In re M.G. CA4/2

CourtListener 10767446CalctappDec 31, 2025

Full text

Filed 12/31/25 In re M.G. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re M.G., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,
E085478
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super.Ct.No. DLIN2300032)
v.
OPINION
M.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Emily A. Benjamini,

Judge. Affirmed.

Jake E. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,

Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steven Oetting and Daniel J. Hilton,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
INTRODUCTION

Appellant M.G. (minor) appeals from a victim restitution order, arguing that it is

not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Riverside County District Attorney’s Office filed three Welfare and

Institutions Code1 section 602 petitions against minor. A petition filed on March 10,

2023, alleged that he committed two assaults with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245,

subd. (a), paragraphs 1 & 2.) A petition filed on August 11, 2023, alleged that minor

committed a burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, paragraph 1) and vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594,

subd. (a), paragraph 2) of the Desert Princess Clubhouse. A petition filed on January 2,

2024, alleged that minor obstructed or resisted an officer in the performance of his/her

duties. (Pen. Code, § 69, paragraph 1.)

On February 14, 2024, minor admitted paragraph 1 of the March 10, 2023 petition

and paragraph 1 of the January 2, 2024 petition, with the understanding that he would be

granted deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) and placed on probation for one year, and that,

if successful on probation, the allegations would be dismissed and his record sealed.

Minor stipulated to a factual basis, based on the police reports for each of the admissions.

Upon the prosecutor’s motion, the court dismissed paragraph 2 of the March 10, 2023

petition and the entire August 11, 2023 petition. Minor’s probation included the

1 All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2
condition that he pay restitution to the Desert Princess Golf Club2 (the victim) in an

amount to be determined by the Riverside County Probation Department (the probation

department) for the allegations in the August 11, 2023 petition. The court granted DEJ as

agreed upon and set a hearing for the determination of the amount of restitution owed.

The probation department filed an Application and Order for Juvenile Restitution,

recommending the juvenile court set restitution in the amount of $7,530.97 payable to the

victim, which included $5,673.00 for repairs to the roof hatch, $1,500.97 for re-keying

the clubhouse, $350 for vodka, $3.00 for one bottle of Gatorade, and $4.00 for two snack

cookie bags. The probation officer noted that the former security director for the victim

emailed a police officer “an itemization of their crime-related loss.” The probation

officer also noted that the executive assistant of the Desert Princess Palm Springs

Homeowners Association verified with the general manager that the roof hatch in the

clubhouse was damaged and required replacement. The probation department attached a

copy of the written proposal for the work to be done by the roofing company to replace

the roof hatch. The probation department recommended that liability be joint and several

with minor’s co-participant. The probation department additionally sent minor and his

parents a letter notifying them of the restitution amount being recommended and telling

them they were entitled to a hearing if they disputed the amount, but they would have the

burden of proving the determined loss amounts were inaccurate.

2 We observe that different parts of the record refer to the victim as the Desert
Princess Clubhouse, the Desert Princess, and the Desert Princess Golf Club. This opinion
will refer to the Desert Princess Golf Club as the victim and the club house as the
victim’s property that was damaged.

3
On July 2, 2024, minor requested a contested restitution hearing, which the court

granted.

On January 28, 2025, the court held a contested restitution determination hearing.

At the outset, it noted that the parties had agreed there would be no dispute as to the

amount sought for the re-keying of the victim’s clubhouse, which was $1,522.43. The

court further noted there had been recent changes to the law (§ 730.6, subd. (b)(3)), and it

would accordingly need to assess each minor participant’s percentage of responsibility

for the economic losses, as there were two offenders in this case.

The prosecutor called as a witness J.Y., who was employed by the victim as the

Director of Golf at the time of the incident, and now as the Club Manager. As to the

robbery and vandalism that occurred on February 25, 2023 (the incident), he testified that

there was damage to the roof hatch as a result of the incident. J.Y. said that “they” (minor

and his cohort) came through the roof hatch and damaged it. J.Y. said he never

personally used the roof hatch or directed anyone to use it prior to the incident, but he

knew it was used by mechanics and the clubhouse maintenance staff to service the air

conditioners. He testified that after the incident, the staff was not able to lock the roof

hatch, “so it had to be replaced and re-setup so that it could be secured at night or secured

all the time.” J.Y. testified that the roof hatch was replaced at an approximate cost of

$5,000.

On cross-examination, J.Y. confirmed that people had broken into the clubhouse

through the roof hatch one time prior to February 25, 2023, but no one was caught. He

stated that “they left personal notes in people’s lockers, so we know it’s the same people.”

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J.Y. added that “there wasn’t damage the first time. The roof wasn’t -- the roof might

have been damaged, but there wasn’t anything taken inside except for one locker, the lock

was cut off and a note left inside the locker.” Defense counsel sought to clarify that the

hatch was entered prior to the date of the incident and that J.Y. did not know the

condition of the hatch before that date. J.Y. said, “I know it was lockable. And

afterwards, we had to go up and wire it shut to keep it locked.” Defense counsel asked

how he knew the roof hatch did not lock if he did not know the condition of the hatch.

J.Y. explained that, even though he did not personally lock or unlock it, he knew “the

staff would have fixed it, had it not been lockable.”

The court addressed J.Y. directly and asked whether the lock on the old roof hatch

was broken, and he replied, “I believe it was broken in the process of the break-in, but I

cannot confirm that.” The court asked whether the new roof hatch that was installed was

“now fully lockable,” and J.Y. confirmed that it was.

The court asked counsel if there was any information from the police reports

regarding minor’s conduct during the incident. The prosecution stated the police officers

reported that they reviewed surveillance video and saw seven minor suspects, and they

recognized minor from prior encounters. They saw him rip the screen from the cafeteria

window, but when the minors realized they could not enter through the window, they

walked along the side of the building until they were out of the camera’s view. One of

the minors moved the camera so they could not be seen until they were actually inside the

clubhouse. The officers recognized minor as the first one inside the cafeteria and saw

him grab some items from a basket. The prosecutor argued that, even though there was

5
no surveillance video showing minor as the one who broke through the hatch, minor was

the one who took the most initiative. He went to the cafeteria window first to try and

break in, and when that was not successful, he and the others went to the roof. Thus, the

prosecutor argued that the court should find minor 60 percent liable and the other

participants 40 percent liable.

Minor’s counsel argued that, whether or not minor and his cohorts broke the roof

hatch to enter was questionable since the maintenance head was not there to testify

regarding the condition of the hatch prior to and after the incident. Minor’s counsel also

contended that J.Y.’s testimony was “highly conflicted” and J.Y. had no idea what the

condition of the roof hatch was prior to the incident. Minor’s counsel argued it had not

been proven that the minors caused the damage that necessitated the roof repair.

After the prosecutor and defense counsel discussed J.Y.’s testimony, the court

stated: “I heard his testimony . . . that the hatch was lockable before the incident, and

after the incident it was broken and they replaced it with a lockable mechanism. So

before the incident it was lockable, and it was damaged due to the incident. And

afterwards they had to replace the roof hatch with a locking mechanism. So it was not

damaged the first time.”

Defense counsel reiterated that “none of this is based on [J.Y.’s] personal

knowledge,” and the court replied with: “[T]here has been an invoice3 submitted

3 We note that, although the court repeatedly referred to the documentation as an
invoice, it was actually a work proposal.

6
regarding the repair, and I think that that suffices on the preponderance of the evidence

standard regarding the repair of the roof and the condition.”

Defense counsel next disputed the documentation of the roof hatch repair, arguing

that it lacked itemization of material and labor to prove the actual repair cost. She further

questioned the condition of the damaged hatch and suggested that a complete hatch

replacement might not have been necessary if the lock alone could have been replaced.

The court reminded defense counsel that, once the invoice was submitted, the burden

shifted to minor to present contrary evidence. The court then asked defense counsel’s

opinion about the apportionment of liability, and she argued there were seven individuals

involved and four were named, so perhaps 40 percent for minor and 20 percent for each

of the others. The prosecutor clarified that although there were seven suspects, only two

were formally charged. The court then stated that, under the recently enacted law, it had

to apportion restitution and each minor had to be held severally liable, rather than jointly

and severally. The court stated it believed the minors had damaged the roof hatch and

noted the invoice submitted by the victim was for $5673. The court conceded that the

invoice was not “terribly specific” but noted it described the type of work the contractors

were doing and the scope of the work. The court found the invoice sufficient, under the

preponderance of the evidence standard. Over defense counsel’s objection, the court

ordered minor severally liable for 50 percent of the re-keying cost ($761.22) and 50

percent of the roof hatch repair ($2836.50) for a total of $3,597.72 in restitution. The

court ordered no victim restitution for the vodka, Gatorade, or cookies.

7
On February 13, 2025, the court found that minor successfully completed his DEJ,

dismissed the petitions, converted the restitution order to a civil judgment, and ordered

his juvenile records sealed.

DISCUSSION

The Juvenile Court Properly Awarded Restitution for the Damage to the Roof Hatch

Minor argues the restitution order must be reversed because it is not supported by

substantial evidence. Specifically, he contends the evidence did not show his actual

conduct caused the damage to the roof hatch. Minor also argues the evidence was legally

insufficient to prove the amount for the roof hatch repairs. We conclude the court

properly ordered minor to pay restitution for the damaged roof hatch.

A. Relevant Law

“Section 730.6 governs restitution in cases where a minor is adjudicated a ward of

the court pursuant to section 602. In pertinent part, that statute provides: ‘(a)(1) It is the

intent of the Legislature that a victim of conduct for which a minor is found to be a

person described in Section 602 who incurs any economic loss as a result of the minor’s

conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor. [¶] (2) [T]he court shall order

the minor to pay, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the

law, . . . the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (B) Restitution to the victim or victims, if any, in

accordance with subdivision (h ).’ In relevant part, section 730.6, subdivision (h)

provides: ‘A restitution order pursuant to subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2) of

subdivision (a), to the extent possible, shall identify . . . the amount of each victim’s loss

to which it pertains, and shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the

8
victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor’s

conduct for which the minor was found to be a person described in Section 602, including

all of the following: [¶] (1) Full or partial payment of the value of stolen or damaged

property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like

property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.’” (In re

Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1131-1132 (Johnny M.).)

“[W]e observe that section 730.6 parallels Penal Code section 1202.4, which

governs adult restitution.” (Johnny M., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132, fn omitted.)

We also note that “[a] minor granted deferred entry of judgment ‘may . . . be required to

pay restitution to the victim or victims pursuant to the provisions of’ the Welfare and

Institutions Code.” (In re J.G. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 867, 873; § 794.) Further, “[a] victim’s

restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed.” (People v. Mearns (2002) 97

Cal.App.4th 493, 500.)

“A restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be reversed

unless it is arbitrary or capricious. [Citation.] No abuse of discretion will be found

where there is a rational and factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered. ‘“[T]he

standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” [Citation.] Section 1202.4 does not, by its terms, require

any particular kind of proof. However, the trial court is entitled to consider the probation

report, and, as prima facie evidence of loss, may accept a property owner’s statement

made in the probation report about the value of stolen or damaged property. [Citation.]

Once the victim makes a prima facie showing of economic losses incurred as a result of

9
the defendant’s criminal acts, the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the amount of

losses claimed by the victim. [Citation.] The defendant has the burden of rebutting the

victim’s statement of losses, and to do so, may submit evidence to prove the amount

claimed exceeds the repair or replacement cost of damaged or stolen property.” (People

v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542-1543 (Gemelli); see People v. Superior

Court (Lauren M.) (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1226.)

Although a restitution order may be challenged on the ground that no substantial

evidence supports the order, “[i]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the ‘“power

of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any

substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to support the trial court’s

findings.’ [Citation.] . . . If the circumstances reasonably justify the [trial court’s]

findings,’ the judgment may not be overturned when the circumstances might also

reasonably support a contrary finding. [Citation.] We do not reweigh or reinterpret the

evidence; rather, we determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the

inference drawn by the trier of fact.” (People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 468-

469 (Baker).)

B. There Was Substantial Evidence to Support the Court’s Finding That Minor’s Conduct

Caused Damage to the Roof Hatch

Minor contends the court abused its discretion in awarding restitution for the roof

hatch because there was insufficient evidence to show his conduct caused the damage to

it. He specifically contends J.Y.’s testimony lacked credibility since J.Y. did not have

personal knowledge of the condition of the roof hatch prior to the incident, and he

10
assumed it was damaged on the day of the incident “because he inferred that the staff

would have fixed the roof if it had not been lockable.” Minor further asserts there was no

surveillance footage of him entering through the roof hatch or damaging it, and there was

no evidence he had tools during the break-in.

Here, J.Y. testified that minor and his companion came through the roof hatch and

damaged it. Although J.Y. had never personally “tested the condition” of the roof hatch,

he testified that he knew it was “lockable” before the incident, but after the incident, the

staff was not able to lock it and had “to go up and wire it shut to keep it locked.” He

further said that the roof hatch then “had to be replaced and re-setup so that it could be

secured at night, or secured all the time.” When asked how he knew the roof hatch could

be locked before the incident, J.Y. said he knew “the staff would have fixed it, had it not

been lockable.” In light of this evidence, it was reasonable for the court to infer that the

maintenance staff checked the roof hatch before the incident, that the roof hatch was able

to be locked before the incident, that minor broke into the clubhouse through the roof

hatch, and after that, the roof hatch did not lock anymore and had to be replaced. Minor

argues that the prosecution failed to prove his conduct caused the damage to the roof

hatch since the evidence was insufficient to establish it was damaged on the day of the

incident, rather than during the prior break-in; however, we observe there was no

evidence that the roof hatch was damaged prior to the incident.

As to minor’s assertion that there was no surveillance footage of him entering

through the roof hatch or damaging it and no evidence he had tools, we note that the

victim restitution statute “does not, by its terms, require any particular kind of proof.”

11
(Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1543; see § 730.6.; People v. Lehman (2016) 247

Cal.App.4th 795, 803 [“[t]he prosecution was not required to present victim testimony or

affidavits or expert declarations in connection with the restitution hearing”].) We note

that on his probation form, minor specifically agreed to pay restitution to the clubhouse in

an amount to be determined by the probation department. Further, at no point during the

restitution hearing did minor present any evidence that he did not break into the

clubhouse or enter through the roof hatch to rebut the victim’s statement of damages.

“[T]he standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence,

not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Baker, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 469.)

Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, we conclude the circumstances

reasonably justified the court’s finding that the roof hatch was damaged as a result of

minor’s conduct. (Baker, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 469 [“‘If the circumstances

reasonably justify the [trial court’s] findings,’” the judgment may not be overturned when

the circumstances might also reasonably support a contrary finding.”].)

C. The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Ordering Minor to Pay for the Roof Hatch

Minor argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the amount of the

roof hatch repairs. He specifically points out that no evidence was presented to “describe

the issues with the existing roof hatch, the damage it incurred as a result of the break-in

and why it was not lockable” or to prove that it had to be replaced rather than just being

fixed. Thus, minor contends the court abused its discretion in finding the evidence

sufficient to prove the amount in victim restitution to be paid for the roof hatch. We see

no abuse of discretion.

12
The court may accept as prima facie evidence of loss a property owner’s statement

made in the probation report about the value of damaged property. (Gemelli, supra, 151

Cal.App.4th at p. 1543.) Furthermore, “the probation report gives notice to the defendant

of the recommended amount of restitution, and the hearing offers him the opportunity to

rebut the amount before the court determines the amount.” (People v. Foster (1993) 14

Cal.App.4th 939, 946, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v.

Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 238-245.) “Once the victim makes a prima facie showing

of economic losses incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal acts, the burden shifts

to the defendant to disprove the amount of losses claimed by the victim. [Citation.] The

defendant has the burden of rebutting the victim’s statement of losses, and to do so, may

submit evidence to prove the amount claimed exceeds the repair or replacement cost of

damaged or stolen property.” (Gemelli, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1543.)

The trial court’s restitution order here was based on the probation officer’s

application of victim restitution and report of crime-related losses incurred by the victim

(the probation officer’s report), which included a copy of the work proposal by the

roofing company to replace the roof hatch. The proposal stated the scope of the work,

which included removing and disposing of the existing roof hatch, installing a new roof

hatch, and “[prim[ing] [the] roof deck with 450 black primer.” It also described the

application of polyurethane foam and coating in detail, as well as the general terms and

conditions to be followed. The total cost for the work was $5,673. This evidence was

sufficient to support the victim’s restitution claim. (See Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th

13
at p. 1543.) We note that the court apportioned minor 50 percent liability and only

ordered him to pay $2836.50 for the roof hatch.

Further, the probation department expressly advised minor that, if he disputed the

recommended amount of restitution, he had the burden of proving the amount was

inaccurate. (See Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1543.) At the contested

restitution hearing, the court reiterated that the burden had shifted to minor to disprove

the amount of loss claimed by the victim. Minor’s counsel responded that she attempted

to obtain documentation to dispute it, but she did not actually offer any evidence.

Instead, counsel merely argued that it was “not a matter of whether the minor needs to

pay, it’s a matter of what he needs to pay and not to allow upgrades or excess work that

doesn’t need to be done.” Minor’s counsel acknowledged that she received notice of the

cost of the repair but just complained that she did not receive any information on “why

that amount is necessary.” Thus, minor failed to rebut the victim’s statement of loss by

submitting evidence to prove the amount claimed exceeded the repair or replacement cost

of the damaged property. (Ibid.; see Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1545 [“If

defendant believed supporting documentation or additional information was necessary to

effectively rebut the amount claimed, it was up to her to obtain it. Having failed to do so,

she did not meet her burden of proof.”].)

In sum, the probation officer’s report and the attached documentation were

sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of the victim’s loss. The probation

department adequately advised minor of the replacement cost of the roof hatch, and he

did not effectively rebut the amount claimed. We therefore conclude the court did not

14
abuse its discretion in ordering minor to pay $2,836.50 to the victim for the roof hatch.

(People v. Phu (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 280, 284 [“When there is a factual and rational

basis for the amount of restitution ordered, no abuse of discretion will be found.”])

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.
McKINSTER
J.

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