People v. Sohal CA6

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Filed 1/8/26 P. v. Sohal CA6
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H052523
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. B9737306)

v.

MANJINDER SINGH SOHAL,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Manjinder Singh Sohal was deported in 2013 after serving a 15-year
prison term for attempted murders among other related crimes. Ten years later, he moved
to vacate his convictions under Penal Code section 1473.7 and now appeals the denial of
that motion.1 Sohal argues that the record demonstrates that he did not meaningfully
understand the immigration consequences of his plea and that the error was prejudicial.
Independently reviewing the trial court’s findings and order, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Operative Complaint and Sohal’s Plea

In 1997, the Santa Clara County District Attorney charged Sohal and several
codefendants by complaint with two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187;
counts 1 and 2), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 3), and assault with a

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
deadly weapon or assault likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1);
count 4). As to count 1, it was alleged that the attempted murder was committed
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. (§ 189, subd. (a).) Multiple other
enhancements, including gang enhancements and firearms enhancements, were alleged as
to all counts.
In 2000, Sohal pleaded guilty to all counts and admitted multiple enhancements.
During the change of plea hearing, the trial court advised Sohal as follows: “Do you
understand if you are not a citizen of the United States this plea or these pleas today
could have the result of your being deported from the United States. It could cause your
re-entry to be refused and it could cancel any legalization or naturalization proceedings
you have now or in the future.” Sohal responded, “I want to fight for the INS case.” The
trial court replied, “You are entitled to fight and challenge. I need to advise you it’s a
possibility. [¶] Do you understand that?” Sohal responded, “Yes, your honor.” By
agreement of the parties, the trial court at sentencing struck the premeditation allegation
alleged as to count 1 and further struck the enhancement that Sohal was armed with a
handgun (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In 2001, Sohal was sentenced to the agreed term of
15 years in prison.
B. The Motion to Vacate

In 2023, Sohal moved to vacate his convictions under section 1473.7, alleging that
he had not meaningfully understood the immigration consequences of his plea. Ten years
earlier, while in deportation proceedings, he had unsuccessfully petitioned to vacate his
convictions by writ of habeas corpus.2
In support of his section 1473.7 motion, Sohal declared that he had been born in
India in 1976, joined his father in the United States in 1993, and was a legal permanent
resident at the time of his plea. Sohal’s two brothers and mother also lived in the United

2
Section 1473.7 did not become effective until 2017. (Stats. 2016, ch. 739, § 1.)

2
States by the time of his plea. Sohal’s goal had been to become a naturalized citizen of
the United States, but he was detained by immigration authorities and placed in
immigration removal proceedings upon his release from prison in 2012. Because his
crimes were aggravated felonies under federal immigration law, Sohal was ordered
deported from the United States in 2013 to India. Sohal now resides in Portugal with his
wife, whom he married in 2021.
In his declaration, Sohal asserted that at the time he entered his plea, his attorney
did not discuss with him that his crimes qualified as aggravated felonies and crimes
involving moral turpitude, which are mandatory deportable offenses that resulted in the
loss of his green card and permanent removal from the United States. Sohal further
claimed that his attorney “never spoke to [him] about [his] immigration status or about
any immigration concerns,” he was not aware that the plea “would have such severe
immigration effects on [him],” and that he “never had any reason to be concerned about
being deported for accepting the plea” because his attorney never discussed “immigration
status or sentencing concerns” with him.
Sohal attached various letters from friends and family members in support of his
motion to vacate. Some family members opined that Sohal would not have taken the plea
deal had he known that he would be deported. Others said they had been unaware that
Sohal would be deported upon his release. A friend wrote that he had planned to go into
business with Sohal—in the United States—upon Sohal’s release from prison and that
Sohal while in prison had been unaware he would be deported. Sohal’s wife wrote that
Sohal would not have accepted the plea had he known he would be deported because her
father would not have agreed to their marriage. Sohal’s father-in-law wrote that his “only
condition” for his children’s marriage was for his children to live nearby. Sohal’s
father-in-law explained that the marriage had been planned since 1997, to take place in
2000 when the wife-to-be turned 18.

3
The People opposed the motion to vacate, relying on Sohal’s plea colloquy and his
statements in support of his 2013 habeas corpus petition. At the change of plea hearing,
Sohal had stated his intention to “fight . . . the INS case,” which to the People indicated
Sohal’s knowledge that he faced serious immigration consequences. The People also
argued that Sohal’s 2013 account of his attorney’s immigration advisement likewise
reflected that Sohal at least knew he faced deportation, although he declared that he was
unaware that his crimes were aggravated felonies making him ineligible for bail or
cancellation of removal.
In his declaration in support of the habeas petition, Sohal did not claim to have
been unaware that he faced deportation for his convictions but took issue with the scope
of the immigration advice he had been given and the extent of his attorney’s efforts to
mitigate his immigration consequences by securing a more favorable result. He declared
that he was “never informed by [his] attorney, or anyone else, of the clear immigration
consequences of [his] plea.” (Italics added.) Sohal asserted that he had been willing to
serve more than 15 years in prison in exchange for a plea “that would not have rendered
[him] deportable, or at least not an aggravated felon.” He added that his attorney advised
him that he “would be able to fight [deportation] later in immigration proceedings.”
Sohal declared that had he been aware of his ineligibility for bail or cancellation of
removal, he would have sought an alternative immigration-safe disposition or would have
exercised his right to go to trial instead of entering a plea that ended his chance of
remaining in the United States with his family.3

3
In May 2013, the trial court denied Sohal’s petition for writ of habeas corpus
after concluding that he did not state a prima facie case for relief. The trial court found
that Sohal’s declaration was self-serving, and there was no supporting evidence that if
properly advised of the immigration consequences, Sohal would not have pleaded guilty.

4
C. The Hearing on the Motion and the Trial Court’s Denial

At the April 2024 hearing on Sohal’s motion to vacate, Sohal appeared only
through counsel. Over the People’s objection, the trial court accepted Sohal’s declaration
in support of his motion to vacate for the truth of the matters asserted: The court found
that Sohal was unavailable to appear for the hearing and that his nonappearance was not
willful.”4
The sole witness, former prosecutor Mark Duffy, testified by video on behalf of
the prosecution. Duffy had been assigned to Sohal’s case as a member of the district
attorney’s gang unit. Although Duffy could not recall how Sohal had been apprehended,
he testified that Sohal had initially fled to Canada after the crime. Duffy recalled that
Sohal’s defense counsel was competent and thorough but that the evidence against Sohal
was strong. Duffy testified that he would have declined any counteroffers for an
immigration-neutral disposition or a lengthier sentence in exchange for lesser charges.
Public safety was always a consideration in settlement.
The trial court denied Sohal’s motion to vacate. The trial court found that Sohal
had not demonstrated prejudicial error because there was no “reliable, contemporaneous
evidence from 2000 to support the [p]etitioner’s preferences announced in [his] 2023”
motion. The trial court further found that Sohal’s assertion in his declaration that his
attorney had never mentioned immigration consequences was “injured” by his 2012
declaration in support of his habeas corpus petition, which acknowledged that he had
discussed eventual immigration proceedings with his defense counsel. The trial court
thus concluded that the motion to vacate was supported by little beyond unsubstantiated
and self-serving statements, and given the risk of an indeterminate prison sentence had he

4
Sohal did not object to the court’s consideration of Sohal’s prior declaration in
support of his 2013 petition for writ of habeas corpus.

5
been convicted of the charges as alleged, there was no reasonable basis to conclude that
Sohal did not knowingly enter his plea.
Sohal timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

Section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) permits a defendant no longer eligible for
habeas corpus relief to seek to vacate a conviction or sentence by showing that the
conviction or sentence is “legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging [the
defendant’s] ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the
actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.”5
“The defendant must first show that he did not meaningfully understand the
immigration consequences of his plea. Next, the defendant must show that his
misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error. ‘[P]rejudicial error . . . means
demonstrating a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if
the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration
consequences.’ ” (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319 (Espinoza).) The
moving party must establish by a preponderance of the evidence both a lack of
understanding of the immigration consequences of the plea and that there was prejudicial
error. (§ 1473.7, subd. (f)(1).)

5
“Upon the request of the moving party, the court may hold the hearing without
the personal presence of the moving party provided that it finds good cause as to why the
moving party cannot be present.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (d).) On appeal, the People do not
question the trial court’s decision to proceed without Sohal’s participation or the decision
to admit Sohal’s declaration in support of the motion without cross-examination.
Although the trial court found that Sohal was “not willfully abstaining himself from these
proceedings,” it did address why Sohal could not submit to examination at least by video,
much as Duffy had done.

6
When moving to vacate a conviction under section 1473.7, “[a] defendant must
provide ‘ “ ‘objective evidence’ ” ’ to corroborate factual assertions. [Citation.]
Objective evidence includes facts provided by declarations, contemporaneous
documentation of the defendant’s immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, and
evidence of the charges the defendant faced.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.)
Thus, “[i]t is not enough for the defendant simply to declare that he or she would not
have accepted a plea that would result in deportation. [Citation.] Rather, the defendant
must ‘corroborate such assertions with “objective evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1178 (Curiel).)
A trial court’s ruling on a section 1473.7 motion is subject to independent review.
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) Applying this standard, we “ ‘exercise[ our]
independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’ ” (People
v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527 (Vivar).)
B. The Immigration Consequences

Under federal law, attempted murder, assault with great bodily injury, and assault
with a firearm are all either aggravated felonies or crimes of violence that are aggravated
felonies if a defendant is sentenced to at least one year imprisonment. (18 U.S.C. § 16(a)
[defining “crime of violence” as an offense “that has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another”];
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A) [murder is an aggravated felony], (F) [defining aggravated
felony as a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year] &
(U) [defining aggravated felony as “an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense
described in this paragraph”]; see also Gomez Fernandez v. Barr (9th Cir. 2020) 969 F.3d
1077, 1090–1091 [murder]; United States v. Vasquez-Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2018) 901 F.3d
1060, 1063–1064, 1068 (Vasquez-Gonzalez) [§ 245, subd. (a)(1)]; People v. Carrillo
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 5 (Carrillo) [§ 245, subd. (a)(2)].) A person not a citizen of
the United States who is convicted of an aggravated felony is ineligible for relief from

7
removal (including cancellation of removal (8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1)(C),
1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) & (B)(i) [asylum]), and voluntary departure (8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1)),
subject to mandatory removal (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) in “expedited” proceedings
(8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)), and is thereafter permanently inadmissible (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)).6
Thus, Sohal’s guilty pleas to two counts of attempted murder, assault with a
firearm, and assault with great bodily injury or with a deadly weapon rendered him
subject to severe and mandatory immigration consequences—including deportation and
permanent inadmissibility.
C. Misunderstanding of the Immigration Consequences

Sohal argues that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of his plea because his counsel then did not adequately advise him.
Because Sohal’s declaration in support of his motion both lacks objective corroboration
and is undermined by his own prior statements, he has not shown by a preponderance of
the evidence that he lacked a meaningful understanding of his plea’s immigration
consequences. (See People v. Abdelsalam (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 654, 664.)
“[I]n deciding whether the defendant has shown error, the focus of our inquiry is
on the defendant’s own error in misunderstanding the immigration consequences of the
plea.” (Curiel, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1176.) “[T]he key is the mindset of the
defendant and not what an objectively reasonable person would have understood under
the circumstances.” (Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 16.) And “[w]here

6
Additionally, a conviction for a felony crime of moral turpitude would prevent
Sohal from obtaining legal status through the petition of his lawful permanent resident
mother. (8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(a) [alien who seeks to adjust status to lawful permanent
resident must be admissible], 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) & (ii)(II) [inadmissibility from crime of
moral turpitude other than a petty offense]; see also Safaryan v. Barr (9th Cir. 2020)
975 F.3d 976, 981 [assault with deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily
injury is crime of moral turpitude]; Carter v. INS (1st Cir. 1996) 90 F.3d 14, 18 [noting
that attempted murder is a crime of moral turpitude].)

8
immigration law is ‘ “succinct, clear, and explicit” that the conviction renders removal
virtually certain, counsel must advise his client that removal is a virtual certainty.’ ”
(People v. Manzanilla (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 905.)
Here, Sohal bases his claim of misadvisement on his declaration that defense
counsel never spoke to him about any immigration consequences.7 Although “[a] party
seeking relief under section 1473.7 is not required to provide the declaration of plea
counsel” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 325), Sohal has provided no objective
evidence to corroborate his factual assertions. (Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 17
[“[a] defendant’s assertion as to his or her state of mind is not accepted at face value by
courts evaluating a section 1473.7 motion”]; People v. Cruz-Lopez (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th
212, 223–224 (Cruz-Lopez) [“[a]n allegation that trial counsel failed to properly advise a
defendant is meaningless unless there is objective corroborating evidence supporting
appellant’s claimed failures”], abrogated on a different ground as stated in Carrillo,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 6.)8

7
In part, Sohal argues that the letters he submitted from friends and family in
support of his motion to vacate also reflect he was unaware of the immigration
consequences of his plea. But these letters were admitted at the hearing on the motion to
vacate “for the limited purpose as to show the defendant’s connection and intertwined
nature with the community in 2000, not for any other purpose.” Sohal does not challenge
this evidentiary ruling on appeal. And even assuming we can properly consider these
letters as corroborating evidence, the letters submitted by Sohal are largely unsupportive
of his claim because they are not reflective of Sohal’s state of mind at the time he entered
his plea. (See Curiel, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1176.)
8
Sohal argues that a defendant’s declaration under section 1473.7 is only
“self-serving and unreliable” if defendant alleges that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance, citing People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950. Padron, an appeal from
a trial court’s denial of a section 1473.7 motion to vacate, distinguished Cruz-Lopez on
the basis that Cruz-Lopez addressed the showing for a Sixth Amendment claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. (Padron, at p. 960, fn. 5.) Indeed, “[a] finding of legal
invalidity may, but need not, include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel”
(§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1)), and whether counsel was effective or ineffective does not
necessarily inform whether a defendant meaningfully understood the immigration
consequences of his plea. But as discussed post, Sohal’s 2023 declaration was unreliable

9
To the contrary, the objective evidence contradicts his 2023 declaration asserting
that no immigration consequences were discussed with him. Sohal’s plea colloquy and
his 2013 declaration show that he knew to expect that his plea would result in
immigration proceedings: At the change of plea hearing, Sohal stated his commitment to
“fight . . . the INS case,” which suggested that at minimum he knew that deportation
proceedings were inevitable, even if he hoped the outcome was not preordained. And
Sohal’s 2013 habeas corpus petition alleged that his “attorney advised [him] that [he]
would be able to fight it later in immigration proceedings.” Absent either objective
corroboration or Sohal’s explanation of the context of this advice, we decline to read the
advice Sohal attributes to his counsel as encouragement that contesting deportation would
be successful, rather than a bare acknowledgement that Sohal could, as a procedural
matter, attempt to resist that outcome. These statements also call into question the
credibility of Sohal’s 2023 declaration that asserted that no immigration issues were
raised with him. Rather, these statements suggested that deportation was specifically
raised by counsel.
Sohal argues that his 2023 declaration is not inconsistent with his 2013
declaration. He acknowledges that his 2023 declaration that his attorney “never spoke to
[him] about [his] immigration status or about any immigration concerns” appears
absolute on its face. But Sohal insists that his broad statement in 2023 must be construed
by reference to his more nuanced statement that defense counsel never discussed legal
terms such as an “aggravated felony” or a “crime involving moral turpitude” with him, or
that conviction of such crimes would result in the loss of his permanent residency status

not only because it is “self-serving” but because he had made prior inconsistent
statements in the past. Furthermore, Padron in distinguishing Cruz-Lopez did not purport
to hold that a defendant’s own declaration is not self-serving or unreliable. “ ‘It is
axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.’ ” (People v. Avila
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 566.) And Padron ultimately observed that “in any event,
Padron’s declaration is corroborated by his counsel’s notes.” (Padron, at p. 960, fn. 5.)

10
and subsequent removal from the United States. We see no reason to read Sohal’s
declaration in such a manner, as doing so would essentially require us to ignore his
assertion—until confronted with his 2013 declaration—that defense counsel never spoke
to him about immigration concerns at all. Nothing in the 2023 declaration acknowledges
Sohal’s 2013 reference to having discussed “immigration proceedings” with his counsel
and or his avowal in his plea colloquy that he would contest deportation in immigration
court.
Sohal next argues that the trial court’s section 1016.5 advisement at the plea
hearing is not evidence that he meaningfully understood the immigration consequences
because the advisement did not capture the full extent of consequences that he faced. We
agree. The statutory immigration advisement given by the trial court does not by itself
establish meaningful understanding of immigration consequences. (See People v.
Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 895 [§ 1016.5 advisement does not operate as bar to
withdraw plea].) What is significant about the plea colloquy is not the trial court’s
advisement but Sohal’s response, personally acknowledging the immigration fight to
come.
In sum, we have little else besides Sohal’s declaration to support his claim that he
was misadvised, and that declaration is contradicted by his own prior statements. On
independent review, we therefore find that Sohal has not met his burden to demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not meaningfully understand the
consequences of his plea. (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)
D. Prejudicial Error
But even assuming Sohal met his burden to demonstrate he misunderstood the
immigration consequences of his plea, we find that Sohal has not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that there is a “reasonable probability that [he] would have
rejected the plea if [he] had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration
consequences.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.)

11
When considering this factor, courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances and factors relevant to the inquiry include “ ‘the defendant’s ties to the
United States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the
defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant had reason to
believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was possible.’ ” (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 320.) “Also relevant are the defendant’s probability of obtaining a more
favorable outcome if he had rejected the plea, as well as the difference between the
bargained-for term and the likely term if he were convicted at trial.” (Ibid.) “[W]hile the
probability of obtaining a more favorable result at trial may be one factor a court
considers in determining prejudice, it is not controlling or necessarily even the most
important factor courts consider.” (People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 714–
715.) “[R]elief should be granted if the court . . . determines the defendant would have
chosen not to plead guilty or nolo contendere, even if the court also finds it not
reasonably probable the defendant would thereby have obtained a more favorable
outcome.” (People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 559; see also People v. Soto
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 602, 610; People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 871 (Mejia)
[prejudice occurs when there is a reasonable probability a person would not have pleaded
guilty and would have risked going to trial “even if only to figuratively throw a ‘ “Hail
Mary” ’ ”].)

We turn first to Sohal’s potential sentence had he gone to trial. (See Espinoza,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.) Sohal makes a conclusory allegation in his declaration that
had he known that he would face severe immigration consequences, he would have
“insisted on proceeding to trial in [his] case.” But Sohal was charged in count 1 with
willful, premeditated, and deliberate attempted murder, an offense that because of the
premeditation allegation carried a potential indeterminate sentence of life, albeit with the
possibility of parole. (§ 664, subd. (a).) The negotiated plea agreement included striking
the premeditation allegation and imposing a determinate term of 15 years in prison.

12
There was a substantial difference between the negotiated term and the potential
indeterminate life term had the case gone to trial and resulted in a conviction. We agree
that a defendant, even in the face of long odds and lifetime penal consequences, may yet
choose trial over certain deportation. But Sohal does not meaningfully acknowledge in
his declaration the potential cost of going to trial and how the possibility of not just a
longer sentence but imprisonment for life would have factored into his decision to accept
a plea. That Sohal originally fled the United States following the commission of the
offense belies his present intimation that his ties to this country outweighed his interest in
minimizing his time in prison. The disparity between the severe sentence he could have
faced had he gone to trial and the negotiated 15-year term weighs against a finding that it
is reasonably likely that he would have rejected the plea.
Next, we examine whether there was a possibility of a more immigration-neutral
disposition. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.) Whether Sohal would have rejected
the plea is in part informed “by whether [he] would have had reason ‘to expect or hope
that a plea deal without immigration consequences ‘would or could have been
negotiated’ ” (id. at p. 324), and there is little evidence Sohal could have had reason to
expect a more immigration-neutral disposition. In Sohal’s case, Duffy expressly testified
at the hearing that he would have declined any immigration-neutral offers or any offers
where Sohal would have received more favorable immigration treatment. (See Carrillo,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 22 [no prejudicial error in part because the defendant did not
identify an offense “that would have lacked adverse immigration consequences or
addressed the likelihood a plea to such an offense would have been accepted by the
prosecutor”].) In fact, because all the charges that Sohal faced were for either aggravated
felonies or crimes of violence that would have turned into aggravated felonies had the
sentence been one year or more,9 Sohal would have received a more favorable

9
On appeal, Sohal posits that a more immigration-neutral disposition would have
been possible had he pleaded guilty only to assault with a firearm (count 3; § 245,

13
immigration disposition only under certain narrow circumstances: such as if the trial
resulted in an acquittal on all counts, if he was acquitted of the attempted murder charges
and the sentences for his remaining convictions were less than one year, or if the
prosecutor amended the charges to charge Sohal with offenses that are not aggravated
felonies or crimes of moral turpitude.10
Sohal nonetheless points to his connections to the United States as corroborating
evidence of prejudicial error. “Ties to the United States are an important factor in
evaluating prejudicial error under section 1473.7 because they shed light on a defendant’s
immigration priorities.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.) Sohal was born in India
in 1976, came to the United States in 1993, and was a legal permanent resident at the
time of his plea in 2000. Sohal committed the offenses at issue in 1997, only four years
after he came into the country. While not insubstantial, Sohal’s ties to the country were
not particularly strong at the time he entered his plea. (Cf. id. at pp. 322–323 [Espinoza
had lived in California for 23 years at the time of plea and had wife and children who
were United States citizens]; Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530 [Vivar was brought to the

subd. (a)(2)) and assault with a deadly weapon or assault likely to produce great bodily
injury (count 4; § 245, subd. (a)(1)) for an alternate sentence of 14 years. But as we have
explained, both are crimes of violence that become aggravated felonies upon imposition
of at least one year in confinement. (See Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 5 [assault
with a firearm is a crime of violence]; Vasquez-Gonzalez, supra, 901 F.3d at pp. 1063–
1064, 1068 [assault likely to produce great bodily injury].) Recently, the Ninth Circuit
held in United States v. Gomez (9th Cir. 2024) 115 F.4th 987 that assault with a deadly
weapon under section 245, subdivision (a)(1) is not a crime of violence because the
statute “sweeps in reckless uses of force.” (Id. at p. 996.) But the Ninth Circuit recently
granted the government’s petition for rehearing en banc, vacating this prior decision and
leaving Vasquez-Gonzalez as controlling precedent in the Ninth Circuit. (United States v.
Gomez (9th Cir. 2025) 133 F.4th 1083.)
10
During the hearing on the motion to vacate, Sohal offered to resolve the case by
pleading to a violation of section 32 (accessory) in exchange for vacatur of all four
counts. The prosecutor rejected this offer.

14
United States as a six year old and remained in the country for 40 years and had children,
grandchildren, and a wife who were United States citizens].)
Sohal argues that the family support letters submitted in support of the motion to
vacate demonstrate his strong, personal attachment to the country. Sohal points to the
letters from his wife and father-in-law explaining how his marriage had ben premised on
his ability to stay near family. The family letters bolster Sohal’s claim that he had a
vested interest in remaining in the United States, but the letters shed no light on whether,
for example, his father-in-law would have preferred that Sohal face the possibility of an
indeterminate life term by proceeding to trial.
In sum, Sohal largely fails to provide corroborating evidence to support his
self-serving declaration that he would have declined the plea. (Cruz-Lopez, supra,
27 Cal.App.5th at p. 224 [“declaration by defendant is suspect by itself”].) Although a
declaration by the defendant is relevant evidence to whether prejudicial error occurred
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 325), as we have stated ante, a defendant’s claims
require “corroboration and objective evidence because a declaration by [the] defendant is
suspect by itself.” (Cruz-Lopez, at p. 224; Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 872 [“[i]n a
postconviction setting, courts should not simply accept a defendant’s statement of regret
regarding the plea, courts should also ‘look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate
a defendant’s expressed preferences’ ”]; see also In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 938
[“a defendant’s self-serving statement—after trial, conviction, and sentence—that with
competent advice he or she would have accepted a proffered plea bargain, is insufficient
in and of itself to sustain the defendant’s burden of proof as to prejudice” for a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel].) “It is not enough for the defendant simply to declare
that he or she would not have accepted a plea that would result in deportation.” (Curiel,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1178.)11

11
We note that in denying Sohal’s 2013 petition for habeas corpus, the trial court
found that Sohal failed to show that he would have declined the plea deal. (See People v.

15
After independently reviewing the record, we find that Sohal has not adequately
shown that there is a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea had he
understood the actual or potential immigration consequences. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 529.)
III. DISPOSITION

The order denying Sohal’s motion to vacate is affirmed.

DeMontoya (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1175 [“[c]ollateral estoppel prohibits
relitigation of issues argued and decided on their merits in prior proceedings”].) The
prosecution did not raise collateral estoppel below, forfeiting the issue. (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)

16
_____________________________________
LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________________________________
GROVER, Acting P. J.

_____________________________________
BROMBERG, J.

People v. Sohal
H052523

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