CourtListener 10766748•In re A.A. CA4/1
Full text
Filed 12/30/25 In re A.A. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re A.A. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
D086583
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. EJ04326A-C)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ABEL A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael P. Pulos, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard L. Knight, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
David J. Smith, Acting County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief
Deputy County Counsel, and Indra N. Bennett, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Abel A. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s August 14, 2025
dispositional orders involving dependents A.A. (born March 2021) and K.A.
(March 2022). At the contested disposition hearing, the court found (1) by
clear and convincing evidence the children should be removed from Father’s
custody under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361(c); (2) his progress
“toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement has
been none”; and ruled (3) he shall have “liberal supervised visit[s],” with the
San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency afforded the
discretion to expand visitation including to overnights.
Father’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its
discretion when it refused to order unsupervised, structured visitation. We
resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion (People v. Garcia (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851–854), and affirm.
I.
A.
Father and Melissa A. (Mother) have two children, A.A. and K.A. In
the year leading up to the Agency’s petitions filed under section 300(b)(1), the
San Diego Sheriff’s Office received 12 service calls involving the family. They
included two domestic violence incidents; four family disturbance calls due to
arguments between the parents; a welfare check; Father’s violation of a
temporary restraining order; a burglary report Mother made when Father
took her car; and various “unknown trouble report[s] with arguing heard in
the background.” The children’s older dependent half-sibling, G.B., told the
Agency he “‘lost count’” of the number of times law enforcement had been to
the family home, the parents fought “‘a lot,’” and when they fought, he and
his siblings would remain in their bedroom.
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The Agency received six additional referrals with concerns of domestic
violence between the parents from 2018 to the filing of the petitions in
May 2025; and myriad “community partners,” including law enforcement,
medical providers, family, and friends, reported the same concerns.
B.
On April 7, 2025, the Agency received a referral regarding a domestic
violence incident between the parents that resulted in paramedics
transporting Mother to the emergency room. Late the night before, Mother
reported that after she denied Father’s sexual advances, he punched her
“‘more than 10 times’” in the face and head. To escape, Mother jumped out of
a second-story window, landing on her back on the concrete patio. She
sustained substantial injuries.
With the children inside, Father barricaded himself in the home.
Forty-five minutes later, he opened the door and deputies arrested him for
domestic violence. The following day, the San Diego Sherrif’s Office obtained
an emergency protective order against Father, which he immediately violated
upon his release from jail.
While at the hospital, Mother reported (1) injuries to her leg and elbow
from a domestic violence incident with Father a week earlier; (2) his “long
history” of such violence against her; (3) on average they drank “one pint of
alcohol . . . about three times a week while the children are in the home” and
domestic violence tended to occur after they consumed alcohol; and (4) after
she confronted Father about his infidelity, there had been “‘ongoing physical’”
violence against her.
C.
At the detention hearing on May 19, 2025, the juvenile court (1) found
the Agency made a prima facie showing the children were persons described
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in section 300(b)(1); (2) followed the Agency’s recommendation to leave the
children in Mother’s care, conditioned on Father remaining out of the family
home; and (3) ordered services for Mother and Father.
D.
During an Agency interview in preparation for the
jurisdiction/disposition hearing, Father (1) reported Mother jumped from the
second-floor window during the April 6 incident because she allegedly did not
want him to leave the family home after they had argued; (2) acknowledged
verbal abuse but denied any physical abuse in their relationship; (3) stated
he did not have time to engage in services recommended by the Agency as
part of his case plan, including for parenting education and domestic violence;
and (4) believed the Agency was “setting him up to fail” by requiring him to
engage in such services.
In a followup interview, Father again refused to participate in services
offered by the Agency, questioned why he needed them just “to see his kids,”
and stated his church provided him with the necessary “support and
guidance.” According to Mother, Father continued to lack “self-awareness”
about why the Agency became involved with the family, but she recognized
their domestic violence had “direct and indirect impacts to the children.” The
Agency recommended the children remain in Mother’s care, with Father
having liberal and supervised visits.
At the contested disposition hearing in August 2025, the juvenile court
(1) followed the Agency’s recommendations and (2) denied Father’s request
for “structured[,] unsupervised supervision.” Relevant here, the court found
Father had made no progress in “alleviating or mitigating the causes
necessitating placement.” According to the court, Father “is not yet at a
stage where he is recognizing the reasons why we are here, the seriousness of
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the events that brought us here. And although he has mentioned . . . he
intends to engage in faith-based assistance to resolve the issues, [the court]
also would urge him to engage in whatever case plan services that are
available to him.” The court thus ordered Father to have “liberal supervised
visit[s],” with the Agency afforded the discretion to expand visitation
including to overnights.
II.
Father contends the juvenile court erred when it denied his request for
“structured[,] unsupervised supervision” because there purportedly was no
evidence of “detriment” to the children’s safety. We disagree.
A.
“One of the dependency court’s responsibilities is to define the rights of
the parties to visitation by balancing the rights of the parent with the best
interests of the child.” (In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1284.)
“Visitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of
the child.” (§ 362.1(a)(1)(A).) In balancing these interests, the court in the
exercise of its discretion may impose “conditions or requirements” on
visitation consistent with the child’s best interest. (In re Jennifer G. (1990)
221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.) We review an order setting visitation for abuse of
discretion. (In re R.R., at p. 1284.)
B.
At the contested dispositional hearing, the court found Father had
made no progress in “alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating
placement.” The evidence supports this finding.
Despite (1) 12 calls involving this family to the San Diego County
Sheriff’s Office in the year preceding the April 6 incident; (2) the events of
that day, when Mother jumped out of a second-story window and landed on
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her back on a concrete patio, after Father punched her at least 10 times in
the face and head while the children were at home; (3) Mother’s substantial
injuries from that incident and her admission of a long-history of domestic
violence in which she was beaten and strangled to the point of
unconsciousness; and (4) reports from “community partners” regarding the
parents’ ongoing domestic violence; Father denied any physical violence ever
occurred between him and Mother, and refused to participate in services
offered by the Agency in support of his case plan, including parenting
education and domestic violence. Instead, he blamed the Agency and Mother
for his and the family’s predicament.
Given Father’s limited insight into what brought the children into
dependency and his refusal to engage in services offered by the Agency, we
conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered
Father to have “liberal supervised visitation.” (See In re R.R.,
187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1284.)
III.
We affirm the August 14, 2025 disposition orders.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
DO, J.
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