People v. Castro CA2/2

CourtListener 10764379CalctappDec 23, 2025

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Filed 12/23/25 P. v. Castro CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B341599

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA189633)
v.

JOSEPH MICHAEL CASTRO, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H.
Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________________
Joseph Michael Castro, Jr. appeals from an order of the
superior court denying a hearing under People v. Franklin (2016)
63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) that appellant sought as potentially
relevant to a later youth offender parole hearing under Penal
Code section 3051.1 The superior court denied appellant’s motion
on the basis that he was statutorily ineligible for a youth offender
parole hearing because he was 19 years old when he committed
special circumstance murder and was sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
Appellant argues that section 3051 violates equal protection by
excluding young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP from such
parole hearings, and that the prohibition constitutes cruel or
unusual punishment. We reject these contentions and affirm the
trial court’s order.
BACKGROUND
Appellant, a gang member, conspired with fellow gang
members to kill Jaime Castillo, whom they believed was going to
testify about murders and other crimes committed by the gang.
In January 1998, appellant rode in a vehicle with Castillo and
others to a remote location and shot Castillo in the back of the
head, killing him.
Appellant was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to
commit murder and first degree murder. The jury found true the
special circumstance allegation that Castillo was a witness to a
crime who was intentionally killed to prevent him from testifying,
and found true the allegation that appellant was a principal in
the murder and at least one principal intentionally and
personally discharged a firearm that caused great bodily injury.
This court affirmed appellant’s conviction on appeal but modified

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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the sentence by striking an unauthorized firearm enhancement,
leaving appellant’s LWOP sentence intact. (People v. Bermudez
et al. (July 21, 2003, B148380) [nonpub. opn.].)
In February and March 2023, appellant filed motions
pursuant to Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, and In re Cook
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 seeking a hearing (commonly referred to as
a Franklin hearing) to make a record of evidence relating to his
youthfulness at the time of the offenses, in anticipation of a
future section 3051 youth offender parole hearing. Appellant
argued that section 3051’s exclusion of 18- to 25-year-olds
sentenced to LWOP violated his right to equal protection and the
state Constitution’s proscription of cruel or unusual punishment.
The superior court appointed counsel to represent appellant in
the proceedings.
In October 2024, the superior court denied the motion for a
hearing, finding that appellant was ineligible for relief under
section 3051 based on the decision in People v. Hardin (2024) 15
Cal.5th 834 (Hardin). Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Section 3051 generally allows for an early parole hearing
for an inmate convicted of a crime committed before the age of 25.
(§ 3051, subds. (a)(1), (b).) Not all such inmates are eligible for
youth offender parole hearings, however. As relevant here, “an
individual [who] is sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed
after the person had attained 18 years of age” is excluded from
early parole consideration under the statute. (§ 3051, subd. (h).)
Appellant challenges the superior court’s denial of a
Franklin hearing. He contends that section 3051
unconstitutionally deprives him of an early parole hearing and
that, if he were properly afforded such a hearing, he would
likewise be entitled to a Franklin hearing.

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I. Equal Protection
Appellant argues that section 3051 violates his right to
equal protection under both the United States Constitution and
the California Constitution. Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” Section 7, subdivision (a) of article I of
the California Constitution states that no person shall be “denied
equal protection of the laws.” We review appellant’s equal
protection claim de novo. (People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
193, 202 (Sands).)
Appellant argues that he is similarly situated to inmates
sentenced to LWOP for offenses committed before the age of 18,
who are eligible for early parole hearings after 25 years of
incarceration under section 3051, subdivision (b)(4). He further
contends that he is similarly situated to inmates who committed
murder before the age of 26 and are not sentenced to LWOP, who
are also eligible for parole hearings under section 3051. With
respect to both sets of inmates, appellant asserts that the
Legislature did not have a rational basis to treat them differently
from an inmate like him sentenced to LWOP for a special
circumstance murder committed as a young adult.
In Hardin, our Supreme Court expressly rejected this
argument with respect to the second set of inmates. The court
observed that “special circumstance murder is a uniquely serious
offense, punishable only by death or life without possibility of
parole.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839.) The court noted
that when the Legislature considered “to expand the youth
offender parole system to include not only juvenile offenders but
also certain young adults,” it “could rationally balance the
seriousness of the offender’s crimes against the capacity of all
young adults for growth, and determine that young adults who

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have committed certain very serious crimes should remain
ineligible for release from prison.” (Ibid.) Appellant’s claim that
he must be treated equally under the statute as inmates who
were not sentenced to LWOP for special circumstance murder
therefore fails.
For similar reasons, appellant’s related argument—that
there is no rational basis to distinguish minors sentenced to
LWOP from young adults sentenced to LWOP—is also
unavailing. The Legislature had a rational basis to afford minors
sentenced to LWOP a parole hearing after 25 years of
incarceration while denying young adults the same consideration.
“The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for
many purposes between childhood and adulthood.” (Roper v.
Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 574 [125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d
1].) “[C]hildren are constitutionally different from adults for
purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have diminished
culpability and greater prospects for reform, . . . ‘they are less
deserving of the most severe punishments.’ ” (Miller v. Alabama
(2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471 [132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407].) As
explained in Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at page 204, “The
Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between offenders
with the same sentence (life without parole) based on their age.”
We agree with Sands and the other courts that have come to this
same conclusion (see In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456,
463–464; People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 196–197;
People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779–780; People v.
Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 347), and accordingly reject
appellant’s equal protection claim.
II. Cruel or Unusual Punishment
Appellant additionally contends that his LWOP sentence
violates the California Constitution’s prohibition of “[c]ruel or
unusual punishment.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) A sentence may

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constitute cruel or unusual punishment if “ ‘ “it is so
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it
shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human
dignity.” ’ ” (People v. Guenther (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 483, 532.)
We review de novo appellant’s claim that his sentence is cruel or
unusual.2 (People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 721.)
Appellant argues that his sentence has been rendered cruel
or unusual by the Legislature’s choice to provide certain young
offenders a parole hearing under section 3051, while denying that
opportunity to inmates like him. This appears to be little more
than a restatement of appellant’s equal protection argument, and
we reject it for the reasons stated above.
To the extent that appellant makes a more traditional cruel
or unusual punishment claim, we conclude that it also lacks
merit. In In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 437, the
petitioner argued that his LWOP sentence for special
circumstance murder was grossly disproportionate given his
diminished culpability as a 21-year-old offender, and therefore
cruel or unusual. (Ibid.) The court rejected the argument, noting
that the “United States and California Supreme Courts have
recognized there is no crime more depraved or more injurious
than intentional first degree murder.” (Id. at p. 438; see also
People v. Cortez (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1201, 1215 [rejecting
claim that LWOP sentence for special circumstance murder
committed when 25 years old was cruel or unusual].)

2 The People argue that appellant forfeited the argument
that his sentence is cruel or unusual by failing to properly raise it
in the superior court. Appellant made the argument in his initial
motion to the superior court, however, and thereby preserved the
issue for appeal.

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In People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429, our Supreme
Court held that a death sentence was not unconstitutionally
disproportionate for homicide committed by 18- to 21-year olds.
Although Flores addressed the issue with reference to the “cruel
and unusual punishment” prohibition under the Eight
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Ibid.), appellant
offers no persuasive argument for why its reasoning should not
apply here. If a death sentence for adults under the age of 21 is
not disproportionate to the crime, then it cannot be said that a
lesser sentence of LWOP is disproportionate.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

RICHARDSON, J.

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