People v. Johnson CA4/1

CourtListener 10767610CalctappDec 31, 2025

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Filed 12/31/25 P. v. Johnson CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084489

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD300578)

ANGELO JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Yvonne E. Campos, Judge. Reversed with directions.
James M. Kehoe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Anastasia Sagorsky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

A jury found defendant Angelo Johnson guilty of felony reckless

evasion of a police officer (Veh. Code,1 § 2800.2) and the trial court placed
him on formal probation for two years. On appeal, Johnson contends
insufficient evidence supports his conviction because the pursuing police
officers’ trial testimony conflicted with other evidence. He also argues the
trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser
included offense of misdemeanor simple evasion (§ 2800.1). Under the highly
deferential substantial evidence review standard, we conclude the conflicting
trial evidence nonetheless supports Johnson’s conviction. We also conclude,
however, that these evidentiary conflicts were sufficient to raise a substantial
question about whether all the elements of reckless evasion were present,
warranting an instruction on the lesser included offense of simple evasion.
We conclude failure to give this instruction was prejudicial error.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment with the direction that if the
People do not timely elect to retry Johnson for reckless evasion, then the
judgment shall be modified to reflect a conviction for simple evasion and the
trial court shall resentence Johnson.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. Prosecution Evidence

Around 10:30 p.m. on September 13, 2023, uniformed San Diego Police
Department officers Jean Garzanti and Colton Hofrichter were patrolling a

1 Statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2
business district in a marked patrol car. A Chevy Malibu being driven by
Johnson caught the officers’ attention because it was driving faster than the
flow of traffic, had no front license plate, had tinted windows, and one brake
light was out. The officers initiated a traffic stop by driving behind Johnson,
activating the patrol car’s overhead emergency lights, and “chirp[ing]” the
siren before eventually activating it continuously. Officer Garzanti drove
while Officer Hofrichter operated the controls and radio from the front
passenger seat.
Johnson stuck his arm out the window and pointed across the street to
a well-lit shopping center, gesturing as if he intended to pull into it.
However, Johnson drove past the shopping center without stopping and
turned into a primarily residential area.
Johnson then led the officers on an 8- to 10-minute, two-mile pursuit.
Officer Hofrichter reported to dispatch during the pursuit that traffic was
light, speeds were low at times, and Johnson was stopping at most stop signs.
Officer Hofrichter also testified that Johnson committed four Vehicle
Code violations during the course of the pursuit: (1) failing to stop behind the
limit line at the intersection of Paradise Valley Road and Potomac Street;
(2) failing to stop at a stop sign at the intersection of Potomac Street and Alta
View Drive; (3) failing to stop at a stop sign at the intersection of Dissinger
Avenue and Beatrice Street; and (4) failing to stop at a stop sign at the
intersection of Keen Drive and Hutton Avenue. We discuss these in greater
detail in part III.A., post.
The pursuit ended after other police officers deployed a “spike strip”
that deflated the tires on Johnson’s car. Johnson managed to keep driving
for a while on deflated tires before abandoning his car in the middle of the
road and running.

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Officers Garzanti and Hofrichter pursued Johnson on foot and found
him hiding in a dark area behind a camper trailer in a residential driveway.
The officers held Johnson at gunpoint and gave him various commands.
Johnson initially was noncompliant and argumentative but he eventually
complied.
Body-worn camera footage of various portions of the vehicle pursuit
and Johnson’s apprehension were played at trial.
The trial court advised the jury that the court had determined via
judicial notice that Johnson previously admitted to reckless evasion in 2008.
The jury was instructed it could consider this information only in
determining Johnson’s specific intent to commit the current charged offense
and not as propensity evidence.

2. Defense Evidence

Johnson’s mother was the only defense witness. She testified she
received a phone call from Johnson during the pursuit and he sounded
scared.

B. Procedural Background

The People charged Johnson with a single felony count of reckless
evasion (§ 2800.2, subd. (a)).
A jury found Johnson guilty as charged.
The trial court placed Johnson on formal probation for two years,
conditioned on (among other things) serving 365 days in jail, with eligibility
for work furlough after serving 180 days.

III. DISCUSSION

It is undisputed that misdemeanor simple evasion (§ 2800.1) is a lesser
included offense of felony reckless evasion (§ 2800.2) and that “[t]he only
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distinction between the two crimes” is that the greater offense requires proof
of the additional element that “the defendant [drove] the pursued vehicle ‘in a
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.’ ” (People v.
Springfield (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1674, 1680 (Springfield), quoting § 2800.2,

subd. (a).)2 The greater offense’s additional element can be established by
proving that during the evasion the defendant committed “three or more
violations that are assigned a traffic violation point count under Section

12810.” (§ 2800.2, subd. (b);3 see People v. Diaz (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th
1484, 1486.)
Johnson “does not contest” that the prosecution established he
committed two qualifying Vehicle Code violations during the pursuit. He
maintains, however, that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he
committed the requisite minimum of three qualifying traffic violations. We
disagree. Alternatively, Johnson contends the trial court erred prejudicially
by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte regarding the lesser included offense
of simple evasion. We agree.

2 Section 2800.2, subdivision (a) states: “If a person flees or attempts
to elude a pursuing peace officer in violation of Section 2800.1 and the
pursued vehicle is driven in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety
of persons or property, the person driving the vehicle, upon conviction,
shall be punished . . . .” Because the elements of the lesser offense under
section 2800.1 are not at issue here, we do not discuss them.
3 Section 2800.2, subdivision (b) states: “For purposes of this section, a
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property includes, but
is not limited to, driving while fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing
peace officer during which time either three or more violations that are
assigned a traffic violation point count under Section 12810 occur, or damage
to property occurs.” Johnson does not dispute that the traffic violations at
issue here would, if established, qualify under sections 2800.2, subdivision (b)
and 12810.
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A. Additional Background

Officer Hofrichter testified at trial that during the pursuit Johnson
committed “[a]pproximately four” Vehicle Code violations that were “[a] mix
of fail[ing] to yield at stop signs and . . . stoplights.”

1. Paradise Valley Road and Potomac Street

The first disputed Vehicle Code violation occurred at the intersection of
Paradise Valley Road and Potomac Street. At trial, Officer Hofrichter
testified on direct examination that Johnson “fail[ed] to yield at the limit line
on the stoplight.”
On cross-examination, Officer Hofrichter acknowledged that
he previously characterized this violation in his police report and
preliminary hearing testimony as Johnson “travel[ing] through a red
circular traffic light . . . without stopping.” The officer reconciled this
apparent discrepancy by explaining that “running a red light and limit line
are all-encompassing” — “if you go through a red light you’re running a
[limit] line” and if “you cross the limit line you cross the red light.” Thus,
while both officers acknowledged that Johnson stopped at this intersection,
Officer Hofrichter maintained Johnson stopped beyond the limit line.
Officers Garzanti and Hofrichter further acknowledged that neither of
them orally called out this alleged violation to the other officer or to dispatch
during the pursuit, as they did with the two violations Johnson does not
contest. The body-worn camera footage confirms this. Officer Garzanti
clarified that he was driving and thus it was Officer Hofrichter’s job to
document violations. Officer Hofrichter explained that no agency policy
requires officers to document pursuits on a “second-by-second” or “minute-by-
minute” basis.

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The body-worn camera footage shows portions of the interior of the
patrol car and a partial view through the windshield. Johnson’s vehicle is
never visible through the windshield view, but traffic signals, streetlights,
street trees, and buildings are. At the intersection of Paradise Valley Road
and Potomac Street, the footage through the windshield shows the patrol car
coming to a complete stop at the red traffic light for several seconds before
proceeding through the intersection after the signal light turns green.

2. Potomac Street and Alta View Drive

The second disputed Vehicle Code violation occurred at the intersection
of Potomac Street and Alta View Drive. At trial, Officer Hofrichter testified
on direct examination that Johnson “[f]ail[ed] to stop at a stop sign.”
On cross-examination, Officer Hofrichter testified he documented this
violation in his police report as Johnson failing to “stop[] at the posted limit
line.” He acknowledged at trial, however, that he did not recall whether
there was a posted limit line or crosswalk at this intersection.
Officers Garzanti and Hofrichter further acknowledged that neither of
them orally called out this alleged violation to the other officer or to dispatch
during the pursuit. The body-worn camera footage confirms this.
The windshield view of the body-worn camera footage shows the patrol
car come to a stop or near-stop about one car-length behind the stop sign at
this intersection.

3. Dissinger Avenue and Beatrice Street

The third Vehicle Code violation, which Johnson does not dispute,
occurred at the intersection of Dissinger Avenue and Beatrice Street. At
trial, Officer Hofrichter testified Johnson “[f]ail[ed] to stop at the stop sign.”

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The body-worn camera footage shows that a few seconds before the
patrol car reaches this intersection, Officer Hofrichter said something to the
effect of, “I’ll start calling out all [the violations he does].” About two seconds
later, the officer said, “He blows the stop sign” at this intersection. The
footage shows the patrol car drive through the intersection after coming to a
near stop at the stop sign.

4. Keen Drive and Hutton Avenue

The fourth Vehicle Code violation, which Johnson does not dispute,
occurred at the intersection of Keen Drive and Hutton Avenue. At trial,
Officer Hofrichter testified that Johnson’s violation at this intersection was
“failing to stop at a stop sign.”
The body-worn camera footage shows that as the patrol car approaches
this intersection, Officer Hofrichter said, “Blew the stop sign” at this
intersection. The footage shows the patrol car travel through this
intersection without stopping.

B. Substantial Evidence Supports Johnson’s Conviction

“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not
determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we “examine the whole record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence — evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid
value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citations.] We presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence.’ ” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215; accord,
People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 819–820.) “ ‘Resolution of conflicts and
inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.

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[Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or
inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a
conviction.’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118 (Ramirez); see
People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638 (Jennings) [“We neither
reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses.”].) “If the
circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact,
reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (Jennings, at
p. 639.)
We conclude the record contains substantial evidence that Johnson
committed qualifying traffic violations at the contested intersections.

1. Paradise Valley Road and Potomac Street

Officer Hofrichter testified at trial that Johnson “fail[ed] to yield at the
limit line on the stoplight” at the intersection of Paradise Valley Road and
Potomac Street. The officer’s testimony based on his firsthand observations
during the pursuit is sufficient to establish this violation. (See Ramirez,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1118; Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 638.)
Johnson argues Officer Hofrichter’s “shifting testimony” was simply not
credible because the officer was impeached at trial with his police report and
preliminary hearing testimony in which he characterized the traffic violation
at this intersection as Johnson “travel[ing] through a red circular traffic
light . . . without stopping.” Officer Hofrichter reconciled this apparent
discrepancy by explaining that he views running a red light and failing to
stop behind a limit line as “all-encompassing” or one in the same. It was
exclusively the jury’s role to resolve these conflicts in testimony. (See
Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1118.) Indeed, Johnson’s trial counsel made

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this argument to the jury in closing argument and the jury apparently
rejected it.
Johnson also argues on appeal (as his trial counsel likewise argued
in closing argument) that because the officers orally logged traffic violations
at other intersections but not this one, then no violation occurred at this
intersection. However, Officer Hofrichter testified that no agency policy
requires officers to document pursuits on a “second-by-second” or “minute-by-
minute” basis. Further, the body-worn camera footage shows Officer
Hofrichter say during the pursuit (but after the violation at this intersection)
that he will “start calling out all [the violations he does].” While the jury
could reasonably have drawn a “dog that did not bark” inference about this
intersection, the jury was not required to do so. (See Ramirez, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1118.)
Finally, relying on the body-worn camera footage, Johnson argues that
“the positioning of the vehicles and the lighting situation at night” show that
Officer “Hofrichter’s claim that [Johnson] committed a line limit violation” is
simply not credible. Again, while this is an inference the jury could have
drawn from the footage, the footage is not so certain as to compel this
conclusion. (See Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1118 [“ ‘unless . . .
testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a
single witness is sufficient to support a conviction’ ”].)

2. Potomac Street and Alta View Drive

Similarly, Officer Hofrichter’s testimony at trial that Johnson “[f]ail[ed]
to stop at a stop sign” at the intersection of Potomac Street and Alta View
Drive is sufficient to establish the violation at this intersection. (See
Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1118.)

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As with the other contested violation, Johnson again cites apparent
inconsistencies in Officer Hofrichter’s testimony (e.g., that he could not recall
whether there was a painted limit line or crosswalk at this intersection) and
the logical inference arising from the officers calling out other traffic
violations but not this one. Again, however, these were issues for the jury to
resolve. (See Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1118.)
Johnson also argues that the body-worn camera footage “suggests that
[he] did stop” at this intersection. That is, because the patrol car was directly
behind Johnson’s car, and because the footage shows that the patrol car
“stopped or came very close to a complete stop behind a car at the stop sign,”
then “[i]t is logical to assume” that Johnson’s car is stopped at the stop sign
in front of the patrol car. The jury was not required to follow these
“suggest[ions]” or make these “assum[ptions].” Moreover, applying Johnson’s
logic, if the patrol car mirrored Johnson’s car’s actions, then the patrol car
coming “very close to a complete stop” would establish that Johnson’s car
likewise came very close — but not all the way — to a complete stop.
Again relying on body-worn camera footage, Johnson argues it “would
have been exceedingly difficult for the officers to determine with any
certainty that [Johnson]’s car in front of them was over the limit line.” But
difficult is not “physically impossible.” (Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 1118.) Because Johnson’s car is not visible in the footage, the footage does
not conclusively establish the car’s position or disprove the officer’s
testimony.

3. Johnson’s Reliance on Other Cases is Misplaced

Johnson also argues the evidence was insufficient to establish that he
drove recklessly during the pursuit because his driving was not as egregious
as the driving in other cases in which the appellate courts found substantial

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evidence supported this element of the offense. But as Johnson
acknowledges, “[w]hen we decide issues of sufficiency of evidence, comparison
with other cases is of limited utility, since each case necessarily depends on
its own facts.” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 516.)

C. The Trial Court Erred Prejudicially by Failing to Instruct on
the Lesser Included Offense of Simple Evasion

Johnson did not ask the court to give the jury instruction on simple
evasion, the lesser offense to reckless evasion. However, “ ‘California law has
long provided that even absent a request, and over any party’s objection, a
trial court must instruct a criminal jury on any lesser offense “necessarily
included” in the charged offense, if there is substantial evidence that only the
lesser crime was committed. This venerable instructional rule ensures that
the jury may consider all supportable crimes necessarily included within the
charge itself, thus encouraging the most accurate verdict permitted by the
pleadings and the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he rule prevents either party,
whether by design or inadvertence, from forcing an all-or-nothing choice
between conviction of the stated offense on the one hand, or complete
acquittal on the other.’ . . . Thus, ‘a trial court errs if it fails to instruct, sua
sponte, on all theories of a lesser included offense which find substantial
support in the evidence. On the other hand, the court is not obliged to
instruct on theories that have no such evidentiary support.’ ” (People v.
Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 239–240; see People v. Breverman (1998)
19 Cal.4th 142, 154 (Breverman).) In this context, “substantial evidence” is
not “ ‘ “ ‘any evidence, no matter how weak’ ” ’ ”; it is “ ‘evidence that a
reasonable jury could find persuasive.’ ” (People v. Williams (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1244, 1263.) “[I]f there is no proof, other than an unexplainable
rejection of the prosecution’s evidence, that the offense was less than that

12
charged, such instructions shall not be given.” (People v. Kraft (2000)
23 Cal.4th 978, 1063 (Kraft).)
Although we concluded above that substantial evidence supports the
finding that Johnson committed at least three qualifying Vehicle Code
violations during the pursuit, there is also substantial evidence that he did
not commit at least three qualifying violations. We find Springfield, supra,
13 Cal.App.4th 1674 instructive. There, our court concluded that although
the pursuing officers’ testimony constituted substantial evidence that the
defendant did drive recklessly, the defendant’s testimony that he did not
drive recklessly constituted substantial evidence that he committed only the
lesser included offense of simple evasion such that the trial court’s failure to
instruct the jury on that theory was reversible error. (Id. at pp. 1680–1681.)
Similarly, here, although Johnson did not testify at trial, there was still
conflicting testimony from the officers themselves about whether Johnson
drove recklessly during the pursuit. Specifically, as to the intersection of
Paradise Valley Road and Potomac Street, Officer Hofrichter testified on
direct examination that Johnson’s vehicle code violation was “failing to yield
at the limit line on the stoplight.” On cross-examination, however, the officer
acknowledged that he characterized the violation in his police report and
preliminary hearing testimony as Johnson “travel[ing] through a red circular
traffic light . . . without stopping.” In addition, Officers Hofrichter and
Garzanti both testified that Johnson stopped for the red light before traveling
through the intersection, and the body-worn camera supports this conclusion.
Further, the officers also acknowledged that whereas they orally called out
other traffic violations during the pursuit, they did not do so for this one.
Although the officers offered explanations at trial for these apparent
discrepancies, the jury was not required to accept them. Moreover, the

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conflicts in the officers’ own testimony provided a valid basis on which the
jury could find that the prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that Johnson committed a qualifying traffic violation at this
intersection. (Cf. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1063 [“unexplainable rejection
of the prosecution’s evidence” does not constitute substantial evidence that
the lesser included offense was committed (italics added)]; People v. Abilez
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 514 [“Because there was no reason why the jury would
have rejected the prosecution’s evidence and defendant presented no
evidence . . . , there was no substantial evidence . . . for instructing the jury
on . . . a lesser included offense”].)
There are similar evidentiary conflicts as to the violation at the
intersection of Potomac Street and Alta View Drive. Officer Hofrichter
testified on direct examination that Johnson “[f]ail[ed] to stop at a stop sign.”
On cross-examination, however, the officer acknowledged that he wrote in his
police report that Johson failed to “stop[] at the posted limit line,” even
though the officer further acknowledged on cross-examination that he did not
recall if there was a posted limit line or crosswalk at this intersection. And,
again, both officers testified they did not orally log a violation at this
intersection as they did at others. Further, the body-worn camera footage is
also inconclusive as to whether Johnson failed to stop at the limit line
because the footage shows the patrol car come to a stop or near stop about
one car-length from the stop sign, leaving room for the jury to reasonably
reject the officers’ testimony and to find that the prosecution failed to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson did not stop before
entering the intersection.
Because the officers’ conflicting trial testimony raised substantial
questions as to whether Johnson committed the disputed traffic violations,

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the jury had a valid basis on which to potentially reject the prosecution’s
evidence and find that the prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that any violations occurred. Without those violations, the prosecution
failed to establish the requisite number of qualifying traffic violations for
reckless evasion, leaving substantial evidence that Johnson committed only
the lesser included offense of simple evasion. Accordingly, the trial court
erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte regarding this lesser included
offense.
Having found error, we must now determine whether it prejudiced
Johnson. We apply the “ ‘ “generally applicable California test for harmless
error” ’ ” set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, under which “ ‘we
deem an error harmless unless it is “reasonably probable” the outcome would
have been different in the absence of the error.’ ” (People v. Schuller (2023)
15 Cal.5th 237, 251; see id. at p. 260 [“emphasiz[ing]” that other than in
cases involving “the ‘unique’ relationship between murder and voluntary
manslaughter [citation], . . . the general rule [is] that the failure to instruct
on other forms of lesser included offenses in noncapital cases is an error of
state law”].) A reasonable probability “ ‘ “ ‘in this context does not mean more
likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract
possibility.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 944.) “ ‘In
assessing prejudice, we consider both the magnitude of the error and the
closeness of the case.’ ” (People v. Vasquez (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 786, 798.)
Applying this standard, we find the error here prejudicial.
The magnitude of the error was significant. The People charged
Johnson with only a single count of felony reckless evasion. This “forc[ed] the
jury into an ‘unwarranted all-or-nothing choice’ ” (People v. Hughes (2002)
27 Cal.4th 287, 365) of convicting him of the greater offense or of nothing at

15
all. Considering that Johnson led police on an approximately 10-minute
pursuit that ended only after police deployed a spike strip to deflate
Johnson’s tires, that Johnson then fled on foot and hid in the dark, and then
defied police commands and was argumentative, the jury would likely have
believed Johnson was “ ‘plainly guilty of some offense.’ ” (Ibid.) But by
failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of simple evasion, the trial
court put the jury in the untenable position of choosing between convicting
him of the greater offense or acquitting him altogether.
The case was also close. The evidence was strong that Johnson
committed two qualifying traffic violations during the pursuit. Indeed, he
essentially conceded the point at trial. But due to the extensive conflicting
evidence discussed above, the case was close as to whether Johnson
committed qualifying traffic violations at the intersections of Paradise Valley
Road and Potomac Street and at Potomac Street and Alta View Drive. The
fact that the jury ultimately resolved these conflicts against Johnson does not
impact our prejudice analysis. (See People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th
140, 156 [“in assessing prejudice, ‘it does not matter that the jury chose to
convict the defendant of the greater offense over acquittal or that the
defendant was convicted of the greater offense on sufficient evidence’ ”
because to “hold otherwise would undermine the very purpose of the sua
sponte rule”], citing Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 178, fn. 25.)
We thus conclude there is a reasonable probability that Johnson would
have achieved a better outcome at trial had the court instructed the jury
regarding the lesser included offense of simple evasion.
When, as here, substantial evidence supports the greater offense but
the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct on the lesser offense,
the proper remedy is to reverse the conviction on the greater offense, give the

16
People an opportunity to retry the defendant on that charge, and order that
the conviction be modified to the lesser offense if the People elect not to retry
the defendant. (See People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 528; Springfield,
supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1681.) We will do so here.

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. Johnson may be retried for felony reckless
evasion. However, if the People fail to bring Johnson to a new trial in a
timely manner (see Pen. Code, § 1382, subd. (a)(2)), our remittitur shall be
deemed to modify the verdict by reducing the conviction from reckless evasion
to misdemeanor simple evasion (§ 2800.1), and the trial court shall promptly
resentence Johnson.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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