In re S.D. CA2/3

CourtListener 10775024CalctappJan 15, 2026

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Filed 1/15/26 In re S.D. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

B341606
In re S.D. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP01755A–D)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

L.D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Mauricio J. Fusco, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Appellant L.D. (mother) appeals from juvenile court
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders sustaining a
petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300
and asserting dependency jurisdiction over her four minor
children, S.D., J.D., C.I., and J.R.1 We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 13, 2023, the Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) received a report that mother hit S.D. in
the face. A school staff member observed that S.D. had a black
eye. The referral was deemed substantiated, but the case was
closed because mother declined services.
On April 11, 2024, DCFS received a referral alleging that
mother physically abused J.D. According to the referral, mother
found J.D. watching television in mother’s room and began to yell
at the child. Mother threatened to hit J.D., counted to three, and
then used her fist to hit J.D. on her head, back, and arm. Mother
then grabbed the child’s hair and “took her to the ground.” J.D.
reported that mother said she would “ ‘kill her’ ” during the
altercation and at least five or six times in the past. J.D.’s adult
sibling, E.D., broke up the fight. J.D. left the home and walked

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

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around for about 10 minutes, then knocked on a stranger’s door,
who happened to be a social worker.
J.D. also reported that mother hit her in the face earlier
that year during another dispute. When J.D. ran away, mother
pursued her and hit her again.
A DCFS social worker interviewed the family about the
incident. J.D. stated that mother found her watching cartoons,
and when mother asked her to leave the room, mother grabbed
her hair and hit her face two or three times. Mother said that
she found J.D. “watching cartoon porn” and “pushed” her out of
the room. Mother accused J.D. of lying and denied that she hit
the child. E.D. reported that mother questioned J.D. but did not
hit her. S.D. and C.I. did not witness the incident, and J.R. was
too young to be interviewed.
During the interviews, S.D. described the incident that led
to the November 2023 referral. S.D. said that she told mother
that she did not like how J.R.’s father treated mother, because he
was verbally abusive. The disagreement “escalated into a
physical altercation” during which mother gave S.D. a black eye.
C.I. reported a previous fight between S.D. and mother as well.
According to C.I., S.D. yelled at mother and threw a marker at
her face, and then they began to physically fight. C.I. did not
recall who started the fight or how it ended. J.R.’s father, who
also witnessed the November 2023 incident, believed that S.D.
attacked mother.
Maternal grandmother did not believe mother hit J.D.
because “she does not hit any of her children.” Maternal
grandmother also did not believe that mother gave S.D. a black
eye in November 2023.

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On June 6, 2024, DCFS filed a section 300 petition alleging
that mother had physically abused J.D. and S.D.; that this abuse
endangered those two children’s physical health, safety, and well-
being; and that the abuse placed siblings C.I. and J.R. at risk of
serious physical harm, damage, and physical abuse. The petition
specifically alleged that mother struck J.D. in April 2024 and on
four prior occasions and that she struck S.D. in November 2023,
causing a black eye.
In July 2024, a DCFS social worker interviewed J.D. again
about the case. J.D. denied that mother ever hit her and asserted
that the allegation was “not true at all.” The social worker also
interviewed mother and E.D., who both again denied that mother
had hit J.D. in April 2024.
The social worker also interviewed S.D. in July 2024, who
again reported that mother gave her a black eye during a fight.
Mother admitted to the social worker that S.D. “got a black eye.”
At the August 27, 2024 adjudication and disposition
hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition and declared all
four children dependents of the court. It found that releasing the
children to mother would not be detrimental to their safety and
ordered them released to mother.
Mother timely appealed from the August 27, 2024 orders.
DISCUSSION
I. Mootness and reportability of conduct for inclusion
in the Child Abuse Centralized Index (CACI)
We previously granted respondent’s request for judicial
notice of orders terminating jurisdiction over all four children and
placing them with mother. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1) [courts
may take judicial notice of records of courts of this state].) We

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invited mother to submit a supplemental letter brief addressing
whether the orders render this appeal moot—that is, whether the
juvenile court’s termination of jurisdiction makes it “ ‘ “impossible
for [a reviewing] court, if it should decide the case in favor of
plaintiff, to grant him [or her] any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) Mother argues that her appeal
is not moot because the court sustained allegations that are
reportable for inclusion in the CACI. DCFS did not address this
issue.
Agencies such as DCFS are required to forward reports of
child abuse to the California Department of Justice for inclusion
in the CACI. (Pen. Code, §§ 11169, subd. (a), 11165.9.)
“Inclusion in the CACI carries several consequences for parents.”
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 279.) Reportable child abuse
“includes physical injury or death inflicted by other than
accidental means upon a child by another person” and “the willful
harming or injuring of a child.” (Pen. Code, § 11165.6.) Here,
mother challenges the juvenile court’s findings that mother
physically abused two of her children and gave one child a black
eye. We assume without deciding that at least some of mother’s
conduct fits the definition of reportable child abuse. Because
“Mother’s conduct is reportable, and there has been no
representation by the Department that the report has not been
and will not be forwarded to the DOJ,” the appeal is not moot
insofar as it challenges findings that are necessarily reportable.
(In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042, 1054 (S.R.).)
Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s findings that
are less clearly reportable. For example, mother challenges the
court’s finding that two of her other children were at risk of
serious physical harm or abuse based on mother’s abuse of their

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siblings. Rather than attempting to determine which of mother’s
arguments challenge reportable conduct, we will exercise our
discretion to consider all of mother’s arguments on appeal. (S.R.,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1054 [“we emphasize that appellate courts
have discretion to conduct a merits review of the parent’s claim
even if the case is moot”].)
II. The juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction
over mother’s four children
On the merits, mother argues that the juvenile court
erroneously sustained jurisdictional allegations that the children
were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. For
the following reasons, we disagree and affirm.
A. Applicable law and standard of review
The juvenile court may assume dependency jurisdiction if
“[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the
child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally
upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.” (§ 300, subd.
(a).) The court may also exercise jurisdiction after finding “[t]he
child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶]
(A) The failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to
adequately supervise or protect the child.” (Id., subd. (b)(1)(A).)
In addition, the court may assume jurisdiction if it determines
that “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined
in subdivision (a) . . . and there is a substantial risk that the child
will be abused or neglected” as defined in that subdivision. (Id.,
subd. (j).)
“For purposes of [section 300, subdivision (a)], a court may
find there is a substantial risk of serious future injury based on

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the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history
of repeated inflictions of injuries on the child or the child’s
siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the
parent or guardian that indicate the child is at risk of serious
physical harm.” (§ 300, subd. (a).) However, “ ‘ “a parent has a
right to reasonably discipline his or her child and may administer
reasonable punishment . . . .” ’ ” (In re D.M. (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 634, 640–641 (D.M.).)
We review jurisdictional findings “ ‘ “in the light of the
whole record” ’ ‘to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value . . . .’ ” (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892.) “ ‘In
making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences
from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the
dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues
of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re
R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633 (R.T.).) “The appellant has the
burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently
substantial nature to support the findings or orders.” (In re E.E.
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
B. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional findings
Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a
finding that S.D. suffered serious physical harm that was
inflicted nonaccidentally. We disagree. As mother acknowledges,
there is no dispute that mother struck S.D. and gave her a black
eye, which is a serious injury. (Cf. In re Mariah T. (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 428, 438 [punishment causing “deep, purple bruises”
sufficient to support a finding of serious physical harm].) As to

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whether mother’s conduct was nonaccidental, S.D. told school
staff that mother hit her, and later reported to DCFS that mother
gave her the black eye after S.D. criticized mother’s relationship
with J.R.’s father. While this description is somewhat
ambiguous, it suggests that mother struck J.R. in retaliation for
this criticism. We must “ ‘draw all reasonable inferences from
the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency
court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (R.T., supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 633.) S.D.’s descriptions of the incident are
sufficient to support a finding that mother struck S.D.
nonaccidentally.
Mother also contends that there is insubstantial evidence
to support a finding that J.D. suffered, or was likely to suffer,
serious physical harm. We again disagree. J.D. reported that
mother threatened to hit her and kill her after finding her
watching television; hit her with a fist on the head, back, and
arm; grabbed her hair; and pushed her to the floor. J.D. was so
frightened that she left the home and went to a neighbor’s house.
According to J.D., mother also threatened to kill her at least five
times previously. And J.D. reported that during an earlier
incident, mother hit her in the face, and when J.D. retreated,
mother followed her and hit her again. Although J.D. later
denied that mother had ever hit her, the court credited the child’s
earlier statements. It reasoned that J.D. may have changed her
story because the family “targeted” her, and it noted that J.D.
provided “too many specific facts” about being hit to ignore her
initial report. We defer to this credibility finding. (In re Kenneth
D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1102.) And although E.D. and mother

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denied that mother had hit J.D., the child’s statements, which
the juvenile court expressly credited, are sufficient to support its
jurisdictional findings. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
438, 451 [“Evidence from a single witness, even a party, can be
sufficient to support the trial court’s findings.”].)
Mother observes that there is no direct evidence in the
record establishing whether or how severely J.D. was hurt, and
therefore she contends there is insufficient evidence that the
child suffered a serious physical injury. But there is evidence
that J.D. fled the home after one incident, which could support a
finding that her injuries were serious. Moreover, a court may
exercise dependency jurisdiction by finding “a substantial risk of
serious future injury based on the manner in which a less serious
injury was inflicted, a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on
the child or the child’s siblings, or a combination of these and
other actions by the parent or guardian that indicate the child is
at risk of serious physical harm.” (§ 300, subd. (a).) Even
assuming that J.D.’s injuries were minimal, mother’s history of
striking J.D. and threatening to kill her support a finding that
J.D. faced a substantial risk of future harm, sufficient to warrant
jurisdiction.
Mother appears to also argue that her conduct qualified as
appropriate physical discipline, and therefore was not physical
abuse. (D.M., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 640 [section 300 does
not “ ‘prohibit the use of reasonable methods of parental
discipline’ ”].) Mother forfeited this claim by failing to raise it
below. (In re D.P. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1282, 1292 [“In
dependency proceedings, as elsewhere, a litigant forfeits an
appellate argument by failing to raise it before the trial court.”].)
Moreover, “a successful assertion of the parental disciplinary

9
privilege requires three elements: (1) a genuine disciplinary
motive; (2) a reasonable occasion for discipline; and (3) a
disciplinary measure reasonable in kind and degree.” (Gonzalez
v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 72, 91.) Mother has not provided any “reasoned
argument and citations to authority” to establish that her
conduct falls within the privilege, meaning she forfeited this
point. (In re A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 672.)
Next, mother contends that there is insufficient evidence to
support a finding that mother’s treatment of J.D. and S.D.
established that there was a substantial risk of harm to their
siblings, C.I. and J.R. Mother specifically argues that the
juvenile court erred by reasoning that these younger children
were endangered because they may one day challenge mother’s
authority, and mother may become frustrated and hit them.
Mother argues that this reasoning is faulty because it is
speculative. However, in assessing risk of future harm, the
juvenile court may consider past events, because “[a] parent’s
past conduct is a good predictor of future behavior.” (In re T.V.
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.) Here, the evidence reflected
that mother gave S.D. a black eye after the child criticized her
relationship with a man, and struck J.D. after becoming upset
because the child was watching cartoon pornography. This
evidence supports a finding that mother might behave similarly
in the future.
Finally, although mother’s opening brief purports to appeal
from the juvenile court’s dispositional orders, she raises no
argument specifically addressing those orders. We presume
mother means to argue that the dispositional orders should be
reversed on the same basis as the jurisdictional findings.

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Because we affirm the jurisdictional findings, we also affirm the
dispositional orders.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

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