People v. Moreno CA2/2

CourtListener 10764374CalctappDec 23, 2025

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Filed 12/23/25 P. v. Moreno CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B343497

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XEAKA130877)
v.

JOHNNY MORENO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Victor D. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Stephanie C. Brenan,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Johnny Moreno appeals the trial court’s
judgment, challenging the court’s denial of his motion for mental
health diversion pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1001.36. His
appeal rests entirely on the premise that the court erred in
denying his request for a continuance to gather additional
evidence to support his section 1001.36 motion. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
One afternoon in July 2022, police spotted Moreno driving
a truck his mother had reported stolen. When they tried to pull
him over, Moreno refused to stop. Instead, he drove to his
apartment complex and parked. During the approximately one-
minute pursuit, he went through several stop signs and red
lights.
Moreno was arrested and charged with driving a vehicle
without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and reckless
evasion of police (Veh. Code, § 2800.2).
About a year later, in July 2023, his appointed counsel filed
a motion for funds for a psychological evaluation, which the trial
court promptly granted.
About a year after that, on August 7, 2024, defense counsel
filed the section 1001.36 motion. To the motion, he attached the
report of psychiatrist diagnosing Moreno with an unspecified
mood disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder. The report was
dated November 7, 2023. The report did not say either diagnosed
condition was a factor in Moreno’s commission of the charged
offenses. It recited that Moreno took his mother’s truck, after she
said he could not, because he had a date he did not want to miss.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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It further recited that he did not pull over for the police on a
public street because he did not want the truck to be towed.
The trial court summarily denied Moreno’s motion. It noted
the psychiatrist’s report had not linked his mental disorder
diagnoses to the charged conduct. The court further concluded
Moreno’s criminal motives, as told to the psychiatrist and
reflected in the report (i.e., wanting to go on a date and not
wanting the truck to be towed), precluded any nexus with his
diagnoses.
Before the trial court denied Moreno’s motion, but after it
expressed concern over lack of evidence to establish a nexus
between the diagnoses and the charged conduct, defense counsel
requested “a brief continuance [to] ask [the psychiatrist] if there’s
. . . anything he can give whether or not there’s a nexus.” The
trial court also denied that request.
Moreno then pled no contest to one violation of Vehicle
Code section 2800.2. After some delays in sentencing, the trial
court sentenced Moreno to 16 months in prison.
Moreno timely appealed on a certificate of probable cause
signed by the trial court.
DISCUSSION
In his opening brief, Moreno argues only that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance to
obtain more evidence for his section 1001.36 motion. The People
disagree, and further assert Moreno waived his right to appeal by
entering his no contest plea. For the reasons that follow, we find
neither waiver nor error.
I. Waiver
“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not
appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is
expressly made appealable by statute.” (People v. Loper (2015)

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60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159.) Generally, a defendant waives his right to
appeal by entering into a plea. (§ 1237.5.) However, a defendant
who has entered into a plea may still appeal based on certain
issues if he has obtained from the trial court a certificate of
probable cause for the appeal. (Id., subds. (a), (b).)
Here, Moreno did obtain a certificate of probable cause.
Nevertheless, relying on People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 9,
the People argue a plea waives any objection to a request for
continuance made before entry of the plea. Kaanehe concerned a
request for a continuance of the trial date. (See ibid.) As the
Kaanehe court observed, the general rule is that “all errors
arising prior to entry of a guilty plea are waived, except those
which question the jurisdiction or legality of the proceedings
resulting in the plea.” (Ibid.)
Importantly here, wrongful denial of pretrial diversion is a
ground for appeal that calls into question the legality of the
proceedings resulting in a plea. (People v. Padfield (1982)
136 Cal.App.3d 218, 228.) It therefore “may be raised on appeal
by a certificate of probable cause after a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere.” (Ibid.) And, while the denial of a motion for a
continuance is generally not appealable, it may be raised in
connection with the appealable order or judgment to which it
relates. (See People v. Peters (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 581, 583.)
We conclude Moreno did not waive his right to challenge
the trial court’s denial of his motion to continue the hearing on
his section 1001.36 pretrial diversion motion and that such denial
is embraced within the court’s certificate of probable cause.

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II. Denial of Continuance
A. Applicable law and standard of review
Continuances in criminal proceedings are governed by
section 1050. (Id., subd. (b).) No continuance may be granted
absent a showing of good cause. (Id., subd. (e).) The trial court
has broad discretion to determine whether good cause exists to
continue a hearing date. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900,
1037.) Thus, “[t]he determination of whether a continuance
should be granted rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court, although that discretion may not be exercised so as to
deprive the defendant or his attorney of a reasonable opportunity
to prepare.” (People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 646.)
We do not reverse the denial of a continuance absent a
showing of abuse of discretion and prejudice to the defendant.
(People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 450.) “Where, as here, a
discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its
exercise of that discretion ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except
on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in
a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994)
8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124.) “A reviewing court considers the
circumstances of each case and the reasons presented for the
request to determine whether a trial court’s denial of a
continuance was so arbitrary as to deny due process.” (Doolin, at
p. 450.)
An order denying a continuance is seldom successfully
attacked. (People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 1003.)
B. Analysis
In his opening brief, Moreno asserts the purpose of the
request for a continuance was to fill a “gap in the evidence”

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concerning eligibility for mental health diversion “that the
mental health disorder was a significant factor in the commission
of the offense.” According to Moreno, “[t]he absence of any
evidence regarding a nexus between the offense and [his] mental
heath disorder mean[t] that the trial court did not have . . . all
relevant evidence. . . . A continuance to enable counsel to attempt
to acquire this evidence would have provided the trial court with
a complete picture of the diversion issue.”
At the hearing, after the trial court concluded Moreno’s
criminal motives were what the psychiatrist wrote in his report
and not related to his mental health diagnosis, defense counsel
explained the purpose of the requested continuance as follows: to
“ask [the psychiatrist] if there’s . . . anything he can give whether
or not there’s a nexus.”
Moreno fails to show an abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s denial of his request. He concedes his motion contained an
evidentiary “gap.” Neither in his opening brief nor before the trial
court did he explain why that gap existed. The trial court
approved funds for a psychological evaluation in July 2023. The
psychiatrist completed his report in November 2023. Moreno
waited to file his section 1001.36 motion until nine months later.
Surely, Moreno had the “opportunity” to “attempt to acquire” the
evidence to fill the “gap.”
But, with over a year to prepare a complete section 1001.36
motion, the only evidence marshalled about Moreno’s criminal
motive was what was contained in the report his psychiatrist
prepared based on the information he provided his psychiatrist.
It was not irrational or beyond the boundaries of reason for the
trial court to refuse to give Moreno additional time to gather
evidence he had had ample time to gather, was largely within his

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control, and was, at the very least, difficult to reconcile with the
evidence he had already adduced. (People v. Johnson (2013)
218 Cal.App.4th 938, 942 [“Whether good cause exists is a
question for the trial court’s discretion but requires at a
minimum that the party seeking continuance demonstrate it has
prepared for the hearing with due diligence.”].)
For the first time on reply, Moreno argues substantial
evidence did not support the trial court’s conclusion his evidence
precluded a finding of nexus between his criminal conduct and
mental health disorder. Moreno did not raise this issue in the
trial court or in his opening brief. We therefore decline to
consider it. (See People v. Brooks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 932, 939
[“As there is no evidence that defense counsel raised this
objection, below or in [the defendant’s] opening brief on appeal,
we treat it as waived.”].)
However, even if we were to consider the issue, Moreno
fails to persuade us that Lacour v. Superior Court (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 391 (Lacour) would control. In that case, the
trial court concluded there was clear and convincing evidence
that no nexus existed between Lacour’s criminal conduct and his
mental disorder because nothing in the police report indicated he
was having symptoms at the time of the offense. (Id. at p. 398.)
The Court of Appeal reversed.
The Lacour court noted multiple issues that are
distinguishable here. First, it rejected the People’s argument that
Lacour could not have acted impulsively, as a symptom of his
mental disorder, because the crime was carefully planned.
(Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 403.) While the court
agreed the crime was planned, there was no evidence Lacour
planned it “or that his involvement in the scheme was anything

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other than an impulsive decision brought about by his mental
disorder.” (Ibid.)
Here, there was affirmative evidence of what motivated
Moreno’s crimes—the convenience of having access to a vehicle to
go on a date and avoiding impoundment of the vehicle.
Second, the Lacour court found it immaterial that the
police report contained no reference to symptoms of Lacour’s
mental disorder. It chided the People for implying “a person
suffering from a mental disorder will declare their feelings of
depression or hopeless to law enforcement when confronted . . . .”
(Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 404.) Moreover, the Lacour
court interpreted certain statements in the police report as
affirmative evidence Lacour was experiencing symptoms of his
mental disorder at the time of his arrest. (Id. at p. 404.)
In contrast, here, the trial court reached its conclusion not
on a lay officer’s routine arrest report but based on evidence in
Moreno’s psychiatrist’s report specially prepared for the purpose
of supporting his section 1001.36 motion. That report contained
affirmative statements of what Moreno’s criminal motives were
and no assertion, or even suggestion, that his mental disorder
played any role in the charged conduct.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:
LUI, P. J. SIGGINS, J.*

 Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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