CourtListener 10770583•People v. Santiago CA4/1
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Filed 1/7/26 P. v. Santiago CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085214
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE423903)
CESAR SANTIAGO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Herbert J. Exarhos, Judge. Affirmed.
Thien Huong Tran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found Cesar Santiago guilty of one count of robbery (Pen. Code,
§ 211) (count 1); two counts of unlawful driving and taking of a vehicle (Veh.
Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) (counts 2 & 5); one count of carrying a loaded
firearm in a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a)) (count 4); and one count of
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11377, subd. (a)) (count 7). The jury also made true findings on certain
firearm allegations. (Pen. Code, §§ 12022.5, subd. (a) (count 1); 25850, subd.
(c)(6) (count 4).) The trial court sentenced Santiago to a lower term sentence
of five years in prison.
Santiago’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief which raises no
claims of error and asks us to review the record independently for reversible
error. (See People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende); Anders v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders).) We offered Santiago the
opportunity to file his own brief on appeal, and he did so. After considering
the issues raised by Santiago (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110) and
conducting an independent review of the entire record, we have found no
arguable issues. We according affirm the judgment.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2024, a man listed for sale on OfferUp an automotive tool
known as a “key programmer,” which is used to reprogram the chips in
electronic automobile keys. Using an OfferUp account under the name
“Marc,” Santiago responded to the offer and arranged to come to the man’s
house on the night of February 15, 2024, to purchase the item. While outside
the man’s house, Santiago, pointed a gun at the man and took the item from
him without paying for it. The man photographed Santiago’s license plate as
he was driving away in a silver minivan. Law enforcement used information
obtained from OfferUp to identify Santiago as a suspect, and the victim of the
robbery subsequently identified Santiago in a photographic lineup and later
in court.
Shortly after the robbery, the silver minivan was located in a nearby
shopping center parking lot. The minivan’s ignition lock cylinder had been
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damaged, and Santiago’s DNA was on the minivan’s steering wheel. On the
night of the robbery, the owner of the minivan had parked it overnight in the
same shopping center parking lot where it was returned after the robbery.
On February 24, 2024, police officers pulled over a Honda CRV driven
by Santiago after they noticed that its license plate information did not
match the make of the vehicle. The Honda CRV that Santiago was driving
had been stolen from the owner three days before. The ignition lock cylinder
on the vehicle was damaged so that it could be started with any kind of flat
metal object. During the traffic stop it was discovered that Santiago
possessed 1.27 grams of methamphetamine and a loaded unregistered
firearm. Inside the vehicle, officers found a key programmer that was the
same model as the item taken in the February 15, 2024 robbery, and the
victim of the February 15, 2024 robbery stated that the firearm Santiago
possessed during the traffic stop was similar to the one that Santiago used in
the robbery.
The crimes that took place on February 15, 2024, were originally
charged in a different information (Case No. SCE423903) from the crimes
discovered during the February 24, 2024 traffic stop (Case No. SDC302526).
The trial court later granted the People’s motion to consolidate the two
informations.
A consolidated information alleged one count of robbery (Pen. Code,
§ 211), with the further allegation that Santiago personally used a firearm in
that count (id., § 12022.5, subd. (a)) (count 1); two counts of unlawful driving
and taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) (counts 2 & 5); one
count of grand theft of an automobile (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1)) (count
3); one count of carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle (Pen Code, § 25850,
subd. (a)), with the further allegation that the firearm was not registered to
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Santiago (id., § 25850, subd. (c)(6)) (count 4); one count of buying, selling,
concealing, receiving or withholding a stolen vehicle (id., § 496d) (count 6);
and one count of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) (count 7).
During motions in limine, defense counsel moved to exclude from
evidence the DNA that was taken from Santiago after he was arrested in
March 2024 for the February 15, 2024 robbery, as well as items found in
Santiago’s residence during a search conducted after that arrest. The trial
court ruled that law enforcement legally obtained the evidence based on
Santiago’s waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights when he was released on
his own recognizance after his February 24, 2024 arrest. During an in limine
hearing, the trial court also rejected defense counsel’s hearsay objection to
evidence that OfferUp told a police investigator that the account used by
“Marc” in connection with the February 15, 2024 robbery was related to
another account, which the police subsequently linked to Santiago.
A jury trial was held from July 23 to July 30, 2024. The jury was
instructed that count 2 was charged as an alternative to count 3, and count 5
was charged as an alternative to count 6, so that the jury should not return a
verdict on count 3 or count 6 if it found Santiago guilty on count 2 or count 5,
respectively. The jury found Santiago guilty on all counts, as charged, except
for counts 3 and 6, for which the verdict forms were left blank. The People
subsequently dismissed counts 3 and 6. The jury also made a true finding on
one aggravating factor, namely that Santiago was armed with or used a
firearm in the commission of the robbery.
On October 11, 2024, the trial court sentenced Santiago to a lower term
sentence of five years in prison. Specifically, the trial court selected the lower
term of two years on count 1, and the lower term of three years for the
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firearm enhancement on that count. The sentences for each of the other
counts were ordered to run concurrently.
II.
DISCUSSION
Appointed counsel for Santiago filed a brief in which counsel
summarized the relevant facts and proceedings, raised no claims of error, and
asked us to conduct an independent review of the record for reversible error.
(See Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441 [the appellate court must “conduct a
review of the entire record whenever appointed counsel submits a brief which
raises no specific issues”].)
Counsel identified the following possible issues: 1. “Whether the
consolidation of cases SCE423903 and SDC302526 was proper.” 2. “Whether
the trial court properly denied [Santiago’s] motion to suppress.” 3. “Whether
[a detective’s] testimony regarding the connection between the two OfferUp
accounts constituted inadmissible hearsay.”
Santiago’s supplemental brief sets forth 10 numbered items. The legal
basis for Santiago’s arguments are not clearly stated, but as we understand
them, they fall into several categories.
First, Santiago contends that defense counsel was ineffective because
he ignored or failed to investigate certain items, suggested that a possible
defense witness should offer false testimony, and engaged in a “trick” to
ensure consolidation of Santiago’s two different criminal cases. These claims
do not provide an arguable basis for an appeal because they are based on
alleged facts outside of the appellate record and are therefore required to be
raised in a habeas corpus proceeding. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15
Cal.4th 264, 266–267.)
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Second, Santiago contends the prosecutor committed misconduct
because she did not “retract” a witness’s testimony that was inconsistent with
the witness’s preliminary hearing testimony, and because she purportedly
“falsely stated” something about an item Santiago listed for sale on his
OfferUp account. We have reviewed the trial proceedings to which Santiago
appears to refer, and we have not located any arguable instances of
prosecutorial misconduct. Further, any appellate claim of prosecutorial
misconduct is forfeited because there was no timely objection during trial.
(People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.)
Third, Santiago argues that certain evidence supports a finding that
he was not the person who committed the February 15, 2024 robbery.
Specifically, Santiago points to aspects of his physical appearance; the
possibility that the key programmer found in the vehicle he was driving on
February 24, 2024, had a different serial number from the item taken during
the robbery; questions about the reliability of the DNA evidence; and the fact
that he did not attempt to flee during the traffic stop on February 24, 2024.
If Santiago intends to argue that those facts require us to reverse his
conviction, the argument is without merit. “ ‘When considering a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We determine
‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing
court ‘presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the
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trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (People v. Edwards (2013)
57 Cal.4th 658, 715.) Based on our independent review of the entire record,
substantial evidence supports the verdict, even in light of the evidence that
Santiago cites in his supplemental brief.
Finally, Santiago appears to contend that the evidence obtained in the
search of his residence in March 2024 was improperly obtained as the result
of an “unlawful warrantless search.” This contention lacks merit because it
is undisputed that Santiago waived his Fourth Amendment rights when he
was released on his own recognizance after his arrest on February 24, 2024.
We have reviewed the entire record for Santiago’s appeal, as required
by Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, and Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, and we
have not identified any arguable grounds for reversal or modification of
either of the judgment. Santiago has received competent representation on
appeal.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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