Piercy v. Piercy CA1/3

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Filed 1/12/26 Piercy v. Piercy CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

TYLA PIERCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172226
v.
ERICK MICHAEL PIERCY, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. FAM0132753)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Erick Piercy appeals the trial court’s order granting the
request of plaintiff Tyla Piercy for modification of timeshare and child
support orders. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2016, Tyla petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to Erick.1
The parties were granted joint legal custody of their three children. In March
2019, the parties stipulated to Erick’s payment of guideline child support in
the amount of $775 per month, which was based his allocated timeshare with
the children of 45 percent.
In February 2023, Tyla filed a Request for Order (“RFO”) seeking a
modification of the existing custody and child support orders. At the

1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by
their first names for clarity and intend no disrespect.

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conclusion of a hearing on November 28, 2023, the trial court modified the
parties’ timeshares, setting Tyla’s at 67 percent and Erick’s at 33 percent.
This modification was reflected in the court’s “Findings and Order after
Hearing” filed on January 4, 2024. The court, however, did not rule on the
request to modify support at that point.
In April 2024, regarding her pending request to modify child support,
Tyla submitted information reflected in a 14-page chart (“Exhibit A”) that
showed her timeshare of the children from March 14, 2023 through May 31,
2024 was 66.77 percent. In June, Tyla offered additional information
showing her timeshare was slightly higher, at 67.48 percent.
Erick’s opposition brief challenged Tyla’s timekeeping and contended
his recent layoff and loss of income necessitated an alternate modification.
However, he offered no evidence bearing on the parties’ timeshares or
otherwise contradicting the information and calculations in Exhibit A.
Instead, his brief argued: “[Tyla] has not provided sufficient evidence to
demonstrate any deviations in the timeshare percentages. Therefore, it
would be inequitable for the court to order arrearages based on a hypothetical
timeshare percentage instead of the actual timeshare percentage established
in the court order.”
On June 12, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the matter. The
Department of Child Support Services appeared and explained that, after a
meet and confer, the parties agreed to calculate child support based on two
different calculations: one that accounted for Erick’s unemployment
beginning June 1, 2024 and a second one that covered the period before that.
For purposes of the support calculation beginning on June 1, Erick’s
severance pay and unemployment insurance benefits were included. Though
the parties disagreed over Tyla’s income and timeshare calculations, there

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was no dispute over the inclusion of Erick’s severance pay in the support
calculation. After Tyla testified that the timeshare information contained in
Exhibit A was compiled from work schedules, phone notes, and text messages
that she kept to document Erick’s requests to deviate from the original
timeshare order, the court was satisfied that Exhibit A reflected credible
evidence of the parties’ actual timeshares.
For his part, Erick’s counsel made an offer of proof that Erick would
testify he followed the existing court orders allocating a 45 percent timeshare
to him and 55 percent to Tyla, and that “there were only a few times where
they may have changed the custodial time share so he can go hunting or so
that [Tyla] could go do whatever she needed to do but in the end it equalized.”
Counsel challenged the trial court’s consideration of Exhibit A, calling it an
“abstract chart without any sufficient corroborating evidence.” But when
asked if he disputed any of the specific timeshare dates reflected on Exhibit
A, counsel responded, “Not at this time.” And when the court asked if there
was any further offer of proof as to Erick’s testimony, Erick’s counsel replied
in the negative.
Relying on Tyla’s testimony and the absence of any conflicting offer of
proof from Erick, the trial court found the information in Exhibit A was
“reliable and persuasive evidence” that Tyla’s timeshare between March 1,
2023 through May 31, 2024 was 67.48 percent. The court determined that
Erick’s adjusted timeshare was 32.5 percent and ordered him to pay child
support of $1,957 per month for the period between March 1, 2023 to May 31,
2024. For the period from June 1, 2024 onward, the court ordered a reduced
support amount of $1,802 per month, which was based on a calculation of
Erick’s monthly income at $11,726, including income from his severance pay
and unemployment insurance benefits.

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Erick timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Erick contends the trial court erred in calculating Tyla’s
timeshare at 67.48 percent for the period of March 1, 2023 to May 31, 2024,
and “particularly for” the period of March 1, 2023 to November 30, 2023
during which, he asserts, the previously ordered timeshare was 55 percent
(Tyla) and 45 percent (Erick). In his view, the court improperly applied the
67.48 percent timeshare retroactively based on Tyla’s Exhibit A.
We start with the familiar principle that a trial court’s judgment is
presumed correct. “ ‘ “All intendments and presumptions are indulged to
support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83,
93–94.)
Child support orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re
Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 283 (Cheriton).) This “ ‘is
not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect
of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are
reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.’ ” (In re Marriage of Walker (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 137, 146.)
In resolving this appeal, we note that Erick, as a self-represented litigant, is
“ ‘held to the same standard of knowledge of law and procedure as is an
attorney.’ ” (People v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1000.)
As a preliminary matter, we conclude Erick is mistaken to the extent
he contends the trial court could not “retroactively” modify the existing child
support order for the period preceding the November 2023 hearing on Tyla’s
RFO. Indeed, the court had express authority to do so under Family Code

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section 3653, subdivision (a), which generally allows modification of support
orders “retroactive to the date of the filing of the notice of motion or order to
show cause to modify or terminate.” (See Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at
p. 300.) Here, the court modified the support order for the period beginning
March 1, 2023, which postdated Tyla’s filing of her RFO in February 2023.
Erick makes no attempt to show the applicability of an exception to such
authority. (See Fam. Code, § 3653, subd. (b).)
Erick next contends the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting
Tyla’s Exhibit A as evidence of the parties’ timeshares beginning in March
2023 because Tyla did not produce any of the records documenting the
compiled timeshare hours. Thus, he argues, he could not meaningfully
challenge the information and was denied due process. We are not
persuaded.
As recounted above, the trial court admitted Exhibit A after
determining that Tyla’s testimony properly authenticated the document as
one she created based on work schedules, phone notes, and text messages
that she kept to document Erick’s requests to deviate from the original
timeshare order. (See People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 207 [trial courts
have broad discretion to admit demonstrative evidence such as charts to
illustrate a witness’s testimony].) And finding her testimony credible, the
court reasonably concluded Exhibit A provided “reliable and persuasive
evidence” of Tyla’s 67.48 percent timeshare with the children. Moreover, the
court allowed Erick’s counsel to cross-examine Tyla as to how she recorded
and calculated the timeshares, and it also invited Erick to make an offer of
proof on the matter. To this, Erick’s counsel said Erick “would testify that he
followed the court orders at the time, which were 45 percent to him and 55
percent to her” with some adjustments. Counsel, however, provided no

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evidence or offer of proof that specific dates on Exhibit A were incorrect. On
this record, substantial evidence supports the court’s determination that the
parties’ timeshares were 67.5 percent (Tyla) and 32.5 percent (Erick) for
March 1, 2023 to May 31, 2024.
Finally, Erick contends the trial court erred by including his severance
pay as part of the child support calculation because such pay was “non-
recurring” and therefore did not qualify as “income” for purposes of section
4058.
As the record reflects, Erick was aware the trial court would include his
severance pay in the child support calculations. Not only did he fail to object,
but his own child support calculations affirmatively included his severance
pay. We reject as forfeited Erick’s belated attempt to raise this contention for
the first time on appeal. (See Parker v. Schwarcz (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 418,
435–436; see also Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 212
[party who induces the commission of error “may not claim on appeal that the
judgment should be reversed because of that error”].)2

2 Effective September 1, 2024, Family Code section 4058 was amended to
explicitly list severance pay as an example of income. (Stats. 2023, ch. 213,
§ 7 [see Fam. Code, § 4058, subd. (a)(1)].) And as the Department of Child
Services points out, case law prior to that amendment had long recognized
severance pay as income for purposes of familial support obligations. (E.g.,
In re Marriage of Samson (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 23, 28 [family court had
“discretion to allocate [husband’s] severance pay” for purposes of spousal
support]; In re Marriage of Stephenson (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 71, 75–76, 81
[affirming portion of order counting severance pay as continuing husband’s
income in amount equivalent to his former salary for eight and a half
months]; see In re Marriage of Sorge (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 626, 642 [noting
the pre-amended version of Family Code § 4058 broadly defined income for
purposes of child support].)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Tyla Piercy is entitled to her costs on
appeal.

_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Petrou, J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

Piercy v. Piercy (A172226)

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