Xiong v. Hui CA4/3

CourtListener 10770638CalctappJan 7, 2026

Full text

Filed 1/7/26 Xiong v. Hui CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

HELEN XIONG,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G062993

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-
01095448)
KIM HUI et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Peter J. Wilson, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Lindemann Law Firm, Blake J. Lindemann and Donna R.
Dishbak for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath, Jeffrey S. Jacobson, Joie C.
Hand and David P. Koller for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff Helen Xiong alleges she worked for defendant Jeunesse,
LLC (Jeunesse), a multi-level marketing company, as a distributor of its
products until it terminated her services in March 2019. In September 2019,
she filed a complaint against Jeunesse and one of its top performing
distributors, defendant Kim Hui, alleging various claims, including a claim
for civil penalties under PAGA.1 Prior to filing the complaint, plaintiff did not
give notice of her PAGA claims to the Labor and Workforce Development
Agency (LWDA). She also did not give notice of her PAGA claims prior to
filing her first amended complaint (FAC), instead sending notice to the
LWDA and Jeunesse on the same day she filed her FAC—February 11, 2020.
The judge assigned the case at the time overruled defendants’ demurrer to
the FAC on the issue of plaintiff’s failure to comply with the prefiling notice
requirements of PAGA. Two years later, in February 2022, plaintiff filed a
second amended complaint (SAC), which defendants answered. With respect
to the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the SAC alleged plaintiff’s
February 11, 2020 letter to the LWDA constituted notice of her claims, and
that she had “received no response from the LWDA.”

After the case was reassigned to another judge, that judge
notified the parties the court intended on its own motion to reconsider the
earlier ruling on the demurrer to the FAC. After briefing and a hearing, the
court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, concluding plaintiff

1
PAGA refers to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of
2004. (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) Although the Legislature enacted extensive
amendments to PAGA effective July 1, 2024 (see Stats. 2024, ch. 44, § 1
[enacting Assem. Bill No. 2288 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.)]; Stats. 2024, ch. 45,
§ 1 [enacting Sen. Bill No. 92 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.)]), our holding is based
on the pre-amendment version of PAGA that was in effect throughout the
litigation of this case. (See Stone v. Alameda Health System (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1040, 1075, fn. 18.)

2
had failed to comply with the prefiling notice requirements of PAGA before
filing her FAC because “the LWDA letter and the FAC were filed the same
day.” The court did not explicitly address the legal effect of the SAC, which
had superseded the FAC by operation of law. Instead, it indirectly did so by
concluding “nothing in [PAGA] suggests there is a cure for the failure to
comply with the PAGA prerequisite of exhaustion.” The court subsequently
entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appealed.
We find no error in the trial court’s reconsideration of the prior
demurrer to the FAC or in its conclusion the FAC failed to allege plaintiff had
exhausted her administrative remedies. We conclude, however, that the trial
court erred in ruling the failure to comply with the PAGA notice
requirements can never be cured. Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision
(a)(2)(C),2 provides otherwise. It permits a plaintiff to add a PAGA claim to
an existing complaint after satisfying the notice requirements, subject to
certain time limitations of that section. Absent some other bar to adding a
PAGA claim to an existing complaint—e.g., statute of limitations—a
previously defective PAGA claim dismissed on demurrer can be realleged
after a plaintiff has complied with the notice requirements.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for
further proceedings in the trial court on the operative SAC, which defendants
have already answered.

2
All undesignated references are to the Labor Code.

3
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
According to plaintiff’s SAC, she became a distributor for
Jeunesse in August 2015 and her services were terminated on March 5, 2019.
In 2016, another distributor who worked for Jeunesse filed class
claims against the company in Arizona. The case ended up in Florida, where
Jeunesse is headquartered. Once in Florida, the class action settled and all
members of the class, including plaintiff, received notice of the settlement.
Plaintiff objected to the settlement, contending it was not applicable to
California-based distributors like her, but the Florida court considered her
objection, overruled it, and approved the settlement.
Plaintiff then filed a class action complaint against Jeunesse in
federal court in the Central District of California alleging substantially
similar claims to those already alleged and settled in Florida. The federal
court dismissed her case.
Plaintiff then filed the complaint in this action on September 4,
2019, in which she asserted individual claims, as well as class claims and
representative PAGA claims. Jeunesse removed the case to federal court. The
federal court struck plaintiff’s class claims, concluding they were barred by
the Florida class action settlement, and remanded plaintiff’s remaining
claims to the Orange County Superior Court. (See Xiong v. Jeunesse Global,
LLC et al. (C.D.Cal., Nov. 15, 2019, No. SA CV 19-1780-DOC (KES)) 2019 WL
8011740, at *3.)
Upon remand, plaintiff filed her FAC on February 11, 2020. The
FAC included both individual and representative claims under PAGA (and
continued to assert class allegations). Plaintiff alleged in the FAC she sent
notice to the LWDA and Jeunesse regarding her PAGA claims on February

4
11, 2020 (the same day she filed the FAC). Plaintiff did not attach the LWDA
3
letter to any of her pleadings in this case.
On March 24, 2020, Jeunesse filed a motion to compel arbitration
of plaintiff’s individual claims, stay the PAGA claims, and strike plaintiff’s
class allegations. Jeunesse argued plaintiff’s claims against Hui also must be
arbitrated. Plaintiff opposed the motion. The trial court granted the
arbitration motion as to both defendants on October 6, 2020, stayed the
PAGA claims, and ordered the class allegations stricken. The court agreed
plaintiff cannot be required to arbitrate her claims for public injunctive relief,
and stated, “[i]f and to the extent [plaintiff] can articulate a valid claim for
public injunctive relief, [it] is stayed, not dismissed, pending arbitration and
such claim can be pursued in this court once the stay is lifted.”
At the time the stay order was entered, two motions were
pending before the trial court: defendants’ demurrer to the FAC and
plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. The court took

3
Although plaintiff’s February 11, 2020 notice to the LWDA and
Jeunesse is included in the record on appeal, the record does not show the
trial court considered it in ruling on the reconsideration motion that is the
subject of this appeal.

5
both motions off calendar without prejudice to the parties’ ability to refile
them once the stay was lifted.
In August 2021, after the trial court lifted the stay on the PAGA
4
claims, defendants demurred to the FAC on the ground, among others, that
plaintiff had failed to give notice and exhaust her administrative remedies
before filing her PAGA claims. On January 26, 2022, the court (Hon. James
Di Cesare presiding) overruled the demurrer on that ground. It sustained the
5
demurrer on other grounds and granted plaintiff leave to amend.
Shortly thereafter, on February 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed her SAC,
which included the same four causes of action for PAGA penalties as those
set forth in the FAC.6 In the SAC, plaintiff alleged Jeunesse had terminated
her services on March 5, 2019. In paragraphs 16 and 17 of the SAC, plaintiff
alleged she had sent a letter to the LWDA and Jeunesse on February 11,

4
The parties engaged in arbitration following the stay, and the
arbitrator issued a final order on September 8, 2021. Although not pertinent
to this appeal, for purposes of procedural completeness and clarity, we take
judicial notice the trial court lifted the stay as to the PAGA claims on June 1,
2021. (Evid. Code, §§ 459, subd. (a) [“The reviewing court may take judicial
notice of any matter specified in Section 452”], 452, subd. (c) & (d).)

5
On March 9, 2022, defendants filed a writ of mandamus with
this court, which was denied. The California Supreme Court subsequently
denied review.

6
Plaintiff also alleged other claims individually and in a
representative capacity, including violation of Civil Code section 1689.2 for
operating an endless chain scheme (fifth cause of action); violation of
Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (UCL) (sixth cause of
action), pursuant to which plaintiff sought, among other things, a public
injunction; and violation of California’s Seller Assisted Marketing Plan Act,
Civil Code section 1812.200 et seq. (seventh cause of action).

6
2020, notifying them of the alleged Labor Code violations and, as of the date
she filed the SAC, she had “received no response from the LWDA.”
Both defendants answered the SAC on April 11, 2022.
Approximately one month later, on May 13, 2022, Judge Peter Wilson (to
whom the case had been reassigned) issued an order sua sponte, stating he
intended to revisit Judge Di Cesare’s prior order overruling the demurrer to
the PAGA claims in the FAC and inviting the parties to submit further
briefing to “‘address the validity and viability of the PAGA causes of action
not only as asserted in the [FAC], but also as alleged in the [SAC].’” (Italics
added.)7 Both parties briefed the issue. In the alternative to her request that
the court overrule the demurrer, plaintiff sought leave to amend to remedy
her alleged failure to comply with PAGA’s prefiling notice requirements,
citing Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365
(Caliber Bodyworks), disapproved on other grounds in ZB, N.A. v. Superior
Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 196, fn. 8. On June 10, 2022, plaintiff also filed a
motion seeking leave to amend her pleading to add three new PAGA
representatives.
On June 23, 2022, following a hearing, Judge Wilson sustained
his sua sponte demurrer to plaintiff’s PAGA claims on the ground plaintiff
had failed to provide the required prefiling notice because she gave the notice
on the same day she filed the FAC and there was no way for her to later cure
that failure. The trial court also denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend
her pleading to add new plaintiff representatives. With respect to Hui, the

7
Neither party’s counsel seemed to be aware at oral argument
that plaintiff had filed a SAC. The record on appeal, however, includes both
the SAC and defendants’ answer to it, and the trial court referred to the SAC
in the order sustaining the demurrer that is the subject of this appeal.

7
court ruled: “Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust necessarily includes her PAGA
claims against Defendant Kim Hui and thus the ruling above also applies to
those claims.”
Defendants then moved for judgment on the pleadings,
contending there was nothing left to be litigated because the PAGA claims
had been dismissed by the court on demurrer and a final arbitration award
had been issued on plaintiff’s individual claims. Plaintiff opposed the motion
for judgment on the pleadings on the ground the arbitration took place out of
state, was never confirmed by the trial court, and therefore was not subject to
res judicata. Plaintiff also argued the arbitration did not resolve all of her
claims pending before the court and the arbitrator had no authority to decide
plaintiff’s claim for public injunctive relief under the UCL.
On June 23, 2023, after taking judicial notice of the arbitrator’s
interim and final rulings, the trial court rejected all of plaintiff’s arguments,
granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, and dismissed the
action in its entirety with prejudice. The court found unpersuasive plaintiff’s
argument that certain of her individual claims were not arbitrated, ruling
that plaintiff could and should have raised in arbitration all individual claims
that were encompassed in the underlying action, and that “[p]laintiff’s
strategic decision not to pursue certain claims or remedies in the arbitration
does not preclude application of res judicata because they fell within the
scope of the arbitration agreement, were related to the subject matter and
relevant to the issues in arbitration.” The court further rejected plaintiff’s
argument the arbitration award was not res judicata, concluding it “resolved
all issues submitted to the arbitrator, including whether Plaintiff had
standing to pursue a public injunctive relief claim” and “may be deemed a
final judgment for purposes of res judicata.”

8
Plaintiff timely appealed the order granting judgment on the
pleadings in favor of defendants and the resulting judgment of dismissal, as
well as the court’s earlier interim orders sustaining the sua sponte demurrer
to plaintiff’s PAGA claims and denying plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend
to add new plaintiff representatives.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING PLAINTIFF COULD NOT CURE NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH PAGA’S PREFILING NOTICE REQUIREMENTS

We review the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer de novo
and its denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. (Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Where the court sustains a demurrer without
leave to amend, we decide if “there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff
could cure the defect with an amendment. [Citation.] . . . The plaintiff has the
burden of proving that an amendment would cure the defect.” (Schifando v.
City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) “In conducting our de novo
review, we ‘must “give[ ] the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and
treat[ ] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded.”
[Citation.] Because only factual allegations are considered on demurrer, we
must disregard any “contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law
alleged . . . .”’” (WA Southwest 2, LLC v. First American Title Ins. Co. (2015)
240 Cal.App.4th 148, 151.)
As a preliminary matter, we reject plaintiff’s contention that
Judge Wilson lacked authority to reconsider Judge Di Cesare’s prior order on
the demurrer to the PAGA claims. It is true one trial court judge generally
may not reconsider and overrule another judge’s order unless the first judge
is unavailable. (See Ziller Electronics Lab. GmbH v. Superior Court (1988)

9
206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1232.) A trial court, however, “retains the authority to
alter or amend its own rulings in the same case, whether made by the same
judge or by his or her predecessor.” (In re Marriage of Nicholas (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 1566, 1577–1578; See Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094,
1097; Aerojet-General Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 132, 139, fn. 6 [no error where different judge reached contrary
result on summary judgment than prior judge did when ruling on demurrer].)
Here, Judge Wilson was the assigned judge on the case, and
Judge Di Cesare’s prior ruling was a non-binding interim order. In addition,
the case had by then been designated complex.8 As the assigned judge
presiding over a complex case, Judge Wilson had broad authority to manage
the case, including the authority to decide legal issues that may dispose of
the case early and expeditiously. (First State Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000)
79 Cal.App.4th 324, 333 [“‘The complex litigation procedure is intended to
facilitate pretrial resolution of evidentiary and other issues, and to minimize
the time and expense of lengthy or multiple trials’”].) We find no error in
Judge Wilson’s decision to revisit a purely legal issue that was potentially
dispositive.9
Turning to the merits, we conclude the trial court erred in

8
“A ‘complex case’ is an action that requires exceptional judicial
management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the court or the
litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, and promote
effective decision making by the court, the parties, and counsel.” (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 3.400.)

9
We also reject plaintiff’s argument, for which plaintiff provides
no legal authority, that Judge Wilson could not reconsider the ruling on the
demurrer while a writ was pending to the California Supreme Court and no
stay was in effect.

10
sustaining the demurrer to the FAC without leave to amend without
considering whether the SAC (which was the operative complaint at the time
the court ruled on the renewed demurrer) complied with the LWDA notice
requirements.
“Before an employee may file an action seeking to recover civil
penalties for violations of any of the Labor Code provisions enumerated in
section 2699.5, . . . he or she must comply with the [PAGA] administrative
procedures as set forth in section 2699.3, subdivision (a), which include
providing notice to the LWDA and the employer and waiting a prescribed
period of time to permit the LWDA to investigate and to decide whether to
cite the employer for the alleged violations.” (Caliber Bodyworks, supra, 134
Cal.App.4th at p. 370; see also § 2699.3, subds (a)(1)(A), (b)(1), & (c)(1)(A);
Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545 [PAGA plaintiff must
provide prefiling notice as a “condition of suit”]; Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co.
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 824, 835 [“Proper notice under section 2699.3 is a
‘condition’ of a PAGA lawsuit”].) The notice must be in writing, and it must
identify the specific provisions of the Labor Code allegedly violated and
specify the facts and theories that support the alleged violation. (§ 2699.3,
subd. (a)(1)(A).) Failure to plead compliance with the notice requirement “is
fatal to those claims.” (Caliber Bodyworks, supra, at p. 382.)
That said, as Caliber Bodyworks recognized, the statutory
scheme includes a cure provision: it permits a plaintiff who has filed a
complaint without giving the necessary prefiling notice to cure that defect by
(1) giving the notice required by section 2699.3, subdivision (a), and (2) then
amending its complaint to assert a PAGA civil penalties claim. Specifically,
section 2699.3, subdivision (a)(2)(C) provides: “Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a plaintiff may as a matter of right amend an existing

11
complaint to add a cause of action arising under this part at any time within
60 days of the time periods specified in this part.”
In Caliber Bodyworks, the appellate court reversed the trial
court’s order that overruled an employer’s demurrer to a wage-and-hour
action brought by former employees that sought (among other things) civil
penalties for Labor Code violations. It found that “because plaintiffs failed to
plead compliance with [PAGA’s] prefiling notice and exhaustion requirements
in section 2699.3, subdivision (a), they are not entitled to pursue their causes
of action seeking only civil penalties” and the defendant’s demurrer to the
causes of action that sought only civil penalties should have been sustained.
(Caliber Bodyworks, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at 383.) The appellate court,
however, added a caveat: even though the plaintiffs had not “specified any
manner in which they would amend their allegations if the demurrer is
sustained to these causes of action” and granting leave to amend at that
juncture therefore “would be futile,” it stated “plaintiffs certainly may follow
the administrative procedures in section 2699.3, subdivision (a), and, should
the LWDA choose not to investigate or cite Caliber based on the alleged
violations, then request leave to amend the first amended complaint to seek
civil penalties” pursuant to section 2699.3, subdivision (a)(2)(C). (Caliber
Bodyworks, at p. 383, fn. 18; italics added.) The court then underscored the
point with respect to the plaintiff’s hybrid causes of action that sought both
civil penalties and unpaid wages. It found the demands for civil penalties in
those causes of action must be stricken for failure to plead compliance with
the prefiling notice and exhaustion requirements. But then, again citing
section 2699.3, subdivision (a)(2)(C), it reiterated: “As with their causes of
action for only civil penalties, plaintiffs are not precluded from later
requesting leave to amend their first amended complaint to seek civil

12
penalties for the Labor Code violations alleged [in those causes of action] but
must first satisfy the requirements of section 2699.3, subdivision (a).”
(Caliber Bodyworks, at p. 385, fn. 19.)
Here, plaintiff did not (indeed, could not) show the FAC
sufficiently alleged compliance with PAGA’s prefiling notice requirement and
that she exhausted her administrative remedies before filing the FAC. The
trial court, however, erroneously concluded plaintiff could never cure that
defect in the FAC and therefore erred in failing to consider whether the SAC
did so.
Here, plaintiff’s SAC alleged she gave notice to the LWDA and
Jeunesse almost two years before the SAC was filed and the LWDA neither
responded that it wished to investigate nor cited Jeunesse for the purported
violations. As with any demurrer, the trial court was required to accept those
factual allegations as true. (San Mateo Union High School Dist. v. County of
San Mateo (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 418, 425.) The court, however, did not do
that. Instead, focusing on the then-superseded FAC, it found plaintiff did not
give the required prefiling notice “because the LWDA letter and the FAC
were filed the same day”—i.e., on February 11, 2020. (Italics added). It then
erred by finding plaintiff could not thereafter “cure” the lack of compliance
without ever reaching the statute of limitations issue.
The trial court’s reliance on Esparza v. Safeway, Inc. (2019) 36
Cal.App.5th 42, is misplaced. It cited Esparza for the general proposition that
the LWDA’s prefiling notice requirement is a condition precedent to the filing
of a PAGA lawsuit. But Esparza does not support what the trial court did
here. The question in Esparza was whether the plaintiff’s PAGA claim
against Safeway, her former employer, was time-barred, not whether the
plaintiff could cure (or had cured) an initial failure to give an effective

13
prefiling notice. Specifically, the plaintiff failed to give the LWDA notice of
her PAGA claims until after the one-year statute of limitations had already
run. (Id. at pp. 47, 60.)
Whether a plaintiff has complied with the prefiling notice
requirements (either at the outset, or by later invoking the “cure” provision of
section 2699.3, subdivision (a)(2)(C)) is a different issue from whether the
plaintiff’s PAGA claims were filed within the governing statute of limitations.
And, as noted above, Judge Wilson expressly declined to rule on whether
plaintiff’s PAGA claims were time barred under the statute of limitations,
finding the issue was mooted by his conclusion that plaintiff’s failure to give
notice before she filed her FAC was fatal to her PAGA claims.10 The trial
court erred in sustaining defendants’ demurrer to the PAGA claims without

10
“The statute of limitations for PAGA claims is one year.”
(Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 839, citing Code
Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (a).) We note inconsistencies in the record regarding
when plaintiff’s employment relationship with Jeunesse ended. Although
plaintiff alleged in her SAC that it ended on March 5, 2019, the federal court
noted in its November 15, 2019 remand order that, as of the date of its order,
“[Plaintiff] ha[d] not done business with [Jeunesse] in four years.” Jeunesse
also contended in its motion to compel arbitration that plaintiff had not
purchased any products from Jeunesse since March 2016. It is not for us to
decide what the relevant facts are or whether plaintiff timely filed her claims;
those are questions to be addressed by the trial court on remand.

14
11
leave to amend.
In light of our conclusion the trial court erred in sustaining
plaintiff’s demurrer and then dismissing her claims against Jeunesse, we
need not address plaintiff’s argument on appeal that the court erred in
denying her motion for leave to amend to substitute in other plaintiffs to
pursue the PAGA claims.
II.
THE ORDER GRANTING JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
IS REVERSED
In addition to challenging the order sustaining the demurrer to
the PAGA claims, plaintiff challenges the court’s subsequent order granting
judgment on the pleadings. We independently review the trial court’s order
granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Gerawan Farming, Inc.
v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515.)

11
The trial court’s reconsideration of the demurrer was limited to
deciding whether plaintiff complied with the LWDA’s prefiling notice
requirements in alleging PAGA claims against defendants and, if not,
whether that could be cured. The court did not invite briefing on, or decide,
whether: (1) Hui is a proper defendant on the PAGA claims; (2) separate
notice of the LWDA letter had to be given to Hui; (3) what plaintiff was
required, if anything, to say in the LWDA notice regarding the claims against
Hui as an individual; and (4) whether the LWDA notice itself—which was not
attached to any of plaintiffs’ pleadings and Judge Wilson declined to consider
as part of the evidence submitted by defendants (to which plaintiff objected)
in support of the renewed demurrer—provided sufficient notice of the claims
against Hui. We decline to decide these issues in the first instance on appeal
and instead confine our review to whether the trial court erred in concluding
plaintiffs’ PAGA claims as to both defendants must be dismissed with
prejudice because plaintiff failed to give prefiling notice of her PAGA claims
to the LWDA and could not later remedy that failure.

15
Plaintiff contends (1) the arbitration award is void for lack of
jurisdiction, (2) the arbitrator had no authority to decide plaintiff’s prayer for
public injunctive relief, (3) the arbitration agreement did not encompass
plaintiff’s demand for equitable relief, and (4) the arbitration order is not
subject to preclusive effect in the underlying action because it was never
confirmed by the trial court. In light of our reversal of the order sustaining
the demurrer as to the PAGA claims, we need not reach these issues.
Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings solely on the
ground plaintiff “has no further business before this Court” following the
court’s order sustaining the demurrer on the PAGA claims, and based on
defendants’ contention the arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claims had
been completed and was final. The motion for judgment on the pleadings was
directed to plaintiff’s entire complaint on this basis, not to individual causes
of action.12 Because we have concluded it was error for the court to sustain
the demurrer to the PAGA claims, the order granting judgment on the
pleadings also must be reversed.13

12
A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be directed to
“[t]he entire complaint . . . or as to any of the causes of action stated therein.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(2)(A).) “A motion for judgment on the
pleadings is similar to a demurrer in most respects . . . . [Citation.] Except as
provided in the statute governing motions for judgment on the
pleadings, . . . section 438, the rules governing demurrers apply.” (Alameda
County Waste Management Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc. (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 1162, 1173–1174; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(a)
[“Each ground of demurrer must be in a separate paragraph and must state
whether it applies to the entire complaint, cross-complaint, or answer, or to
specified causes of action or defenses”].)

16
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal of the action is reversed, and the
matter is remanded for further proceedings before the trial court. Appellant
shall recover costs on appeal.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

SCOTT, J.

13
We invited supplemental briefing from the parties on whether
reversal of the order sustaining the demurrer to the PAGA claims mandates
reversal of the subsequent order granting judgment on the pleadings. In their
supplemental brief, defendants argue that if we reinstate the PAGA claims,
we “should nevertheless agree with the trial court that the rest of [plaintiff’s]
claims became res judicata in arbitration.” Defendants cite no authority for
the proposition that, although they moved for judgment only as to the entire
complaint, the court can decide the motion based on individual claims
without disposing of the entire complaint.

17

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.