CourtListener 10767618•People v. Cooks CA2/5
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Filed 12/31/25 P. v. Cooks CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B341301
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24AVCF01274)
BRENNEN MICHAEL COOKS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Lisa M. Strassner, Judge. Affirmed.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, and Lauren Sanchez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Brennen Michael Cooks appeals from a robbery
conviction entered following a plea, arguing that the judgment
should be reversed because his waiver of the right to withdraw
the plea under Cruz1 was not knowing and voluntary. We affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Complaint
On August 20, 2024, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney (District Attorney) charged defendant in a felony
complaint with second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code
section 211.2 The District Attorney also alleged that defendant
had: served a prior prison term; previously performed
unsatisfactorily on probation, mandatory supervision, post-
release community supervision, and parole; engaged in violent
conduct that indicated a serious danger to society; and sustained
two prior felony convictions.
1 People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247, 1249 [A defendant
who “pleads guilty pursuant to a plea bargain which is
subsequently disapproved by the trial court shall be permitted to
withdraw the plea if he or she so desires”] (Cruz).)
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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B. Change of Plea and Cruz Waiver
On August 26, 2024, defendant completed and filed a “Plea
Form, with Explanations and Waiver of Rights—Felony.” He
placed his initials next to, among other items, item 6(e) which
stated: “I understand that if the court approves this plea
agreement the approval of the court is not binding, and that the
court may withdraw its approval of the plea agreement upon
further consideration of the matter. I understand that if the
court withdraws its approval of this plea agreement I will be
allowed to withdraw my plea. (. . . § 1192.5.)” Defendant also
initialed item 10(a) which stated: “I agree that if I fail to appear
on the date set for surrender or sentencing without a legal
excuse, my plea will become an ‘open plea’ to the court, I will not
be allowed to withdraw my plea . . . .” Defendant’s attorney
signed the form, acknowledging that he “explained each of the
items in the form” to defendant, including “the consequences of
the plea.”
On that same date, the trial court conducted a change of
plea hearing,3 at which it stated its understanding that there was
“going to be a resolution in this case wherein [defendant will] be
pleading no contest or guilty as to count 1 as a violent strike [in
exchange] for two years of formal probation” and other standard
terms. The court asked defendant if he was willing to accept
those terms, and defendant responded in the affirmative.
The trial court next confirmed with defendant that he had
signed and initialed the plea form and had “read and understood
all of the constitutional rights that [were] contained within [that]
document, including the right to a speedy jury trial . . . and all of
3 The plea hearing took place before Judge Scott Yang.
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the rights that flow[ed] from that.” The court also confirmed with
defendant that he was “going to waive and give up all of [his]
constitutional rights and . . . accept all the consequences of [his]
impending plea[.]”
After advising defendant of the consequences of his plea,
the trial court asked the prosecutor if he could explain “why [the
prosecution] made this offer when [defendant had] a kidnapping
in 2013 and his last felony conviction was two years ago out in
Riverside[.]” The prosecutor responded, “[T]his offer was
provided by [a different prosecutor]. But I believe his reason was
. . . in this case it’s alleged the defendant and a couple of other
folks went into the Family Fashion store, selected pants off the
rack. When the victim, owner attempted to stop . . . defendant
from leaving[,] he pushed the victim out of the way and then
continued on. Later on he admitted the incident but denied
pushing. This is an early disposition offer. The offer would have
expired today.” The prosecutor added that the value of the
clothing taken was $40. The court observed, seeming to address
the defendant, “I think you got a phenomenal deal.”
After accepting defendant’s no contest plea, the trial court
asked defendant whether he agreed that his sentencing hearing
could be scheduled for September 17, 2024. Defendant agreed.
The court then informed defendant that he would be sentenced
on September 17, 2024, in Department A18 by Judge Lisa
Strassner. The court next advised defendant of the consequences
of failing to appear for the scheduled sentencing hearing: “In the
event you don’t show up on September 17th to be sentenced in
Department A18 at 8:30 in the morning by Judge Strassner, or if
you pick up a new case from now [until] then, what’s going to
happen is your plea will remain, but the court will no longer be
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bound by its terms. You may be sentenced all the way up to four
years in state prison. [¶] This is commonly referred to as a Cruz
waiver.” When the court asked defendant if he understood and
agreed, he replied, “Yes, sir.” Finally, the court asked
defendant’s counsel if he joined the Cruz waiver, and he joined.
C. September 17, 2024, Sentencing Hearing
At the September 17, 2024, sentencing hearing, Judge
Strassner called defendant’s case, noted that, although it was
9:43 a.m., he was not present, and issued a bench warrant.
During the afternoon session that same day, the trial court
called the matter again and quashed the bench warrant because
defendant had appeared around 11:40 a.m. The court informed
defendant’s counsel that it was not prepared to sentence
defendant that day because he had violated the Cruz waiver.
Defendant’s counsel explained defendant’s absence:
“[Defendant] indicated to me that he was waiting for his child’s
mother to give him a ride to the courthouse. He kept waiting and
waiting and then she eventually ended up not being able to come
pick him up, so he ended up having to take the bus here. And
that’s why he was late. He apologized to the court but he wasn’t
intentionally trying to be late. He just thought he had a ride and
then he took public transportation to get here.”
The trial court admonished defendant for not using his cell
phone to call the court and stated, “You were told three weeks
ago [by Judge Yang] when you entered a plea . . . on August 26th
. . . [,] that if you failed to appear at 8:30 [a.m.], that’s a Cruz
waiver violation. If you picked up a new case, that’s a Cruz
waiver violation. [¶] So when you walk in here at 11:35 or 11:40
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a.m., without so much as even having any communication with
your attorney, or calling the court or anything of that nature,
that’s a Cruz waiver violation. [¶] So while I understand . . .
your attorney[ ] has indicated to me you waited and waited and
waited, that’s not persuasive to this court.”
After a further colloquy with defendant and his counsel, the
trial court advised defendant that he was being remanded into
custody. At that point, there was an interruption in the
proceedings. When the court went back on the record, it
explained: “All right. [Defendant] has exited the courtroom. He
did attempt to flee and was taken down by the Sheriff’s
Department when I remanded him. [¶] In any respect, at this
point in time bail is set at no bail. And the matter will trail
within the period to October 8th, 2024, . . . for probation and
sentencing. [¶] [Defendant is] ordered out and ordered to appear
October 8th, 2024, 8:30 a.m. in this courtroom.
D. October 8, 2024, Sentencing Hearing
On October 8, 2024, the trial court began the hearing by
expressing concern about the original plea agreement, stating, “I
couldn’t understand why [the original plea] offer was being made
to [defendant],” noting that Judge Yang had expressed the same
concern. The court then advised that, before the September 17,
2024, hearing, it had decided not to accept the terms of the plea
agreement, detailing its reasons as follows: “[L]egally he’s not
eligible for probation. This was not an unusual circumstance
case. He has had multiple convictions . . . as an adult from 2009
through 2021, several state prison commitments where he’s
violated parole, violated [his post-release community supervision
6
(PRCS)], his strike offense for kidnapping was in 2013, where he
served a six-year state prison commitment. And he has another
state prison commitment as recently as 2021 for domestic
violence. [¶] He picked up this violent felony, this robbery, . . . in
2024 before being discharged off PRCS. Those are all the factors
this court considered . . . when I had determined that I would not
be accepting the probationary offer in [defendant’s] case.”
The trial court also noted defendant’s attempt to flee the
courtroom on September 17, 2024, after realizing he was being
remanded into custody, stating, “[T]hat certainly did not help his
cause in determining whether he is a suitable candidate for
probation where he is actually legally ineligible for probation.”
The court sentenced defendant to the low term of two years. That
same day, defendant filed a notice of appeal and a request for a
certificate of probable cause. The court granted the request for a
certificate of probable cause the next day.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that, under the totality of the
circumstances, his Cruz waiver was not knowing and intelligent.
According to defendant, although he “was explicitly advised that
he could potentially be sentenced to a term higher than that
negotiated only if he failed to appear for court on his sentencing
date,” he “was not clearly advised that the judge could impose a
higher sentence simply because he failed to timely appear in
court.”
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A. Legal Principles
“‘[T]he court, upon sentencing, has broad discretion to
withdraw its prior approval of a negotiated plea.’ [Citation.]
‘Generally, a trial court may exercise its discretion to withdraw
approval of a plea bargain because: (1) it believes the agreement
is “unfair” [citation]; (2) new facts have come to light; (3) the
court has become more fully informed about the case; or (4) when,
after further consideration, the court concludes that the
agreement is “‘“not in the best interests of society”’” [citation].
But this list is not exhaustive.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Stamps
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 706.)
In Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1247, the court explained the
limitations on a trial court’s power to withdraw its approval of a
prior plea. “Plea bargaining is an accepted practice in our
criminal justice system. [Citations.] The Legislature has
endorsed it in . . . section 1192.5,[footnote omitted] which
provides for the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
specifying both the punishment to be imposed and the exercise of
other powers legally available to the sentencing court. Upon the
acceptance of such a plea by the prosecution and its approval by
the court, the statute provides that the court may not impose ‘a
punishment more severe than that specified in the plea . . . [nor]
proceed as to such plea other than as specified in the plea.’
Before the plea is entered, the court also must inform the
defendant ‘that (1) its approval is not binding, (2) it may . . .
withdraw its approval in the light of further consideration of the
matter, and (3) in such case the defendant shall be permitted to
withdraw his plea if he desires to do so . . . . [¶] If such plea is
not accepted by the prosecuting attorney and approved by the
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court, the plea shall be deemed withdrawn, and the defendant
may then enter such plea or pleas as would otherwise have been
available.’ (Italics added.)” (Id. at pp. 1249–1250.)
In a footnote, however, the court in Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.3d
1247, acknowledged that a defendant’s right to withdraw a plea
under section 1192.5 could be waived. “We do not mean to imply
by this holding that a defendant fully advised of his or her rights
under section 1192.5 may not expressly waive those rights, such
that if the defendant willfully fails to appear for sentencing the
trial court may withdraw its approval of the defendant’s plea and
impose a sentence in excess of the bargained-for term. Any such
waiver, of course, would have to be obtained at the time of the
trial court’s initial acceptance of the plea, and it must be knowing
and intelligent.” (Id. at p. 1254, fn. 5.)
B. Analysis
Defendant’s argument that his Cruz waiver was not
knowing and voluntary is based upon his characterization of the
plea hearing. According to defendant’s reading of the plea form
and hearing transcript, neither the form nor the trial court
expressly advised him that, if he was late for the sentencing
hearing, the court could deny him the promised grant of
probation and instead sentence him to a prison term.
In support of his characterization of the plea hearing,
defendant quotes the trial court’s statement concerning the Cruz
waiver but selectively places bold emphasis on the September 17,
2024, date for sentencing, while ignoring the clause immediately
following which further informs defendant of the time of the
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hearing.4 But, when the court’s admonition is read in full, it
advises defendant that, if he failed to appear on September 17,
2024, at 8:30 a.m., the court would “no longer be bound by the
terms” of the plea agreement and defendant could be sentenced
“all the way up to four years in state prison.” Moreover,
defendant indicated that he understood the admonition; and the
court then ordered that defendant “return September 17, 2024.
8:30 in the morning in Department A18 to be sentenced.” His
waiver was therefore knowing and voluntary.5
To the extent defendant suggests that he did not fail to
appear for his sentencing hearing but was “simply . . . late,” we
reject his characterization. The trial court ordered defendant to
appear for sentencing in Department A18 at 8:30 a.m. on
September 17, 2024. By failing to comply with that order,
defendant failed to appear as required by law. (See § 978.5 [“(a)
A bench warrant of arrest may be issued when a defendant fails
4 For example, at page 12 of the opening brief, defendant
includes the following quote from the plea hearing with bold
emphasis: “In the event you don’t show up on September
17th to be sentenced in Department A18 at 8:30 in the morning
by Judge Strassner, or you pick up a new case from now till then,
what’s going to happen is your plea will remain, but the court will
no longer be bound by the terms. You may be sentenced all the
way up to four years in state prison.”
5 Our discussion is limited to the only issue raised by
defendant, that is, whether he was adequately advised that he
would waive his right to withdraw his plea under Cruz if he
failed to appear on the date and at the time of the sentencing
hearing. We do not address whether the trial court abused its
discretion by rejecting the plea agreement on the grounds stated
or by imposing the two-year term.
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to appear in court as required by law, including, but not limited
to, the following situations: [¶] (1) If the defendant is ordered by
a judge or magistrate to personally appear in court at a specific
time and place”].)
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
MOOR, J.
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