People v. Vasquez CA2/5

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Filed 1/2/26 P. v. Vasquez CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B336476

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. PA045357)

FRANK VASQUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael Terrell, Judge. Affirmed and remanded
with directions.
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Frank Vasquez’s (defendant’s) Penal Code
section 1172.75 petition for resentencing asked the trial court to
strike certain sentencing enhancements that were no longer valid
under current law and to exercise its discretion to strike other
enhancements and prior strike convictions.1 The trial court held
a resentencing hearing, struck the invalid enhancements, but
declined to further reduce defendant’s sentence. We consider
whether this was an abuse of discretion. We also address certain
conceded errors in the pronouncement of sentence, including with
respect to custody credits.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Defendant’s 2005 Conviction and Sentencing2
Defendant took car keys from a neighbor twice in
September 2003. In the first instance, defendant asked to borrow
his neighbor’s sister’s car and, when the neighbor refused,
defendant struck him in the jaw, took the keys, and drove away.
In the second instance, defendant (along with another man)
struck the neighbor with a gun, handcuffed him, and took his
debit card, his car, and other items.
A jury convicted defendant in 2005 of carjacking for each of
the two incidents (§ 215, subd. (a)) (counts two and four) and one
count of first degree residential robbery in connection with the

1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
2
Our summary of the offense conduct is based on the opinion
in defendant’s direct appeal. (People v. Vasquez (Nov. 22, 2006,
B185153) [nonpub. opn.].)

2
second incident (§ 211) (count three).3 With respect to the
charges arising from the second incident (counts three and four),
the jury found true allegations that defendant inflicted great
bodily injury upon the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and personally
used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The trial court found true
allegations that defendant suffered prior strikes for robbery in
1985 and 1995,4 one prior serious felony conviction (the 1995
robbery), and multiple prior prison terms. The trial court
sentenced defendant to a total term of 110 years to life in state
prison: 27 years to life in prison on count two; 38 years to life on
count three; and 45 years to life on count four.

B. Defendant’s 2006 Appeal and 2007 Resentencing
On direct appeal, another panel of this Court affirmed
defendant’s convictions but held the robbery and carjacking
counts arising from the second incident (counts three and four)
constituted a single, indivisible transaction precluding multiple
punishment under section 654. (People v. Vasquez (Nov. 22,
2006, B185153) [nonpub. opn.] (Vasquez I).) This Court also
determined the trial court improperly ordered two one-year prior
prison term enhancements to run concurrently and remanded for
the trial court either to strike those enhancements or order them
to be served consecutively. Additionally, this Court held the trial
court erred in applying serious felony and prior prison term
enhancements only once to the principal term—and not
separately as to each of defendant’s three convictions. We

3
Defendant was acquitted of residential robbery in
connection with the first incident.
4
Defendant was a juvenile in 1985.

3
accordingly modified the judgment to stay the sentence imposed
on the robbery count (count three) and to reflect imposition of the
five-year serious felony enhancement as to each count. The
matter was remanded for the trial court to “consider whether
defendant’s circumstances warrant[ed] the striking of any or
none of” the prior prison term enhancements.
On remand in 2007, the trial court imposed a new sentence
of 81 years to life in state prison. On count two, the trial court
imposed a sentence of 27 years to life plus a five-year prior
serious felony enhancement and two one-year prior prison term
enhancements. On count four, the trial court imposed a term of
27 years to life plus a three-year serious bodily injury
enhancement, a ten-year firearm use enhancement, a five-year
prior serious felony enhancement, and two one-year prior prison
term enhancements. A 45-year sentence was imposed and stayed
on the count three conviction for robbery.

C. Defendant’s 2023 Petition for Resentencing
In October 2023, defendant’s appointed attorney filed a
petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, which
deems section 667.5 prior prison term enhancements invalid
(with limited exceptions) and requires a court to resentence a
defendant sentenced to one or more such enhancements.
Defendant asked the trial court to strike all of the imposed prior
prison term enhancements and “to apply all ameliorative changes
in the law, including the exercise of its discretion to now strike
sentence enhancements, apply presumptive mid-term sentences,
and consider resentencing [defendant] as a second strike
offender.” Defendant emphasized he is 55 years old and suffers
from Parkinson’s disease.

4
The People agreed defendant’s prison priors were no longer
valid but opposed any other modification of his sentence. Among
other things, the People highlighted defendant’s prison rule
violations, including instances in which defendant punched other
inmates (one of whom was in a wheelchair) in 2019 and 2021.5
At the December 2023 hearing on defendant’s petition, the
trial court explained defendant’s one-year prior prison term
enhancements were “automatically gone.” The court then
considered what it needed to “find or not find as far as going
beyond the striking of the one year priors.” Specifically, the trial
court noted the split of authority—which our Supreme Court had
granted review to settle—as to whether “the ultimate question is
whether it is in furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement”
or “whether or not dismissing the other enhancements would
endanger public safety.” Defendant’s attorney argued the
enhancements should be stricken under either standard because
his age and physical condition meant there was “no danger to
public safety” and “no benefit to continued incarceration” despite
the “horrible” facts of the case and defendant’s “rather extensive”
criminal record.
The trial court ruled it would resentence defendant exactly
as before except for striking the prior prison term enhancements.
With respect to the other enhancements, the trial court explained
it was focused on whether striking them would be in furtherance
of justice—i.e., its analysis was not based on “whether or

5
The People’s memorandum of points and authorities in
opposition to defendant’s petition cites exhibits that are not
included in the appellate record. Defendant does not dispute the
prison rule violations or challenge the trial court’s decision on
this basis.

5
not . . . defendant would endanger public safety.”6 The “first step”
in the court’s analysis was “to look to see what actually
happened, to look at the conduct that occurred.” The trial court
found that, “[a]s both counsel have acknowledged, the conduct in
this case was extremely aggravating. There was nothing
mitigating about it. The enhancements which were imposed for
his prior criminal record, this is primarily the Three Strikes,
were well supported by the record.” Although there was “no
doubt [in the court’s] mind that [defendant] has a severe medical
condition,” and the trial court considered defendant’s “age, time
served[,] and diminished physical condition,” these factors did not
outweigh defendant’s offense conduct and conduct in custody.
The trial court declined to strike defendant’s strike priors
“because this case clearly does not fall outside of the spirit of the
Three Strikes law.”
In pronouncing sentence, the trial court appears to have
subtracted the stricken prison priors from the original sentence
imposed in 2005 rather than the sentence imposed on remand in
2007. The court stated: “And so on Count 4, the sentence instead
of being 45 years to life will be 43 years to life and that will
consist of a base term of 27 years to life plus 10 years for the
12022.53(b) plus 5 years for the 667.5(a) plus 3 years for the
12022.7.[7] [¶] On Count 3, the sentence will remain at 38 years
to life consecutive reflecting a base term of 25 years to life

6
The trial court emphasized that if defendant’s threat to
public safety were the sole issue, “then the court would find that
he is not a risk to endanger public safety . . . .”
7
The components of this sentence add up to 45 years—not 43
years.

6
consecutive plus 10 years consecutive pursuant to 12022.5(b) [sic]
plus 3 years consecutive pursuant to 12022.7. [¶] For Count 2,
the sentence will remain as it current—as it originally was,
which is 27 years to life, and that is the base term without any
enhancement.”
A minute order issued the same day indicated the trial
court struck the prison priors on count four, reducing the total
prison term for this count to 45 years to life.
The trial court did not address defendant’s custody credits
at the hearing or in its minute order, and the amended abstract
of judgment indicates “CDC [sic] to recalculate custody credits
from 8/5/05.”8 The abstract of judgment also reflects prior prison
term enhancements on counts two and three.

II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in
declining to strike his enhancements for personal use of a
firearm, infliction of great bodily injury, and a prior serious
felony conviction in addition to striking his prior prison term
enhancements. It was within the trial court’s discretion,
however, to determine this relief would not be in furtherance of
justice based on defendant’s offense conduct and conduct while in
prison. Contrary to defendant’s contention, that the court made
reference on the record only to defendant’s age and physical
condition does not mean it ignored other mitigating
circumstances.

8
The amended abstract of judgment following defendant’s
resentencing in 2007 includes a similar note.

7
Defendant’s argument that the trial court abused its
discretion in declining to strike one or both of his prior strike
convictions also lacks merit. His physical condition, time in
custody, and the remoteness of one of his strike priors did not
preclude the finding that a third-strike sentence was in the
interest of justice.
Defendant and the Attorney General agree, however, that
the abstract of judgment issued in connection with the
resentencing is flawed. They also agree on the remedy in one
respect: the matter should be remanded for the trial court to
calculate defendant’s custody credits. Defendant’s suggestion,
however, that the abstract of judgment should also be “corrected”
to strike the prior serious felony enhancement on count two is not
a true matter of mere correction, nor is it founded on a
meritorious claim of error. The trial court was clear that it only
intended to strike the prior prison term enhancements, but its
oral pronouncement of sentence was based on defendant’s 2005
sentence rather than his 2007 sentence—and that is why it
omitted the prior serious felony enhancement on count two. We
will accordingly remand for the trial court to calculate
defendant’s custody credits, to strike the prior prison term
enhancements on counts two and three, to clarify the sentence as
to the prior serious felony enhancement on count two, and to
clarify that the sentence on count three is stayed.

A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Declining to Strike Additional Enhancements
Where, as here, a defendant’s sentence includes one or
more enhancements for a prior prison term that was not for a
sexually violent offense, the trial court must recall the sentence

8
and hold a full resentencing that accounts for “any other changes
in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.”
(§ 1172.75, subds. (c), (d)(2).)
In determining whether to strike the additional
punishment for an enhancement, the trial court “shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) “In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any” of several
statutorily defined mitigating circumstances are present.
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) “Proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2).)
As the trial court anticipated, our Supreme Court recently
explained that, even in the absence of a finding that dismissing
an enhancement would endanger public safety, “a court retains
the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that
it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating
circumstances when they are present.” (People v. Walker (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029.) “In other words, if the court does not find
that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an
enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the
dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds
substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may
nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating
circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

9
Here, it is undisputed that mitigating circumstances set
forth in section 1385 are present: there were multiple
enhancements alleged in this single case (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B))
and the prior serious felony enhancement was based on a
conviction more than five years old (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H)).9
Although the trial court did not discuss these mitigating
factors on the record, “we presume that the trial court knew the
law and followed it” absent evidence to the contrary. (People v.
Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042; accord People v. Brugman
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637 [“‘The trial court is not required
to state reasons for declining to exercise its discretion under
section 1385’”].) There is no such evidence, and we reject
defendant’s argument that a mere silent record would still
warrant reversal because the record here is not in fact silent.
The trial court’s discussion of whether it was required to find that

9
In his moving papers, defendant cited the multiple
enhancements subdivision (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)), but he did not
cite the subdivision addressing convictions more than five years
old (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H)). Defendant instead cited a different
subdivision concerning enhancements that “could result in a
sentence of over 20 years” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)), which he does
not mention on appeal. (People v. Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th
88, 93 [holding section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) does not apply
where the sentence “already exceeded 20 years without any
enhancement” and “the enhancement itself does not ‘result’ in a
sentence exceeding 20 years”].) We assume for the sake of
argument defendant did not forfeit his argument concerning
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(H) by failing to raise it in the trial
court. (But see § 1385, subd. (c)(2) [requiring courts to “consider
and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to
prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs
(A) to (I) are present”], emphasis added.)

10
dismissing enhancements would endanger public safety shows
that it understood mitigating factors listed in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) were present because that is the statutory
subdivision that makes the potential danger to public safety
relevant. The trial court’s focus on defendant’s age and health at
the hearing was a consequence of defense counsel’s focus on these
circumstances.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that striking the enhancements would not be in furtherance of
justice despite the “‘great weight’” and “significant value” due
these mitigating factors. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at 1029.) As
defendant’s attorney acknowledged in the trial court, defendant
has a “rather extensive” criminal history and the offense conduct
in this case was “horrible”—repeated and escalating violence
against the same victim. Defendant does not challenge the trial
court’s further reliance on his assaults on other inmates while
imprisoned. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3) [“The court may consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the
disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant
while incarcerated”].) We believe this evidence suffices to uphold
the trial court’s discretionary determination that the mitigating
factors had been “‘neutralize[d] . . . such that dismissal of the
enhancement[s] [wa]s not in furtherance of justice.’ [Citation.]”10
(Walker, supra, at 1029.)

10
Nothing we say in this opinion bears on the separate
question of whether defendant may at some point be entitled to
consideration for compassionate release (see, e.g., § 1172.2).

11
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Declining to Strike Defendant’s Prior Strike
Convictions
A trial court conducting a resentencing under section
1172.75 has discretion to dismiss a “strike” allegation under the
Three Strikes law. (See, e.g., § 1385, subd. (a); People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504; People v. Williams
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) There was no abuse of discretion
here.
Defendant believes the age of his first strike (which he
suffered as a juvenile in 1985), his age (55 years), the nearly 20
years he had already served at the time of resentencing, and his
physical condition combine to make the trial court’s decision not
to dismiss at least one of his prior strikes an abuse of discretion.
With respect to the first point, the remoteness of defendant’s
1985 robbery carries relatively little weight in light of defendant’s
other convictions and jail/prison terms both before and after his
second strike in 1995. (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [holding that the remoteness of an offense
is not mitigating where there has been no “crime-free cleansing
period of rehabilitation”].) The remaining arguments generally
reflect the reduced danger defendant would pose to the
community, which the trial court acknowledged, but it was
within the trial court’s discretion to conclude this was outweighed
by defendant’s criminal history, the circumstances of his offense
conduct, and his conduct in custody.11

11
Defendant’s argument to the contrary relies on cases
involving strikingly different facts. In People v. Garcia (1999) 20
Cal.4th 490, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking
certain prior conviction allegations because, unlike in this case,

12
C. Remand to Correct and Clarify Sentence
Defendant correctly observes the trial court calculated
certain elements of his sentence by subtracting the one-year prior
prison term enhancements from his original 2005 sentence as
opposed to the sentence imposed on remand in 2007. Defendant’s
proposed remedy is for this Court simply to order the abstract of
judgment amended to remove the prior prison term
enhancements for Counts Two and Three and to remove a prior
serious felony enhancement on Count Two (which was imposed in
2007, but not in 2005).
Defendant takes the position that, notwithstanding the
trial court’s express ruling that it would
“resentence . . . defendant exactly as before except that the two
one year priors w[ould] be stricken,” it impliedly struck the prior
serious felony enhancement on Count Two when it said the
sentence would “remain as it current—as it originally was, which
is 27 years to life . . . without any enhancement.” This is not a
plausible understanding of the trial court’s remarks at the
hearing. Defendant’s suggestion that the trial court deliberately
distinguished between his “current” (i.e., 2007) sentence and his
“original” (i.e., 2005) sentence on Count Two contradicts its
stated intentions and is further belied by the court’s statement
that the sentence would “remain” as it was.

the defendant’s “prior convictions all arose from a single period of
aberrant behavior,” “his crimes were related to drug addiction,
and his criminal history [did] not include any actual violence.”
(Id. at 503.) Similarly, in People v. Bishop (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th
1245, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing two
strikes because, among other things, the defendant’s current
crime was nonviolent. (Id. at 1248, 1251.)

13
The Attorney General requests that we remand for the trial
court to strike the prior prison term enhancements on Counts
Two and Three, to clarify the sentence on Count Three remains
stayed, and to clarify the status of the prior serious felony
enhancement on Count Two. Defendant does not object to this
approach “should this Court determine remand necessary.” We
shall adopt the Attorney General’s suggestion. (See People v.
Garcia (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 834, 838-839 [remanding for trial
court to clarify ambiguous sentence].)

D. Remand to Calculate Custody Credits
Defendant also argues—and the Attorney General
appropriately concedes—the trial court improperly delegated
calculation of his custody credits to the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. We shall remand for the trial
court to calculate credit for actual time served. (§§ 2900.1,
2900.5, subd. (d); People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23-
24.)

14
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for the trial court to strike the
prior prison term enhancements on Counts Two and Three, to
clarify the sentence as to the prior serious felony enhancement on
Count Two, to clarify the sentence on Count Three is stayed, and
to calculate defendant’s custody credits. In all other respects, the
trial court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM (D.), J.

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