Barboza v. Sherman CA4/1

CourtListener 10765575CalctappDec 26, 2025

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Filed 12/26/25 Barboza v. Sherman CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FABIAN BARBOZA, D085289

Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 22FL005650C)

RAQUEL SHERMAN,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Christopher S. Morris, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Antonyan Miranda and Anthony J. Boucek for Appellant.
Raquel Sherman, in pro. per., for Respondent.

Fabian Barboza appeals the domestic violence restraining order
(DVRO) the family court issued against him in favor of Raquel Sherman. He
contends the court erred by using a reasonable person standard to determine
whether he had disturbed her peace, issuing the DVRO without sufficient
evidence he engaged in any conduct that constituted statutorily prohibited
abuse, and including her fiancé as a protected party. We reverse.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Marital Dissolution Proceeding
Barboza and Sherman are parties to a marital dissolution proceeding.
They married in 2012 and lived together until they separated in 2022. After
separating, the parties agreed to joint legal and physical custody of their
children, a daughter born in 2015 and a son born in 2018.
On April 11, 2024, Barboza and Sherman participated in a mandatory
settlement conference and agreed on terms to be incorporated into a marital
settlement agreement. The parties’ marital status was terminated on that
date. Over the next few months, the parties’ counsel worked on the marital
settlement agreement. On August 19, 2024, Barboza’s counsel sent
Sherman’s counsel a letter requesting additional revisions.
B. DVRO Request and Response
On August 20, 2024, Sherman, acting in propria persona, filed a
request for a DVRO against Barboza and identified as protected persons
herself, her fiancé, her fiancé’s son from a prior relationship, and the son she
had with the fiancé. In a supporting declaration, Sherman stated Barboza
has been verbally and mentally abusive throughout their relationship,
threatened and attempted to fight her fiancé during child custody exchanges,
and made disparaging and defamatory comments about her fiancé’s children
in the presence of the children she had with Barboza. The family court
issued a temporary restraining order that prohibited Barboza from abusing
or contacting Sherman and the others she identified as protected persons in
the DVRO request and required him to stay 100 yards away from her. The
court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.

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Before the hearing, Barboza filed a response in which he asked the
family court to deny Sherman’s DVRO request. In an accompanying
declaration, he denied her allegations of abuse. Barboza admitted he
“reacted poorly” when Sherman’s fiancé “antagonized” him during a child
custody exchange but claimed it “was an isolated incident” and the fiancé was
not afraid of him. He denied Sherman’s allegations he made disparaging and
defamatory comments about her fiancé’s children.
C. DVRO Hearing
At the evidentiary hearing, Sherman called herself and her fiancé as
witnesses. Her fiancé testified he was present at child custody exchanges
during which Barboza was aggressive, shouted profanities at him, and tried
to fight with him. Sherman testified she had known Barboza for
approximately 19 years. She said he physically abused her while they were
dating, but she did not report the abuse to police or end the relationship
because he threatened to abandon her in the desert or kill her family if she
did. Sherman testified that after she married Barboza, he stopped physically
abusing her but started mentally and emotionally abusing her by refusing to
pay for her medication and by shouting profanities at her. On cross-
examination, Sherman admitted that during the marriage she directed
profanities at Barboza. On redirect examination, she testified that if the
court found Barboza perpetrated domestic violence against her, she wanted
sole custody of the children. When asked why she requested the DVRO,
Sherman responded that Barboza kept on asking for changes to the marital
settlement agreement, and when his counsel sent her counsel the letter
asking for more changes on August 19, 2024, she “just knew he was not going
to stop, and [she] had to do it.” Sherman said that by making the marital

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dissolution proceeding difficult, Barboza “was disturbing [her] peace and
[her] mental health.”
Barboza called himself and his girlfriend as witnesses. The girlfriend
testified she observed one child custody exchange while she was on a video
call with Barboza and was present at more than 20 other exchanges. On the
video call, Barboza’s girlfriend observed Sherman’s fiancé act “aggressively”
toward Barboza while he remained “calm.” Based on her observations at the
other child custody exchanges, Barboza’s girlfriend testified Sherman and her
fiancé “seem[ed] calm” and did not “appear to be fearful of [Barboza].”
Barboza testified he never physically, verbally, or mentally abused Sherman.
He denied being aggressive or combative toward Sherman’s fiancé and
claimed the fiancé was aggressive and combative toward him. He described
interactions with Sherman as “[p]eaceful” and “cordial.” Barboza testified
issuance of a DVRO would adversely affect his employment as a security
guard and his application to become a U.S. Border Patrol Agent. On cross-
examination, Barboza was hostile to Sherman’s counsel. When asked
whether he ever apologized to Sherman for abusing her, Barboza answered,
“No.” Counsel then played a recording of him apologizing to her.
The parties submitted many documents, including recordings of their
interactions. As a recent example of abuse, Sherman played a recording of
the child custody exchange on Rio Drive on January 20, 2023, and provided a
transcript of the audio portion. During that exchange, Barboza told Sherman
to “shut up,” approached her fiancé, and repeatedly told him, “Threaten me
again.” Sherman tried to calm Barboza down as she held their son, and her
fiancé repeatedly told Barboza not to be disrespectful. Barboza, Sherman,
their son, and Sherman’s fiancé repeatedly used foul language during the
exchange.

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In closing argument, Sherman’s counsel argued that based on
Sherman’s testimony about the different types of abuse Barboza inflicted on
her throughout their relationship, the recording of the child custody exchange
on Rio Drive, the impeachment of Barboza, and his demeanor on the witness
stand, Sherman met her burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he disturbed her peace, and she was therefore entitled to a DVRO.
Barboza’s counsel urged the family court to deny the DVRO request. He
argued Sherman had not met her burden of proof because her allegations of
abuse were vague and did not amount to disturbing her peace, and she
admitted the real reason she filed the DVRO request was that Barboza had
asked for additional revisions to the marital settlement agreement the day
before she filed it.
During closing argument, the family court asked counsel whether it
had to apply a subjective test, i.e., Sherman’s peace was actually disturbed
and she remained fearful of Barboza, or an objective test, i.e., a reasonable
person’s peace would have been disturbed and the person would remain
fearful of Barboza. Sherman’s counsel responded the evidence satisfied both
tests. Barboza’s counsel responded the court should consider both tests as
part of the totality of the circumstances.
D. DVRO Decision
The family court announced its decision from the bench. It first focused
on the recording of the January 20, 2023 child custody exchange on Rio Drive
as what it called “extrinsic evidence” to assist it in determining which of the
parties’ “diametrically different positions” was more credible. The court
stated:
“I’m not sure based on what I saw in the video that that’s not a
Tuesday night for you folks. Okay. And the way you guys talk to
each other and the way this child is screaming MF at his father

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leads me to conclude this is your get down. This is how you guys
interact, and it’s so inappropriate, so over the top.

“I’m not sure I can make a finding that her subjective peace was
disturbed based on that video and their history, but I can
certainly find that [the peace of] an objective person, a reasonable
person, a person who interacts with each other in a reasonable
manner[,] . . . would have been disturbed going through what I
saw on the Rio Drive video. So that element for me is met. Okay.

“I’m not sure that that’s not how you guys interacted with each
other all the time. If it was it’s -- I just feel bad for the children.
I mean, screaming MF at their father and nobody even raises --
bats an eye at that? It’s their dad, and that just seems to be
okay. That was like -- no one even mentioned it, and I’m looking
at that video going, ‘Oh, my God. You got a little child screaming
MF at his father and no one tells him to stop, or it’s
inappropriate,’ because that’s just like normal behavior for that
family. That’s not okay. It’s not okay.

“So I will find that a reasonable person’s peace would have been
disturbed.”

The family court next “look[ed] at the totality of the circumstances.” It
found Barboza’s “testimony was discredited” and Sherman’s “testimony was
credible and backed up by the extrinsic evidence.” The court found Sherman
met her burden of proof to obtain a DVRO in favor of her and her fiancé but
not in favor of his children. The court issued standard no-abuse, no-contact,
and stay-away orders for a term of two years. (See Fam. Code, §§ 6320,
subd. (a) [prescribing content of DVRO], 6345, subd. (a) [prescribing term of
no more than 5 years].)
II.
DISCUSSION
Barboza attacks the DVRO on three grounds. First, he argues the
family court prejudicially erred by applying an objective rather than a
subjective standard to determine whether he disturbed Sherman’s peace.

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Second, Barboza argues the record contains no evidence that would support a
finding he engaged in any conduct toward Sherman that constituted the
“abuse” required to issue the DVRO. Third, he argues the court had no
jurisdiction to issue the DVRO in favor of Sherman’s fiancé. Barboza asks us
to reverse the DVRO.
A. Appealability and Standard of Review
A DVRO is appealable as “an order granting or dissolving an
injunction.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6); Molinaro v. Molinaro
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 824, 831, fn. 6.) We review a decision to issue a DVRO
for abuse of discretion. (K.T. v. E.S. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1114, 1126
(K.T.); M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1143.) A court abuses its
discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard, makes factual findings
not supported by substantial evidence, or reaches a decision that exceeds the
bounds of reason. (K.T., at pp. 1126–1127; City of Desert Hot Springs v.
Valenti (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 788, 793.) Whether a court applied the correct
legal standard is a legal question we decide de novo. (K.T., at p. 1127; Cueto
v. Dozier (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 550, 560.) We review factual findings for
substantial evidence, crediting all evidence that tends to support the findings
and resolving any conflict in favor of them. (K.T., at p. 1128; M.S., at
p. 1144.) To obtain reversal, an appellant must show both abuse of discretion
and prejudice. (Conservatorship v. Farrant (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 370, 378;
In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 118–119.)
B. Standard for “Disturbing the Peace of the Other Party”
Barboza’s first claim of error is that the family court prejudicially erred
by applying the wrong legal standard in deciding whether he had disturbed
Sherman’s peace. The claim has merit.

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Under the Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, § 6200
et seq.), a court may issue a restraining order “to prevent acts of domestic
violence” upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse” (id., §§ 6220,
6300, subd. (a); see K.T., supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 1127). “ ‘Domestic
violence’ ” includes “abuse” perpetrated against a spouse or former spouse.
(Fam. Code, § 6211, subd. (a).) As relevant to this appeal, “abuse” means
“disturbing the peace of the other party,” which “refers to conduct that, based
on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of
the other party.” (Id., §§ 6203, subd. (a)(4), 6320, subds. (a), (c); see In re
Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1498.) To issue the
DVRO, then, the family court had to find by a preponderance of the evidence
that a past act by Barboza destroyed Sherman’s mental or emotional calm.
(Hatley v. Southard (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 579, 592–593; Curcio v. Pels (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 1, 11 (Curcio).)
The family court stated at the end of the evidentiary hearing that it
was issuing the DVRO based on its finding that Barboza’s conduct at the Rio
Drive child custody exchange on January 20, 2023, would have disturbed the
peace of a reasonable person even though it did not disturb Sherman’s peace.
The statutory provision defining “ ‘[d]isturbing the peace of the other party’ ”
(Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (c)), however, “contains no language suggesting
that a reasonableness standard governs” (Parris J. v. Christopher U. (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 108, 119 (Parris J.)). By including a reasonableness standard
in provisions defining other types of abuse (e.g., §§ 6203, subd. (a)(3), 6320,
subd. (c)(5)) but omitting it from the definition of disturbing the peace of the
other party, “the Legislature deliberately chose not to limit the DVPA’s reach
to conduct that would destroy the mental or emotional calm of a reasonable
person.” (Parris J., at p. 119.) Under Parris J., an objective, reasonable

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person standard does not control the decision whether conduct qualifies as
disturbing the peace within the meaning of the DVPA. “Instead, the relevant
inquiry is simply whether the person against whom the DVRO is sought
engaged in ‘conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances,
destroy[ed] the mental or emotional calm of the other party.’ ” (Id. at p. 121,

italics added.)1 By using a purely objective test, the family court applied the
wrong legal standard in issuing the DVRO.
Application of the wrong legal standard when issuing a discretionary
order is an abuse of discretion and subjects the order to reversal. (Costco
Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733; Rodriguez v.
Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 820.) Reversal is required if there is a
reasonable probability that in the absence of the error the appellant would
have obtained a more favorable result. (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M.,
supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 118; Priscilla N. v. Leonardo G. (2017)

1 To the extent Parris J. suggests a DVRO may issue based on conduct
that disturbed the peace of the party requesting the DVRO but that would
not have disturbed the peace of a reasonable person, it adopts a purely
subjective test in conflict with other cases. For example, Curcio, supra,
47 Cal.App.5th at page 13, rejected the notion that a DVRO “may issue based
on any act that upsets the petitioning party.” The court noted the social
media post at issue “may have made [Curcio] fear for her career,” but
concluded it did not “rise to the level of destruction of Curcio’s mental and
emotional calm, sufficient to support the issuance of a [DVRO].” (Ibid.)
Similarly, K.L. v. R.H. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 965, 981 held that “calling K.L.
a ‘dick’ and failing to show up for custody exchanges [was] not sufficient to
disturb anyone’s peace” and “simply d[id] not rise to the level required by the
law” for issuance of a DVRO in favor of K.L. We need not choose a side in
this conflict to decide this appeal. The question for us is whether a court may
issue a DVRO when it finds the conduct at issue would have disturbed the
peace of a reasonable person but did not disturb the peace of the party
requesting the DVRO. As we explain in the text, the answer to that question
is no.

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17 Cal.App.5th 1208, 1215–1216.) There is such a probability in this case.
The family court found that although Barboza’s conduct during the recorded
child custody exchange on Rio Drive would have disturbed the peace of a
reasonable person, it could not find Sherman’s “subjective peace was
disturbed based on that video and their history.” The court found the video

depicted “how [the parties] interact” and “normal behavior for that family.”2
“In this case, there is no need to speculate what the family court would have
done in the absence of its error because it is clear from the record.” (Priscilla
N., at p. 1215.) Had the court applied the correct legal standard, i.e.,
whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, Barboza’s conduct
destroyed Sherman’s mental or emotional calm (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (c)),
it would have denied her DVRO request. We must therefore reverse the
DVRO.
C. Evidence of Abuse
Barboza’s second claim of error is that the record contains no evidence
sufficient to support a finding he committed “abuse” within the meaning of
the DVPA. The gist of the claim seems to be that his conduct toward
Sherman, when assessed objectively, does not constitute abuse. We need not
decide the issue. The only type of abuse at issue at the evidentiary hearing
was “disturbing the peace of the other party.” (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (a).)

2 Sherman contends her reaction to Barboza’s conduct during the child
custody exchange on Rio Drive “does not mean his actions did not subjectively
destroy her emotional peace or calm.” For the family court to have found
otherwise “just because of an, in the moment, lack of reaction by someone,
who by all accounts is likely accustomed to extreme behavior and abuse at
this point, seems unfair and irresponsible” to her. These assertions,
unaccompanied by any analysis with citations to the record and legal
authorities, do not suffice to show “the evidence compels a finding in
[Sherman’s] favor as a matter law.” (Estate v. Berger (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
1293, 1307.) We thus must accept the family court’s finding.
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We explained above that to obtain a DVRO based on that type of abuse,
Sherman had to prove Barboza’ conduct destroyed her mental or emotional
calm, not simply that it would have destroyed the calm of a reasonable
person. (Id., subd. (c); Parris J., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 121.) As
Sherman’s trial counsel argued, “[A]t a minimum, the [c]ourt needs to make a
finding that there’s been a disturbance of my client’s peace.” (Italics added.)
The court could not make such a finding based on the conduct at issue, which
it found was “normal behavior for that family.” Hence, Sherman was not
entitled to a DVRO regardless of whether Barboza’s conduct, considered
objectively, constituted disturbing the peace.
D. Inclusion of Sherman’s Fiancé as a Protected Party
Barboza’s third and final claim of error is that the family court lacked
jurisdiction to include Sherman’s fiancé as a party protected by the DVRO
because her fiancé is not a “person” to whom the DVPA authorizes a court to
grant a DVRO. Barboza is correct that a court may grant a DVRO only to a
current or former spouse, current or former cohabitant, relative, or other
person described in Family Code section 6211. (Id., § 6301, subd. (a); Riehl v.
Hauck (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 695, 700–701.) Nothing in the record suggests
Sherman’s fiancé meets any of those descriptions. But he did not file the
request for the DVRO at issue. Sherman did, and she could do so as
Barboza’s former spouse. (Fam. Code, § 6211, subd. (a).) When the family
court granted her request, it had discretion to add “other named family or
household members” as parties protected by the DVRO. (Id., § 6320,
subd. (a).) Since Sherman had listed her fiancé as a member of her
household, the court had statutory authority to add him as a protected party.
A consequence of our reversal, however, is that there is no longer a DVRO to
which to add him as a protected party. Barboza’s objection to the addition is

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therefore moot. (See, e.g., Cohen v. Superior Court (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
706, 714 [issue is moot when events occurring after case initiation make it
unnecessary for court to decide issue].)
III.
DISPOSITION
The DVRO is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the family court
with directions to enter a new order denying respondent’s request for a
DVRO. Appellant is entitled to costs on appeal.

IRION, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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