CourtListener 10777474•People v. Jaramillo CA4/3
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Filed 1/21/26 P. v. Jaramillo CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063955
v. (Super. Ct. No. 23HF0895)
ADRIAN DANIEL JARAMILLO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michael A. Leversen, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Law Office of Lisa A. Kopelman and Lisa A. Kopelman, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel and James Spradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Adrian Daniel Jaramillo appeals from a judgment
entered after he pled guilty to various, primarily drug-related charges. He
contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
obtained from his person and a vehicle he was driving after he was stopped
for an equipment related Vehicle Code violation. From his perspective, the
searches resulted from an unjustifiably prolonged traffic stop which violated
his constitutional rights. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we agree
the detaining officer prolonged the stop without the reasonable suspicion
necessary to justify detouring from the traffic stop’s mission. Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment, and we remand the matter to allow Jaramillo to
withdraw the guilty plea and with directions to the trial court to enter a new
order granting his suppression motion.
FACTS
I.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CHARGED OFFENSES
Just after 1:30 a.m. on a Thursday, Newport Beach Police Officer
Quinton McKay initiated a traffic stop of a Dodge Durango on Pacific Coast
Highway for having a nonfunctioning rear license plate light. The vehicle
yielded and stopped “immediately” and the officer did not observe any furtive
movements or suspicious behavior from its occupants. Officer McKay
approached and asked Jaramillo, who was driving, to roll down the windows.
Looking inside, Officer McKay saw a large backpack on the front passenger
seat, a male passenger sitting in the rear right seat, and several tools on the
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left rear seat directly behind Jaramillo. He recognized a couple of the tools to
be power tools, including an electric pipe cutter and a Sawzall reciprocating
saw, and commented to Jaramillo and the passenger that there were “a lot of
tools.”
Officer McKay asked whether either occupant was on probation
or parole, requested their identification, and asked if the vehicle was
Jaramillo’s. The passenger said he did not have identification on him.
Jaramillo denied being on probation or parole, provided his identification,
and said the vehicle belonged to his roommate. After the officer explained he
pulled them over because of nonfunctioning license plate lights, referring to it
as “nitty gritty, stupid shit,” he asked if there were any weapons in the car.
Jaramillo stated there were not and confirmed there was nothing in the car
the officer should worry about; the passenger did the same. Officer McKay
then unsuccessfully tried to obtain Jaramillo’s consent to search the vehicle.
In response to a subsequent question, Jaramillo denied having
anything illegal in the car, including drugs. When asked why he was not
looking at Officer McKay when answering, Jaramillo explained he was
looking in the car’s mirror at another officer who was approaching. Officer
McKay identified the other officer as his partner and turned back to
questioning the passenger about his identification. The passenger said he did
not have his wallet or any form of identification on him, so Officer McKay
asked a variety of questions to get basic information such as name, birthdate,
and address. Regarding the latter, the passenger said he did not have an
address because he was “couch surfing.” He denied anything in the car being
his; Jaramillo said the backpack in the front seat was his.
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Without requesting the vehicle’s registration or proof of
insurance, Officer McKay asked the two to “[s]it tight” and returned to his
patrol vehicle to run a records check based on the information provided to
him. The roughly two and a half minute check revealed Jaramillo had a past
methamphetamine-related arrest but no active probation, parole, or warrant.
The check on the passenger returned no information.
With approximately seven minutes having elapsed since the
initiation of the traffic stop, Officer McKay put on latex gloves and
reapproached the stopped vehicle. He said to Jaramillo, “Alright, sir, I’m just
gonna have you step out and we’re gonna talk outside.” In response to a
question about whether he had any weapons on him, Jaramillo said he had a
pocket knife in his back pocket but nothing else.
After Jaramillo was out of the vehicle, Officer McKay instructed
him to face the door and link his fingers behind his back. He then escorted
Jaramillo to the sidewalk where he asked whether he could check Jaramillo’s
person for additional weapons. Jaramillo responded, “Uh, yeah,” and the
officer searched him, reaching the back pocket with the pocket knife last. The
search of Jaramillo’s various pockets revealed lock picks, shims, a bump key,
and a “Flipper Zero” device. When questioned what he used the Flipper Zero
for, he said he used it for penetration testing of his home networks because
he has a server. Officer McKay inspected and powered on the Flipper Zero
before proceeding back to the vehicle to speak with the passenger.
Officer McKay told the passenger to step out of the vehicle, led
him to the sidewalk, and inquired if he could search him for weapons. The
passenger agreed to be searched and denied having any weapons or anything
illegal on him. The search yielded what the officer recognized as a “crumb” of
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methamphetamine in a jacket pocket. Officer McCay asked some questions
about methamphetamine use; the passenger admitted to having “snorted”
before and said he normally smokes. He said he “believe[d] [Jaramillo] also
inhales.” In response to further questioning, the passenger denied knowing
what else was in the vehicle and ownership of anything in it, and he said he
could not give the officer requested consent to search the vehicle because it
was not his.
Returning to Jaramillo, Officer McKay inquired about the
vehicle’s contents. Jaramillo said the backpack and tools were his, explaining
he was using them to fix up his grandma’s house because she had recently
passed away. He denied knowing what else was in the vehicle because he was
just borrowing it. And after confirming there was “nothing in the car that[]
[was] going to get [him] in trouble,” Jaramillo said, “No”, when Officer McKay
asked if he could check and make sure. Notwithstanding Jaramillo’s
response, Officer McKay performed a roughly two-minute search of the
vehicle’s interior.
After the preliminary search, the other officer on the scene
provided Officer McKay with identity information obtained from a
conversation with the passenger. He used that information to run another
records check. It was later determined the passenger initially gave his middle
name as his first name and falsely stated he had no middle name.
At some point after the second passenger records check, Officer
McKay performed a full search of the vehicle, including Jaramillo’s backpack.
The search uncovered alleged illicit drugs and paraphernalia.
Jaramillo was charged with five felony drug related counts and
one misdemeanor burglary tool related count: sale or transportation for sale
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of gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a));
possession for sale of methamphetamine (id. at § 11378); sale or
transportation for sale of methamphetamine (id. at § 11379, subd. (a));
possession for sale of Alprazolam (id. at § 11375, subd. (b)(1)); possession for
sale of GHB (id. at § 11351); and possession of burglary tools with felonious
intent to burglarize (Pen. Code, § 466).
II.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Jaramillo moved pursuant to Penal Code Section 1538.5 to
suppress the evidence obtained from his person and the vehicle. Among other
arguments, he contended the traffic stop was prolonged without justification
in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; accord, Cal. Const., art. I, § 13). His
primary focus was on the officer’s actions after the initial records check
revealed no probation, parole, or warrants.
The trial court held a hearing on Jaramillo’s motion at which it
heard testimony from Officer McKay and viewed a video of the traffic stop
captured by the officer’s body worn camera. In addition to detailing what
took place during the traffic stop, Officer McKay provided additional
information on the circumstances surrounding it. He relayed the city had
been receiving “frequent calls for catalytic converter thefts.” Based on his
training and experience, he was aware the tools he observed in the vehicle
are sometimes used to commit such a crime. At the same time, he
acknowledged the tools are not illegal, have noncriminal uses, and may be
bought at a store. On cross-examination, he also admitted there had not been
any reports of catalytic converter theft on the night of the stop and his
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suspicion regarding the tools “was just based on the fact in [his] mind [that]
theoretically they could be used to commit [that type of theft].”
In explaining his reasons for putting on the gloves and having the
vehicle occupants step out after running the initial records check, Officer
McKay said he decided to investigate matters beyond the traffic violation
that led to the traffic stop. He elaborated: “I wanted to further investigate the
potential that those power tools were burglary tools, the potential that a
passenger was lying to me, the potential . . . the vehicle that was not
registered to him could have been stolen, the potential that he may have been
driving under the influence [(DUI)] as it relates to my training and
experience[,] as well as the traffic violation which he was initially pulled over
for if he needed a citation or he did not based on the fact that he may or may
not own the vehicle.” Regarding DUI, the officer agreed there was nothing in
his police report regarding a suspicion or signs of Jaramillo having been
under the influence or impaired by any substance at the time of the traffic
stop. When questioned why he would rely on matters not documented in his
report to further investigate, Officer McKay responded, “To continue my
investigation, I don’t need a lawful reason. I have things that I’m
investigating[,] and my investigation evolves throughout the course of the
traffic stop.”
III.
TRIAL COURT’S RULING AND GUILTY PLEA
During the parties’ arguments and before ruling on the motion,
the trial court made various comments about its perspective of the issues. It
found it “a little weird for two males to be in a car at 1:30 or 1:40 [in the
morning[,] with one male riding in the back seat [and] a backpack sitting in
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the front seat.” Regarding the presence of tools in the car, the court stated it
would not “place much relevance in that by itself”: “I’m telling you[,] I don’t
think the fact that somebody has a Sawzall and a pipe cutter in the back of
their car is much.” And as for any DUI related matters, it indicated it would
not consider “the DUI stuff” because it was not in the police report, Officer
McKay “didn’t consider it,” there was no evidence that anyone was under the
influence, and there was “no evidence that [Jaramillo] had a record.”
After rewatching the body worn camera videos, reviewing Officer
McKay’s testimony and case law, and taking a weekend to think about it, the
trial court denied Jaramillo’s motion. Although the court detailed some facts,
it did not explain its rationale.
After pleading guilty to all charges and being sentenced to two
years of formal probation, Jaramillo timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues evidence found during the search of his person
and vehicle should have been suppressed because Officer McKay violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by unjustifiably prolonging his detention beyond
what was necessary to complete the mission of the traffic stop. “‘“In reviewing
a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s
factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial
evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent judgment in determining
whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.”’ [Citation.] In doing so we do not consider each fact
in isolation. Instead, ‘we must consider “the totality of the circumstances—
the whole picture.”’” (People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043 (Flores).)
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Applying this standard, we conclude the trial court erred in denying the
suppression motion.1
I.
APPLICABLE LAW
“The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .’
[Citations.] A traffic stop ‘constitutes a “seizure” of “persons” within the
meaning of’ the Fourth Amendment, but ‘where the police have probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred,’ the seizure is
constitutionally reasonable. [Citation.] Nevertheless, a traffic stop ‘that is
lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of
execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution.’
[Citation.] ‘[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for
which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against
unreasonable seizures.’ [Citation.]
“‘A seizure for a traffic violation justifies’ a ‘“relatively brief
encounter”’ for police investigation of the traffic violation. [Citation.] ‘[T]he
tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined
by the seizure’s “mission”—to address the traffic violation that warranted the
stop [citation] and attend to related safety concerns [citation]. [Citations.]
Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.” [Citations]. Authority
1 Our resolution of this issue precludes the need to reach
Jaramillo’s other arguments, including whether his consent to the search of
his person was valid and whether Officer McKay had probable cause to
search the vehicle.
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for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or
reasonably should have been—completed. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
“The United States Supreme Court has identified tasks that are
part of an officer’s mission during a stop for a traffic violation: ‘Beyond
determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes
“ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” [Citation.] Typically such
inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are
outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s
registration and proof of insurance. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The temporary
detention may also include ‘a criminal history check [citation], which is done
by consulting an in[-]car computer terminal or radioing dispatch. [Citations.]’
[Citation.] ‘“And although not specifically compelled by law, certain other
steps customarily taken as matters of good police practice are no less
intimately related to the citation process: for example, the officer will usually
discuss the violation with the motorist and listen to any explanation the
latter may wish to offer.”’ [Citation.] These tasks are included within the
officer’s mission during a traffic stop because they ‘serve the same objective
as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are
operated safely and responsibly. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] An officer may also
require a lawfully stopped driver to exit the vehicle for officer safety to
complete his traffic stop mission. [Citation.]
“‘On-scene investigation into other crimes, however, detours from
[the traffic stop’s] mission. So too do safety precautions taken in order to
facilitate such detours. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] While ‘[a]n officer . . . may
conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop,’ the
officer ‘may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable
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suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual. [Citation.]’”
(People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669–670, fn. omitted (Gyorgy).)
“‘Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause
and can arise from less reliable information than that required for probable
cause. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] But a detaining officer must be able to ‘“point to
specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained
may be involved in criminal activity.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘“‘[A]n
investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch
is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith.’”’”
(Gyorgy, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 675.)
II.
ANALYSIS
Both parties concede the inception of the traffic stop was lawful
due to an observed equipment violation. (See Veh. Code, § 24601.) The parties
also appear to agree it was lawful for Officer McKay to ask for identification,
inquire about weapons, and perform a records check—all activities which
occurred within roughly the first six and a half minutes of the stop. (See
Rodriguez v. U.S. (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 355 (Rodriguez) [describing such
matters as “‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop’”].) Where their
agreement diverges is whether the detention became unwarrantedly
prolonged when Officer McKay put on gloves and ordered Jaramillo out of the
vehicle around the seven-minute mark. Jaramillo contends it was a clear
unjustified departure from investigating and resolving the equipment
violation for which he was stopped. The People argue “reasonable suspicion of
catalytic converter theft and drug activity developed [during the first seven
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minutes of the traffic stop] and supported expanding the scope of the
detention to investigate that activity.” On the record before us, we find merit
in Jaramillo’s argument.
Regarding catalytic converter theft, Officer McKay observed tools
in the back seat of the vehicle which could be used for that type of theft. But,
he confirmed the tools themselves were not illegal and had noncriminal uses,
and Officer McKay did not observe any evidence of actual theft (e.g. vehicle
parts). Although he testified there had been catalytic converter theft reported
in the city in the recent past, he confirmed none had been reported that
night. Further, there was no indication the area of the city the vehicle was
driving through was one where such thefts had occurred, and there was no
evidence Jaramillo had any type of theft related criminal history. Absent
something more, and notwithstanding the time of day, the presence of the
tools in the vehicle was insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion of
catalytic converter theft.
We reach the same conclusion about potential drug activity.
Officer McKay did not observe any potential drug related paraphernalia in
the vehicle, and both Jaramillo and the passenger denied any drug use.
Notably, the trial court declined to consider any DUI related arguments
because “there[] [was] no evidence that anybody was under the influence.”
The only thing potentially linking Jaramillo to drugs was the past
methamphetamine related case that Officer McKay said he became aware of
during the records check. But, Officer McKay testified he did not know from
when that case originated and there was no testimony he knew details of
what it involved. The fact of an arrest at an unknown time in the past cannot,
without more, create reasonable suspicion of present criminal activity.
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(People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 491 [past criminal arrest or
conviction is not sufficient alone for reasonable suspicion to detain or
search].) Concluding otherwise would effectively allow a further investigation
of anyone with a criminal background who is stopped for a traffic violation.
Without explaining how they factor into the calculus, the People
also note the large backpack in the front seat of the vehicle, the passenger’s
location in the back seat instead of the front, and Officer McKay’s inability to
verify the passenger’s identity based on initial information provided. None of
these circumstances, individually or combined, are sufficient to provide
reasonable suspicion under the circumstances. We recognize “the possibility
of innocent explanations for the factors relied upon by a police officer does not
necessarily preclude the possibility of a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. [Citations.] . . . Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged that by allowing the police to act based upon conduct that was
‘ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,’ [case law has]
‘accept[ed] the risk that officers may stop innocent people.’” (People v. Letner
and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 146–147.) However, there must nevertheless
be specific articulable facts providing some objective manifestation that the
person detained may be involved in criminal activity. (See People v. Brown
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 985–986; Gyorgy, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 675.)
That standard “is not satisfied simply because a person’s behavior is ‘odd.’”
(Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1045.) And, curiosity or hunch, even if
pursued in good faith, cannot render a prolonged detention lawful. (Gyorgy,
at p. 675.)
Understandably, the People do not attempt to justify Officer
McKay’s action of ordering Jaramillo out of the vehicle by saying it was
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necessary to ensure officer safety as part of the traffic stop. Although an
officer making a traffic stop generally may order the driver and passengers
out of the vehicle pending completion of the stop, the underlying justification
for allowing such action is officer safety. (Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S.
408, 411–415.) Here, Officer McKay permitted the vehicle’s occupants to
remain in the vehicle during the first seven minutes of the stop, including the
roughly two minutes it took him to return to his patrol vehicle to run a
records check. In addition, after the first two minutes of the stop, a second
officer was on site monitoring Jaramillo and the passenger’s behavior in the
vehicle. Under these circumstances, officer safety would not justify ordering
them to exit the vehicle to bring resolution to the equipment violation issue.
Because Officer McKay detoured from the mission of the traffic
stop when he ordered Jaramillo out of the vehicle, but the totality of the
circumstances did not provide reasonable suspicion for doing so, Jaramillo’s
motion to suppress should have been granted. (See Rodriguez, supra, 575
U.S. at p. 357.) “Because it is impossible to assess the impact of an erroneous
denial of a motion to suppress evidence on a defendant’s decision to plead
guilty, the harmless error rule is inapplicable in appeals taken pursuant to
Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m).” (People v. Suggs (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 1360, 1366.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded for further
proceedings to allow Jaramillo to withdraw his guilty plea, after which the
trial court shall vacate its order denying Jaramillo’s suppression motion and
enter a new order granting it.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
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