People v. Faison CA1/3

CourtListener 10763278CalctappDec 22, 2025

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Filed 12/22/25 P. v. Faison CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171604
v.
JAMES GREGORY FAISON, JR., (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 04-24-01249)
Defendant and Appellant.

The trial court found defendant James Gregory Faison, Jr. incompetent
to stand trial and authorized the involuntary administration of medication.
Defendant appeals on the grounds his rights to due process and equal
protection were violated by the denial of a full evidentiary hearing on
whether he should be involuntary medicated.
The Attorney General has moved to dismiss the appeal as moot because
defendant has since been restored to competency and granted mental health
diversion. For the reasons that follow, we grant the motion and dismiss the
appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged by complaint on June 17, 2024 with seven
counts of felony vandalism with damages of more than $400. (Pen. Code,
§ 594, subd. (a); see id., subd. (b)(1); all statutory references are to this code.)

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His attorney declared a doubt as to his competency to stand trial (§ 1368),
and the trial court suspended criminal proceedings and appointed doctors to
evaluate him. After reviewing their reports, on September 3, 2024 the trial
court found defendant incompetent to stand trial and ordered him referred to
the Contra Costa Conditional Release Program (CONREP) for a
recommendation regarding placement for restoration to competency. The
court also noted that both doctors had opined defendant met the criteria for
involuntary medication, and it indicated it would hear argument on that
point at the commitment hearing. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
CONREP recommended that defendant be committed to the
Department of State Hospitals (DSH), and the trial court did so on October 1,
2024. At the hearing, defense counsel objected to an involuntary medication
order and argued defendant had the right to a full hearing on the issue on
due process and equal protection grounds. Without holding an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court authorized DSH to administer medication to
defendant involuntarily. Defendant timely appealed the trial court’s October
1 order.
Defendant moved for pretrial mental health diversion on November 12,
2024. (§ 1001.36) The trial court referred the matter to Forensic Mental
Health for an evaluation of whether a treatment plan could be provided, and
a plan was later provided to the court that included psychiatric
appointments, medication, and individual and group therapy.
On January 6, 2025, the trial court found defendant competent to stand
trial, reinstated criminal proceedings, granted defendant’s request for
pretrial mental health diversion, and ordered him released with conditions.
Defendant agreed to comply with his treatment plan.

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After this appeal was filed—and after defendant’s opening brief on
appeal was filed—the Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
as moot. We deferred consideration of the motion until we could consider the
merits of the appeal. Although defendant did not file an opposition to the
motion to dismiss, he urges us in his appellate briefs to exercise our
discretion not to dismiss the appeal as moot.
DISCUSSION
A case is moot if a court ruling can have no practical effect and would
provide no effective relief to the parties. (People v. Armas (2024) 107
Cal.App.5th 350, 353.) Even if an action was originally based on a justiciable
controversy, it cannot be maintained on appeal “ ‘ “if all of the questions have
become moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal in such a case would
be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed.” ’ ”
(Ibid.)
Later events have overtaken the trial court’s order committing
defendant to DSH and authorizing involuntary medication. He has been
declared competent to stand trial and diverted to pretrial mental health
treatment, and he is no longer subject to the orders on appeal. No action on
our part will provide him effective relief.
Nevertheless, defendant asks us to exercise our discretion to decide his
appeal because, he asserts, it raises issues of “broad public interest that [are]
likely to recur” (In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23) and because those
issues are likely to evade review due to the short duration of involuntary
treatment orders, which are limited to one year (§ 1370, subd. (a)(7)(A)), the
length of time it takes to resolve an appeal, and the risk that an involuntary
medication order may—as here—be superseded by later events.

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While recognizing the concerns defendant raises, we are not persuaded
we should consider on the merits this appeal, which can have no practical
effect on defendant. This is not a case in which an appellant is subject to
successive commitments of limited duration, each of which may expire before
an appeal can be decided. (See People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370,
1380–1381.) Rather, defendant is no longer committed to DSH, is no longer
being involuntarily medicated, and has been granted pretrial mental health
diversion. And defendant has suggested no collateral consequences he would
face even after the order he appeals is no longer effective. (See
Conservatorship of K.Y. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 985, 988–989 (K.Y.).)
Nothing we could do would have any practical effect for defendant.
Nor are we persuaded by defendant’s argument that the issues he
raises are likely to evade appellate scrutiny. (See People v. Harrison (2013)
57 Cal.4th 1211, 1217–1218; K.Y., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 989;
Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 953, 960–961.) Our
colleagues in Division Two of this court have recently considered and decided
an appeal rejecting the very arguments defendant makes here—that “the
trial court violated [a defendant’s] rights to due process and equal protection
when it issued [an] involuntary medication order without first affording him
an evidentiary hearing.” (People v. Lewis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1086.)
We acknowledge a different court might have analyzed these issues
differently. (See, e.g., Fost v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 724, 733–
735 [“ ‘Cross-examination of a witness is a matter of right,’ ” and “the
conventional remedy” for a witness unavailable for cross-examination “is to
exclude the witness’s testimony on direct”].) We are also mindful that orders
of commitment for mental health issues may become moot before an appeal
can be decided. (See K.Y., at p. 990.) But we nonetheless remain

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unpersuaded that the issues appellant raises have evaded, or will evade,
appellate review, and we decline to exercise our discretion to revisit them
here. (See People v. Pipkin (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1152 [declining to
reach moot question another case had recently addressed]).
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.

TUCHER, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

PETROU, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

People v. Faison (A171604)

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