CourtListener 10766041•Jin v. Yan CA2/4
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Filed 12/29/25 Jin v. Yan CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
SHINO JIN, B333809
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 23STCV13341)
v.
JIE YAN,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner, Jed Patrick White, David
Harford, Robert Hoffman, Elliott Averett; Knez Law Group and
Matthew J. Knez for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Shulman Bastian Friedman & Bui, Leonard M. Shulman,
Franklin J. Contreras, Jr. and Bryan Whitmer-Cabrera for
Defendant and Respondent.
In this case, we must decide a surprisingly difficult
question: Who owns Starbridge Group, Corp. (Starbridge), the
majority owner of a hotel near the Ontario Airport (Hotel)? After
conducting a hearing and weighing evidence, the trial court ruled
that defendant and respondent Jie Yan, and not plaintiff and
appellant Shino Jin, owned Starbridge. We affirm the trial
court’s decision.
Under Corporations Code section 709 (section 709), a
shareholder can commence an equitable proceeding to contest the
validity of a corporate election. Shino Jin brought such action to
invalidate the appointment of Jie Yan as director of Starbridge
and the removal of Shino’s husband, Jianhua Jin,1 and his
related companies from corporate management. The shareholder
vote followed Yan’s purchase of Starbridge shares from Jianhua’s
relative, Shengjing Lu, and Lu’s company, Starry Palace Limited
(Starry). In her petition, briefing, and evidentiary submissions,
Shino asserted she, not Yan, was majority owner of Starbridge
through a company called American Asset Management Group
Inc. (AAMG). The trial court did not find this assertion credible.
On appeal, Shino contends the trial court committed
structural error by refusing oral testimony and cross-
examination. She also challenges the sufficiency of evidence
supporting the finding Yan held a valid shareholder vote after
purchasing Starbridge, as well as evidentiary rulings regarding
two declarants. Shino’s arguments lack merit.
1 We refer to Shino Jin, her husband Jianhua Jin, and others who
share the same last name by their first name. We intend no
disrespect.
2
BACKGROUND
On June 9, 2023, Shino filed a section 709 petition to
invalidate an October 2021 Starbridge shareholder vote held by
Yan after her purchase of Starbridge shares. At a hearing setting
conference, the trial court directed the parties to brief the issues
with supporting evidence. Shino filed opening and reply briefs.
Yan filed an opposition brief. Below we discuss Starbridge’s
complex and disputed 11-year history as set forth in the petition,
briefs, and record evidence.
A. Individuals and Corporate Entities
On December 6, 2012, Jianhua filed articles of
incorporation for Starbridge Investment LLC (LLC) in this state.
The same month, the LLC was capitalized through wire transfers
from AAMG ($10.9 million total), Pt. VicValuta ($4.68 million
total), and Skylight Holdings Limited (Skylight) ($1.32 million
total). The LLC used this money and other deposits2 to purchase
the Hotel for $18.5 million.
Notwithstanding this capitalization, the LLC’s initial
corporate documents listed the following three member-owners:
Starbridge (60% owner), Lancer Solution Corp. (Lancer) (30%
owner), and Morgan Holding Group, Inc. (Morgan) (10% owner).
Members were permitted to seek the return of capital
contributions upon approval of majority shareholders. No
member could assign or sell any membership interest without
prior approval of majority shareholders.
2 Velocity Investment Group, Inc. (Velocity), a company owned by
Jianhua, made three earnest money deposits totaling $3.9 million.
Shino’s petition alleges Velocity advanced this money on AAMG’s
behalf. The parties do not make arguments based upon these deposits.
3
Jianhua is sole owner-shareholder of Morgan and Lancer.
Jianhua’s relative, Lu, is sole owner-shareholder of Skylight and
Starry.3 Lu also contributed the funds from Pt. VicValuta.
Jianhua or Shino own AAMG.
In March 2013, Jianhua filed articles of incorporation of
Starbridge in Nevada. These articles identified 1,000 issued
shares priced at $100 per share. A share certificate, corporate
tax return (fiscal year 2012–2013), and October 2013 Starbridge
Resolution confirmed Starry owned 100% shares in Starbridge.4
The 2013 Starbridge Resolution also identified a man named
Pakshu Chan as Starbridge’s President, who possessed powers of
management subject to shareholder approval.
Yan is a real estate agent. After negotiating a failed Hotel
sale in September 2021, Yan agreed to pay Starry $2 million for
1,000 Starbridge shares. Yan paid this amount through her
business associate, Mingzhe Li. Li’s payment was received by
another intermediary, Bo Chen, and an affiliated company called
Fu Bang Group Corp. (Fu Bang Group).5
3 At the time of these proceedings, Lu and another person
associated with funding the LLC and Hotel, Rongji Chan, were
“detained in China” and unable to participate in the proceedings.
4 The October 2013 Starbridge Resolution, signed by Lu and
Jianhua, ratified a Property Rights Affirmation Agreement executed
the same day between Starry and another company owned by Jianhua,
Black King (Global) Investment Group Limited (hereinafter “Black
King”). The resolution and agreement confirmed Starbridge was
(1) fully owned by Lu through Starry; (2) 60% owner of the LLC; and
(3) “[r]esponsible for [the LLC’s] entire capital contribution.” The
Hotel comprises one of several “real estate properties” Black King and
its subsidiaries (Lancer and Morgan) purchased for Starry.
5 Bo Chen’s husband owns Fu Bang Group.
4
B. The Dispute: Starbridge Ownership and Voting
Rights
The parties’ dispute arose in October 2021 when Yan, as
sole Starbridge shareholder, held corporate meetings and voted
herself Director and removed Jianhua from management and
Morgan as a proxy. Relying on a set of corporate documents
purporting to amend Starbridge’s ownership in 2014, Shino
alleged Yan’s election was invalid because she did not own the
majority interest in Starbridge. Yan disputed Shino’s theory and
the documents on which she relied.
1. Shino’s Opening Brief and Supporting Evidence
a. Capital Contributions and Basis for Amendments
In her opening brief, Shino argued she personally
capitalized the LLC through AAMG with the understanding that
her husband Jianhua’s relative, Lu, would repay her
contributions. The initial corporate documents of Starbridge
were drafted “in anticipation of the initial arrangement that Mr.
Lu was supposed to fully fund the purchase of the Hotel in 2012.”
When Lu informed Shino and Jianhua he could not refund her
contributions in 2013, and after the LLC returned $3 million to
Lu in 2014, Shino and Lu executed various documents purporting
to amend Starbridge’s ownership. These documents (the
Amending Documents) include a 2013 Starbridge Shareholder
Agreement, various 2014 LLC Resolutions and Starbridge
Meeting Minutes, and a 2021 Starbridge Resolution.
In declarations, Shino and Jianhua averred Shino and Lu
personally executed the Amending Documents inside Lu’s
Fuzhou, China home. Jianhua was “long-term” acquaintances
with Yan, Yan’s ex-husband (and Jianhua’s realtor) Ray Cai, and
5
Bo Chen. By trade, Shino was a schoolteacher and Jianhua
managed schools in China. The Hotel was Jianhua’s first
American investment. Jianhua admittedly made “inconsistent
statements” about Starbridge ownership in various corporate and
underwriting documents.
b. The Amending Documents
The 2013 Starbridge Shareholder Agreement, executed in
December 2013, ratified the issuance of 20,000 shares at $1,000
per share. AAMG owned 14,000; Starry owned 6,000. These
shares would be adjusted proportionately if any shareholder was
returned capital. Any share transfer was conditioned on
shareholder consent and rights of first refusal.6
The 2014 LLC Resolutions and Starbridge Meeting
Minutes, executed in August 2014, authorized the return of $3
million from the LLC to Starbridge, and in turn to Starry, in
exchange for the following changes in LLC ownership: 45.67%
Starbridge; 40.75% Lancer; and 13.58% Morgan.
The 2021 Starbridge Resolution, executed in March 2021,
ratified a set of bylaws to correct a drafting error associated with
designating Starbridge as a California corporation instead of a
Nevada corporation. In this resolution, Shino is listed as the
“‘Sole Director’” and “‘Majority Shareholder.’”
Handwritten signatures of Shino and Lu appear on these
Amending Documents.7
6 Starbridge did not formally alter its outstanding shares until
September 12, 2023, when it filed a Certificate of Amendment in
Nevada.
7 Another corporate document executed by the LLC in August
2021, a First Amendment to the LLC’s Operating Agreement, further
6
c. WeChat Text Messages
In undated WeChat text messages, Yan questioned Lu
about the $3 million remittance from the LLC. Yan informed Lu
of Shino’s allegations (i.e., that Lu received $3 million in
exchange for reducing Starbridge ownership in the LLC). Lu
confirmed receipt of $3 million, but stated it was a “return of
investment, not a transfer of ownership of shares.”
d. Hotel Franchise Licensing and Construction
Loan
In January 2016, Jianhua entered the LLC into a
Franchise License Agreement with Holiday Hospitality
Franchising. As licensee, the LLC affirmed its ownership
interests as follows: 60% Starbridge, owned 100% by Starry and
Lu as sole shareholder; 30% Lancer, owned 100% by Worldwide
Capital Development Investment Limited; and 10% Morgan,
owned 100% by Black King and Jianhua as sole shareholder. The
Franchise License required construction and renovations.
Between 2019 and 2023, the LLC by and through Jianhua
entered into various loan and extension agreements with Cathay
Bank for a $15 million construction loan. Jianhua, his wife
(Shino), and Starbridge are listed as guarantors for the borrower
LLC. The loan agreement was ratified by LLC resolution
executed by Jianhua in June 2023. In various underwriting
amended the LLC’s ownership, voting, and net profits/losses as follows:
42.05% Starbridge; 37.51% Lancer; 12.50% Morgan; and 7.94% La
Moda (Ontario Hotel) EB5 Investment LP (hereinafter “La Moda”), a
new LLC member. Jianhua signed the LLC First Amendment as CEO
of Starbridge, Lancer, Morgan, and La Moda.
7
documents (closing certificates) to Cathay Bank, Jianhua verified
Starbridge’s 60% ownership in the LLC.
e. Challenges to Yan’s Stock Purchase
Shino argued Yan did not purchase a majority interest in
Starbridge. In support, she averred: (1) the purchase was
circular and fraudulently consummated through intermediaries;
(2) the purchase violated the 2013 Starbridge Shareholder
Agreement, which required member approval and the exercise of
rights of first refusal; and (3) even if lawful, Yan’s shares
constituted a minority interest under the Amending Documents.
In support, Shino submitted 2023 deposition testimony of
Yan’s associate, Mingzhe Li. Without issuing a promissory note,
Li wired $2 million to Fu Bang Group as a loan to Yan. At Lu’s
request, Fu Bang Group issued a deed of trust on its own
property to secure the transaction. Yan used the borrowed
money to purchase 1,000 Starbridge shares.
A certified public accountant reviewed Yan’s purchase
transaction and submitted a declaration finding it “heavily
discounted,” “unusual,” and indicative of fraud. The accountant
questioned Yan’s due diligence. A week after Li wired the
purchase money, Fu Bang Group disbursed $1.92 million “to
entities or individuals” related to Yan and Fu Bang Group,
including WWL Holding, LLC and another individual.
2. Yan’s Opposition and Supporting Evidence
a. Challenges to Shino Ownership and Capital
Contributions
Yan argued Shino could not contest the shareholder vote
because she was not a valid shareholder. Until recently (see fn. 6
8
ante), all corporate and underwriting documents confirmed
Starbridge’s share amount (1,000) and ownership interest (100%
Starry). Jianhua attempted to “paper over” these documents in a
fraudulent attempt to alter Starbridge’s ownership, making it
appear that his wife, Shino, was the majority shareholder when
she was not.
Yan also argued that the Amending Documents on which
Shino claimed an ownership interest were forged. After
reviewing 14 comparison documents of Lu’s signatures, a
handwriting expert submitted a declaration finding a “strong
probability” Lu did not personally sign the 2013 Starbridge
Shareholder Agreement or 2021 Starbridge Resolutions. The
expert could not opine on the 2014 Starbridge Meeting Minutes
because it contained an “identical” signature to those compared.8
In their own 2023 depositions, Jianhua testified he formed
AAMG and brought $20 million of his “own money” to America,
while Shino testified, in contradiction, that the money used to
fund the LLC through AAMG was hers. Neither could provide
details (banks, accounts, funds, etc.) regarding AAMG’s funding.
Jianhua admitted the funds AAMG used to fund the LLC were in
its account for just “several days before it [was] then wired” to the
LLC. Shino could not explain why, if she were majority
Starbridge owner, Starbridge’s ownership interest in the LLC
would be reduced (60% to 45%) in exchange for Lu’s $3 million
payment.
AAMG bank records provided that approximately
$8.5 million was wired into its account between December 11 and
14, 2012—the same period when AAMG helped capitalize the
8 This suggested the signature was transferred to or from the
document.
9
LLC. Of this money, Pt. VicValuta, which was associated with
Lu, wired $4.1 million.
b. Lu Declarations
In declarations signed in November and December 2021
and submitted in prior litigation between the parties, Lu averred
Jianhua concocted “a scheme to steal money and other assets
from the LLC” and the Hotel. Lu was the “ultimate controller” of
Starbridge until he liquidated shares in October 2021. The only
capitalization agreement was memorialized in the 2012 LLC
Operating Agreement and 2013 Property Rights Affirmation
Agreement. Lu denied signing the 2014 Starbridge Meeting
Minutes, denied any agreement to reduce Starbridge’s 60%
ownership interest in the LLC, and denied reassigning shares to
Shino.
c. Bo Chen Declaration
Bo Chen submitted a declaration in support of Yan. Bo
Chen has known Jianhua for over 20 years and a businessman
named Rongji Chen, one of the richest men in the Fujian
Province, for five years. Based on her “long history” and personal
knowledge of Jianhua’s business affairs, Bo Chen did not believe
Jianhua or Shino provided funds to capitalize the LLC or Hotel.
In support, Bo Chen discussed Jianhua’s prior complaints “about
failed businesses and projects that were shut down.”
In June 2021, Rongji told Bo Chen he was frustrated at
Jianhua for not sending him and Lu Hotel profits. Following
conversations with Yan, Li, Cai, Lu, and a personal
representative of Rongji, Bo Chen assisted in structuring a deal
to purchase the Hotel involving Lu, Li, and Li’s company, USA
10
BAK LLC (BAK). That transaction was cancelled when questions
arose about Lu’s ability to sell the Hotel.
After the failed sale, Rongji asked Bo Chen to speak with
Jianhua and ask for his cooperation with Rongji and Lu. In
meetings, Jianhua admitted to Bo Chen that Rongji funded the
Hotel’s purchase and owned 60% of the Hotel. When Jianhua
stopped cooperating with Rongji and Lu, Bo Chen was asked to
assist the sale of Starbridge shares to Yan for $2 million.
Following Li’s $2 million transfer to her husband’s company (Fu
Bang Group), Bo Chen was directed to remit money to Rongji and
Lu.
d. Yan’s Stock Purchase
In her own deposition testimony and supporting
declaration, Yan claimed she assisted in the (attempted) Hotel
transaction between Lu and BAK. That deal arose out of
discussions between Lu’s associate, Bo Chen, and Cai. Cai
introduced Bo Chen to Yan, who introduced Li as a prospective
investor. The deal fell through after Lu could not provide records
of his capital contributions to the LLC or establish his ownership
rights therein.
A month after the failed transaction, Lu approached Yan to
inquire about her interest in purchasing Starbridge, which held
60% ownership in the LLC. After reviewing the initial LLC
documents (the 2012 Operating Agreement and the 2013
Property Rights Affirmation), Yan believed Lu fully owned
Starbridge and was majority owner of the LLC. Based on the
Hotel’s appraisal ($21 million); debt ($15 million); and
Starbridge’s 60% ownership interest, Yan calculated an overall
Starbridge share price of $3 million and negotiated Lu down to
11
$2 million. Yan and Lu memorialized the deal in a signed
Purchase Agreement. Starry issued a Stock Assignment
verifying the sale to Yan. Li and Yan denied recouping any part
of the $2 million Li transferred to Fu Bang Group.
3. Shino’s Reply Brief and Evidence
Shino argued Yan’s handwriting expert was unreliable. In
support, her own expert submitted a declaration discussing his
review of the Amending Documents. The expert opined that the
signatures provided insufficient detail because they were
machine-produced.
Shino also argued Bo Chen’s discussion of capitalization
was based on inadmissible hearsay. Shino disputed Bo Chen’s
statements and submitted a new declaration by Rongji’s son,
Pakshu Chan.
C. The Ruling and Judgment
After posting a 28-page tentative ruling, the court heard
extensive argument by the parties at the section 709 hearing.
Following argument, the court issued evidentiary rulings,
adopted its tentative ruling, and denied Shino’s petition.
In its ruling denying the petition, the court found Shino’s
request to “follow the money” to be particularly difficult. In light
of Shino and Jianhua’s background, their inability to provide
information regarding assets used to fund AAMG and the LLC,
and conflicting statements by Bo Chen, the court found “strong
reason to disbelieve that Shino (or Jianhua) put up $10.9 million”
to fund AAMG and the LLC. The court further found the
Amending Documents not genuine, and as a result, any
ownership changes in favor of Shino inoperative. Shino’s theory
12
of corporate restructuring “does not make sense” if, as Shino
alleged, she held a controlling 70% interest in Starbridge.9 Lu
denied this restructuring while confirming his receipt of
$3 million in return capital. While noting Yan’s stock purchase
was “odd” and “concern[ing],” the court found Lu and Yan’s
declarations verified the sale.
Based on these findings, the court held that “Lu was the
sole owner of Starbridge [ ] and 60% owner of [the] LLC and the
Hotel until he sold his interest to Yan. Jianhua . . . concoct[ed]
fictitious documentation that Shino owns the vast percentage of
Starbridge [ ]. This was false. Yan is the 100% owner of
Starbridge [ ] and Shino had no right to vote at the October 2021
meeting.” The court entered judgment in Yan’s favor.
D. Post-Ruling Evidence
Following the court’s ruling, an attorney representing Lu
and Rongji filed an ex parte application to intervene. In
supporting declarations, both declared that Yan was attempting
to steal Starbridge and the Hotel. In an attached cross-
complaint, Lu, Rongji, and Pakshu alleged they owned Starbridge
through Starry. They sought an order vacating all corporate
actions taken by Yan and declaring them “the rightful owners”
(capitalization omitted) of Starry’s shares in Starbridge. The
court denied the ex parte application “in favor of filing a separate
lawsuit” to presumably resolve their own disputes with Yan.
9 The trial court reasoned, “If Lu’s interest was supposed to be
reduced, the reduction should have been in his (Starry’s) ownership
interest in Starbridge [ ], not a reduction of Shino’s own interest in
[the] LLC.”
13
DISCUSSION
Shino raises two contentions on appeal. First, she contends
the trial court erred by refusing live witness testimony and cross-
examination at the section 709 hearing. Second, she contends
insufficient evidence, including evidence improperly admitted or
excluded by the court, supports the finding Yan lawfully
purchased Starbridge and held a valid shareholder vote.
A. Governing Law: Section 709
“Upon the filing of an action therefor by any shareholder or
[person claiming] to have been denied the right to vote, the
superior court of the proper county shall try and determine the
validity of any election or appointment of any director of any
domestic corporation, . . .” (§ 709, subd. (a).) Absent good cause,
the court must “enter an order fixing a date for the hearing” on a
section 709 petition within five days to determine any person(s)
entitled to office, to order a new election, or to determine “the
validity of the issuance of shares and the right of persons to vote
and may direct such other relief as may be just and proper.”
(§ 709, subds. (b), (c).)
Section 709 proceedings are broad, equitable, summary in
nature, and designed to avoid cumbersome review by writ of quo
warranto. (Morrical v. Rogers (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 438, 454
(Morrical); Shahin v. Wawro (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 749, 753–754;
see Boericke v. Weise (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 407, 410; Guaranty
Loan Co. v. Fontanel (1920) 183 Cal. 1, 8; see also 2 Fletcher,
Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations (September 2025) § 369; cf.
Greb v. Diamond Internat. Corp. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 243, 266, fn.
31 [Fletcher is “the leading treatise of the day”].) Courts retain
wide discretion to consider all matters relevant to any section 709
14
determination “and are not limited by technical or procedural
issues.” (Haah v. Kim (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 45, 53 (Haah); see
also Lawrence v. I.N. Parlier Estate Co. (1940) 15 Cal.2d 220, 227
[discussing predecessor statute].)
Like other equitable proceedings, section 709 and the
authorities from which it derives contemplate an expedited
hearing or bench trial. (Morrical, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at
p. 458; Caira v. Offner (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 12, 26, fn. 8; see
Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 1, 19.)
As the parties observe here, “the meanings of the terms
‘trial’ and hearing’ can vary depending on the particular context
in which they are used and can, in certain circumstances,
overlap.” (Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th
953, 966.) Section 709 includes both terms. Because these terms
are “‘taken from the practice in equity procedure, and
correspond[ ] to the term “trial,” as used in cases at law,’” they
signify “‘the consideration and determination of a cause by the
court or by a judge, as distinguished from a trial of a cause, which
is a term more properly predicated of its determination by a jury.
[Citations.]’ ([Niles v. Edwards (1892)] 95 Cal. [41,] 43; see also
Schlessinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 1096, 1105 [an arbitrator’s duty to ‘hear’ evidence
under section 1286.2, subdivision (e), does not require the oral
presentation of evidence or live testimony].)” (Lewis v. Superior
Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1248.)
B. Standards of Review
In the trial court, a section 709 petitioner must overcome
presumptions of regularity and legality to establish an invalid
15
election. (Shamel v. Lite Products Sales, Inc. (1955) 131
Cal.App.2d 33, 36; Michaels v. Pacific Soft Water Laundry (1930)
104 Cal.App. 366, 368.)
On appeal, we review section 709 determinations for abuse
of discretion. (Garnier v. Garnier (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 255,
259.) “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the
trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.” (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d
474, 478–479.) When “‘evaluating the factual basis for an
exercise of discretion,’” we apply substantial evidence, and must
“‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses,
or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ [Citation.]” (In re Caden C.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640–641 (Caden C.).)
C. Shino Did Not Timely Request Oral Testimony or
Cross-Examination
Shino contends the trial court structurally erred by
refusing live witness testimony or cross-examination at the
section 709 hearing. Yan contends Shino failed to heed the
court’s instructions. We agree with Yan.
1. Relevant Background
Months before holding the section 709 hearing, the court
held a hearing setting conference. There, the court ordered a
briefing schedule to proceed “on paper like an oral argument just
like a noticed motion.” Shino’s counsel raised “a logistical issue”
on two witnesses coming from China. The court responded:
“They don’t testify live . . . All they have to do is sign
16
declarations.” When the court stated it did not take live
testimony, counsel inquired, “So how do I challenge?” and “I’m
not going to have an opportunity to cross-examine[?]” The court
replied, “It’s a summary proceeding” and stated:
“Here is the caveat. You have your 709 hearing.
Basically[,] I decide the credibility issues based on the
details and the reasonableness of the declarations. . . .
“If at the hearing I can’t tell who is lying on a
key issue, only then would I permit live testimony.
But in 27 years on the bench, I feel like I’m pretty
good as ascertaining credibility from declarations and
the reasonableness of the occurrence of events.”
The court informed counsel he could argue the issues and request
to cross-examine Yan’s witnesses at the hearing if needed. “[I]f
you say, you know, ‘I’m losing, Judge, because you can’t tell that
they are lying, and I really, really, really want to cross-examine
so-and-so,’ you know, you can make that pitch at the hearing.”
No requests were made for oral testimony or cross-
examination at the section 709 hearing.
2. Analysis
“[S]ometimes complex factual disputes, not readily
amenable to summary proceedings, may require resolution when
issues . . . underlie [an] electoral contest” under section 709.
(Morrical, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 459.) “Trial judges . . .
have ample inherent supervisory and administrative power to
‘“‘“to adopt any suitable method of practice, both in ordinary
actions and special proceedings, if the procedure is not specified
by statute or by rules adopted by the Judicial Council”’”’ and
‘“exercise reasonable control over all proceedings connected with
17
pending litigation . . . in order to insure the orderly
administration of justice.”’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 459–460.)
Here, Shino fails to demonstrate how the court’s directions
prevented her from creating an adequate record or receiving a
“fair hearing on the merits.” (Morrical, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at
p. 460.) Shino was informed she could request live witnesses and
seek cross-examination at the section 709 hearing. The court
confirmed it would consider live testimony to settle outstanding
credibility issues and told Shino she could “make [a] pitch” to
cross-examine Yan’s witnesses.
Shino did not heed these directions. Instead, she based her
arguments on the evidence she submitted—more than 2,000
pages of declarations, deposition testimony, and documents.
Shino raises no argument disputing the suitability of this
evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2002, 2009, 2015.5; Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 3.1306(a).) Absent an objection to “their use in
evidence, a use in which” Shino participated (In re Reilly’s Estate
(1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 564, 570), she cannot now be held to
complain about it. (See Eddy v. Temkin (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d
1115, 1120–1121.)
To the extent Shino contends section 709 required a full
and complete hearing, she provides no authority requiring it.
Some of the cases Shino cites included live testimony (Morrical,
supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at pp. 449, 459; Colburn Biological
Institute v. De Bold (1936) 6 Cal.2d 631, 644), some evidentiary
submissions (Haah, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 52; Wright v.
Central California Colony Water Co. (1885) 67 Cal. 532, 533–
535), and none addressed the requirement of calling oral
18
testimony or cross-examination.10 “It is axiomatic that cases are
not authority for propositions that are not considered.”
(California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources
Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1043.) On these facts, we
reject Shino’s first contention of error.
D. Substantial, Admissible Evidence Supports the
Court’s Findings
Next, Shino contends insufficient evidence supports the
finding Yan owns 100% of Starbridge Group and that Shino had
no right to vote at the October 2021 meeting. In support, Shino
relies on alleged evidentiary errors made by the trial court in
connection with declarations by Bo Chen and Pakshu Chan.
1. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
Findings
We conclude sufficient evidence supports the conclusion
Shino had no right to vote at the Starbridge shareholder meeting.
According to the formation and capitalization of Starbridge,
Lu held 1,000 shares, constituting 100% of outstanding shares at
the time of Yan’s purchase, through his company Starry. The
10 Additional authorities on which Shino principally relies are
inapposite. (E.g. Doe v. University of Southern California (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 1212, 1233–1234 [“where there is no corroborating
physical evidence to assist” student disciplinary proceedings, the
adjudicator “must have the ability to observe the demeanor of those
witnesses” in reaching its decision]; Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41
Cal.4th 1337, 1352–1356 [local rule calling for declarations in lieu of
direct testimony violated statutes governing contested marital
dissolution trial]; Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals
Bd. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 965, 971 [parties to Worker’s Compensation
Appeals Board action must inspect and rebut evidence].)
19
2013 Starbridge articles of incorporation, related share
certificate, and 2012–2013 corporate tax returns confirm this
share amount and ownership percentage. The 2013 Property
Rights Affirmation Agreement and 2013 Starbridge Resolution
confirm that all LLC “capital contributions” came from
Starbridge, which Lu fully owned. Starry’s full ownership
interest also appears in documentation executed by Jianhua for
the Hotel Franchise Agreement and related construction loan.
The court was within its discretion to reject as not genuine
the Amending Documents. (See City of El Monte v. Ramirez
(1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1011–1012 [trial court must “resolve
various conflicts in the evidence and determine the credibility of
witnesses, including the opinions of experts”].) Yan’s
handwriting expert questioned whether these documents were
personally signed by Lu, who denied signing the 2014 Starbridge
Meeting Minutes and denied reassigning shares to Shino.
Shino’s theory for amending Starbridge’s ownership is
further belied by the documents on which she relies. In Shino’s
view, Lu received $3 million in return capital from the LLC in
exchange for a reduced ownership interest. Lu’s return of capital,
however, was made after the 2013 Starbridge Shareholder
Agreement that sought to establish Shino’s majority (70%)
ownership interest in Starbridge. Assuming the validity of this
agreement, the 2014 Starbridge Meeting Minutes and 2014 LLC
Resolutions reducing Starbridge’s ownership interest in the LLC
by 14.33% most negatively impacted Shino, not Lu. Shino could
not explain this issue at deposition.
The evidence Shino and Jianhua provided was also vague,
contradictory, and uncorroborated. The $10.9 million transfer to
the LLC from AAMG was made during the same period AAMG
20
received $8.5 million, nearly half of which was contributed by
Lu’s affiliated company (Pt. VicValuta). On these facts, we
conclude substantial evidence supports the finding Lu held 100%
(1,000) shares of Starbridge before selling them to Yan.
The stock sale, while admittedly “odd” and concerning, is
also supported by substantial evidence. The stock purchase is
memorialized in various documents. Shortly after its execution,
Lu confirmed he liquidated his ownership of Starbridge. The
court credited Yan’s declaration that neither she nor Li received
purchase money back from the intermediaries. (See Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 640–641; Cornerstone Realty Advisors,
LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771,
804–805 [“witness credibility is . . . within the exclusive province
of the trial court, not us”].)
2. The Evidentiary Rulings Were Partially Incorrect, But
Harmless
Shino raises several arguments disputing the court’s
evidentiary rulings and consideration (or exclusion) of statements
made by Bo Chen and Pakshu. With two exceptions, Shino cites
no statement(s) made by either declarant. (See Jackson v.
County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 178, fn. 4
[citations to separate statement are not citations to evidence, as
required under the Rules of Court]; Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998)
70 Cal.App.4th 309, 317 [failure to comply with rules constitutes
forfeiture of error].) We nevertheless proceed to the merits.
We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including
“its determination of issues concerning the hearsay rule,” for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 590.)
“‘Specifically, we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling “except
21
on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in
a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’ [Citation.] A miscarriage of
justice results only if ‘it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the
absence of the error.’ (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836.)” (Briley v. City of West Covina (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 119,
132.)
a. Bo Chen Declaration
Shino argues the trial court erred by admitting hearsay
statements in Bo Chen’s declaration in four respects. “Hearsay is
an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of its
content.” (People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 831; see
Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) “Hearsay is generally inadmissible
unless it falls under an exception.” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63
Cal.4th 665, 674; see Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b).)
First, Shino contends the trial court erred by admitting
hearsay statements from Rongji and Lu concerning Lu’s sale of
his Starbridge shares to Yan. Despite the court’s limited
admission of these statements to “explain Bo Chen’s course of
action”—why she would facilitate the sale of the Hotel—under
Evidence Code section 1250, it appears Shino correctly notes the
court’s use of these statements as substantive evidence.
Statements of a hearsay declarant’s then-existing state of mind
falls into an exception to the hearsay rule if “offered to prove or
explain acts or conduct of the declarant.” (Evid. Code, § 1250,
subd. (a)(2).) This exception “applies only to statements offered
to show the state of mind of the declarant, not the listener”
(People v. Luo (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 663, 677), and does not
22
“make admissible evidence of a statement of memory or belief to
prove the fact remembered or believed.” (Evid. Code, § 1250,
subd. (b).)11 To the extent the court relied on hearsay statements
that Rongji funded the Hotel through Lu, who took title to the
Hotel through Jianhua as facilitator, as substantive proof or to
explain Bo Chen’s conduct,12 the court erred. To the extent it
considered these statements to show the state of mind of Rongji
or Lu explaining their participation in the Hotel sale and stock
transfer, we discern no error.
Second, Shino contends the court erred by impliedly finding
Bo Chen’s statements sufficiently trustworthy under Evidence
11 “Any statement of a past event is, of course, a statement of the
declarant’s then existing state of mind—[their] memory or belief—
concerning the past event. If the evidence of that state of mind—the
statement of memory—were admissible to show that the fact
remembered or believed actually occurred, any statement narrating a
past event would be, by a process of circuitous reasoning, admissible to
prove that the event occurred.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, com. on
Evid. Code, § 1250.)
12 In her declaration, Bo Chen stated that Rongji contacted her
around June 2021 to help “sell one of his assets in the United
States, . . .” Rongji told Bo Chen “he had funded the purchase of the
Hotel in 2012 and his business associate [(Lu)] took the title of the
Hotel on behalf of him. According to [Rongji], because he and Mr. Lu
were both in China, they agreed to invest $20 million with [Jianhua] to
facilitate the purchase of the Hotel and in exchange they agreed to give
[him] 10% of the Hotel’s profits.” Rongji told Bo Chen “he was very
upset with [Jianhua] because he had invested the money almost ten
years ago but [Jianhua] never sent him any profits from the Hotel.
[Rongji] told me that he no longer wanted to own the Hotel because he
was not making any money from his investment and thought [Jianhua]
was taking advantage of him.” After Rongji and Lu “found a buyer,”
they confirmed Rongji’s “intention to sell the Hotel and requested that
[Jianhua] cooperate with me to facilitate the sale.”
23
Code sections 1250 and 1252. Shino forfeited this objection by
not raising it below. (People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758,
821, abrogated on other grounds in People v. Rangel (2016) 62
Cal.4th 1192.) In any event, Shino’s argument confuses the
inquiry. As discussed, state of mind exception and the
trustworthiness prerequisite “applies ‘to the statement made by
the hearsay declarant . . . not to the testimony of the witness who
relates the hearsay statement . . . .’ [Citations.]” (Riccardi,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 821.) Absent reasoned discussion on the
hearsay declarants (Rongji, Lu,13 and Jianhua), we shall not
reject their trustworthiness.
Third, Shino contends the court erred by admitting
Jianhua’s hearsay statements as party admissions. We disagree.
In various corporate and underwriting documents, Jianhua is
listed as agent and manager of Starbridge and the LLC. In these
roles, Jianhua represented the ownership interests of Starbridge,
of which Shino alleged she is majority owner. As such, Jianhua’s
statements were admissible party admissions. (See Evid. Code,
§ 1220; Greenspan v. LADT LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 524
[statements by LLC manager]; Los Angeles County Flood Control
District v. Mindlin (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 698, 713 [agent];
Dincau v. Tamayose (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 780, 789 [spouses
with established relationship on subject matter].) Jianhua’s
statements to Bo Chen were also admissible as inconsistent
statements to his own declaration. (See Evid. Code, § 1202;
People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976 [reviewing courts
uphold evidentiary rulings if correct on any theory].)
13 Shino retracts her discussion of Lu’s “motive to fabricate” in her
appellate briefs.
24
Fourth, Shino argues the court overruled various objections
for lack of foundation. (See Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a)
[testimony of particular matter “is inadmissible unless [they
have] personal knowledge of the matter”].) Of the rulings Shino
identifies, all but one are correct.14 The matters Bo Chen
discussed related to Shino and Jianhua’s claimed ability to
capitalize the LLC and Hotel. These statements were based on
her “long history” with Jianhua and Shino or were directly
relayed by Jianhua.
b. Pakshu Chan Declaration
Shino contends the trial court erred in excluding many
statements appearing in Pakshu’s declaration as lacking in
foundation. In those statements, Pakshu declared: he was the
owner of Starry; Bo Chen was trying to defraud his family in
China; “we” (presumably his family) agreed to have Starry hold a
minority interest in Starbridge “to be split 70–30 with Shino [and
AAMG];” Lu was powerless to dispose Starbridge shares without
his consent; and neither his family nor Lu received any part of
Yan’s $2 million transfer.
We discern no abuse of discretion in excluding these
statements. (See People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 46–47.) We
concur in the lower court’s assessment that Pakshu’s declaration
was not self-sufficient. (See Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (b)
[witness’s “own testimony” can establish personal knowledge].)
14 Bo Chen lacked personal knowledge to attest Jianhua “would
actually seek to meet people in a nice hotel where he was not staying,
in order to create a nicer impression for himself given that otherwise
[he] had limited financial means.” (See People v. Valencia (2006) 146
Cal.App.4th 92, 103–104.)
25
The grounds on which Pakshu claimed personal knowledge—that
he was “owner and financial backer of Starry,” Rongji’s son, and
the first listed President of Starbridge—were either contradicted
by significant corporate documents or insufficient to establish
Pakshu’s personal knowledge of Starbridge funding and
ownership.15 (Compare J&A Mash & Barrel, LLC v. Superior
Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1, 21 [corporate documents provided
personal knowledge of partnership structure] with Overhill
Farms, Inc. v. Lopez (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1270
[declarants offered “no real information” regarding personal
knowledge].)
c. Prejudice
Erroneous evidentiary rulings require reversal “only if
‘there is a reasonable probability that a result more favorable to
the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of
the error.’” (Twenty-Nine Palms Enterprises Corp. v. Bardos
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1449.) Shino has not established
prejudice from the erroneous evidentiary rulings.
The substantial evidence analysis conducted above does not
include any of the improperly admitted statements appearing in
Bo Chen’s declaration.16 Thus, “[e]ven if we were to disregard
15 During the section 709 hearing, Shino relied on Rongji’s hearsay
statements to Bo Chen regarding Rongji’s funding of the Hotel through
Lu to demonstrate that Rongji’s family, of which Pakshu is a member,
were beneficial owners with knowledge about the Hotel’s financing.
The court rejected the argument: “You can’t sweep the whole family
in. It’s one person.”
16 Nor do we consider evidence Shino raised after the order from
which this appeal was taken. “It has long been the general rule and
understanding that ‘an appeal reviews the correctness of a judgment
26
this evidence, we would affirm the trial court’s decision.”
(Daimler Trucks North America LLC v. Superior Court (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 946, 961.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Shino’s petition and the resulting
judgment are affirmed. Yan shall recover costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
COLLINS, Acting P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of matters which were
before the trial court for its consideration.’ [Citation.]” (In re Zeth S.
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.) We disregard the post-ruling evidence
concerning the motion to intervene and deny Shino’s request to take
judicial notice of a Tennessee consent judgment invalidating a notary
acknowledgement affixed to Yan’s Purchase Agreement.
27
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