the
one hand, and the criminal threats convictions, on the other hand. “[W]here
there is a basis for identifying the specific factual basis for a verdict, a trial
court cannot find otherwise in applying section 654.” (People v. McCoy (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339 (McCoy), italics added.) However, “in the
absence of some circumstance ‘foreclosing’ its sentencing discretion ... a trial
court may base its decision under section 654 on any of the facts that are in

25
evidence at trial, without regard to the verdicts.” (Id. at p. 1340.) Indeed, “a
court may even rely on facts underlying verdicts of acquittal in making
sentencing choices.” (Ibid.)
Here, there was ample evidence to support the court’s implied finding
that the stalking conviction was based on acts other than the sending of text
messages on March 17. As noted, Zaczkiewicz called Alana and sent her a
myriad of troubling messages, separate and apart from the text messages he
sent on March 17. Because any number of these threatening communications
were adequate to support the harassment and credible threat elements of the
stalking charge, and there is no basis to conclude the stalking conviction was
necessarily based on the March 17 text messages, the court properly imposed
separate punishments for the stalking and criminal threats convictions. (See
Cruz, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 737–738 [section 654 inapplicable where
evidence supported finding that defendant’s stalking, protective order
violations, and criminal threats convictions were based on separate acts]; see
also People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 90–91 [rejecting claim that
section 654 precluded multiple punishments for conspiracy and furnishing
controlled substance convictions where furnishing of controlled substance
was one of several overt acts offered to prove conspiracy charge], reversed in
part on other grounds by __ Cal.5th __ [2025 Cal. Lexis 8402]; McCoy, supra,
208 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1337–1340 [affirming separate punishments for
burglary and restraining order violation convictions based on evidence that
defendant arrived at victim’s apartment two separate times, despite the lack
of any jury finding that “resolved the question of which of the two possibly
separate arrivals were the basis for its [protective order] verdict”].)

26
3. Section 654 Required the Court to Stay the Punishment for One of the
Two Criminal Threat Convictions (Count 2 or Count 3)
Zaczkiewicz also claims section 654 required the trial court either to
stay the punishments for the stalking conviction (count 1) and one of the two
criminal threat convictions (count 2 or count 3), or to stay the punishments
for both criminal threat convictions (counts 2 and 3), because all three
offenses comprised a single, indivisible course of conduct incident to the same
criminal objective—to harass Alana.
As a general matter, “[w]hether a course of conduct is divisible for
purposes of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the defendant.
[Citation.] If multiple offenses ‘ “were incident to one objective, the defendant
may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.” ’ ”
(People v. Fuentes (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 670, 680 (Fuentes).)
However, “ ‘a [course] of conduct divisible in time, although directed to
one objective, may give rise to multiple violations and punishment.’ ”
(Fuentes, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 680; see also People v. Gaynor (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 794, 800 [“even if a course of conduct is ‘ “directed to one
objective,” ’ it may ‘ “give rise to multiple violations and punishment” ’ if it is
‘ “divisible in time” ’ ”]; People v. Goode (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 484, 492
(Goode) [“If the offenses were committed on different occasions, they may be
punished separately.”].) “This is particularly so where the offenses are
temporally separated in such a way as to afford the defendant opportunity to
reflect and to renew his or her intent before committing the next one, thereby
aggravating the violation of public security or policy already undertaken.”
(People v. Gaio (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 919, 935; see People v. Louie (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 388, 399 [“If the separation in time afforded [the] defendant[] an
opportunity to reflect and to renew [the defendant’s] intent before committing
the next crime, a new and separate crime is committed.”].)

27
On the record before us, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to
support the court’s implied finding that Zaczkiewicz’s course of conduct was
divisible due to the temporal separation between the acts on which the
stalking conviction was based, on the one hand, and the acts on which the
convictions for making criminal threats were based, on the other hand.
There was substantial evidence Zaczkiewicz perpetrated the acts giving rise
to the stalking conviction as early as March 10 (when he messaged Alana he
hoped God would “take[] [her] off this planet,” the universe would “get rid of
[her] gray-haired ugly ass,” and he hoped she would die) and March 11 (when
he messaged her that unnamed persons were “going to kill” her). Those acts
occurred six and seven days before he sent the text messages giving rise to
the convictions for making criminal threats on March 17. Given this
temporal separation, the court could rationally infer Zaczkiewicz had
sufficient time to reflect and renew his intent to harass Alana, his course of
conduct was divisible, and section 654 was therefore inapplicable. (See Cruz,
supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 738 [acts composing course of conduct in case
involving stalking and criminal threats “were divisible in time because they
occurred on separate days”].)
However, we agree with Zaczkiewicz that section 654 required the
court to stay the punishment for one of his two criminal threat convictions. It
is evident Zaczkiewicz entertained the same criminal objective when he sent
the text messages giving rise to both convictions—to harass Alana for
spurning his romantic advances. Indeed, the People do not contend otherwise
on appeal. Further, the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that
Zaczkiewicz had sufficient time to reflect and renew his intent between his
act of sending the first set of text messages giving rise to count 2 and his act
of sending the second set of text messages giving rise to count 3. On the

28
contrary, screenshots of the text messages taken from Alana’s phone show he
sent all the text messages on the same day (March 17, 2023) within one
minute of each other (at 7:39 a.m.). Moreover, the People do not point to any
evidence suggesting that Zaczkiewicz’s act of sending the second set of text
messages mere seconds after he sent the first set of text messages created a
new or elevated risk of harm to Alana. Therefore, we conclude section 654
barred the imposition of punishment for one of the two criminal threat
convictions. (See Goode, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 493 [“As a matter of
law, we conclude the lapse of a few seconds between the two acts was not
sufficient to make defendant’s course of conduct divisible in time, such that
he could be punished separately for each act.”].)
In its present form, section 654 permits a court to stay the punishment
for either conviction to which it applies, regardless of which punishment is
more severe. (See People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379 [“Penal
Code section 654 now provides the trial court with discretion to impose and
execute the sentence of either term, which could result in the trial court
imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the longer
sentence”].) However, in this case, the court imposed the same 16-month
punishment for both criminal threat convictions, and it makes no difference
whether the punishment is stayed for count 2 or count 3. Therefore, we stay
the sentence for count 3 and affirm the judgment as modified, without
remanding the matter for resentencing. (See People v. Bey (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 144, 167.)
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to stay the sentence for count 3 pursuant to
Penal Code section 654. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended

29
abstract of judgment reflecting this modification and forward a certified copy
to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As modified, the
judgement is affirmed.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

KELETY, J.

30

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.