CourtListener 10765585•Turner v. BBV Profit Sharing Plan CA1/1
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Filed 12/26/25 Turner v. BBV Profit Sharing Plan CA1/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
BERNICE TURNER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A168874
v.
BBV PROFIT SHARING PLAN, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. 17CV01474)
Defendant and Respondent.
Appellant Bernice Turner owns a 50 percent interest in real property
located in East Palo Alto (the “Property”). She granted her brother, Michael
Turner,1 the other 50 percent interest in the Property. Thereafter, without
Bernice’s knowledge, Michael obtained a loan from respondent BBV Profit
Sharing Plan (BBV) that encumbered his Property interest.
Bernice sued BBV for fraud and negligence, claiming that BBV
conspired with Michael to illegally encumber the Property. She further
alleged that BBV owed her a duty to disclose the loan because it acted as a
broker in the loan transaction and its agents, William Stuart and Zoe
Hamilton, had previously assisted Bernice in taking out a loan. The trial
court granted BBV summary judgment on both causes of action. Bernice
1 As Bernice and Michael share the same last name, we shall refer to
them by their first names in the interest of convenience and clarity only. We
intend no disrespect.
appeals, arguing that she established triable issues of fact as to her claims.
We affirm.2
I. BACKGROUND3
A. Factual Background
In 2013, Bernice acquired title to the Property. The Property was
subject to a first deed of trust. To pay off the first deed of trust, Bernice
obtained a loan from Milestone Financial, LLC (Milestone), a private lender.
Hamilton worked for Milestone at that time, and she was the person who
dealt with Bernice’s loan brokers. Stuart was the manager of Milestone.
The following year, Bernice granted Michael a 50 percent interest in
the Property. The grant deed stated that she was transferring to Michael an
2 While we sympathize with Bernice’s situation, we must affirm the
judgment because she has not shown that the trial court erred in granting
BBV’s summary judgment motion or in denying her motion to vacate the
judgment or for a new trial.
3 On March 3, 2025, Bernice filed a motion to consolidate this appeal
with the appeal in Turner v. BBV Profit Sharing Plan et al., case No.
A170257, for purposes of oral argument, or, in the alterative, to assign both
appeals to the same appellate panel “to promote judicial efficiency and ensure
consistent consideration of the overlapping factual and legal issues.” We
agree that argument should be calendared for the same date and the appeals
assigned to the same panel, and we will issue the opinions simultaneously to
ensure a uniform and consistent decision. However, we deny the motion to
consolidate because the appeals do not involve common issues. (See Pacific
Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 165, fn. 3.)
One appeal is from an order granting summary judgment in an action
challenging BBV’s conduct in making the loan for Michael, while the other
appeal is from an order sustaining a demurrer to a cross-complaint
challenging the subsequent foreclosure. (See Sampson v. Sapoznik (1953)
117 Cal.App.2d 607, 609 [denying motion to consolidate appeal from
judgment with appeal from an order granting a motion to correct the
judgment because “the question as to whether the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction or abused its discretion has [no] relation to the issues to be raised
in attack or defense of the judgment on appeal”].)
2
undivided 50 percent interest in the Property as a gift. Shortly thereafter,
Bernice and Michael executed a deed of trust for a loan, secured by the
Property, which was used to pay off the loan from Milestone.
In 2017, Michael obtained a loan from BBV, which is a 401K deferred
compensation retirement plan. Stuart and his wife own the company that
sponsors the plan. The loan encumbered only Michael’s 50 percent interest in
the Property. Bernice learned about the loan soon after the deed of trust was
recorded.
In 2019, BBV assigned the note for Michael’s loan to MERS Link 4,
doing business as Milestone.
Michael subsequently defaulted on the payments owed on the note, and
MERS Link 4 initiated foreclosure proceedings on the deed of trust.
Michael’s 50 percent interest in the Property was purchased by third parties
at the foreclosure sale in August 2022.
B. Procedural Background
Bernice initiated this action in April 2017, before Michael took out the
loan from BBV. Bernice sought rescission of her transfer of a 50 percent
interest in the Property to Michael based on fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and mutual mistake.
Bernice amended her complaint in November 2020 to add BBV as a
defendant. Her operative second amended complaint asserted two causes of
action against BBV for fraud and negligence. In her fraud cause of action,
Bernice alleged that BBV conspired with Michael to illegally encumber the
Property in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA; 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.) and an agreement Bernice had with
Michael. She further claimed BBV acted as a broker in the loan transaction
and therefore owed her a duty of disclosure, and that BBV “broke virtually
3
every rule applicable to brokers.” She alleged that BBV’s agents, Hamilton
and Stuart, had contracted with Bernice previously and knew she did not
want to take out another loan on the Property.
In her negligence cause of action, Bernice alleged that BBV was
negligent in signing the deed of trust for Michael’s loan because Stuart and
Hamilton knew that Bernice did not want to take out another loan and that
her signature was required for the loan documents. Bernice further alleged
that BBV had a duty “not to assign away its interest” in the deed of trust
when it learned of this litigation.
BBV filed a motion for summary judgment and/or summary
adjudication. For Bernice’s fraud claim, BBV argued that it did not fail to
disclose any fact to Bernice that it had a legal duty to disclose. In making the
loan, BBV was entitled to rely on the unconditional grant deed conveying to
Michael a 50 percent interest in the Property, and the loan encumbered only
Michael’s interest in the Property. BBV further argued that it did not act as
a broker when it loaned money to Michael, nor did it violate ERISA in
loaning him money. For Bernice’s negligence cause of action, BBV argued
that it did not owe Bernice a duty of care. BBV also asserted that both
causes of action were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. BBV’s
motion was supported by the declarations of Stuart and Hamilton and the
relevant deeds and loan documents.
Bernice opposed the summary judgment motion. She asserted the loan
was illegal and BBV owed her a duty to disclose because it acted as a broker
in the loan transaction. She further argued that BBV owed her a duty of care
because it was the alter ego of Milestone, which had previously loaned her
money, and BBV had a “continuing fiduciary duty” to Bernice. Finally, she
argued that the applicable statute of limitations was tolled by California
4
Rules of Court COVID-19 Emergency Rule 9(a). Bernice’s opposition was
supported by her declaration and the declaration of a fraud investigator and
mortgage lending expert.
The trial court granted the motion. Based on the undisputed facts, the
court concluded that BBV was entitled to rely on the recorded title in making
the loan because Michael was free to encumber his interest in the Property
without Bernice’s knowledge and consent, and Bernice never recorded a lis
pendens. The court further concluded that Bernice failed to offer admissible
evidence of collusion or evidence showing that BBV was her broker or the
alter ego of Milestone, nor did she cite to any ERISA provision that would
preclude BBV from making a loan to a third party. The court found that
Bernice improperly asserted new theories of liability in her opposition to the
motion, including that BBV negligently failed to conduct proper due diligence
before classifying the loan as “commercial” and that it violated Department of
Real Estate rules and regulations. It did not reach the statute of limitations
issue.
After the trial court entered judgment in favor of BBV, Bernice filed a
motion to vacate the judgment or for a new trial, which the court denied.
This appeal followed.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Bernice’s Challenges to the Trial Court’s Procedural Rulings.
1. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying a
Continuance.
Bernice contends the trial court erred in denying her request for a
continuance to allow her to complete the deposition of Hamilton. The court
5
based its ruling on Bernice’s failure to make the showing required by Code of
Civil Procedure4 section 437c, subdivision (h).
Section 437c, subdivision (h) allows for continuance of a motion for
summary judgment hearing if it appears from affidavits in opposition to the
motion that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for
reasons stated, be presented.” The affidavits “must show: ‘(1) the facts to be
obtained are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe
such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is needed to
obtain these facts.’ ” (Cooksey v. Alexakis (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 246, 254.)
Continuance requests under section 437c, subdivision (h) are to be liberally
granted, and are “virtually mandated ‘ “upon a good faith showing by
affidavit that a continuance is needed to obtain facts essential to justify
opposition to the motion.” ’ ” (Bahl v. Bank of America (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th
389, 395, disagreed with on other grounds in Cooksey v. Alexakis, supra, 123
Cal.App.4th at pp. 256–257.) A continuance is not required, however, when
the submitted affidavit fails to make the necessary showing. (Cooksey, at
p. 254.)
Here, an affidavit was not submitted, and the record fails to establish
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance of a
summary judgment hearing. Bernice did not demonstrate with any
specificity that “ ‘facts essential to justify opposition may exist.’ ” (Roth v.
Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 548.) She stated in her opposition that
“crucial evidence remains outstanding, specifically the conclusion of the
deposition of Zoe Hamilton.” Hamilton had already been deposed at the time
Bernice filed her opposition, and Hamilton’s deposition had been continued
for an additional “partial” day. As the trial court noted, Bernice did not
4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
6
specify what additional information she sought from Hamilton that she was
unable to obtain in the first deposition session. Thus, we conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bernice’s request to continue the
summary judgment hearing.
2. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding the
Supplemental Declaration of Bernice’s Expert.
Bernice argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
the supplemental declaration of Bernice’s fraud investigator and mortgage
lending expert, Curtis Novy. The trial court did so on the ground that Novy’s
supplemental declaration was untimely and concerned issues outside the
scope of the SAC. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
disregarding Novy’s supplemental declaration.
“A trial court has broad discretion under rule 3.1300(d) of the
[California] Rules of Court to refuse to consider papers served and filed
beyond the deadline without a prior court order finding good cause for late
submission.” (Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 765;
accord, Choi v. Sagemark Consulting (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 308, 322.) In the
summary judgment context, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in
excluding the opposing party’s late-filed declarations. (Mackey v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640, 657,
disagreed with on other grounds in Harris v. Thomas Dee Engineering Co.,
Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 594, 604, fn. 8.)
Here, Bernice was required to file her opposing papers with the court
at least 20 days before the June 27, 2023 hearing date. (§ 437c, subd. (b)(2).)
She filed Novy’s supplemental declaration approximately a week before the
hearing. Thus, Novy’s supplemental declaration was untimely. There does
not appear to be a prior court order finding good cause for the late
7
submission, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
late-filed Novy declaration. (See Mackey v. Board of Trustees of California
State University, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 657.)
Further, we agree with the trial court that Novy’s supplemental
declaration addressed issues beyond the scope of the pleadings. It is well
established that “ ‘[t]he pleadings delimit the issues to be considered on a
motion for summary judgment. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Thus, a ‘defendant
moving for summary judgment need address only the issues raised by the
complaint; the plaintiff cannot bring up new, unpleaded issues in his or her
opposing papers.’ [Citation.] ‘To create a triable issue of material fact, the
opposition evidence must be directed to issues raised by the pleadings.
[Citation.] If the opposing party’s evidence would show some factual
assertion, legal theory, defense or claim not yet pleaded, that party should
seek leave to amend the pleadings before the hearing on the summary
judgment motion.’ ” (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242,
1253.)
Novy’s supplemental declaration was relevant only to Bernice’s
argument that BBV violated its obligations as a lender by misclassifying the
loan as “commercial.” The SAC says nothing about BBV’s obligations as a
lender, however. Relying on FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231
Cal.App.3d 367, Bernice argues that the pleadings “should be construed
broadly to encompass all relevant factual issues that support the plaintiff’s
claims.” But even the liberal framework established in Nakashima requires
that the pleading at issue give notice to the other party of the theory
asserted. (Id. at p. 385; see, e.g., Danieley v. Goldmine Ski Associates, Inc.
(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 111, 119–120 [complaint alleged owner negligently
8
maintained ski slopes; plaintiff could not avoid summary judgment by
showing owner negligently cared for her after the accident].)
Here, the SAC did not give even minimal notice that Bernice was
asserting any claim that BBV violated its duties as a lender by misclassifying
the loan it issued to Michael. For the fraud cause of action, the SAC alleged
that BBV violated Bernice and Michael’s agreement, ERISA rules, a cease-
and-desist order disqualifying BBV and Stuart from acting as a broker, and
“virtually every rule applicable to brokers.” (Italics added.) Regarding BBV’s
alleged negligence, the SAC alleged that BBV had a duty “not to assign away
its interest in the DOT” and a duty to inform Bernice of the loan because of
Bernice’s past experience with Stuart and Hamilton. The SAC simply does
not allege that BBV violated its duties as a lender by misclassifying the loan.
For that reason, we do not agree that the trial court abused its
discretion in disregarding the supplemental Novy declaration in connection
with the motion for a new trial, and we will not consider any arguments on
appeal related to the theory that BBV misclassified the loan.
3. Bernice’s Remaining Contentions Lack Merit.
Bernice argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her
request for judicial notice of Department of Real Estate licensing information
for Stuart and Bear Bruin Ventures Inc., an alleged alter ego of BBV and
Milestone, and of documents related to disciplinary proceedings against
Stuart, Stuart’s wife, Hamilton, Milestone, and Bear Bruin Ventures, Inc.
The trial court denied the request for judicial notice because the request did
not contain argument or citation to authority. “ ‘[T]he decision of the judge
not to take judicial notice will be upheld on appeal unless the reviewing court
determines that the party furnished information to the judge that was so
persuasive that no reasonable judge would have refused to take judicial
9
notice of the matter.’ ” (Willis v. State of California (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th
287, 291, citing Evid. Code, § 453.) In her request for judicial notice, Bernice
did not cite any legal authority to support her request or otherwise explained
how any of the documents were matters subject to judicial notice under the
Evidence Code. Thus, she did not carry her burden to provide the trial court
with sufficient information to allow it to take judicial notice.
Even if the trial court abused its discretion in denying Bernice’s
request for judicial notice, the error was harmless. The documents for which
Bernice was requesting judicial notice were relevant to her argument that
BBV and Stuart had a history of engaging in “illegal lending practices” and
violating Department of Real Estate regulations and licensing laws.
However, the only documents for which she requested judicial notice that she
ties to her claims are cease-and-desist orders issued by the Bureau of Real
Estate. Those same cease-and-desist orders are attached to Novy’s
declaration. Moreover, the cease-and-desist orders do not involve BBV, and,
as we will explain, Bernice has not established a triable issue of material fact
regarding whether BBV was the alter ego of the entities and individuals
subject to the orders. Thus, the documents for which Bernice requested
judicial notice would not have changed the outcome.
Bernice also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in many of
its rulings on the parties’ evidentiary objections. While she identifies the
evidentiary objections at issue and the court’s reasons for sustaining or
overruling the objections, she does not explain why the court’s rulings were
erroneous. “ ‘In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and
citation to the record.’ ” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146.) Bernice has failed to meet this requirement
10
here, and thus we affirm the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. (See Salas v.
Department of Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1074 [plaintiffs
forfeited challenge to evidentiary rulings where they made “no attempt to
demonstrate how each evidentiary ruling was erroneous”].)
B. Legal Standards Governing Summary Judgment
A summary judgment motion “ ‘ “shall be granted if all the papers
submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” ’ ” (Thimon v.
City of Newark (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 745, 755.) A defendant moving for
summary judgment must present evidence that either “conclusively negate[s]
an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action” or “show[s] that the plaintiff does
not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,” evidence needed to establish at
least one element of the claim. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 853–854.) If the defendant meets this burden, “the burden shifts
to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts
exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
The pleadings establish “the outer measure of materiality in summary
judgment proceedings.” (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima, supra, 231
Cal.App.3d at p. 381.) “ ‘The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is
to permit a party to show that material factual claims arising from the
pleadings need not be tried because they are not in dispute.’ ” (Ibid.)
“Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only
requires that he or she negate plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the
complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some
theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Hutton v. Fidelity
National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493.)
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“We review the record de novo, ‘liberally construing the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolving doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’ ” (Staats v. Vintner’s Golf
Club, LLC (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 826, 832.) However, the scope of our de
novo review is limited to issues that have been adequately raised and
supported by authority and record citations. (See Kim v. Sumitomo Bank
(1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 978–979.)
C. Bernice Failed to Raise a Triable Issue Precluding Summary
Judgment on Her Fraudulent Concealment Claim.
The gist of Bernice’s fraud claim is that BBV did not disclose to her its
intent to fund a loan for Michael that would encumber the Property. We
agree with BBV that Bernice failed to show a triable issue of material fact
exists regarding whether BBV owed her a duty to disclose.
The elements for fraud based on concealment are concealment or
suppression of material fact; the defendant must have been under a duty to
disclose the fact to the plaintiff; the defendant must have intentionally
concealed or suppressed the fact with intent to defraud; the plaintiff must
have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did had he
known of the concealment; and damages. (Bank of America Corp. v. Superior
Court (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 862, 870.)
Liability for concealment is imposed where the defendant is in a
fiduciary or other confidential relationship that imposes a duty of disclosure.
(OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp.
(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 859.) Where there is no fiduciary relationship,
“the duty to disclose generally presupposes a relationship grounded in ‘some
sort of transaction between the parties. [Citations.] Thus, a duty to disclose
may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and
12
prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of
contractual agreement.’ ” (Ibid., quoting LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52
Cal.App.4th 326, 337.)
Bernice alleged the following facts in connection with the issue of
whether BBV had a duty to disclose to Bernice its intent to issue a loan to
Michael: (1) BBV knew that Bernice and Michael “had acted as ‘joint
tenants’ requiring each to agree before action could be taken to encumber the
property”; (2) BBV’s agents, Stuart and Hamilton, knew that Bernice did not
want to take out another loan; and (3) BBV, “[a]s a broker,” had “a duty of
disclosure to Plaintiff, whom Will [Stuart] and Zoe [Hamilton] had contracted
with in the past.”
We conclude, and Bernice does not dispute, that BBV made a prima
facie showing negating the duty to disclose element based on the grant deed.
As BBV argued in its motion for summary judgment, any condition imposed
on the transfer of real property that is not reflected in the deed will be
disregarded upon execution and delivery of the deed to the grantee, “and the
grantee receives title free and clear of the condition.” (McMillin v. Eare
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 893, 914–915, citing Civ. Code, § 1056; see Ivancovich
v. Sullivan (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 160, 165; Security-First Nat. Bank of Los
Angeles v. Leatart (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 211, 215 [legal effect of a deed
delivered to a grantee “cannot be defeated by parole evidence of an intention
on the part of a grantor that it would have an effect different from that
apparent on its face”].) Moreover, a joint tenant has the right to sell or
encumber his or her interest without the knowledge or consent of other joint
tenants. (Meyer v. Wall (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 24, 30; see Estate of Propst
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 448, 456; Wilk v. Vencill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 104, 108–109
13
[“One joint tenant may dispose of his interest without the consent of the
other.”].)
Applying these principles here, Bernice’s decision to not take out
another loan and any agreement she had with Michael regarding his right to
encumber his interest in the Property did not alter the legal effect of the
grant deed, which conveyed to Michael a 50 percent interest in the Property
without conditions. The deed was executed by the parties and recorded years
before Michael took out the loan. Recordation of the deed constituted prima
facie evidence of delivery of the deed. (Evid. Code, § 1600, subd. (a); Butler v.
Butler (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 228, 233.) Additionally, it is undisputed that
the loan encumbered only Michael’s interest in the Property. It is also
undisputed that before BBV funded the loan, Bernice did not record a lis
pendens, which would have indicated that there was a dispute over
ownership of the Property. Under these circumstances, BBV was entitled to
make a loan to Michael that encumbered his interest in the Property without
Bernice’s consent or knowledge. Bernice may have been able to seek
damages from Michael for his breach of their separate agreement (see
McMillin v. Eare, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 915), but title in a 50 percent
interest in the Property vested in Michael without conditions.
Moreover, BBV met its initial burden of negating the duty to disclose
element based on Stuart’s declaration, which established that BBV did not
act as a broker in the loan transaction or otherwise have any relationship
with Bernice.
Thus, BBV made a prima facie showing that it did not owe Bernice a
duty to disclose its intent to make a loan to Michael based on any past or
present relationship with Bernice.
14
Bernice presents three arguments for why she created a triable issue of
fact on the duty to disclose element, all of which lack merit. First, Bernice
argues that BBV owed her a duty based on the factors established in
Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650. The Biakanja factors, however,
are used to determine whether a defendant has a duty to exercise due care to
avoid negligently injuring a plaintiff not in privity with the defendant. (Id. at
p. 648; see Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 937 [“we
have repeatedly stated that [Biakanja’s] factors are used to determine
whether persons must exercise reasonable care to avoid negligently causing
economic loss to others with whom they were not in privity”].) This is an
inquiry distinct from whether a defendant has a duty to disclose material
facts, the latter of which presupposes a fiduciary relationship or “a
relationship grounded in ‘some sort of transaction between the parties.’ ”
(OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp.,
supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 859.)
Even if the Biakanja factors applied in the fraudulent concealment
context, Bernice presents no citations to the record or authority in support of
her argument that each of the factors weigh in favor of imposing a duty to
disclose on BBV. Moreover, her reasoning is often contrary to the law
regarding the rights of co-owners. For example, she argues that BBV’s
conduct carries “significant moral blame” in part because the loan
disregarded her ownership interest. As discussed above, however, Michael
was entitled to encumber his interest in the Property, and the loan
encumbered only Michael’s separate interest.
Second, Bernice argues that BBV is liable for fraud as the alter ego of
Stuart. She reasons that “once the veil is pierced,” Stuart was the “de facto
broker for both” the 2013 loan transaction between Bernice and Milestone
15
and the 2017 loan transaction between BBV and Michael. It seems that
Bernice is claiming BBV owed her a continuing duty to disclose as the alter
ego of Stuart.
Assuming without deciding that a broker may owe a past client a
continuing duty to disclose, there are at least two fatal issues with Bernice’s
argument. First, Bernice has not shown that a triable issue of material fact
exists regarding whether Stuart acted as a broker in both of the loan
transactions at issue. She concludes, without any citation to the record, that
Stuart should be held to the “same legal and ethical standards as a licensed
broker” because he “functioned as a de facto broker by negotiating the terms
of both loans, dealing with lenders, and controlling the financial
arrangements.” Our review of Bernice and Novy’s declarations does not
reveal any evidence to support her conclusion. At most, Stuart stated in his
deposition that “[w]e” negotiated a loan for Bernice on “our own behalf,” but
there is nothing indicating that he or BBV negotiated the terms of Michael’s
loan.
We also agree with the trial court that Bernice’s alter ego argument
lacks evidentiary support. The two basic requirements for piercing the
corporate veil are “ ‘ “(1) that there be such a unity of interest and ownership
that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no
longer exist and (2) that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation
alone, an inequitable result will follow.” ’ ” (Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010)
191 Cal.App.4th 486, 511.) In this case, the trial court concluded that the
only evidence Bernice offered to demonstrate that BBV, Milestone, and
Stuart were alter egos was Stuart’s ownership and control of BBV and
Milestone. “Mere ownership of all the stock and control and management of
a corporation by one or two individuals is not of itself sufficient to cause the
16
courts to disregard the corporate entity.” (Meadows v. Emett & Chandler
(1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 496, 499.)
On appeal, Bernice points to the exhibits attached to Novy’s declaration
as support for her conclusion that the veil was pierced. However, Bernice
does not cite to specific portions of the exhibits, which are comprised of nearly
150 pages. It is the appellant’s “duty to point out portions of the record that
support the position taken on appeal. The appellate court is not required to
search the record on its own seeking error.” (Del Real v. City of Riverside
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) In another part of her brief, Bernice claims
Novy opined that BBV was the alter ego of Stuart and the “BBV entities.”
While Novy concluded that BBV was the alter ego of Milestone and Bear
Bruin Ventures, Inc., he presented no facts, reasoning, or evidence to support
his conclusion. This was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. (See Bay
Area Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 476, 482
[“The value of opinion evidence rests not in the conclusion reached but in the
factors considered and the reasoning employed.”].) Accordingly, we find there
is no evidentiary support for Bernice’s alter ego argument.5
Finally, Bernice cites Shaw v. Santa Monica Bank (D.Haw. 1996) 920
F.Supp. 1080 for the rule that “no fiduciary relationship can exist between a
lender and a third party unless special facts exist which give rise to such a
duty.” (Id. at p. 1087.) She argues that special facts existed in this case that
created a duty to disclose on the part of BBV based on a cease-and-desist
order issued by the Bureau of Real Estate. However, the only cease-and-
5Similarly, we find no evidentiary support for Bernice’s conclusory
argument that she “established aiding and abetting at oral argument, using
an alter ego theory.” And we need not consider Bernice’s extensive discussion
of Bear Bruin Ventures, Inc., Milestone, Stuart, and Hamilton’s history of
misconduct or its relevance to her claims.
17
desist orders we see in the record were issued against Milestone, Stuart, and
other individuals and entities. As discussed above, Bernice has not shown
that she created a triable issue regarding whether BBV is the alter ego of any
entity or individual. Nor does she explain why BBV was liable “based on the
agency relationship between it and the BBV entities,” which requires a
showing that BBV was acting on the behalf of another entity and that BBV
was acting within the scope of its agency when it issued the loan to Michael.
(See CACI No. 3701; Barenborg v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 70, 85.)
The authorities Bernice relies on here are distinguishable. (See Souci
v. William C. Smith & Co. (D.C.Ct.App. 2000) 763 A.2d 96, 97–98 [contractor
repairing damaged apartment owed a duty of care to the tenant in that unit];
Whitley v. Taylor Bean & Whitacker Mortg. Corp. (N.D.Ill. 2009) 607
F.Supp.2d 885, 894–895 [husband had standing to assert claims against real
estate brokers and lenders because he participated in the loan transaction,
signed mortgage instruments, and held title with wife as tenant by entirety].)
As Bernice presents no other basis from which we can conclude that
she created a triable issue of material fact regarding the duty to disclose
element of her fraudulent concealment claim, we affirm the grant of
summary adjudication as to that claim.
D. Bernice Failed to Create a Triable Issue that BBV Conspired with
Michael to Illegally Encumber the Property.
Bernice also argues that BBV conspired with Michael to illegally
encumber the Property, resulting in damage to Bernice. It is unclear
whether she intended her conspiracy allegations to constitute a standalone
claim. The conspiracy allegations appear in the SAC’s first cause of action for
fraud, yet at some points in her appellate brief, Bernice appears to treat her
18
conspiracy allegations as a claim distinct from her fraudulent concealment
claim. We may disregard the claim’s label and determine the actual nature of
the pleadings from its allegations. (See Foster v. Sexton (2021) 61
Cal.App.5th 998, 1020 [“We, like the trial court, are required to look past the
pleading’s label and examine its substance.”].) Doing so here, we conclude
that Bernice has not established a basis for reversal of the summary
judgment based on her conspiracy allegations.
“ ‘ “The elements of an action for civil conspiracy are the formation and
operation of the conspiracy and damage resulting to plaintiff from an act or
acts done in furtherance of the common design.” ’ ” (Applied Equipment Corp.
v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 511.) A conspiracy need not
be based on tort principles. “It is sufficient that a conspiracy is based on an
agreement to engage in unlawful conduct regardless of whether the
conspiracy violates a duty imposed by tort law or a statute.” (Rickley v.
Goodfriend (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1158; see also Cellular Plus, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1236–1238.) A defendant is not
liable under a conspiracy theory absent the commission of an actual tort or
illegal act. (See Applied Equipment Corp., at p. 511.)
Here, the SAC alleged that BBV and Michael had a “common plan” to
“illegally encumber [Bernice’s] home in violation of the parties’ (Michael and
Bernice) agreement and in violation of ERISA rules.”6
6 To the extent Bernice’s conspiracy claim is also based on the
allegation that BBV broke rules applicable to brokers, we reject that claim.
As previously discussed, BBV met its burden to show that it never acted as a
broker, and Bernice has not shown that triable issues of fact exist regarding
whether Stuart or BBV acted as a broker in the loan transaction or whether
BBV was the alter ego of any entity or individual subject to the Bureau of
Real Estate’s cease-and-desist orders.
19
We agree with the trial court that BBV made a prima facie showing
that Bernice’s conspiracy allegations lacked merit. As discussed above, BBV
showed that Michael had the right to encumber his interest in the Property,
and that it was entitled to rely on the unconditional grant deed in making a
loan that encumbered Michael’s separate interest. BBV also presented
evidence that it was unaware of any agreement between Michael and
Bernice. Finally, BBV presented evidence showing that it was not governed
by ERISA because Stuart and his wife were the only participants and
beneficiaries of the BBV Profit Sharing Plan and the only owners of the
company that sponsored the profit sharing plan. “[A] plan whose sole
beneficiaries are the company’s owners cannot qualify as a plan under
ERISA.” (Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 1991) 952 F.2d 262, 264;
see Sipma v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co. (2001) 256 F.3d 1006, 1011.) Even
if BBV was governed by ERISA, BBV argued, and the trial court agreed, that
ERISA did not prohibit BBV from making a loan to a third party.
We further conclude that Bernice has not established that a triable
issue of material fact exists regarding the alleged conspiracy. First, with
respect to the alleged agreement between Michael and Bernice, Bernice
makes conclusory arguments that the trial court should have rejected BBV’s
argument that it was unaware of the agreement and that BBV made “a
deliberate effort to sidestep” the agreement. The only authority she cites
here is the “Biajanka factors,” but she does not articulate how those factors
support her argument or provide any record citations. Nor does she address
BBV’s prima facie showing that title in a 50 percent interest in the Property
vested in Michael free of any conditions. Thus, even if BBV was aware of
Michael and Bernice’s agreement, we have no reason to conclude that BBV
20
was required to abide by the agreement in making a loan to Michael that
encumbered only his interest in the Property.
Regarding her ERISA allegations, Bernice contends BBV violated
ERISA by “arranging a loan using ERISA covered assets in violation of
fiduciary duties.” She argues that the fiduciary duties BBV violated were the
duties to not engage in self-dealing and “imprudent lending.” We need not
address this argument since Bernice has not shown that ERISA even applies
here despite BBV’s evidence that it is not governed by ERISA.7
In any event, her ERISA argument is unsupported by citations to the
record or legal analysis explaining how making a loan to a third party
constituted imprudent lending or self-dealing. She cites title 29 of the United
States Code section 1104 but presents no argument that BBV violated that
statute. She also cites title 29 of the United States Code section 1106(b)(3),
arguing that BBV improperly used “ERISA-covered funds” to “secure an
7 The trial court did not expressly cite this ground as a reason for
granting BBV’s motion for summary judgment. Although we may affirm an
order granting summary judgment on any ground supported by the record
(Jimenez v. County of Los Angeles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 140), section
437c, subdivision (m)(2) requires a reviewing court to afford the parties an
opportunity to present their views on the issue by submitting supplemental
briefs. The purpose of this subdivision is “fully met” and supplemental
briefing is not required where “the parties have already been provided ‘an
opportunity to present their views on the issue,’ ” including where
“[d]efendants directly addressed the issue in their briefs, and plaintiffs
addressed it in their reply brief.” (Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th
445, 471, fn. 39; accord, Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (2003) 109
Cal.App.4th 1134, 1147 [concluding supplemental briefing not required
pursuant to § 437c, subd. (m)(2) where issue was raised below and on
appeal].) Here, BBV argued in the trial court and in its response brief on
appeal that ERISA does not apply in this case. Bernice had an opportunity to
file a reply brief presenting her views on the issue but chose not to do so.
Thus, we conclude that the requirements of section 437c, subdivision (m)(2)
have been satisfied as to this alternative ground.
21
illegal loan.” That statute prohibits a fiduciary with respect to an ERISA-
covered plan from “receiv[ing] any consideration for his own personal account
from any party dealing with such plan in connection with a transaction
involving assets of the plan.” (29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(3).) Bernice identifies
BBV and Stuart as the fiduciaries but does not claim that they received
consideration for their personal accounts. Nor does she provide any record
citations to support her suggestion that BBV was using “ERISA-covered
funds” in making the loan. We therefore reject her claim that she presented
evidence showing that BBV violated ERISA in making the loan. (See Kim v.
Sumitomo Bank, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 979 [conclusory averments
without legal argument or citation to the record disregarded on appeal].)
In sum, the trial court correctly ruled BBV carried its burden to
present evidence that in making the loan for Michael, it did not violate
ERISA or any agreement between Michael and Bernice, and Bernice
presented no evidence in opposition that raised a triable issue of fact as to the
illegality of the loan.
E. Bernice Has Failed to Show the Trial Court Erred in Granting
Summary Judgment on Her Negligence Claim.
Bernice contends she created a triable issue of material fact regarding
whether BBV’s violations of ERISA and consumer protection laws constituted
negligence per se. BBV responds that this argument cannot be used to defeat
summary judgment because it is outside the scope of the pleadings. We agree
with BBV.
Negligence per se can be shown if the plaintiff establishes four
elements: (1) the defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a
public entity; (2) the violation caused the plaintiff’s injury; (3) the injury
resulted from an occurrence the statute or regulation was designed to
22
prevent; and (4) the plaintiff was one of the class of persons the statute or
regulation was designed to protect. (Daum v. SpineCare Medical Group, Inc.
(1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1306; Evid. Code, § 669, subd. (a)(1)–(4).) “All
four elements must be shown in order for a claim of negligence per se to
succeed.” (Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 19
Cal.App.4th 334, 347.)
Here, the SAC alleged that BBV was negligent because it “had a duty
to inform” Bernice of the loan transaction based on Stuart and Hamilton’s
prior experience with Bernice. The SAC further alleged that BBV breached
its duty “not to assign away its interest in the [deed of trust] once it learned
that this matter was in pending litigation.” Bernice did not allege in the SAC
the claim she now raises—whether BBV committed negligence per se in
violating ERISA and consumer protection laws. Nor did she allege the
elements of negligence per se. Because this controversy was not framed in
the SAC, her negligence per se arguments provide no basis for reversal. (See
FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 381–382
[pleadings limit the scope of the issues on summary judgment]; Tsemetzin v.
Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342 [party
seeking summary judgment need only address the issues actually pled].)
Bernice does not otherwise address the theories of negligence pleaded
in her SAC or dispute that BBV met its burden to negate an element of her
negligence claims.8 As a result, she has not shown that she created a triable
8 At various points in her appellate brief, Bernice contends BBV’s
conduct constituted negligence per se because it had a duty to not engage in
“prohibited lending practices” and because it violated the cease-and-desist
orders. Bernice does not elaborate on the first claim. To the extent it is
based on BBV’s alleged misclassification of the loan, we disregard that
argument as outside the scope of the SAC. She also fails to establish that
23
issue of material fact as to her negligence cause of action, and summary
adjudication as to that cause of action is affirmed. We also affirm the order
denying Bernice’s motion to vacate the judgment or for a new trial, as she
does not present any argument for reversal of the order.
II. DISPOSITION
The judgment and the order denying appellant’s motion to vacate the
judgment or for a new trial are affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on
appeal.
BBV violated the cease-and-desist orders in making the loan, as discussed
above.
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_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Banke, Acting P. J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
A168874
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